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Abstract 
This thesis will contend that Polybius' stress on Achaean unity was 
related to his need to contrast how tyche and anacyclosis, the two vital 
supernatural forces that he believed influenced historical events, had 
influenced the Achaean system of polity detrimentally. Examining the 
rationale behind Aetolian intervention in the Peloponnese during the 
Hellenistic period, it will contend that the Aetolians and their allies in Elis and 
Sparta were engaged in a struggle for control over the Peloponnese against 
the Macedonians and their Arcadian allies, a situation the Romans exploited. 
During the Second Macedonian War Polybius presents the Achaean 
league and Rome acting as equals; this was related to his desire to show the 
eventual decline in Greece that allowed the Romans to gain control. In reality 
Flamininus exploited Megalopolitan fears over Aetolian and Spartan interests 
to ensure the Peloponnese remained stable during the Aetolian/Syrian War. 
Afterwards Polybius took the question of the Spartan exiles, a relatively 
unimportant question, and presented its resolution as the decisive turning 
point in the relationship between Rome and the Achaean league, Callicrates' 
speech in front of the senate marking the onset of the final stage of anacyclosis 
in Achaean democracy. This process continued in his portrayal of later events; 
Polybius was detained by the Romans because of his sympathy for Perseus 
during the Third Macedonian War; however he blamed Callicrates because at 
this point he wished to present the corruption and decline that was occurring 
in the Achaean league. This process ended with the destruction of Corinth in 
146BC, where Polybius emphasises the madness and irrationality of the 
Achaean mob and leadership. This was to provide his readers with the 
consolation that their society would emerge renewed and strengthened at a 
time that the Roman Republic began its eventual decline through the 
resumption of anacyclosis 
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Polybius begins his histories by stating that he intended to 
write a universal history that would deal with the questions of 
how and under what system of polity the Romans came to 
control the Mediterranean world. Taking as his starting point the 
140th Olympiad in 220BC, Polybius contended that before this 
point the history of the world had been a series of unconnected 
events, separate in their origins and effect. Afterwards the rise of 
Rome unified the histories of four regions, Africa, Asia, Greece 
and Italy, leading to Polybius' claim that he was writing a 
universal history that would explain Rome's dominance to his 
readers. Polybius' chief concern was with educating the active or 
aspiring statesman, who, he believed, would learn from his 
history practical lessons that they could apply to their future 
dealings, terming his writings, pragmatike historia. Polybius' 
stated aim in writing history was to explain Roman rule over the 
Mediterranean world to his readership. His intention was to 
record the past so that Greek political leaders would be able to 
understand Rome's extraordinary success. The explanation for 
this success, Polybius believed, lay in the suspension of the 
natural deterioration of constitutions in the Roman system 
government, which Polybius termed anacyclosis. 
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This thesis will assess the extent to which Polybius' writings 
can be taken by present day historians as a framework for 
understanding Rome's advent into the Greek world; in particular 
how Polybius presented the information he collected to instruct 
his Greek readership. Polybius' concept of history was that it 
was a genre whose primary purpose was to give political 
instruction. As a result, he presented the Achaean league, a 
political organisation that dominated the Peloponnese during 
the Hellenistic period, as a single polis, so that he could contrast 
the influence that anaciyclosis had on its system of government 
with Rome. His intention in doing so was to instruct his 
readership about the decline that had taken place in Greece, 
which allowed the Romans to gain mastery over it. Present day 
historians attempting to understand the Hellenistic world cannot 
use Polybius' writings as source for reconstructing events 
without taking into account how Polybius' stress on the role of 
tyche and anacyclosis in explaining historical events distorts our 
understanding of the situation in the Peloponnese. 
Polybius, who was born sometime around 200BC at 
Megalopolis in Greece, le, d an active political life, attaining the 
office of hipparch, the second highest position in the Achaean 
league, before he was detained in Italy by the Romans in the 
aftermath of the Third Macedonian War. Whilst in detention 
Polybius began to write a history that he believed would provide 
his readers with an answer to the question he posed them in the 
2 
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introduction to his work. As such, Polybius' writings are of 
immense interest to present day historians attempting to 
understand the circumstances surrounding Rome's conquest of 
the Mediterranean world. He was a contemporary source who 
claimed to have taken part in many of the events that he wrote 
about. More importantly, although during his lifetime Greece 
had come under Roman domination, Polybius' histories are seen 
as those of a Greek who, despite his detention, came to accept 
Roman domination and admired Roman institutions. 
However, the stress in the introduction to his work on the 
role that the Roman Republic's system of government played in 
allowing it to achieve domination over the Mediterranean world 
may be the key to understanding Polybius' depiction of events. 
Polybius believed that tyche; a supernatural force which had a 
profound influence on human affairs, rewarding the virtuous 
and punishing the wicked, played an important role in allowing 
Rome to achieve its conquest. As he argued, historians, 
especially those writing a universal history, should take into 
account the role that tyche played in influencing events, since: 
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Just as tyche has steered almost all the affairs of the world in one 
direction and forced them to converge upon one and the same 
goal, so it is the task of the historian to present to his reader 
under one synoptical view the process by which she has 
accomplished this general design. I 
How should present-day historians view pragmatike historia, 
especially since Polybius wrote his histories in the belief that that 
tyche, a capricious force, influenced the events surrounding 
Rome's conquest of the Mediterranean world? The basic premise 
of historians is that they should critically examine the evidence 
that is available to them, in order to achieve a rational 
explanation of past events, taking into account their own unique 
vantage point. In doing so, they should take into account in their 
writings how others have interpreted the same evidence, 
accounting for circumstances that have changed since their 
predecessors approached the subject. Yet, despite their concern 
with the past, historians are placed in the unenviable position of 
being a prisoner of their own present. They cannot foretell how 
changing circumstances in the future will influence their work. 
Ultimately, all historians can do is present their work in the hope 
that it will give instruction. 
Present day historians trying to reconstruct the 
circumstances surrounding Rome's conquest of the 
Mediterranean world are presented with Polybius' writings, 
'Polyb. 1.4.1-3. 
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essentially fragments of a much wider history written by a Greek 
who lived in the Second Century BC. Polybius was a historian 
who approached the subject of history in a similar fashion to that 
which is outlined above. Polybius did not intend or write his 
histories to serve as a source of information. Like all other 
historical writings, Polybius' writings were the product of one 
man's perspective on events, written to instruct his 
contemporaries as to how the Romans had conquered them. 
They were written at a point where Greek society had 
undergone an abrupt change, although the long-term 
consequences were unknown to Polybius. As Polybius notes at 
one point in his histories, in his own time, Greeks had tended to 
devote themselves primarily to intellectual and scholarly 
pursuits. They had not done so primarily from choice. It was a 
situation they were forced into because their traditional avenues 
to political and military power and responsibility had been 
closed to them by the advent of Rome? In these circumstances, 
how should present day historians view the pragmatike historia 
written by Polybius? 
The historian's basic role is to critically analyse evidence; 
those dealing with Polybius' writings are faced with a problem. 
They are dealing with the writings of a historian like themselves, 
writing under the same influences and with his own unique 
prejudices, who shaped evidence available to him to give 
2 Polyb. 3.59.4. 
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instruction to future Greek politicians. In this case, can present 
day historians use the information they derive from a source like 
Polybius, without taking into account how his viewpoint on the 
past, and belief in the role that his writings would play in his 
own present, influenced his presentation of events? 
In particular, was pragmatike historia a political weapon that 
Polybius intended as a means for instructing his readership as to 
how the situation they faced had come about, and to provide 
them with hope as to what direction tyche would take in the 
future? Literature had become the primary outlet for the 
expression of a political elite who found themselves denied 
access to their traditional roles. Polybius' stated intention as a 
historian was to instruct this class. His method of instructing his 
contemporaries, tyche and anacyclosis, influences our 
understanding of his writings. 
Polybius presented tyche in his writings as the supreme 
force that governed historical events. The vital element, Polybius 
believed, that had allowed Rome to achieve its domination over 
the Mediterranean world, was its system of government. In light 
of his opening remarks about the importance of this factor in 
Rome's rise to greatness, tyche's influence on the Roman 
constitution and the systems of government in the states that 
Rome came into contact with is fundamental in understanding 
Polybius' presentation of events. Polybius argued that 
constitutional development and change in poleis occurred in a 
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cyclical manner which he termed anacyclosis. During this cycle 
the system of government in a polis underwent three separate 
stages. Initially monarchy arose, followed by oligarchy after 
monarchy descended into tyranny, then finally democracy, 
which resulted in the state collapsing into anarchy, chaos and a 
single destructive event. After this the cycle re-started. Polybius 
contended that the Romans gained their empire because they 
had managed to achieve a balance between the three forms of 
government in the cycle of anacyclosis in their system of 
government, delaying the process of anacyclosis during their 
conquest of the Mediterranean world? However, as Polybius 
makes clear at the conclusion of book six, this suspension was 
not permanent and eventually the cycle of anacyclosis would 
resume in the Roman system of government. 
Polybius' account of anacyclosis is seen as an attempt by a 
Greek to rationalise the Roman system of government in a 
manner that was familiar to his native readership. " However, 
Polybius' intention was not to explain the Roman constitution as 
such; it was to explain how Rome achieved the balance in its 
system of government that created the circumstances that led to 
its conquest of the Mediterranean world. " Polybius makes 
' Polyb. 6.3.1ff. 
' Polyb. 6.57.1-4. 
5 Cornell (2001) p. 47. 
'Powell (2001) p. 24 " The Platonic or Polybian theory is there only to explain how Rome 
reached that condition; thereafter it fades out". 
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mention of a number of other states, both Greek and barbarian, 
such as Carthage and Sparta, which had previously managed to 
achieve the same balance as Rome had in their systems of 
government. ' By implication, the systems of government in all 
poleis were subject to anacyclosis including democracies like the 
Achaean league, which, Polybius claimed, resembled a polls. 
Tyche, or fortune, had favoured the Romans. They had achieved 
balance in their system of government, they had access to natural 
resources, political acumen and an unrivalled military system: 
they were even barbarians who ruled Greeks. However, Rome 
had achieved all this at a time when tyche had been unfavourable 
to Greek states in whose system of government the process of 
anacyclosis had not been delayed. 
Polybius did record the events surrounding Rome's 
conquest of the Mediterranean world, collating the available 
evidence to the best of his ability. What should be questioned is 
whether or not his presentation of this evidence, as an author of 
pragmatike historia, is distorted by two interrelated factors. 
The first is Polybius' need to explain to his readers how the 
Romans had, through the workings of tyche and anacyclosis, 
managed to conquer the Greeks- a topic that has never been 
adequately assessed. I shall contend that Polybius' emphasis on 
the early unity of and the subsequent decline of the Achaean 
league, was designed to show the workings of anacyclosis at 
'For Sparta see Polyb. 6.10.1-11; Carthage Polyb. 6.51.1-8. 
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work in both their systems of government; Polybius deliberately 
presenting a picture of decline in Greece to account for Rome's 
success. This thesis will contend that Polybius' stress on the 
Achaean league's almost utopian unity was to show how tyche 
had been favourable to the people and city of Rome at a time 
when it had been unfavourable to the Achaean ethnos. Polybius 
presents the Achaean league in his Res Graecae as the entire 
Peloponnese resembling a single polls. His intention was to show 
how, through the capricious force that was tyche, the Achaean 
league had degenerated, through the workings of anacyclosis, 
from initially dealing with Rome on an equal basis under 
Philopoemen and Aristaenus' leadership, into mob-rule and 
anarchy by the time of Corinth's destruction in 146BC. 
The second factor is how Polybius' stress on the unity of the 
Achaean league in his histories distorts our understanding of the 
actions undertaken by Greek states in the Peloponnese before, 
and during, the Roman conquest. Throughout his work, 
Polybius, though he was a native of Megalopolis in Arcadia, calls 
himself an Achaean. At the same time, it is evident from 
Polybius' narrative that Megalopolitans like Philopoemen, 
Lycortas, Aristaenus, Diophanes, Critolaus and Diaeus played a 
dominant role in Achaean politics. Although Polybius describes 
the Achaean league as a democracy, it was in reality an oligarchy 
in which Megalopolis had an extremely powerful position. 
Given that pragmatike historia was intended to instruct, is 
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Polybius' presentation of events in the Peloponnese related to his 
wider objective to explain anacyclosis ' influence on the Achaean 
and Roman systems of government when they began to interact 
with each other? 
Roman intervention in Greece had taken place in the 
aftermath of the Social War between the Achaean and Aetolian 
leagues, which was itself caused by the alliance concluded 
between the Achaean league and Macedonia during the 
Cleomenic War. Polybius portrays Aetolian actions during this 
period as those of irrational pirates bent on wreaking havoc on 
the Peloponnese, especially during their raids on Messene and 
Cynaetha prior to the outbreak of the Social War. Although 
Polybius may have believed that what he wrote about Aetolian 
actions in the Peloponnese was an accurate account of events I 
shall suggest that they only give us his own, Arcadian, 
perspective. It would appear that the Aetolian league claimed a 
mythical kinship relationship with the Eleans and that the 
Achaean league's alliance with Macedonia had placed the 
Aetolian league in an extremely dangerous position. Though the 
threat from Sparta to the Achaean league explains the decision to 
call on Macedonia, Polybius does not mention the fear that 
Cleomenes would export social reforms throughout the 
Peloponnese as a factor in the decision. From the resistance in 
Corinth and Sicyon after the entry of Macedonian troops into the 
Peloponnese, it would appear that there was widespread 
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opposition to this move, which was not solely based on socio- 
economic factors. The earlier expansion of the Achaean league 
into the Peloponnese, especially into Arcadia, was carried out in 
conjunction with the Aetolian league, with the intention of 
removing the pro-Macedonian tyrants in this region. 
However, once Arcadian poleis like Megalopolis had been 
absorbed into the Achaean league, there was an alteration in the 
orientation of its policy towards these communities' interests 
that provoked conflict with Cleomenes' Sparta and damaged 
Elean interests. Polybius was a Megalopolitan; his presentation 
of events in the Peloponnese prior to Rome's involvement in 
Greek affairs was bound to be favourable to the interests of his 
native polls. No matter how justified Aetolian actions in the 
Peloponnese may have been, to Polybius they were aggressive 
acts. 
Yet in some respects this is the crux of the matter. Polybius 
wrote to explain to his readers how the Romans came to control 
the Greek world. He did so in terms of the cyclical nature of 
history, stressing how tyche benefits certain states at a time when 
it is unfavourable to others. By stressing these factors, and 
emphasising the unity of the Achaean league so that he could 
explain its eventual decline, Polybius, whose intention was to 
give his contemporary readership political instruction, could not 
have imagined that readers who came from a completely 
different society would read his histories. As such, elements of 
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pragmatike historia, which may have appeared straightforward to 
the readership Polybius' writings were aimed at, are alien to us. I 
shall suggest that Polybius' stress on Achaean unity, and his 
presentation of it as a single polis, unwittingly masks the true 
situation in the Peloponnese. The Achaean identity that Polybius 
stresses throughout his work was in reality that of an Arcadian 
who was a member of a political federation called the Achaean 
league, resulting in a partisan depiction of the actions of states 
like Aetolia and Sparta. Furthermore that the competing interests 
of the various powers and regional differences in the 
Peloponnese brought about Rome's initial involvement in Greek 
affairs, and were later exploited by Romans like Flamininus to 
further Rome's imperial control. 
So if tyche's affect on the process of anacyclosis in Rome and 
Greece is the key to understanding Polybius' portrayal of events, 
does this have any implications for our understanding of Roman 
imperialism and Polybius' portrayal of it? Polybius has in the 
past been seen as a man who adopted a positive view of Rome's 
presence in the Greek world after the destruction of Corinth in 
146BC' The view that the Hellenistic period was a time of 
immense social upheaval in Greece is based largely on Plutarch's 
account of the lives of Agis and Cleomenes which laid emphasis 
on the influence that Stoic philosophy played in their reforms. 
This view leads to a belief that the Hellenistic period was a time 
'Walbank (1972) pp. 166-83. 
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of social upheaval in Greece, culminating in Corinth's 
destruction in 146BC 9 Should this be accepted? In Polybius' 
account of Cleomenes' reign, which survives intact, Polybius 
makes no mention of either Agis or Cleomenes being influenced 
by Stoic philosophy. Although Cleomenes undoubtedly carried 
out some reforms at Sparta during some part of his reign, 
Polybius does not mention them directly. 
Does this have any implications for our understanding of 
Polybius' depiction of later events? There is an assumption that 
the events of 146BC and Corinth's destruction by the Romans 
were to some extent motivated by socio-economic problems that 
existed in the Peloponnese during the Hellenistic period. The 
role of the mob, its irrationality and madness is evident in 
Polybius' account of events leading up to Corinth's destruction 
in 146BC. Pausanias, drawing on Polybius, draws attention to 
the sordid corruption of the Achaean leadership that caused the 
dispute that ignited this conflict. " 
However, Corinth's destruction was, as Polybius 
emphasised, the single greatest misfortune to have occurred in 
9 For the most recent discussion of the role of the masses in Corinth's destruction, see 
Eckstein (1995) pp. 135-6, who suggests that an aristocrat like Polybius feared and 
detested the role that the common people played in this affair. 
'o Paus. 7.12.1-4. 
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Greece. " It was exactly the sort of event that occurred at the end 
of the cycle of anacyclosis, democracy degenerating into mob 
rule, anarchy and a single destructive event, before a strong 
leader emerged to save men from their weakened state. " 
Polybius portrayed in his histories how Rome expanded its 
control over Asia, Africa, Greece and Italy from 220BC onwards, 
the point where Polybius began his histories, claiming that the 
rise of Rome had unified the affairs of these four regions 13 The 
fortunes of the Achaean league had become entwined with those 
of Rome from that point onwards; a period when tyche benefited 
the Romans while the - cycle of anacyclosis was corrupting the 
Achaean league's democracy. Corinth's destruction ended this 
and as the process of anacyclosis resumed in Rome, Greek society 
would renew itself, its political classes drawing inspiration from 
Polybius' histories, learning how tyche had allowed the barbarian 
Romans to gain mastery over Greece, so that this situation 
would not re-occur. 
The first four chapters will deal with the events in the 
Peloponnese prior to Rome's advent into the Greek world, and 
will examine whether the account given in Polybius' pragmatike 
historia is a neutral one or related to his wider theme of 
" Polyb. 38.1.2. "For though both Greece and her several parts had often met with 
mischance, yet to none of her former defeats can we more fittingly apply the name of 
misfortune with all it signifies than to the events of my own time. " 
12 Polyb. 6.9.9. 
13 Polyb. 5.33.1-5. 
14 
explaining Roman imperialism. The first chapter will be a very 
brief examination of Polybius' attitude towards the writing of 
what he terms as pragmatike historia, which is contemporary 
political history. The second chapter will examine the links, 
through proxenia and mythical kinship, that the Aetolian league 
had in the Peloponnese, to see if they might provide a different 
viewpoint on the Aetolian league's interests in the Peloponnese 
from that presented by Polybius. From there the expansion of the 
Achaean league under Aratus and the influence that it had in 
bringing the Achaean league into conflict with Sparta will be 
examined. I shall argue that once Cleomenes had effectively 
gained control over the Peloponnese, Arcadian poleis in the 
Achaean league, such as Megalopolis, appealed to their 
traditional ally Macedonia for assistance, even though this was 
at variance with the wishes of the inhabitants of poleis such as 
Corinth and Sicyon. 
The third chapter will look at how accurate Polybius' 
depiction of the development of the Achaean league during the 
Hellenistic period actually is and how it compared with the 
evolution of the Aetolian league. Unlike the Achaean league, 
which appears from its inception to have been a political 
organisation, the Aetolians from the archaic period onwards 
formed an ethnos and were a distinct people in the same manner 
that the Arcadians were. Thus, although the Aetolian league 
expanded during the Hellenistic period, Aetolians from the 
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ethnos retained control over the office of strategos. However, in 
the Achaean league the office of Achaean strategos was 
dominated firstly by Aratus of Sicyon and later by 
Megalopolitans. While there was traditionally an assumption 
that both leagues evolved in a similar fashion, the archaeological 
evidence would seem to suggest otherwise, the Achaean identity 
espoused by Polybius being essentially artificial. 
This has ramifications for our understanding of Aetolian 
actions during the Social War, which will be the topic of the 
fourth chapter. Aratus' expansion into Arcadia had been carried 
out in conjunction with the Aetolian league, with the stated aim 
of ridding the Peloponnese of pro-Macedonian tyrants. Once the 
Macedonians had re-entered the Peloponnese, the Aetolian 
league was placed in a dangerous strategic position. Instead of 
viewing Aetolian actions prior to the Social War as irrational acts 
of piracy, as Polybius presents them, the raids launched on 
Messene and Cynaetha were actually part of a military strategy 
conceived by the Aetolian league's leadership to defend their 
mythical kinsmen in Elis. The intention is to find out whether 
Polybius' contention that the cause of these two wars was merely 
avaricious behaviour by the Aetolian league is defensible. 
The fifth chapter will focus on how Rome exploited the 
situation in the Peloponnese to further its imperial ambitions. 
Instead of viewing the treaty between the Aetolian league and 
Rome in 212/211BC as a joint looting expedition, I shall suggest 
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that the Romans approached the Aetolian league because they 
knew of the difficult situation it faced after the Macedonian 
entry into the Peloponnese and sought to exploit it. The 
reference in Livy to the Romans promising to restore parts of 
Acarnania to Aetolian control suggests that the treaty was 
concluded to assist the Aetolians in their effort to regain some of 
the ground that they had lost to the Macedonians. Furthermore, 
the mention of so many allies of the Aetolian league as Roman 
adscripti in the Peace of Phoenice indicates that the Romans were 
successful in finding a pretext for a further intervention in the 
Greek world when the Second Punic War was over. 
From there the chapter will turn towards the Second 
Macedonian War, in particular the alliance between the Achaean 
league and Flamininus in 198BC. Once the alliance with the 
Aetolian league had served its purpose Flamininus allied with 
the Achaean league, taking advantage of Megalopolitan fears 
that they would find themselves isolated when they faced a 
renewed threat from Sparta under Nabis. I will suggest that the 
treaty of *alliance between Rome and the Achaean league was 
concluded much earlier than previously thought. 
The sixth chapter will examine the fruits of co-operation 
between the Achaean league and Rome. Polybius presents the 
initial phase of the relationship between Rome and Achaea as 
one between equals. In reality, Megalopolitans within the 
Achaean league appear to have co-operated with the Romans, 
17 
foiling the plot to bring Antiochus to Greece swiftly, because 
they sought to profit from the defeat of the Aetolian league. I 
shall argue that Flamininus rewarded the Megalopolitan 
leadership of the Achaean league by granting them control over 
Sparta, Elis and Messene in return for their support during the 
Aetolian/Syrian War. 
When this war was over Philopoemen began to direct the 
Achaean league towards renewing its alliances with a number of 
Hellenistic monarchs. The Romans, who expected their subjects 
to behave in a different manner, exploited grievances at Sparta, 
and later Messene, to undermine the Megalopolitan position in 
the Achaean league. I shall suggest firstly that Callicrates' 
actions in 180BC, in particular his settlement of Spartan affairs, 
drew Polybius' ire because he broke the dominance that 
Megalopolitans had held over the Achaean league for at least 
twenty-five years beforehand. Secondly, that Polybius depicted 
Callicrates' mission as marking the onset of the final stage of 
anacyclosis in the Achaean system of government, and that from 
this point onwards Achaean democracy began its degeneration 
into mob-rule, anarchy and a final destructive event. 
The final chapter will look at resistance in the Achaean 
league towards Rome, in particular Polybius' attitude towards it. 
Before the outbreak of the Third Macedonian War, 
Megalopolitan, who felt that their interests had been betrayed 
by Callicrates' settlement in Sparta, tried to push the Achaean 
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league towards supporting Perseus and that Polybius' 
subsequent behaviour during the Roman invasion of Macedonia 
resulted in his detention. Although Polybius holds Callicrates 
personally responsible for his detention, I shall suggest that 
Callicrates merely used Roman suspicion at Polybius' actions to 
remove one of his rivals and advance the interests of his own 
region at the expense of the Arcadian communities within the 
Achaean league. Furthermore, that by placing the blame solely 
on Callicrates, Polybius was attempting to show how anacyclosis 
had resulted in corrupt politicians gaining control of the 
Achaean league 
From there the chapter will look at the events surrounding 
the Achaean War of 146BC, a problematic question since 
Polybius' account of it is extremely fragmentary. I shall suggest 
that the causes of the war itself were not socio-economic 
tensions. Rather, that when, after the death of Callicrates, a new 
generation of politicians from Megalopolis began to re-assert 
their position, regional tension within the Peloponnese resulted 
in Sparta attempting to secede from the Achaean league. 
Furthermore, that Polybius' depiction of these events shows not 
that he considered the leaders of the revolt to have been 
demagogues who threatened to bring socio-economic upheaval 
to the Peloponnese. Rather that his emphasis on the mob and 
anarchy was an attempt to show his readers that the cycle of 
anacyclosis in the Achaean system of government was over. His 
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intention in doing so was to point out to his readers that the 
Achaean league would renew itself at the same time as the 
Roman Republic began to decline from within. 
Traditionally, Polybius has been seen as a descendent of 
Thucydides, writing contemporary political history with the 
intention of instructing his readership. Even in antiquity the link 
between historians and exile or separation from their homeland 
was noticed. 14 Thucydides was exiled from Athens for his failure 
at Amphipolis and both Herodotus and Xenophon spent long 
periods away from their homelands. 
Unlike these earlier historians, Polybius was not exiled; he 
was detained at the hands of an alien power that had destroyed 
his society, ended its independence, and imposed its own 
authority and rule. The question arises whether Polybius came to 
accept Roman domination and wrote so that both the Greeks and 
Romans would come to understand each other? Or whether the 
intention of pragmatfke historia was to explain to his Greek 
readers how the barbarian Romans had managed to, achieve the 
unthinkable, thus providing -them with the consolation that, 
although it had happened, the cyclical nature of history was such 
that eventually they would regain what they had lost. 
14 P1ut. Moralia 605C. 
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Chapter One 
The purpose of pragmatike historia 
Introduction 
At the introduction to his histories Polybius explains his 
decision to write them in the form of a question, aimed at his 
contemporary readership, pointing out that: 
Who is so lacking in curiosity and so worthless as not to 
wish to know by what means and under what system of 
polity the Romans have succeeded in under fifty three years 
in bringing almost the entire inhabited world under their 
control, an event unique in history. ' 
Taking as his starting point the 140th Olympiad in 220BC, 
Polybius contended that before this point the history of the 
world had been a series of unconnected events, separate in their 
origins and effect. Later the rise of Rome unified the histories of 
four regions, Africa, Asia, Greece and Italy, leading to Polybius' 
claim that he was writing a universal history that would explain 
the rise of Rome to his readers? Polybius' chief concern was with 
' Polyb. 1.2.5. At the conclusion to his histories, (Polyb. 39.8.7. ) "As I said, students by 
this treatment will attain the best and most salutary result, which is to know how and by 
what system of polity the whole world was subjected to the single rule of Rome, an 
event without any parallel in the past". 
2Polyb. 5.33.1-5. Walbank (1972) pp. 1-18 addresses the question of Polybius' readership 
and intentions, arguing that Polybius intended his histories to be used as a guidebook 
for Greek politicians in their dealings with Rome. 
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I 
educating the active or aspiring statesman, whc, ., 
he believed, 
would learn from his history both practical lessons and general 
wisdom- as he termed it, pragmatike historia. 
Polybius' stated aim in writing history was to explain Roman 
rule over the Mediterranean world to his readership. His intention 
was to reconstruct past events in a fashion that would provide 
Greek political leaders with an explanation for Roman rule over 
the Mediterranean world. The model he chose to explain this 
conquest was Rome's system of government and the influence of 
anacyclosis' suspension on it. This chapter will assess Polybius' 
attitude towards the writing of history; in particular how he 
presented the information he collected to instruct his readership. 
Polybius' concept of history was that it was a medium whose 
primary purpose was to give political instruction. As a result he 
presented the Achaean league, a political organisation that 
dominated the Peloponnese during the Hellenistic period, as a 
single polis so that he could contrast the influence that anacyclosis 
had on its system of government with that of Rome. His intention 
in doing so was to instruct his readership about the decline that 
had taken place in Greece, which had allowed the Romans to gain 
mastery over it. It will question the extent to which present day 
historians can use Polybius' writings as a source for 
reconstructing events during the Hellenistic period without 
taking into account how his stress on the role of tyche and 
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anacyclosis in historical events distorts our understanding of the 
situation in the Peloponnese. 
Polybius on the writing of history 
In book twelve of his histories Polybius examines the 
approach of other Hellenistic historians, finding fault with his 
contemporaries' methodology, and then proceeds to expound 
his own approach to historia at great length. For Polybius, 
history's sole purpose was to give instruction to future 
politicians? Polybius believed that those who had practical 
experience in politics were best qualified to perform this task 
and he extensively criticised historians whose knowledge of past 
events did not come from personal experience, which he 
believed was vital. Polybius had been hipparch of the Achaean 
league before his detention in Italy: his father Lycortas and his 
family's close ally Philopoemen had dominated the office of 
3 See Sacks (1981) pp. 21-96 for the best discussion of Polybius' narrative method, which 
focuses on book six. Sacks identified three important terms that Polybius used to define 
his intention in writing history. Autopatheia, or personal experience, (p. 32) and empeiria, 
or actual experience (p. 35) were for Polybius the key factors necessary for those writing 
pragmatike historia. More problematic in any discussion of Polybius' attitude towards 
historia is his use of emphasis, both in book six and elsewhere. Sacks discusses Polybius' 
use of emphasis in detail, (pp. 36-56) contending that despite Polybius' varied use of this 
word in different contexts, emphasis has one basic meaning, "they (all) describe a 
transference of knowledge from the person creating the emphasis to the intended 
recipient"(p. 36). 
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Achaean strategos for long periods! Furthermore, Polybius 
claimed to have travelled extensively throughout the 
Mediterranean world because of his detention in Rome and 
friendship with Scipio Aemilianus, as reflected in book thirty- 
four where he writes on the geography of Europe and Africa. ' 
Book twelve is, in reality, largely devoted to a polemic 
against other historians' methods. Timaeus, who wrote a history 
of Sicily, though his work has survived only in fragments, has 
his writings singled other for particular reproach by Polybius. 
According to Polybius, a historian of political affairs should have 
proficiency in three areas: the study of written sources, a detailed 
knowledge of the places that he is writing about and personal 
experience in political affairs. " Historians such as Timaeus were, 
Polybius believed, unable to write history properly, since they 
were neither proficient in political affairs nor widely travelled. 
As Polybius states about Timaeus' methodology: 
He believed that by settling in Athens for nearly 
fifty years and acquainting himself with what his 
predecessors had written, he had thoroughly 
prepared himself to write history, a very deluded 
supposition in my view. ' 
`See Eckstein (1995) p. 3 for Polybius' background and political connections. 
s Walbank (1979) pp. 563-4. 
6 Polyb. 12.25E. 1. Also at 12.25G. 1. 
Polyb. 12.25. D. 1. 
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In criticising Timaeus' approach to history, Polybius argued 
that historians should not deal with events that took place in the 
distant past. Polybius contended that history should instead 
deal with contemporary events. Regarding his own work and the 
period that he wrote about, Polybius states that it coincided with 
his own generation and that of his father thereby allowing him to 
draw on his own political experiences and those of his 
contemporaries. Polybius' detention in Italy and later his travels, 
allowed him a unique view of the world he wrote about, such as 
his description of the destruction of Carthage- an event Polybius 
claims to have witnessed at Scipio's invitation and by his side. 
As for other historical approaches, Polybius forcefully states 
that historians like Timaeus, writing about genealogies, the 
foundation myths of poleis and such matters, were unable to 
comprehend history properly. As he argued, such a historian: 
Either must repeat what others have said, while passing it 
off as his own, which is very wrong, or, if he refuses to do 
this, his work will prove quite useless, since he will as a 
result concede that what he writes and thinks about is 
what his predecessors have adequately dealt with before.... 
accordingly it was my decision to write contemporary 
history, first because new events are constantly taking 
place and require treatment for the first time.... secondly, 
because this is the most instructive type of history! 
e Polyb. 9.2.2-6. 
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Polybius' approach to history was in the tradition set by 
Thucydides, rejecting an exploration of events in the distant past, 
along with mythological factors, in favour of contemporary 
political and military history! Through his extensive knowledge 
of internal Greek politics, from his own experiences as Achaean 
hipparch, or through those of his father Lycortas- the Achaean 
league's strategos on a number of occasions, it appears that 
Polybius' histories were based on first hand experience. His 
detention in Rome may have allowed Polybius the opportunity 
to question both the actions of his fellow detainees and more 
importantly, the actions of influential Romans, giving him the 
ability to understand the reasoning and motives of those who 
took differing positions to his own 1° Finally, Polybius appears to 
have been familiar with some archive material; his account of the 
alliance between Philip V and Hannibal appears to have been 
based on the Punic original. " 
Despite this, problems with Polybius' writings have been 
identified. Scholars see Polybius' application of causation at best 
as a mechanical copy of Thucydides; Polybius never gives us any 
Hoinblower (1994) p. 60 draws attention to a number of passages that indicate 
Polybius' knowledge of Thucydides. He suggests that Polybius had a clear view of 
Greek history from 480BC onwards. 
'0 Walbank (1972) p. 75 draws attention to Polybius' detailed knowledge of events in 
Philip V's court during the last years of his reign, information that Polybius could only 
have obtained from somebody who was there, presumably one of his fellow detainees. 
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indication of the motivation and reasoning behind many of the 
actions that he describes in his work, notably Antiochus' motives 
at the outbreak of the Aetolian/Syrian War, despite expounding 
his theory of causation at length. 12 More importantly, as Walbank 
pointed out, although Polybius claimed to be writing a universal 
history, the history of the Achaean league was an important 
secondary theme in his writings. Walbank suggests this was due 
to Polybius basing his history on earlier works. According to 
Walbank's hypothesis, before his detention in Rome, Polybius 
had already composed a life of Philopoemen, which he 
expanded into a history of the Achaean league from where 
Aratus' Memoirs left off in 220BC. Eventually, Walbank suggests 
that Polybius used these two earlier works as the basis for his 
universal history. 13 Walbank argues that a close examination of 
what remains of the histories shows us that: 
The parts of the histories that deal with Achaea and the 
unification of the Peloponnese seem to fit naturally 
enough into the greater work, where they constitute a 
" Gruen (1984) p. 60. Walbank (1972) pp-82-83 suggests that Polybius' access to archival 
material was probably limited, though he did make use of this source when possible. 
'2 For an exploration of Polybius' theory of causation, see Derow (1994) pp. 73-90. 
Though Derow acknowledges that Polybius widened the notion of causation from 
"how" to "why", he nevertheless insists that one of the fundamental problems of 
Polybius' histories fail to explain the causes with all their intricacies and full complexity. 
13 See Walbank (1972) p. 14. Since neither of these two works survives, it should be noted 
that there is actually no evidence for this view. Walbank describes this possibility as not 
impossible, but dependent on speculation. 
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minor variation on the major theme of oecumenical 
unity under the guidance of Rome 14 
However, events in the Peloponnese take up a significant 
portion of Polybius' surviving text. Polybius' concern with this 
region's affairs, especially those of the Achaean league, heavily 
influences his presentation of Rome's advent in the Greek world. 
Polybius admitted that it was impossible for a historian not to 
write about his homeland with favouritism and held that this 
was acceptable as long as it did not contradict the facts 15 It has 
been acknowledged that opponents of the Achaean league such 
as Aetolia and Sparta receive negative treatment at Polybius' 
hands. 16 
As for Polybius' attitude in his histories towards the actions 
of states and individuals, Walbank argues that Polybius was 
almost Machiavellian, in that he exercised a utilitarian and 
ruthless standard of judgement in assessing others. Success, 
according to Walbank, was important to Polybius at all costs; 
being the ultimate criterion that governed human behaviour, no 
heed was to be paid to ethics 17 More recently Eckstein has 
suggested that Polybius' work was part of the moralistic genre of 
literature that was widespread in the Hellenistic period and that 
" Walbank (1972) p. 15-16. 
'5 Polyb. 16.14.6. 
16 See for example Luce (1997) p. 132 who describes Polybius' criticism of the Aetolian 
league as a minor lapse from his standards of veracity. 
" Walbank (1972) p. 164. 
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many of Polybius' judgements on states and individuals derive 
from his aristocratic background. 18 
An interesting example of the differences between Walbank 
and Eckstein comes in book four, in two passages where 
Polybius suggests that Messene and Arcadia should ally, a 
comment which he follows up with the suggestion that war is 
not the greatest of all evils 19 Eckstein suggests that Polybius was 
actually expressing his own carefully thought-out opinions 
about the ethics of peace and war and that the examples that he 
gives are not actually relevant, simply ones that his readers 
would find familiar! ' Walbank earlier contended that these two 
passages represented clever strokes of policy, all aimed at 
strengthening the Achaean league against Sparta- the 
Arcadian/Messenian co-operation suggested by Polybius has the 
explicit goal of balancing Spartan power 21 As Walbank points 
out, Polybius' advice to Elis to become permanently neutral 
subtly achieves the same result since its neutrality would 
deprive Sparta of an ally ' Given that Megalopolis and Sparta 
18 See Eckstein (1995) especially pp. 1-25, which examines Walbank's "Polybius", and 
draws attention to earlier writers, such as Dryden and John Adams, who both regarded 
Polybius as a moralist. 
19 Polyb. 4.30.5. and Polyb. 3.33.12. 
20 Eckstein (1995) pp. 60-61. 
21 Polyb. 4.33.11. 
Walbank (1957) p. 478 and (1972) p. 20. He suggests that these passages are later 
insertions just before publication of the first fifteen books, and was probably written 
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were long-standing rivals, Polybius' concern, according to 
Walbank, appears to be to secure the Achaean league's position 
in the Peloponnese. 
Was Polybius' account of events in the Peloponnese a 
dispassionate one, especially given his intention to instruct? Or 
was it related to his intention to explain Rome's conquest 
through tyche's influence on the process of anacyclosis in systems 
of government? Polybius stated that he was writing a certain 
type of history that would appeal to those interested in public 
life, and that as a result, his writings were not aimed at the 
general reader. Polybius clearly differentiates pragmatike historia 
from other histories that featured myths, legends, genealogies 
and stories surrounding the foundation of poleis and colonies o 
Despite Polybius' contention that those writing pragmatike 
historia should ignore mythological factors, focusing instead on 
military and political affairs, recent epigraphic evidence suggests 
that claims of pan-Dorian brotherhood between states was an 
important factor in determining the foreign policy of the 
Aetolian league in the late Hellenistic period. Polybius was 
aware of the role that claims of mythical kinship played in the 
conduct of relations between states, mentioning kinship 
relationships between Sparta and Selge, and Rome and Ilium 24 
around 150/149BC, when relations between the Achaean league and Sparta were 
deteriorating. 
23 Polyb. 9.1.2. 
Z4 For Polybius' awareness of kinship relations, see Polyb. 5.76.11. 
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In the past scholars have discounted the importance of kinship 
links, but they appear, on the basis of epigraphic evidence, to 
have been an important factor in governing the relations 
between Greek states. Evidently there were two schools of 
history in the late Hellenistic period, one represented by 
Polybius writing pragmatike historia, and the other represented by 
Timaeus, whose writings presumably placed more emphasis to 
the mythological aspects of the relations between states 2' 
Polybius and Achaean Unity; Federalism and the socio- 
economic question in the Peloponnese 
Not only is Polybius the only surviving contemporary 
source for Rome's advent in the Greek world but his histories are 
also the only contemporary literary source that deals with the 
situation in the Peloponnese during the Hellenistic period. 
Polybius paid particular attention to the unity of this region 
under the Achaean league, but was Polybius' depiction of the 
situation in the Peloponnese related to his primary concern in 
writing pragmatike historia; providing his readers with an 
explanation for Roman control over the Greek world? Although 
the Greek world contained a large number of federal states, it is 
astonishing that there is a complete and utter lack of any 
" Writing in the First Century BC, the noted critic Dionysius of Halicarnassus identified 
three major types of historical writing: local chronicles, larger scale histories as written 
by Herodotus, and the intermediate type, best exemplified by Thucydides. See Sacks 
(1981) p. 98. 
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explanation from the ancient sources about how these states 
actually functioned. In Polybius this omission is even more 
startling. Polybius had been hipparch of the Achaean league 
before his detention in Rome and was extremely interested in 
constitutional matters. Polybius should have been the right 
person to tell us in detail about the organisation and workings of 
the Achaean league, yet he is remarkably silent on this topic Z6 
This omission is even more surprising since in his histories 
Polybius depicts a situation far removed from the one that 
pertained in the classical period. Throughout his work Polybius 
refers to himself as an Achaean, though he was a native of 
Megalopolis in Arcadia, since in 235BC Megalopolis had 
become a member of the Achaean league. According to 
Polybius, the Achaean league had developed to a point where 
all the poleis that became members of it shared the same law 
courts and Boule 27 
This situation came about, he argued, because of the 
freedom the Achaean league's system of government gave its 
members, since: 
' Lehmann (2001) pp-49-53 suggests that Polybius may have had a detailed description 
of how the Achaean constitution functioned in one of his later books. 
27 Polyb. 2.37.10. 
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One could not find a political system and principle so 
favourable to equality and freedom of speech, in a word, 
so sincerely democratic. " 
Despite these claims, scholars have long accepted that 
Polybius exaggerated the unity of the Achaean league. ' The area 
around Dyme, Patrae, Pharea and Tritaea, the poleis that 
originally formed the Achaean league, appears to have had a 
form of local government distinct from the rest of the Achaean 
league during the Hellenistic period 30 Poleis that were members 
of the Achaean league regularly sent embassies to each other as 
if they were independent states 31 
Polybius stresses the freedom and equality within the 
democratic Achaean league in his histories; he also makes it 
apparent that many of its members during the Hellenistic period 
joined unwillingly. As he admitted: 
2' Polyb. 2.38.6. Despite Polybius' claim that the Achaean league was a democratic 
organisation, modem scholars have tended to doubt this. Aymard (1938) p. 17 n. 10 and 
Walbank (1957) p. 222, both argue that it was an oligarchy. Lehmann (2001) pp. 58-61 
argues that Polybius is making reference in this passage to Aristotle's claim that the 
tribal states of Greece had the structure of mere symmachies, and that this reference is a 
response to Aristotle's claim that that it would be impossible to build a wall around the 
Peloponnese. 
Larsen (1968) pp. 215-240, though accepting Polybius' account of the development of 
the Achaean league, exercises some caution, accepting that (p. 219) "this unity may seem 
artificial and unnatural". 
'° Larsen (1968) p. 339. 
31 Larsen (1968) p. 238. 
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Some of the Peloponnesians chose to join it of their own free 
will, it won many others by persuasion and argument, and 
those whom it forced to adhere to it when the occasion 
presented itself, suddenly underwent a change and became 
quite reconciled to their position 32 
As Walbank pointed out, states that became members of the 
Achaean league can be divided into two categories; those who 
joined voluntarily and those who were forced into it against their 
will ' Catherine Morgan has recently disputed Polybius' account 
of the development of the Achaean league from the archaic 
period onwards; pointing out that the archaeological evidence 
contradicts much of what he writes. She argues that the 
Achaeans did not form a distinct nation, or ethnos, during the 
archaic period. She suggests it is probable that the Achaean 
league was an artificially based political organisation whose 
members came together due to their need for mutual protection, 
contending that Polybius' account of early Achaean history was 
an attempt to create a historical past for the Achaean league of 
his own day. ' In light of this, should Polybius' assertion that the 
development of the Achaean league resulted in the various ethne 
of the Peloponnese uniting to form one ethnos be accepted? In 
particular should we accept that Polybius, an Arcadian from 
32 Polyb. 2.38.7. 
'3 Walbank (1957) p. 222. 
34 Morgan (1996) p. 195. 
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Megalopolis, adopted an Achaean identity? Scholars in the past, 
looking towards the United States of America as a model, 
suggested that the Achaean league during the Hellenistic period 
came to form a strong centralised government which united the 
disparate peoples of the Peloponnese into a single state. 
However, the United States of America is merely one 
example of a modern political federation. Polybius' presentation 
of the destruction of Corinth in 146BC; anarchy, an irrational 
leadership, and its constituent members attempting to secede, 
echoes the demise of one of the most important political 
federations of the 20' century, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, which collapsed in similar chaotic circumstances. The 
whole concept of modern federalism has also evolved; like the 
Achaean league, the European Union has common law courts, 
standardised weights and measurements, and with a few 
exceptions, a common currency. Despite this unity regarding 
certain matters, countries within the European Union retain their 
own national governments. Though elements of a centralised 
administration such as a parliament do exist, its powers are 
limited, the constituent members of the European Union 
remaining sovereign states. The states of the Peloponnese did 
belong to some form of a political union during the Hellenistic 
period. This does not necessarily mean that they considered 
themselves to be a single ethnos, or people. As Polybius' histories 
relate, many of the states that were members of the Achaean 
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league during the Hellenistic period were forced into it, notably 
Corinth, Argos, Sparta, Elis and Messene. At various stages both 
Sparta and Messene tried to leave the Achaean league, Messene 
attempting to secede from the league in 183BC, while a similar 
attempt by the Spartans to leave provoked the crisis that led to 
the Roman sack of Corinth in 146BC. 
The leadership of the Achaean league was not 
representative of its members; the dominance of Megalopolitans 
over the office of Achaean strategos has been noted 35 Despite 
this, the influence that Megalopolitan dominance over this office 
may have had on the events leading up to Rome's involvement 
in Hellenic affairs has not been assessed. Of particular interest 
are the decision by the Achaean league to invite Antigonus 
Doson into the Peloponnese in 220BC to seek his assistance 
against Cleomenes of Sparta, and later the decision, under 
Aristaenus' influence, to ally the Achaean league with Rome in 
198BC. Polybius presents these actions as decisions that were 
forced on the Achaean league by circumstances beyond its 
control. In reality, the first changed the balance of power in 
Greece in favour of the Macedonians, the traditional rivals of the 
Aetolian league; the second appears to have affected the interests 
that the Aetolian league had in the Peloponnese and endangered 
the position of its kinsmen in Elis. The influence that 
Megalopolitan membership of the Achaean league had in 
" O'Neil (1984-86) pp. 34-36. 
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provoking conflict between the Achaean league and Sparta from 
235BC onwards, with Megalopolitans playing an important role 
in opening the negotiations leading to the alliance with 
Macedonia, has been noted ' 
According to Plutarch, Aratus' first instinct was to appeal to 
the Aetolian league for assistance against Cleomenes and it was 
only when they refused that he reluctantly agreed to call on the 
Macedonians 37 The earlier alliance between the Aetolian league 
and Aratus during the Achaean league's expansion into the 
Peloponnese has been frequently overlooked 38 The decision by 
the Achaean league to invite Antigonus Doson to re-enter the 
Peloponnese placed the Aetolian league in a dangerous strategic 
situation, leading to the outbreak of the Social War and 
subsequently the Aetolian alliance with Rome during the First 
Macedonian War 39 
Were the crimes that Polybius depicts Aetolians committing 
in the Peloponnese prior to the outbreak of the Social War in 
reality an attempt to gain a strategic foothold in this region? For 
example, Polybius portrays the Aetolian league's raid on 
Cynaetha before the outbreak of the Social War as a betrayal by 
malcontent exiles, who had been restored to this polis shortly 
'See Scholten (2000) p. 188 for the pressure exerted on Aratus by former Antigonid 
clients in the Achaean league. 
37Plut. Arat. 41.2. Scholten (2000) pp. 187-88. 
'' It has not been entirely ignored, see Larsen (1975) pp. 159-79. 
39 Scholten (2000) p. 230. 
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beforehand. 40 Cynaetha was situated at the centre of an 
important communication route in the Peloponnese and had 
been earlier forced into the Achaean league by Aratus, even 
though some of its inhabitants favoured an alliance with Elis 41 
The restored exiles who betrayed Cynaetha to the Aetolian 
raiding force are usually seen as members of the lower classes 
who hoped for a re-distribution of property. In light of the 
earlier attempt by some inhabitants of Cynaetha to ally with Elis 
the possibility exists that the exiles had been created in the 
aftermath of Cynaetha's entry into the Achaean league. 
Polybius' reference to the re-distribution of property may be 
linked to the desire of these restored exiles to regain on their 
return the land they had possessed before their exile 42 
So, although Polybius portrays the Peloponnese in his 
histories as unified under the Achaean league to the extent that it 
came to resemble a single polls, we only have his assertion that it 
was. Given the total dominance that Megalopolitans held over 
the office of Achaean strategos between 205 and 181BC, the 
40 Polyb. 4.17.4. "Constant mutual massacres, banishment, the robbery of people's goods, 
and even the redistribution of lands". Eckstein (1995) pp. 136-38 discusses this passage 
in the context of Polybius' fear of the lower orders. Polybius makes no mention of this as 
a factor, suggesting that the Cynaethans, living as they did in the harshest part of 
Arcadia, needed gentleness and mildness in their educational system that music could 
supply (Polyb. 4.21.3-5. ). 
" Scholten (2000) pp. 288-94. 
4' For the events surrounding Cynaetha's earlier forced entry into the Achaean league 
see Walbank (1936) pp. 67-71. 
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period covering Rome's initial involvement in the Greek world, 
that which Polybius presents as the Achaean league's policy was 
actually carried out entirely by Megalopolitans such as 
Philopoemen, Aristaenus, Diophanes and Lycortas. It would 
appear from the unwilling entry of Sparta, Elis and Messene into 
the Achaean league between 192-188BC that there was a close 
degree of co-operation between the Megalopolitan and 
Flamininus and that the Achaean league benefited from Aetolia's 
defeat by absorbing its allies in the Peloponnese. 
Does Polybius' assertion in his histories that he was an 
Achaean and his stress on the unity of the Achaean league have 
any implications for our understanding of Roman imperialism? 
During the 19`' and 20`h centuries, European imperial powers 
exploited ethnic and religious divisions amongst the indigenous 
peoples they came into contact with so that their subjects 
remained divided and were unable to unite in resistance against 
colonial rule. During their conquest of Italy, the Romans had 
exploited differences between various Italian peoples, playing 
off the different ethnic groups against each other in order to gain 
mastery over the peninsula. Although it is tempting to suppose 
that in the late Hellenistic period the boundaries of the polls 
became more permeable, leading to the development of koina, 
political federations that united previously disparate peoples, it 
must be asked whether or not these institutions were able to 
overcome old rivalries. In the Peloponnese, the Eleans 
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maintained close links with their mythical kinsmen in Aetolia, 
despite the fact that they were separated from each other by the 
Gulf of Corinth, and fought alongside the Aetolian league 
during the Social and First Macedonian Wars, and later against 
Rome in 192BC. When Elis subsequently became a member of 
the Achaean league did it accept its membership willingly? Or 
did the Spartans willingly accept membership of an Achaean 
league dominated for long periods by Megalopolitans? 
Polybius, Rome and anacyclosis 
Polybius gives an account of Greek society that stresses the 
unified nature of the Peloponnese under the Achaean league 
though his narrative suggests that communities within it 
retained many of their old animosities and allegiances. Again, 
one should question Polybius' motivation in writing his 
histories, especially his attitude towards Rome. This section will 
contend that Polybius presents Rome in idealised terms during 
its conquest of the Mediterranean world because he wished to 
instruct his readers as to how the process of anacyclosis, a cycle 
that poleis experienced in their systems of government, had been 
disrupted there. This suspension created the circumstances that 
resulted in Rome achieving mastery over the Mediterranean 
world. 
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Anacyclosis is frequently is seen as an attempt by Polybius 
to explain the Roman constitution to his Greek readership in 
terms that would be familiar to them. Should it be seen only in 
this, isolated context? Polybius was writing historia, a type of 
literature that derived from the Greek oral and epic traditions, 
with the stated purpose of explaining Roman imperialism to his 
readership. At the outset of his work, Polybius stresses that the 
Roman system of government was vital in allowing Rome to 
gain control over the Mediterranean world, and at the start of his 
third book, he re-iterates the vital role that Rome's system of 
polity played in its conquests 43 He devoted his sixth book 
entirely to a discussion of the Roman system of government; the 
significance of this factor in his wider work cannot be ignored. 
Again, one should remember the extent to which historia 
had developed by the time that Polybius was writing 44 By the 
fourth century, historians had already begun to divide their 
works into books. If one looks at the way that Polybius devised 
his work, there appears to be a hexadic structure in his first 
thirty books, Polybius' intention being to have five books 
discussing events around the Mediterranean and then a book 
consisting of a digression devoted to a particular subject 45 The 
first five books are an introduction, dealing with the First Two 
43 Polyb. 3.2.6. 
4° Derow (1994) p. 84 remarks on Polybius' professionalism. 
4 'See Hornblower (1994) p. 16-17, which suggests that possibly Polybius' geographical 
book was intended to be twenty-four instead of thirty-four. 
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Punic Wars and the expansion of the Achaean league, ending 
with the conclusion of the Social War and Philip alliance with 
Hannibal. At that point Polybius introduces his account of the 
Roman system of government in book six. Between books seven 
and eleven Polybius deab with events in Greece after the alliance 
between Philip V and Hannibal and events in Italy during the 
Second Punic War, digressing on the role and purpose of historia 
in book twelve. Books thirteen down till seventeen deal with 
events leading up to the end of the Second Punic War and the 
turn eastwards of the victorious Roman Republic. Book eighteen, 
although incomplete, in its surviving fragments concentrates on 
the period in Greece between 198-196BC, immediately after the 
alliance between the Achaean league cif 
Iome, 
containing 
Flamininus' declaration of Freedom. In books nineteen till 
twenty-three Polybius presents Rome and the Achaean league 
acting almost as equals. Polybius' twenty-fourth book, again far 
from complete, relates the circumstances surrounding the break 
down of this relationship, Callicrates' embassy to Rome and his 
decision to tell the Romans that they should regard the Greeks as 
subjects. Books twenty-six to twenty-nine deal with the decline 
in the Achaean league and growing Roman encroachment into 
its affairs until the battle of Pydna which occurs in book thirty. 
In the extension to his work, books thirty-one to thirty nine 
Polybius presents tyche as the supreme force governing human 
affairs and men's behaviour, corrupting the senate and Roman 
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youth, and in Greece, dominated by corrupt men such as 
Callicrates, Polybius' historia culminates with the destruction of 
Corinth. 
The intention of this section will be to examine the concept 
of anacyclosis in Polybius' histories, to find out if it was an 
attempt to rationalise the Roman conquest for his readers. By 
stressing that Rome's success had occurred because the systems 
of government in Greek states had being undergoing a decline, 
Polybius was indicating to his readers that subjection to Roman 
rule had occurred because Rome was temporarily superior to 
Greek states where the process of anacyclosis had not been 
suspended. As Polybius made evident, eventually anacyclosis 
would resume in the Roman system of government, thereby 
destroying the circumstances that had led to Rome achieving 
domination over the Mediterranean world. As Rome was re- 
entering a period of decline, the Achaean league, having suffered 
the final destructive event that occurred at the end of the cycle of 
anacyclosis, would have emerged renewed. 
Assessing Polybius' attitude towards Rome is difficult, since 
at no point does Polybius clearly state how he regarded Roman 
rule over the Mediterranean world. In explaining his decision to 
extend his work from the battle of Pydna as originally conceived 
down to the sack of Corinth, Polybius stated that he hoped that 
his work would serve the purpose of explaining Roman rule 
since: -S 
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It is evident that contemporaries will thus be able to see 
clearly whether the Roman government is acceptable or not, 
and future generations whether it should be considered to 
have been worthy of praise and admiration or rather of 
blame. " 
Although Polybius provides the evidence, he leaves it up to 
his readers how they should judge Rome's rule, without adding 
his own opinion which has been seen by various scholars as pro- 
Roman, anti-Roman, impressed, embittered, ambivalent and 
cynica147 At times Polybius' presentation of Rome appears 
almost contradictory. He portrayed the Greeks as regarding 
Rome as an aggressive power set on conquest and more 
importantly, as barbarian during the First Macedonian War 48 At 
the same time, there is no doubt that Polybius also portrays 
Rome during its struggle with Carthage in the part of his 
histories that survive, his first five books, in almost ideal terms 
and individuals like Flamininus and Scipio are depicted in a 
favourable light 49 In book six of his histories, which is almost 
46 Polyb. 3.4.7. 
47 Erskine (2000) p. 1382. 
See Walbank (1985) p. 150-1 for a discussion of five passages where Polybius has 
Greeks argue that Rome was an aggressive, barbarian state. 
9' For an example of Polybius describing the Romans as barbarians in a direct voice, see 
Campion's discussion of Polyb. 12.4b. 1-c. 1. Histos (2000), dealing with Polybius' account 
of Timaeus' depiction of the October horse ceremony, which was celebrated to 
commemorate the disaster at Troy. Polybius states that Timaeus is incorrect to link this 
with the fall of Troy, and that the Roman custom was a common practice amongst all the 
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intact, Polybius gives a glowing account of the Roman system of 
government and institutions, drawing attention to its many 
virtuous features. Scholars who in the past have doubted the 
aggressive and imperialistic nature of the Roman Republic have 
drawn attention to a supposed contradiction in Polybius, whose 
narrative presents not Rome, but rather its enemies as being 
responsible for starting many of the wars they fought 5° Walbank 
suggested that despite Polybius' assertion that Rome was 
aggressive, his interpretation was not only factually incorrect, 
but could be shown to be from his own text. He argued that 
Polybius stated that Rome was aggressive because he assumed 
that it was the duty of any sovereign state to expand 51 However 
despite his glowing account of Roman institutions, Polybius is 
careful to point out to his readers that the Romans are different 
from the Greeks. In the case of Roman religious practices, 
Polybius points out how the Roman elite manipulated 
barbarians. However, Polybius' intention was to prove that Timaeus' reasoning was 
wrong. It does not necessarily imply that he did not accept that the Romans were 
Trojans. 
50 The supposed contradiction has been refuted by Derow (1979) pp. 1-15. 
See Walbank (1963) p. 10 and (1972) p. 163-4 for this argument. Harris (1979) p. 114 
points out that after 216BC many of the vital parts of Polybius' text are missing. He 
suggests that had we access to the full text, possibly in the missing sections Polybius 
would have given some details about the widening of Roman ambitions as the 
Carthaginian effort failed, and the Romans extended their power into Spain and Africa. 
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superstition, a typical barbarian characteristic, to keep the 
masses under control. 52 
Walbank argued that although Polybius was cautiously 
anti-Roman before his detention and had a cynical attitude 
towards Roman policy during his time in Italy, the catastrophic 
events of 146BC changed his attitude into one of acceptance of 
the Roman presence. 3 Polybius' connections with members of 
the Roman elite may have altered his attitude. Polybius informs 
his readers that at 'the beginning of his detention he became 
acquainted with the young Scipio Aemilianus through the loan 
of some books. This action, Polybius claimed, grew into a 
friendship that allowed him to spend much of the time he spent 
in detention at Rome itself, unlike the other hostages who were 
distributed throughout Italy, Polybius presenting himself as the 
younger man's mentor! Aemilianus was the son of Aemilius 
Paullus, the victor over Perseus and the adoptive grandson of 
Scipio Africanus; Polybius presents himself as moving within the 
highest circles in Roman political life during his detention. 
The Romans also appear in parts of Polybius' histories not 
as barbarians 55 During the Second Punic War, Polybius portrays 
the Romans as having many characteristics that would be 
considered as being typically Greek, such as rationality, self- 
SZ Polyb. 6.56.7-9. 
Walbank (1972) p. 82-3. 
5' Polyb. 31.23.4. 
55 Polyb. 39.2.1-3. 
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sufficiency and discipline. Polybius portrays the Carthaginians 
during this conflict as having typical barbarian characteristics, 
leading some to suggest that Polybius felt the Romans were 
honorary Greeks 56 In the events surrounding Corinth's 
destruction in 146BC, the event that Walbank suggests made 
Polybius pro-Roman, Polybius presents the Romans behaving in 
a rational fashion; it is his fellow Achaeans whom he depicts as 
irrational. 
This does not imply that Polybius admired Roman 
institutions or accepted Roman rule. Polybius conceived his 
histories as a means of providing his Greek readers with a 
rational explanation as to why the Romans were successful; he 
could hardly portray them in anything but a positive light 
during their conquest of Greece 57 In his histories Polybius 
assumed the task of explaining to his readership something that 
many of them probably considered a complete and utter reversal 
of the natural order 58 Greeks considered themselves distinct 
from other people, viewing non-Greeks, whom they called 
barbarians, as irrational, brutal, cruel and superstitious; 
See Erskine (2000) p. 174. 
Walbank points out that Polybius never, in the surviving parts of his work, describes 
the Romans as barbarians in a direct voice, though he frequently has others make this 
claim in speeches. Walbank (1985) pp. 152-3. 
Walbank (1972) pp. 3-6 collects a number of passages which indicate that Polybius 
intended his work primarily for a Greek readership. Polyb. 31.22.8. states that Polybius 
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characteristics that Polybius shows in Roman behaviour at 
various stages of his work 59 Polybius' histories had to address an 
important question for his readers. Why, if the Greeks had the 
characteristics they believed themselves to possess, were they 
subject to an alien and barbarian people? ' This was the question 
that Polybius intended his histories to give a satisfactory answer 
to. 
As Polybius stated, from 220BC onwards, the fates of the 
Achaean league and Rome had become linked 61 Polybius argued 
that a cycle occurred in the development of the systems of 
government in all poleis, which he termed anacyclosis 62 The initial 
phase occurs at a time when some great disaster has left men 
weak and living in a primitive condition. A single strong 
individual then emerges, forcing the people to obey his dictates, 
a phase that Polybius describes as monarchia. During this period 
men gradually develop a sense of duty and justice from rearing 
their children, from whom they expect gratitude and obedience, 
which leads to a sense of right and wrong developing. This in 
knows that Romans will examine his histories, but does not mean that he wrote for both 
audiences. 
' See Erskine (2000) pp. 165-82 for an examination of Polybius' depiction of typical 
barbarian characteristics in Romans regarding religious practice and the sacking of 
cities. 
60 For a discussion of the Romans as barbarians in Greek international political discourse, 
see Deininger (1971) pp. 21-37. 
61 Polyb. 5.33.1-5. 
' For Polybius' theory of constitutional change see Polyb. 6.6.1-9.10. 
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turn leads to monarchy developing, the king ruling with the 
support of his subjects `3 According to Polybius, the king's 
descendants, because of rank and privilege, will eventually 
begin to commit acts of violence against their subjects, and 
monarchy will give way to tyranny, until eventually the tyrant is 
overthrown when his rule becomes unendurable' Aristocracy 
replaces monarchy in the second phase of anacyclosis but the 
descendants of the initial aristocratic leaders abuse their 
position, leading to an oligarchy alongside growing abuses of the 
citizenry. Eventually this type of government is overthrown in 
favour of democracy. ' 
At the end of the cycle, Polybius argued that the citizens of 
the democracy become so accustomed to freedom and equality 
that they no longer value them; violence erupts, leading to mob- 
rule and the cycle culminates in a single great destructive event. 
In the end anarchy prevails as it did at the beginning and the 
cycle of anacyclosis resumes `' 
However, as Polybius points out, Rome, along with certain 
other states, had managed to achieve a mixture of these three 
basic forms of government in such a manner that their system of 
government was kept in a state of equilibrium, delaying 
Polyb. 6.6.1-12. 
64 Polyb. 6.8.4-6. 
65 Polyb. 6.9.1-3. 
" Polyb. 6.9.9, "Until they degenerate again into perfect savages and find once more a 
master and monarch. " 
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6ý. ¢. 
anacyclosis 67 Sparta had achieved it through the actions of 
Lycurgus, and it had developed in Rome through a process of 
trial and error. But, as Polybius makes clear, sooner or later all 
mixed systems of government in poleis lose their balance and 
anacyclosis resumes. Carthage, like Rome, had a mixed system of 
government at one stage but it eventually broke down, Carthage 
entering into a period of decline that eventually led to its 
destruction by the Romans in 146BC. Polybius has Scipio 
Aemilianus voice his fear that the same fate would happen to 
Rome as he watched Carthage bum. ' 
Polybius' account of anacyclosis is seen by many historians 
as a clumsy attempt to impose a Greek political theory onto the 
mixed Roman constitution, suggesting that it was a "simple- 
minded notion of a predictable and unchanging cycle of 
constitutional forms" 69 Was Polybius' account of anacyclosis 
merely a device to explain the Roman system of government to 
his Greek readers? Or rather was it a theory that could be 
applied to the systems of government in all poleis which would 
explain to Polybius' Greek readership why they found 
67 Polyb. 6.10.1-14. 
6' Polyb. 38.22.1-3. "A glorious moment, Polybius; but I have a dread foreboding that 
some day this doom will be pronounced upon my own country". It would be difficult to 
mention an utterance more statesmanlike and more profound". 
69 See Cornell (2001) p. 47; also note 26, where he states that, "I should also emphasise 
that I agree with those who draw a sharp distinction between Polybius the second-rate 
philosopher and Polybius the first-rate historian. " 
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themselves living under barbarian rule? Polybius' intention in 
book six was not merely to explain the working of the Roman 
constitution to his readers; it was to explain how Rome reached 
the position that allowed it to achieve mastery over the 
Mediterranean world. " 
In his histories Polybius had to explain to his readers why 
the natural order had been reversed, the irrational Romans 
ruling the rational Greeks. His portrayal of Hellenic behaviour 
was bound to reflect the decline that had allowed the Romans to 
gain mastery over Greece. Although not a polls, similarities to 
one undergoing a transformation through the workings of 
anacyclosis could be seen in Macedonia where Philip V began his 
reign by showing the potential, according to Polybius, to be the 
greatest of all the Antigonid monarchs. But, shortly before Rome 
became involved in Greek affairs there was, as Polybius makes 
evident, a change in his character for the worse and he was 
transformed into a tyrant capable of carrying out the most 
heinous of crimes. 71 As Polybius states: 
70 Powell, (2001) p. 24. 
" For Polybius' digression Philip V's change in character, see Polyb. 7.11.1-12. 
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Henceforth, as if he had had a taste of human blood and of 
the slaughter and betrayal of his allies, he did not change 
from a man into a wolf, as in the Arcadian tale cited by 
Plato, but he changed from a king into a cruel tyrant. " 
Polybius depicts Philip V as a drunk who committed 
adultery with the wives of his friends. Perseus, who is described 
by Polybius as a miser and a physical coward, then succeeded 
him. 73 Polybius' rather judgmental account of Philip V's reign 
resembles the depiction he gave of monarchy when anacyclosis 
transforms this institution into tyranny, producing monarchs 
who: 
Received the office by hereditary succession and found 
their safety now provided for... they gave way to their 
appetites owing to this abundance, and came to think that 
the rulers must be distinguished from their subjects by a 
particular dress, that there should be a particular luxury 
and variety in the presentation of their food and drink, and 
that they should meet with no denial in the pursuit of their 
love affairs, however lawless. ' 
Tyche played an important factor in the destruction of 
Macedonia, taking revenge on Philip V for the crimes that he had 
n Polyb. 7.13.7. 
For Polybius' depiction of these two monarchs, see Eckstein (1995) p. 261 n. 80, and 
p. 286 n. 3 for the accusation of drunkenness in Philip V and Antiochus. 
74 Polyb. 6.7.7. 
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committed. 75 Undoubtedly tyche had favoured the Romans. They 
were fortunate enough to fight against and defeat the 
Macedonians at a time when the Antigonid monarchy was 
degenerating into a tyranny, as Polybius stated all monarchies 
eventually did under the pressures of anacyclosis, at a point when 
Rome's system of government was unaffected by this process. 
Cicero looked back on the process that led to the formation 
of Rome's mixed constitution in the First Century BC, 
suggesting, as Polybius did, that Rome had acquired its mixed 
system of government in or around 449BC. However, Cicero 
contended that despite its difficulties from 133BC onwards, 
Rome still retained a mixed system of government. 76 Polybius 
stresses that anacyclosis was merely delayed in the Roman system 
of government and would resume. Polybius depicts Rome as an 
aggressive state, and during the First Macedonian War his 
histories portray Greek politicians warning the Aetolian league 
that the Romans were barbarian aggressors who were exploiting 
its difficulties to further their imperial ambitions. Nor does 
Polybius deviate from his belief that Rome was aggressive. He 
states that unlike the Spartans, who remained essentially bound 
to the Peloponnese, the Romans aimed for world domination 
's Eckstein (1995) p. 263, commenting on Polyb. 15.20.5-8. 
76 Powell (2001) p. 24 
53 
from the outset and placed all of their energies into achieving it. " 
As he states: 
It is quite natural, that having been schooled in such great 
enterprises, they not only boldly threw themselves into 
gaining the leadership and mastery of the world, but they 
succeeded in realising their aim. " 
It would appear that the Romans were, in Polybius' opinion, 
exploiting their newly acquired territories. Rome's decision to 
seize the gold and silver from Syracuse during the Second Punic 
War was natural; according to Polybius, because the Romans: 
Could not lay claim to world power without taking away the 
resources of others and appropriating them for themselves. ' 
However, Rome achieved its mastery over the 
Mediterranean world at a time when anacyclosis was suspended 
in its system of government, and had remained in force in other 
states that had systems of government similar to poleis, like the 
Achaean league. Polybius' account of Roman behaviour had to 
account for how anacyclosis' suspension had produced a society 
that had been able to overcome Greek states like the Achaean 
league, which were undergoing a decline 80 
" For Polybius' comments on Spartan imperialism, see Polyb. 6.50.5. 
7B Polyb. 1.63. 
'Polyb. 9.10.11. 
80 See Polyb. 6.19.1-42.6, for Polybius' account of the Roman military system. Polyb. 6 56. 
6-15 for Roman religious practices. 
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As for Polybius' presentation of events in the Peloponnese, 
although events at Corinth in 146BC were undoubtedly 
destructive, they do not appear to have put an end to Greek 
resistance to Rome, or have had the finality that Polybius' 
histories suggest. As a recent re-interpretation of an inscription 
from Dyme indicates, it would appear that resistance to Rome's 
presence existed in the immediate aftermath of the Achaean War 
and that there was no real change in Greece 81 Although there 
was no known large-scale revolt against Roman power in the 
Peloponnese between the destruction of Corinth and 
Mithridates' invasion, this does not mean that Greeks like 
Polybius came to accept Roman rule. 
Rather, Polybius expected the Roman system of government 
under which its conquest of Greece had been achieved to suffer 
as the result of internal decline and external pressures. The 
implication for his readers was that Roman rule over Greece was 
not permanent. Polybius believed that Rome had reached its 
zenith during the Hannibalic War ß2 In his last ten books he 
depicts the senate's foreign policy as both amoral and immoral 
and the Roman youth being corrupted by an influx of wealth, 
leading to idleness and luxury. It appears, as Eckstein argues, 
that tyche was already punishing the Romans since the benefits 
B1 Kallet-Marx (1995) pp. 129-153. 
82 Powell (2001) p. 23. 
55 
of empire were corrupting the very values that had achieved it 83 
Indeed, the final image of Roman behaviour that Polybius 
presents to his readership is of soldiers playing board games on 
a priceless work of art during the sack of Corinth, acting in truly 
barbarian fashion. ' Perhaps he was suggesting that the 
resumption of anacyclosis in the Roman system of government 
was not a distant prospect 85 Moreover, internal decline at Rome 
would come at a time when the Achaean league, having suffered 
the catastrophic event that Polybius claimed heralded the end of 
every cycle of anacyclosis, would have emerge renewed " 
However, internal decline was not the only result that 
anacyclosis had in its final stages, though it was constant. As 
Polybius stated, external pressures, although unknown, also 
played an important role in the eventual descent of the polis into 
anarchy $' Politicians like Callicrates had corrupted the Achaean 
league through the workings of anacyclosis; Roman pressure and 
interference in its affairs also resulted in its destruction. 
Carthage, which like Rome, at one point possessed a mixed 
83 Eckstein (1995) p. 265. 
Polyb. 39.2.1-3. 
Polyb. 31.25.2-6. 
86 Polybius' role in the Roman settlement was to ensure that statues of Philopoemen 
remained intact (Polyb. 39.3.4-11). Furthermore, he refused a Roman present of property 
that Diaeus had owned, and urged his friends not to acquire property owned by the 
leadership of the rebellion when the Romans sold it (Polyb. 39.4.1-5. ). 
87Polyb. 6.57.2. 
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constitution, had been weakened both by its mob and Roman 
pressure. Yet, although supernatural forces beyond their control 
had played a vital role in Greek subjection to Roman rule, 
ultimately Polybius not deny th ,- hat might be described as 
"free will" was als an important actor. As he stated: 
But as for matters the efficient and final cause of which it is 
possible to discover we should not, I think, put them down 
to divine action. For instance, take the following case. In our 
own time the whole of Greece has been subject to a low 
birth-rate and a general decline in population, owing to 
which poleis have become deserted and the land has ceased to 
yield fruit, although there have neither been cc, n7, 'ni,;, swars 
nor epidemics. If, then, any one had advised us to send and 
ask the gods about this, and find out what we ought to say 
or do, to increase in numbers and make our cities more 
populous, would it not seem absurd, the cause of the evil 
being evident and the remedy being in our own hands?.... 
About this it was of no use at all to ask the gods to suggest a 
means of deliverance from such an evil. For any ordinary 
man will tell you that the most effectual cure had to be 
men's own action, in either striving after other objects.... 
Neither prophets nor magic were here of any service, and the 
same holds for all particulars. " 
" Polyb. 38.17.4-12. 
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Tyche had favoured the Romans during a period when it 
had been unfavourable to the Greeks. However, Rome's 
conquest could not be explained solely by supernatural factors; 
all they had, or could do in the future was create favourable 
circumstances. Ultimately the Romans had achieved world 
domination because they had desired it from outset, and had 
placed all of their resources into achieving it. Now that the 
circumstances were going to be reversed, the Greeks could not 
simply rely on internal decline within the Roman system of 
government; that would occur naturally, but would not be 
enough. They themselves had to be in a position to exert 
sufficient pressure on a Roman state weakened through the 
process of anacyclosis. The readership that Polybius intended his 
histories for, those interested in public life, would only be able 
to do so if they were able to learn from the events and actions 
that Polybius outlined, which had resulted in their subjection to 
Roman rule. 
Polybius' Portrayal of the Aetolian league 
Polybius' depiction of the Aetolian league and its actions 
during the Hellenistic period is of a piratical and irrational state 
bent on wreaking destruction in the Peloponnese. However, it is 
merely one opinion, and as Rigsby points out in the context of 
asylia decrees, had Polybius been an Aetolian, perhaps scholars 
today would be assessing the popularity or otherwise of the 
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Aetolian Empire 89 As early as the late 19' century, Woodhouse, 
one of the first scholars to study Aetolian topography and 
archaeology, pondered the question of how much longer 
childish perception of the Aetolians as a nation of robbers would 
persist 9° 
Woodhouse's prediction about the course of future 
scholarship on Aetolia was as accurate as his belief that the long- 
term consequences of the revival of the Olympic games in 
Athens in 1896 would be disaster 91 Polybius clearly depicts the 
Aetolians and their actions in the Peloponnese in the worst 
possible fashion. It is merely one view, and given that the 
Aetolians absorbed many communities from outside their ethnos 
into their league in the late Hellenistic period, it would appear 
that not all other Greeks held it. Admittedly, aspects of Aetolian 
society were different from those found elsewhere in Greece 
during the classical period. These differences do not mean that 
during the Hellenistic period Aetolian leaders were incapable of 
conceiving a rational foreign policy. 
Yet, if Polybius' account is to be believed, the Aetolian 
league initiated the Social War merely to satisfy its insatiable 
desire for plunder in the Peloponnese. When that war was over, 
Polybius' narrative implies that a continued Aetolian desire to 
89 Rigsby (1996) p. 17. 
90 Woodhouse (1897) p. 50. 
"Woodhouse (1897) p. 51. 
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amass loot led to their alliance with the Romans during the First 
Macedonian War 92 
Polybius' intention in writing history was to instruct. His 
aim was to show his readers the influence that the suspension of 
anacyclosis had on the Roman system of government, and to 
contrast it with other states where tyche had not been so 
favourable. His view of the past and presentation of events in the 
Peloponnese was bound to reflect his intention of presenting the 
Achaean league as a state in with which the influence of 
anacyclosis could be compared to Rome. Historia was for Polybius 
a means of instructing, and as he stated: 
There are few occasions which admit of setting forth all 
possible arguments, most admitting only of those brief 
arguments, which occur to one, and even of these there are 
certain which are appropriate to contemporaries, others to 
men of former times, others again to Aetolians, others to 
Peloponnesians and others to Athenians... Since the needs 
of the case vary, we have need of special practice and 
principal in judging how many and which of the possible 
arguments we should employ, that is to say if we mean to 
do good rather than harm to our readers. 93 
f 
92 For Polybius' depiction of Aetolian attitudes at the end of the Social War see 
Polyb. 5.107.5-7. 
93 Polyb. 12.25I. 4-6. 
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Does Polybius' failure to explain other viewpoints affect our 
understanding of events in the Peloponnese prior to Rome's 
intervention in Greece? If one takes into account the 
circumstances that le, .d to the 
decision to request Macedonian 
assistance against Cleomenes of Sparta, the influx of Arcadian 
communities such as Megalopolis into the Achaean league 
appears to have been a decisive factor in the decision to invite 
Antigonus Doson to re-enter the Peloponnese. Plutarch, 
although not a contemporary source, had access to now missing 
works like Aratus' Memoirs. Plutarch's account emphasises 
Aratus' reluctance to call on Macedonia and mentions his initial 
decision to request the Aetolian league's assistance before he 
reluctantly agreed to accept Macedonian support 94 Aratus had 
earlier carried out the expansion of the Achaean league into 
Arcadia in close co-operation with the Aetolian league. The 
claimed mythical kinship links between the Aetolians and Elis 
suggests that despite the Gulf of Corinth, the Peloponnese was 
an area of vital concern to the Aetolian league. These factors 
indicate that subsequent Aetolian actions in the Peloponnese had 
a justifiable basis. All are events that Polybius ignores in his 
pragmatike historia. Polybius expresses definite opinions about 
Aetolian actions in the Peloponnese; they are merely his own 
and do not reflect the opinions that may have existed in states 
like Elis or Sicyon. 
94 Plut. Arat. 41.2-3. 
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Conclusion 
Traditionally Polybius' narrative has provided a framework 
for understanding Rome's advent in the Greek world that has 
largely been accepted, despite its limitations. As Polybius, who 
had strong opinions about the writing of history admits, the 
purpose of historia pragmatike was to instruct; he intended his 
histories to be read by anybody trying to cope with the 
vicissitudes of tyche since, as he stated, knowledge of the past 
helps in the present. Does this intention distort our 
understanding of how Rome came to conquer the Greek world? 
Polybius clearly believed that the Roman system of 
government under which its successes had been achieved would 
decline. Corinth's destruction in 146BC may have caused 
Polybius to assist the Romans. This does not mean that Polybius 
abandoned his belief that the Roman Republic would eventually 
decline into anarchy through a resumption of anacyclosis in its 
system of government, a decline that had occurred in the 
Achaean league during the period covered by his histories. 
Polybius emphasises that the destruction of Corinth was the 
single greatest misfortune ever to happen to the Greeks, even 
compared to the Persian invasions 95 It was exactly the sort of 
destructive event that Polybius claimed heralded the end of a 
cycle of anacyclosis in democracies like the Achaean league after 
95See Polyb. 38.2.1-5. 
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they had been corrupted by mob-rule and dishonest politicians, 
a situation that he describes in the events surrounding the 
Achaean War 96 Furthermore, there is Polybius' emphasis on the 
unity of the Achaean league throughout his histories, a unity he 
compares to that found in a polis. Although Polybius describes a 
situation whereby the various ethne of the Peloponnese united to 
form one ethnos, scholars have long doubted this, suggesting that 
the larger members of the Achaean league such as Corinth 
would have acted in their own interests as circumstances 
dictated. 7 It would appear from the predominance of 
Megalopolitans in the office of Achaean strategos, that they often 
acted in accordance with Arcadian interests, rather then those of 
the entire league. 
Polybius clearly differentiates pragmatike historia from other 
types of history, stating that since his writings were the result of 
personal experience, he would leave matters like foundation 
myths and genealogies to other historians. One of the things that 
Polybius criticises Timaeus' histories for, his close attention to 
the mythological aspect of the relations between states, appears 
to have been an important factor in interstate relations during 
the Hellenistic period. The closeness of the relationship between 
Elis and Aetolia during the Hellenistic period, despite their 
% See Polyb. 38.12.4-5. 
" For the ethne of the Peloponnese merging into one ethnos see Polyb. 2.37.7-38.4. 
Walbank (1985) p. 36 takes a slightly more cautious approach towards Polybius' 
assertions. 
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separation by the Gulf of Corinth, suggests that Polybius' 
decision to ignore claims of kinship in his histories masks one of 
the reasons for Aetolian intervention in the Peloponnese. 
Essentially Polybius' presents the evidence in accordance with 
the political message that he wished his contemporary Greek 
readership to draw from his writings. That the Roman conquest 
was a temporary situation that had occurred because of 
capricious nature of tyche, and his readership should look to and 
learn from mistakes made in the past, drawing lessons that 
would allow them to renew their own society. 
Polybius, like many historians, seems to have interpreted 
the past through his understanding of the present. The events 
surrounding the Third Macedonian War found Polybius forcibly 
removed to Italy and detained there for sixteen years. On his 
return he witnessed the destruction of Corinth in the aftermath 
of a failed revolt against Rome. Polybius' need to explain to his 
Greek readers how they now found themselves ruled by a power 
that many of them probably considered as alien and barbarian 
appears to distort present-day understanding of his writings. 
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Chapter Two 
Polybius' Presentation of the Peloponnese in his 
pragmatike historia; Aetolia's kinship relationship with Elis 
and Cleomenes' revolution. 
Introduction 
For most of the Aetolians themselves are not Greek. The 
countries of the Agraae, the Apodotae and the 
Amphilochians are not Greek. ' 
In some respects this supposed remark by Philip V to 
Flamininus captures the problem of how Polybius' attitude has 
influenced modem scholarship on Aetolia. Located in north- 
western Greece in close proximity to peoples such as the 
Illyrians, the Aetolian league has acquired a reputation amongst 
Hellenistic historians as a nation of pirates located at the 
periphery of the Greek world? This attitude is seen as a natural 
continuation from the classical period; Thucydides described the 
Aetolians as a warlike ethnos living in primitive conditions 3 
I 
' Polyb. 18.5.7-9. Walbank (1967) p. 556 suggests that these were the actual words Philip 
used. Woodhouse (1897) p. 79 earlier pointed to the alliteration. 
2 For Walbank's comments on Aetolian behaviour, see CAH Vol. 7 (led) pp. 232. See also 
Will's remarks in the same volume, p. 107. 
3 Thuc. 3.94.4-5. Eur. Phoen L. 138 describes the clothing of Tydeus as half barbarian. 
Antonetti (1990) pp. 113-43 examines the development of the hostile image of the 
Aetolians in Athenian drama and comedy, drawing attention to the role that the 
Aetolian defeat of Athenian forces played in its development. Scholten (2000) p. 5. n. 12 
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However it is from Polybius that most of our knowledge 
about the Aetolians derives and they receive extremely harsh 
treatment in his histories. According to Polybius, such was the 
Aetolian addiction to piracy that if two other states were at war 
they would take advantage of the situation and plunder both 
sides even if they were not involved in the conflict! There are 
few character faults that Polybius does not accuse the Aetolians 
of having: violence and aggression (4.3.5. ), cruelty (4.18.7-9), 
impiety (4.62.2. ), haughtiness (5.64.8. ), inhumanity (4.67.3-4), and 
cowardice (4.79.1. ). Polybius depicts the Aetolians as natural 
revolutionaries (13.1.2), spendthrifts (13.1.1. ), liars who find 
plundering and raiding habitual (4.3.1: 16.2) and a nation whose 
obsession with looting causes them to lose battles and friends 
(4.29.47. ). According to Polybius, the ultimate goal of the 
Aetolian league was the conquest of Greece (2.49.3. ). ' 
Plausible explanations have been advanced for Polybius' 
attitude. It is suggested that perhaps Aetolian society evolved 
differently from elsewhere in Greece because the Aetolians lost 
control over their coastline to the Achaean league during the 
classical period. ' Grainger suggests that the Aetolian role in the 
suggests that the stereotype was based on some generally recognisable abnormality in 
behaviour. 
` Polyb. 18.4.8; 5.2. 
''This list of crimes is listed by Sacks (1975) p. 92. 
6 Scholten (2000) p. 12 "The rugged isolation environment of Old Aitolia did little to 
promote change away from these earlier, more freewheeling socio-economic concepts". 
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defence of Delphi in 279BC and their constant references to this 
action in their propaganda might have annoyed other Greeks, 
causing them to remember Aetolian crimes. ' Finally there is their 
position at the fringe of the Greek world as a possible 
explanation for Polybius' invective, the Aetolians appearing to 
him as hill men. ' 
The Aetolian league is not the only state that Polybius 
describes in negative terms. Of extreme relevance for 
understanding the situation in the Peloponnese is Polybius' 
depiction of Sparta, especially Nabis' rule there. Polybius 
portrays Nabis' regime in the worst possible light, alleging that 
Nabis used an instrument of torture built in the image of his wife 
to extort money from wealthy Spartans and shared out their 
wives and daughters amongst his supporters as he shared out 
the land. " As with his depiction of the Aetolian league, plausible 
arguments are advanced to account for Polybius' bias, in 
particular his concern that rule by the masses threatened social 
stability. 
However, despite Polybius' depiction of it, the Aetolian 
league played an important role in Greek history, for example its 
defence of Delphi against the Celts in 279BC, and during the 
Hellenistic period it included many communities in northern- 
7 Grainger (1999) p: 17. 
8 Grainger (1999) p. 25. 
9 Polyb. 13.7.1-11; 13.6.2,16.13.1-2. See Eckstein (1995) p. 133. 
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western Greece in its league, along with controlling the shrine at 
Delphi 1° Furthermore, the Aetolian league was the first state in 
Greece to ally with Rome, and the first to challenge its influence. 
The intention of this chapter is to examine whether 
Polybius' depiction of both the Aetolian league and Sparta 
during the Hellenistic period is dispassionate. Or whether 
Polybius' regional perspective as an Arcadian and the rivalry 
between various ethnic interests in the Peloponnese account for 
his partisan representation of the Aetolian league's actions in 
that region. It will contend that Aetolian actions and 
interventions in the Peloponnese during the Hellenistic period 
had a consistent basis and that Polybius' perspective on events 
and concern with the situation at the time he was writing masks 
the true situation in the Peloponnese. 
Aetolia's relationship with the Peloponnese. 
This section will be a brief description of the geographical 
relationship between Aetolia and the Peloponnese. The 
geographical structure of Aetolia is relatively simple, consisting 
of two distinct regions; the coastal plain around Calydon and 
Pleuron, and the area around Lake Thermon with its 
mountainous hinterland. Despite Aetolia's separation from the 
'o See Flaceliere (1938) for the Aetolian presence at Delphi. See also Champion (1996) pp. 
315-28. 
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Peloponnese by the Gulf of Corinth, the geography of the region 
suggests that connections between the two existed. 
Strabo describes Aetolia as an area divided into two distinct 
regions. " The first is "old" Aetolia, containing the area around 
the coastal plain; the second "acquired" Aetolia, referring to the 
area around Lake Thermon and the mountainous interior. 
Although Strabo's terminology comes from the Homeric 
tradition about Aetolia, it rightly points to the differences 
between the various component parts of Aetolia. The river 
system and the influence of the last ice age have created two 
distinct areas in Aetolia that are at the same time connected with 
each other. 
We shall start at the coastal plain, an area that poses a 
number of problems. Firstly, there is the question of how far it 
could be said to be open to contact with the Peloponnese. From 
the coastline, the relative proximity of the Peloponnese, about 
ten kilometres distant, is obvious 12 A lagoon dominates the 
Aetolian coastline, the result of extensive silting from the river 
network in this region. 3 In antiquity this situation manifests 
itself in the inability of the Aetolians to develop a commercial 
port and the significant role that harbours such as Naupactus 
played in the Aetolian league's strategic calculations. 
Strabo C450. 
'Z Bommelje (1988) p. 312 states that until the Second World War, shepherds from Aetolia 
were more likely to bring their flocks to markets in Patras then Agrinio. 
"Woodhouse (1897) p. 54 and Antonetti (1990) p. 31. 
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As one proceeds inland the situation changes. Away from 
the coastline the coastal plain changes, with agriculture, aided by 
the alluvial soils deposited by the river network, playing a 
significant role 14 This gave the area agricultural self-sufficiency 
during antiquity and it has the highest concentration of urban 
centres in Aetolia, containing the two most important 
settlements, Calydon and Pleuron. It is in this region that the 
mythological traditions concerning the Aetolian ethnos are 
centred. " The coastal plain is linked with the rest of Aetolia 
through the pass at Kleisura and from there on to the rest of 
northern Greece. The coastal plain is somewhat focused onto the 
Peloponnese and isolated from the rest of Aetolia. This sense of 
distinctiveness seems to have manifested itself with the 
development of a religious centre at Calydon, dedicated to 
Artemis Laphria, to act as a focus for the communities on the 
coastal plain 16 This site may have been an attempt by the coastal 
communities to try and counter balance the dominance of the 
inland areas. " When the site fell into disuse, Pausanias informs 
us that the sacred objects were moved to Patrae in Achaea, 
suggesting connections with the Peloponnese. " 
14 Woodhouse (1897) p. 23-41, Antonetti (1990) pp. 19-23. 
`Payne (1925-6) pp. 124-132. 
16 Antonetti (1990) p. 234. 
" Morgan (1990) p. 8. 
18 Paus. 7.18.8-13. Patrae was the only Greek polis to aid the Aetolians in 279BC, Paus 
7.18.5. 
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Potentially the most interesting reference about the distinct 
nature of the coastal region comes from Thucydides' account of 
the Athenian expedition to Aetolia in 426BC. After meeting 
fierce Aetolian resistance, the Athenians and their allies were 
forced to retreat to Naupactus. A Spartan force that had been 
sent to assist the Aetolians saw this development and realising 
that they did not have the forces necessary to take Naupactus, 
according to Thucydides: 
Went into the country that used to be called Aeolis and 
is now called Calydon and Pleuron- also to other places 
in that area, and to Proschium in Aetolia. 19 
This reference has provoked much debate, since it implies 
that Thucydides regarded the coastal region as distinct from the 
rest of Aetolia. Beloch and Wilamowitz both argued that a clear 
distinction had to be made between Homeric and historic 
Aetolia 2° According to Beloch, Calydon and Pleuron were 
independent poleis during Homeric times and Thucydides' 
reference to Aeolis reflects their Homeric origins. Wilamowitz 
argued that after the war between the Aetolians and the Curetes 
recorded in mythology, the Curetes ruled Aetolia until they were 
driven away by a mountain people who assumed their name, 
and that Thucydides' reference to Aeolis is a remnant of these 
events. Kirsten discusses the problem at length from an 
'Thuc. 3.102.5. The punctuation follows Hornblower (1991) p. 516. 
' Beloch (1897) p. 667-672 
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archaeological viewpoint, suggesting that in the sub-Mycenean 
period groups of Aetolian settlers moved from the Peloponnese 
to the coastal area of Aetolia. Kirsten suggests that one should 
distinguish the Aetolians who moved to Elis, but are mentioned 
in the Iliad, from the later ones who took over the coastal area, 
displacing the settlers who had brought Mycenean culture from 
the Peloponnese. Kirsten suggests that Thucydides was simply 
using a legendary name from the area. 21 
There are a number of problems with these arguments. All 
assume that the Homeric tradition can be taken at face value and 
that the Dorian migrations actually happened. Bommelje more 
recently argued that Thucydides' reference to Aeolis indicates 
that this area was under the control of the Achaean league. ' 
Bommelje contends that that since both Calydon and Pleuron 
were at various stages members of the Achaean league, that the 
Achaean league controlled the Aetolian coastline at this point ' 
Bommelje is undoubtedly correct in pointing to the close links 
between the coastal communities of Aetolia and the 
Peloponnese. This does not necessarily mean that poleis like 
Calydon and Pleuron were Achaean. Calydon may have been a 
Z' Kirsten (1952) pp. 241-242 
' Bommelje (1988) pp 307-314. Scholten (2000) pp. 12-13 follows Bommelje, suggesting 
that the loss of the Aetolian coastline to the Achaean league may have caused the 
Aetolians to develop in isolation from the rest of Greece, and retain archaic era attitudes 
towards plundering. 
" Xen. Hell 4.6.1. Paus. 7.11.3. 
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member of the Achaean league in 389BC; that does not imply 
that it was in 426BC. The sole reference to Pleuron's membership 
of the Achaean league is its request to leave, suggesting an 
unwilling association on its part with the Achaean league. What 
appears more likely is that Aetolian communities on the coastal 
plain had extensive links with the Peloponnese, not that their 
inhabitants were ethnically Achaean. 
What implications does this have for our understanding of 
Polybius' depiction of Aetolian actions in the Peloponnese? 
Although communities centred on Lake Thermon and the 
surrounding mountains may have had little or no contact with 
the Peloponnese, both Calydon and Pleuron had. Though not 
representative of the league as a whole, because of the fertile 
nature of this region and its large population, the inhabitants of 
this area must have had a significant role in determining the 
policy followed by the Aetolian league. Assuming that the 
Aetolian strategos would act with the collective interests of the 
Aetolian ethnos as a whole in mind, any change in the 
Peloponnese that impinged on relations between it and the 
coastal communities of the Aetolian league would be reflected in 
his decisions. 
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Mythical kinship links between the Aetolian league and the 
Peloponnese. 
The geographical structure of the region suggests that the 
coastal area of Aetolia had links with the Peloponnese, though 
the evidence is at best circumstantial. However, recent 
epigraphic evidence has brought to light the possibility that 
kinship links in the ancient world may have been more 
important than previously believed. Polybius makes very little 
mention of kinship relationships in his histories, although he 
was aware of them, stating that since his intention was to 
provide a history that would be of practical use to his readers, he 
would ignore this factor 24 For most of the Hellenistic period the 
Aetolian league and Elis were allied, though Polybius gives no 
explanation as to why these two states co-operated with each 
other. This alliance, especially its closeness, has been noted; very 
little thought has been placed into why Elis would maintain such 
strong links with a state that Polybius describes as piratical' My 
argument in this section will be that the close relationship 
between Elis and the Aetolian league, and subsequent Aetolian 
actions in the Peloponnese during the Hellenistic period were 
24See Polyb. 5.76.11. "The Selgians after nearly losing their country owing to the impious 
treachery of Logbasis, preserved it by their own valour and disgraced neither their 
liberty nor their kinship with the Spartans". See Polyb. 9.2.1-7 for Polybius' attitude to 
kinship links in the writing of history. 
u Larsen (1975) pp. 161 suggests that the Aetolians were in absolute control over Elis. 
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linked to a belief hgld by both the Eleans and Aetolians that they 
shared a common mythical heritage. 
The Xanthos/Cytenion inscription is the obvious starting 
point for a discussion of Aetolian attitudes towards kinship 
relations. The inscription itself deals with the appeal made by 
Cytenion to Xanthos in Lycia asking for financial aid to repair 
damage caused to its walls by earlier Macedonian attacks and an 
earthquake. The inscription recording the appeal and the 
response stresses the ancient bonds that tied the two poleis 
together 26 The description of the relationship between the 
Dorian peoples can be found throughout the appeal and is 
stressed in lines 73-79 27 Should the document be taken at face 
value? Cytenion was a small settlement about twenty-four 
kilometres north of Delphi subject to the control of the Aetolian 
league. In the document, dated to some time after 205BC, the 
inhabitants of Cytenion sought and received the permission of 
the Aetolian assembly before making their appeal 28 There was a 
time lapse between the destruction of the walls and the appeal 
for aid and Bousquet suggests that the inhabitants of Cytenion 
' For the text see SEG XXXVIII. 1476. For a translation of the document into French see 
Bousquet (1988) p. 16ff. See Erskine (1997) pp. 133-6. 
'Hornblower (1996) pp. 71-72 points out that Dorian syngeneia was important to all the 
states involved. 
" Walbank (1989) p. 192 dates the destruction caused by the forces of Antigonus Doson 
to shortly before the embassy of Nicophanes and Cercidas of Megalopolis in 225-6BC. 
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were adept at gaining financial contributions from other states 
29 
However, a small community like Cytenion may have found it 
difficult to both finance and organise such a large project. 
If one looks at the inscription for evidence that Aetolian 
foreign policy was influenced by claims of pan-Dorian 
brotherhood, reference is made to Ptolemy's descent from 
Hercules, the same descent that the inhabitants of Cytenion and 
Xanthos share 30 The embassy was sent with the approval of the 
Aetolian league's assembly which stated that any aid 
forthcoming from Xanthos would be acceptable not only to the 
inhabitants of Cytenion, but also to the Aetolians, Ptolemy and 
all other Dorians 31 So, although a small community in need of 
financial assistance made the appeal, it was done in a context 
where all the states involved publicly acknowledged a belief in a 
common origin. 32 
The problem lies in how much credence Greeks placed in 
the mythical kinship links that they acknowledged between each 
other. Curty argues that kinship relationships were closely 
defined and can be divided into three specific types, philia, 
oikeiotes and syngeneia, suggesting that the language employed in 
29 Bousquet (1988) p. 44-5. 
30 Walbank (1989) p. 184 and Hornblower (1996) p. 79. 
31 See Lines 73-4 and 79-88. 
'Z The case of the Aetolian polis of Ariginoe demonstrates how close the relationship was, 
this settlement voluntarily changed its name from Konope to one derived from a 
member of the Ptolemaic monarchy. Cohen (1995) p. 109. 
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them was precise and rarely interchangeable ' Hornblower 
doubts that kinship can be defined this closely and points out 
that a certain amount of caution has to be exercised, since much 
of the information relating to mythical kinship in Thucydides, in 
particular the relationship between Macedonia and Argos, comes 
from Herodotus ' However, Hornblower accepts that 
Thucydides was aware of the significance of these links. The 
problem lies in the question of whether or not claims of mythical 
kinship were sometimes conveniently created to explain existing 
political alliances ' For example, reference is made to the kinship 
links between Aetolia and Axos on Crete in the alliance formed 
between the two, where in reality strategic considerations were 
probably responsible 
Turning towards the relationship between Elis and Aetolia, 
one must firstly consider the mythological record. Starting with 
Pausanias, the legends he records are confined to the coastal 
plain of Aetolia. According to Pausanias, writing in the second 
century AD, the father of the Aetolian ethnos, Aetolus, was born 
in Elis 37 Aetolus was the son of Endymion and the nymph Neis, 
and was forced to give up his claim to the throne of Elis after he 
33 Cumly. (1995) pp. 215-231. 
3' Hornblower (1996) p. 70. 
'5 Erskine (2001) pp. 163-8. 
3' Curty (1995) numbers 14 and 35. 
37 Paus. 5.1.8. 
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killed Apis ? He moved to Aetolia, which at the time was 
occupied by the Curetes, whom he eventually overcame in the 
episode recorded in the sequence in the Iliad dealing with 
Meleager's boar hunt. 39 According to Strabo, the Curetes moved 
to Acarnania where they settled 4° Aetolus' sons, Calydon and 
Pleuron, came to dominate the area and the two major 
communities on the Aetolian coastal plain were named after 
them. It was from Aetolus' sons that famous Aetolian heroes 
such as Tydeus of Calydon were descended. 
Nor was this mythical movement all one-sided. Pausanias' 
account reflects a back and forth migration between Aetolia and 
Elis. One of the descendants of Aetolus, Oxylus, returned to Elis, 
where he was made king 41 Pausanias also states that the Eleans 
had crossed over from Calydon, suggesting that the Aetolians 
claimed that they originally came from Elis, and the Eleans that 
they had originated in Aetolia 42 
How important was this claimed mythical kinship to the 
Eleans and the Aetolians during the Hellenistic period, 
especially since the majority of the evidence for its existence is 
derived from such a late source? Although the relationship was 
undoubtedly close, Aetolians becoming Elean strategoi during 
'8Paus. 5.1.8. 
39 Homer I1.9.509ff. 
40 Strabo 10.3.4. See Bommelje (1988) p. 300. 
41 Paus 5.3.6. Aristotle Polit. 6.2.5. 
42 Paus. 5.1.3. 
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the Social War, there may be reasons for the alliance other than a 
belief in a common origin. Elis had opposed the formation of the 
Arcadian league, mostly because it laid claim to territory that fell 
under Arcadian control during the fourth century 43 Thus, when 
the Achaean league began to expand a century later under 
Aratus' leadership and incorporated most of Arcadia, the co- 
operation between the Aetolian league and Elis was possibly 
based on the political realties of the Hellenistic period. 
Perhaps one must first consider the limited evidence for the 
classical period; in particular an episode recorded in Diodorus 
where the Aetolians sent a force of a thousand men to assist the 
Eleans in 402BC. In discussing the preparations made in Elis to 
withstand the Spartan onslaught, Diodorus states that: 
A short time before this they had got from the Aetolians a 
thousand elite troops to help them. ` 
Although not a contemporary source, Diodorus draws 
attention to the significant contribution made by the Aetolians to 
assist Elis when it faced almost total destruction at the hands of 
Sparta. If one looks at contemporary evidence for claims of a 
kinship relationship between the two, there is a reference in 
Pindar to a belief in Elis that the founders of the Olympic games 
originated in Aetolia 45 
'3 Larsen (1968) pp. 189-92. 
4' Diodorus 14.17.9. See Unz (1986) p. 33, who doubts they were mercenaries. 
4'Pindar. OL. 3.12. 
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Thus, although the Aetolians may from time to time have 
adapted their mythology to suit political realties, the fact 
remains that in the fifth century the Aetolians sent a sizeable 
force across the Gulf of Corinth to assist Elis when Sparta 
threatened it. Furthermore, the mythical kinship relationship 
between the two was acknowledged in the fifth century. Does 
Polybius' stated belief that such links were not a worthy subject 
for pragmatike historia account for his failure to acknowledge such 
claims as a reason for the alliance between the two? Elis had 
resisted earlier attempts by the Arcadians to form a league. As 
an Arcadian, and a member of a vastly expanded Achaean 
league, Polybius had a different perspective on events in the 
Peloponnese from the Aetolians and Eleans. For example, 
Cynaetha, on the Arcadian/Elean border was surrendered by 
some of its citizens to the Aetolians in 220BC before the outbreak 
of the Social War. Although Polybius mentions internal strife in 
this polls and digresses at great length about the uses of music in 
education, Cynaetha had earlier favoured an alliance with Elis 
and had been brought within the Achaean league against its will 
by Aratus 46 Thus, was this a betrayal by social revolutionaries 
from the lower classes who hoped for the re-distribution of land? 
Or rather does it indicate that Elis used the kinship bond it had 
with the Aetolians to appeal for assistance when it felt its 
'6 Walbank (1936) pp. 64-71. 
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position endangered and that a faction in Cynaetha viewed the 
Aetolians as the kinsmen of their allies in Elis? 
Aetolian Piracy and the Peloponnese? Proxenia and Asylia 
Decrees. 
Of the epigraphic remains found at Thermon, the political 
centre of the Aetolian league during the Hellenistic period, the 
number of proxenia and isopoliteia decrees are the most abundant, 
since the Aetolian league negotiated proxenia relationships with 
citizens of nearly all the major islands and seaboard states! 7 It is 
not easy to assess what the granting of these honours means for 
our understanding of the Aetolian league's relations with other 
states. The intention of this section will be to place Aetolian 
proxenia relationships in their proper context. 
According to Davies, proxenia as a concept was intended to 
regulate and assist the flow of commercial activity between 
states. Proxenia was a necessary part of trade, since the recipient 
would be expected to assist in disputes on behalf of the state that 
had awarded him this honour 4S Returning to Polybius' 
contention that the Aetolians were a nation of pirates and 
brigands, we are left with the question of whether or not this was 
true. Polybius describes them as such only in regard to their 
actions in the Peloponnese before the outbreak of the Social War. 
"Benecke (1934) p. 31. 
'' CAH vol. 7 (2"d ed. ) p. 288. 
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If one accepts that piracy was an essential part of the Aetolian 
economy there is the question of how they could have carried it 
out since the Aetolian coastline is a vast lagoon, hindering the 
development of maritime activities 49 The only evidence for 
Aetolian piracy is one interpretation of asylia decrees, in which 
one state promised another protection from acts such as piracy. 
The conclusion by the Aetolian league of asylia agreements with 
maritime states such as Chios, Delos and Mytilene suggests that 
these states had gained immunity from Aetolian piracy, through 
what Davies describes as a system of state sponsored 
blackmail 50However, asylia has also been linked with diplomacy, 
both in Aetolia and elsewhere 51 
Thus, we are left with the problem of whether the Aetolians 
concluded proxenia agreements in order to gain assistance in 
their piratical activities or, rather, to cement their commercial 
and political relations with other states. It is interesting to see 
how one recipient of Aetolian proxenia acted during a period of 
crisis. According to Livy, Euthymidas was exiled from Chalcis 
because he tried to ally it with the Aetolian league in 192BC in a 
co-ordinated attempt by the Aetolians to seize control over key 
Greek states before the outbreak of war with Rome 52 It appears 
certain that the same individual became an Aetolian proxenos in 
09 Grainger (1999) p. 24 
50 CAH. VII. (2nd ed. ) pp. 285-90. 
51 Rigsby (1996) p. 17. 
52 Livy. 35.37.1-38.4. 
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208BC 53 So although grants of proxenia may have originated on a 
commercial basis, the ties created probably resulted in the 
recipient favouring the Aetolian league politically. Thus, if the 
grants of proxenia by the Aetolian league secured the support of 
individuals in communities who expounded a pro-Aetolian 
view, the extensive network of proxenia relations that the 
Aetolian league formed begins to take on a new light. 
If one looks at the Peloponnese, the Aetolians concluded a 
proxenia alliance with inhabitants of every major state there 
during the Hellenistic period, including Polybius' native 
Megalopolis. Whatever their motives may have been, we still 
have to understand the relationship between the image derived 
from Polybius' depiction of " Aetolian actions and the evidence 
that many, presumably influential, citizens in the Peloponnese 
were Aetolian proxenoi. 
Turning firstly towards Dyme, the Aetolian league 
concluded a number of proxenia relationships with inhabitants of 
this polis TM The decrees themselves remain fairly formulaic, with 
just the names of the officials involved and the recipient 
mentioned 55 A similar pattern is followed in the surrounding 
poleis that were the founding members of the Achaean league; 
the Aetolian league concluded proxenia relationships with four of 
53 IG. IX. 1(2)1.31 Line 67. 
'' Polyb. 2.41.1-8. 
IG. IX. 1(2)1.13 Lines 35-6; IG IX. 1(2) 1.34. line 22. 
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the principal poleis that formed the original Achaean league, 
including Aegium, which was its capital until 188BC. If one 
accepts the argument that the Aetolians used proxenia to assist 
their piratical activities, it is possible that they were using these 
awards to further their position in coastal areas that they may 
have wished to prey on. However, links between poleis on either 
side of the Gulf of Corinth had been very 'strong since the archaic 
period. Craftsmen from Sicyon and Corinth assisted in the 
development of the Aetolians' religious centre at Thermon, so it 
seems only natural that there should have been proxenia relations 
between these communities. This situation continues along the 
northern coast of the Peloponnese; inhabitants of Sicyon, another 
polis that had long-standing links with the Aetolian league, were 
Aetolian proxenoi 56 
Apart from the northern shore of the Peloponnese, the 
Aetolian league seems to have concentrated proxenia agreements 
with individuals in areas of the Peloponnese that were of 
strategic importance to them, such as Messene, Phigaleia, Sparta, 
Telphusa, Thurioi and Argos 57 The final polls in the Peloponnese 
For Sicyon see IG. IX. 1 (2)1.17 lines 14,49,80 and 85. 
57 Messene and Phigaleia IG. IX. 1(2) 1.12H Line 47, IG. IX. 1 (2) 1.17. lines 7 and 62; IG. IX. 
I(2) . 1.31 lines 23 and 34-5; IG. IX. 1(2) 1.13.1ine 19. 
Sparta IG. IX. 1(2) 1.17 line 78; IG. IX. 1(2) 1.29 line 11. 
Telphusa, Thurioi and Argos, see IG. IX. 1(2) 1.31 line 89; IG. IX. 1(2) 1.31 line 18 and 
IG. IX. 1(2) 1.25 line 9. 
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whose inhabitants the Aetolians established proxenia relations 
with was Megalopolis 58 
It must be asked whether these relationships should be seen 
simply in a commercial context. For example, proxenia 
relationships existed between the Aetolian league and 
individuals in Ambrakia, Phaloria and Larisa, all communities 
bordering on Macedonia, a traditional rival of the Aetolian 
league, suggesting a strategic basis. In Italy, the Aetolian league 
concluded proxenia relationships with individuals in most of the 
important Greek commercial ports 59 It is not inconceivable that 
these relationships might have originated for commercial 
reasons, but once formed, created a situation where political 
support ensued when the Aetolian league faced a crisis, as the 
case of Euthymidas in 192BC suggests. 
As with the claimed mythical kinship link that existed 
between Elis and the Aetolian league, Polybius' depiction of the 
relationship that the Aetolian league had with the Peloponnese is 
very different from what the evidence provided by proxenia 
decrees suggests. The proliferation of links between the Aetolian 
league and important and influential citizens in many poleis in 
the Peloponnese suggests that Aetolian league had long 
established commercial and strategic interests there. 
IG. IX. 1(2) 1.13 lines 8 and 11; IG. IX. I(2) 1.17 lines 7 and 62 and IG. IX. I. (2)1.31 line 78. 
Naples IG. IX. 1(2)1.33 
Tarentum IG. IX I(2)1.24 lines 12,31 and 83 
Syracuse IG. IX. 1 (2) 1.17. Line 67. 
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Polybius, the Cleomenic War and the socio-economic question 
in Sparta. 
Apart from the Aetolian league, the other state that 
challenged the Achaean league for control over the Peloponnese 
during the Hellenistic period, prior to Roman involvement, was 
Sparta and as with the Aetolians, Hellenistic Spartan kings 
receive negative treatment in Polybius' histories. However, we 
are not solely dependent on Polybius as a source for Sparta 
during this period since Plutarch wrote lives of Agis and 
Cleomenes in parallel with the Gracchi, apparently using 
Polybius' contemporary Phylarchus as his primary source. This 
creates an interesting situation, since the existence of an 
alternative source has drawn historians' attention to Hellenistic 
Sparta. Of particular interest are the reforms of Agis and 
Cleomenes, especially their socio-economic aspects, such as the 
re-distribution of land, the enlargement of the citizen body and 
the abolition of debts. Sparta during the Hellenistic period has 
been depicted by historians as suffering from a socio-economic 
crisis, with the gap between rich and poor becoming ever wider, 
accounting for Cleomenes' popularity. 
Should we accept Plutarch's account of the situation in 
Sparta and his stress on the influence that Stoic philosophy 
played in influencing reforms there? Polybius fails to make any 
mention of Cleomenes' social reforms as a justification for the 
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Achaean league's decision to invite the Macedonians to re-enter 
the Peloponnese. Polybius' only mention of Cleomenes carrying 
out reforms comes in an indirect reference to Cheilon, a later 
Spartan king, who- , Polybius stated, believed that: 
If he followed in Cleomenes' footsteps by holding out to the 
multitude the hope of allotments and redistribution of the 
lands, he would soon have the masses behind him. 60 
Polybius extensively discusses -the military campaigns of 
Cleomenes in the part of his histories that survive intact, but this 
is his only reference to any of Cleomenes' reforms and no 
indication is given as to what stage in his career it came. In 
discussing change in Sparta, Polybius merely states that 
Cleomenes overthrew the ancient constitution and turned 
himself from a king into a tyrant without elaborating on what 
actually happened. As Piper notes, Cleomenes made no attempt 
to extend his reforms outside Sparta; they were limited to the 
citizen body. " 
Since Polybius does not describe the Spartan kings of the 
late third century BC as social revolutionaries, it might be more 
profitable to consider Plutarch who does. Writing in the second 
century AD, Plutarch's intention was to compare the lives of two 
Spartan kings, Agis and Cleomenes, with the Gracchi, to draw 
parallels from the lives of famous figures in both Greek and 
ti° Po1yb. 4.81.2. and Polyb. 4.81.13. 
"' Piper (1986) pp. 65-66. 
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Roman history which would give moral instruction to his 
readers. Given that comparisons between Rome and Sparta were 
long established, Plutarch's decision to choose two Spartan kings 
was natural 62 
The extent to which Plutarch's writings on the Gracchi 
influence his thoughts and presentation of events in Greece in 
the third century has only recently been considered ` It is 
generally accepted that Plutarch draws much of his information 
about Cleomenes from Phylarchus, but since the latter does not 
survive we know little about his writings apart from the fact that 
he was pro-Spartan and that Polybius criticised his work as 
sensational. Phylarchus' philosophical attitude, whether he was 
a Stoic or a Cynic, is unknown. We have little knowledge of the 
vocabulary that he used and it is evident that Plutarch did not 
copy out his source, but re-organised it and changed the 
vocabulary. Although the life of Cleomenes contains Stoic 
epithets, they originate with Plutarch' Plutarch presents 
Cleomenes' actions as those of a social reformer influenced by 
Stoic philosophy; it is by no means evident that Phylarchus did. 
The fear that the Peloponnese would fall into the hands of a 
reformer who favoured the masses is taken for granted by some 
historians. It is based on evidence provided by Plutarch, a source 
62 See Cicero De Off 2.80 for an earlier example. 
6' Erskine (1990) p. 127-8 draws particular attention to Agis. 
"See Erskine (1990) p. 132. 
88 
whose wider picture of Spartan society has recently come in for 
re-appraisal. 
If one looks at Cleomenes' reforms as detailed by Plutarch, 
for the first five years of his reign Cleomenes failed to take any 
action, starting only after Aratus had captured the polis of 
Mantinea. When Cleomenes tried to retaliate, according to 
Plutarch, he was forced to bribe the ephors for permission `0 When 
Cleomenes tried to restore the diarchy by recalling Archidamus, 
Agis' brother, the ephors had Archidamus murdered before his 
arrival66 After this, according to Plutarch, Cleomenes began to 
plot with his mother Cratesicleia and other prominent citizens 
and eventually murdered the ephors and exiled eighty leading 
Spartan citizens 67 When this had been achieved, Cleomenes 
introduced a number of reforms; the ephorate was abolished, the 
agoge, the traditional training of boys was revived, as were the 
common messes for men. With regard to land, Cleomenes 
ordered that it should be divided into four thousand equally 
sized plots, that suitable foreigners should be made citizens, and 
all debts should be abolished. ' 
65 Plut. Cleom. 6.1. 
"Plut. Cleom. 5.2-3. Polyb. 5.37.1-6. suggests that Cleomenes, not the ephors, was 
responsible for this murder. 
67Plutarch emphasises the Stoic element in Cleomenes' education by Sphaerus of 
Borysthenes and his marriage to Agis' widow. Plut Cleom 1.1-2,2.2. Walbank (1984) p. 
456 doubts this element in the narrative. 
`8 Plut. Cleom. 10.6. Shimron (1972) pp. 151-2. 
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It is interesting to contrast these reforms with those carried 
out in 146BC, when the Achaean league was facing war with 
Rome 69 According to Fuks, at least three areas of possible social 
revolutionary activity can be seen in the actions undertaken by 
the leadership of the Achaean league that year: the abolition of 
debts, the freeing of slaves and the use of the wealth of the elite. 
On closer examination these reforms seem to be an attempt by 
the Achaean leadership to gain popular support in its struggle 
against Rome. '° If one remembers that Plutarch's intention was to 
write a parallel life of the Gracchi, his presentation of 
Cleomenes' actions as ones influenced by Stoic philosophy may 
be a distortion of what actually happened. Phylarchus presented 
events from a Spartan point of view; his transmission through 
Plutarch leads to an assumption that there were social problems 
in Sparta that are not evident in Polybius' account of this conflict. 
Cleomenes' reforms may have been an attempt to gain popular 
support at a time when Sparta faced severe difficulties. For 
example, after Macedonian troops had entered the Peloponnese, 
in an attempt to gain both money and troops, Cleomenes is said 
to have sold six-thousand helots their freedom in return for five 
minas a head. " Cleomenes was willing to carry out this reform to 
gain a short-term advantage at the end of the war. Were his 
69 Shimron (1972) p. 133-4 comments on the irony in the reversal of roles, since at this 
time the Achaeans are the radicals and the Spartans the conservatives. 
70 Fuks (1970) pp. 79-86. 
" Plut. Cleom. 23.1. 
90 
earlier reforms influenced by Stoicism, or rather were they 
measures designed to increase Spartan military effectiveness? 72 
It cannot be doubted that Cleomenes did introduce changes 
in Spartan society. Polybius' reference to a later Spartan king 
following in his footsteps by holding out to the multitude the 
hope of re-distributing land would seem to indicate that at some 
stage of his reign Cleomenes proposed this reform. What is 
unclear is the impetus behind these reforms and why Polybius 
did not make any direct reference to this aspect of Cleomenes' 
reign. Erskine suggests that Polybius may have downplayed 
Cleomenes' reforms because he did not wish to undermine the 
fragile socio-economic basis of the Achaean league. 73 He draws 
attention to Polybius' reference to events at Cynaetha, which 
surrendered itself to an Aetolian raiding force just before the 
outbreak of the Social War, where sometime between 241 and 
229BC there had been calls for the re-distribution of land. 74 In 
discussing events at Cynaetha, Polybius makes mention of a 
group of restored exiles whom allowed the Aetolian raiders into 
this polis, and the calls for land re-distribution that heralded their 
exile. 
Should events at this polls be seen solely as evidence of 
socio-economic problems in the Peloponnese? Cynaetha's 
n For the earlier use of slaves in the Spartan army see Hunt (1998) pp. 171-5. 
'3 Erskine (1990) p. 127. 
74 Polyb. 4.17.4-5. Walbank (1957) p. 464 suggests a date nearer to 227BC. 
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location in northern Arcadia suggests that it favoured allying 
with Elis, since it had broken away from the Arcadian league in 
favour of an alliance with Elis in 244BC. 75 Aratus had forced 
Cynaetha into the Achaean league by a surprise attack similar to 
his more famous assault on Corinth and the exiles might have 
been created in the aftermath of this episode. In the context of 
the claimed mythical kinship link between Elis and the 
Aetolians, what has in the past been seen as evidence of class 
conflict in the Peloponnese, may actually have been an attempt 
by some inhabitants of Cynaetha to' end its membership of the 
Achaean league in favour of an alliance with the Eleans and their 
Aetolian kinsmen. 
The Outbreak of the Cleomenic War and the Achaean alliance 
with Macedonia. 
Although the Cleomenic War falls outside the period that 
Polybius states will be covered by his histories, he informs his 
readers that he will give a long digression on it because: 
I thought that it would be of service, or rather that the 
original plan of this work made it necessary for me to 
make clearly known to everybody the state of affairs in 
Macedonia and Greece. 76 
75 Polyb. 4.77.9-10 
76 Polyb. 2.71.2. 
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Why did Polybius feel it necessary to have such a long 
digression on events in the Peloponnese, especially when, 
presumably, Aratus had covered these events in his Memoirs? 
Was Polybius' intention merely to carry on from where Aratus 
finished his work, or was it to provide another view on the 
affairs of the Achaean league? There is the problem that 
although we know that Aratus wrote Memoirs, which Plutarch 
used, they do not survive, except in fragments. After the battle 
of Sellasia, for the latter part of Aratus' career, Plutarch used 
Polybius as his source, suggesting that he began his histories 
from the point where Aratus had stopped. ' Given that Aratus 
had devoted most of his life to ridding the Peloponnese of 
Macedonian influence, he may have considered that Antigonus 
Doson re-gaining control over this region was a suitable point 
to finish. 
However, despite the assumption that Polybius started his 
histories from the point where Aratus stopped, there are 
differences in the sources as to who . was responsible 
for the 
outbreak of the Cleomenic War. Furthermore, in his account of 
the eventual decision to invite the Macedonians to re-enter the 
Peloponnese, Polybius' account is vague as to the reasons 
behind this decision and who was actually responsible for 
taking it. Polybius places the blame for the outbreak of the war 
on the treacherous nature of the Aetolians, Macedonians and 
" Porter (1939) p. XIX 
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Spartans. After discussing the early history and development of 
the Achaean league, Polybius states that: 
The Achaeans, being naturally thus materially increased in 
extent and power, the Aetolians, owing to that 
unprincipled passion for aggrandisement which is natural 
to them, either out of envy, or rather in the hope of 
partitioning the poleis... joined hands with Antigonus and 
Cleomenes. 78 
As Walbank points out, this sequence of events is 
improbable. He suggests that Polybius was merely reproducing 
Aratus' tendentious account of events 9 Walbank argues that it 
is doubtful whether it was with the acquiescence of the Aetolian 
league that Cleomenes seized a number of poleis in Arcadia, 
which were members of the Achaean league 80 
Plutarch's account of the outbreak of the war is different. 
Although Polybius presents the Spartans acting aggressively, 
Plutarch in his life of Cleomenes states that: 
Aratus, the most powerful man amongst the Achaeans, was 
from the start desirous of bringing the Peloponnes`ians into 
one confederation... nearly all of them adopted his views, 
but the Spartans, Eleans and the Arcadians who sided with 
78 Polyb. 2.45.1. 
Walbank (1957) p. 239. Followed by Urban (1972) p. 131. 
e0 Walbank (1957) p. 243 suggests that the Aetolian league's interests in the Peloponnese 
were focused elsewhere. Cleomenes at the same time fortified the temple of Athena at 
Belinatis inside Megalopolitan territory: Plut. Cleom. 4.4. 
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the Spartans refused. Therefore, as soon as Leonidas was 
dead, Aratus began to harass the Arcadians, and ravaged 
the territories of those especially who were adjacent to the 
Achaeans... his object was to put the Spartans to the test. " 
Aratus does not seem to have been the sole Achaean leader 
who favoured an aggressive policy towards Sparta. In 234BC 
when Lydiades, the former tyrant who brought Megalopolis 
within the Achaean league was elected Achaean strategos, his 
first action was to attack Sparta 82 Although Polybius places the 
blame for the outbreak of war on others; Plutarch's account 
suggests that the Spartans were responding to provocation by 
Aratus and the Achaean league. 
Cleomenes' seizure of these Arcadian poleis brought about 
a declaration of war by the Achaean league and later that year 
Aratus captured Caphyae 83 Cleomenes responded by 
advancing into Arcadia, seizing Methydrium, which belonged 
to Megalopolis ' When in response the Achaean league's 
strategos Aristomachus led an army consisting of twenty 
thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry against Cleomenes' 
force of five thousand men, Aratus forced the Achaeans to 
61 Plut. Cleom. 3.4-5. 
az Plut. Arat. 30.3. 
83 Polyb. 2.46.2. and Plut. Cleom . 4.4. 
" Polyb. 2.46.5. Walbank (1957) p. 243. 
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retreat after the two armies had met at Pallantium, despite the 
massive superiority in numbers they enjoyed 85 
Who was responsible for the aggressive policy towards 
Sparta that the Achaean league undertook? Gruen has noted the 
influence that Megalopolitans had in defining the Achaean 
league's policy towards Sparta after it became a member in 
235BC 86 The Achaean league was simultaneously attacking Elis, 
suggesting an Arcadian dominated policy. "' If Megalopolitans 
guided this policy, we have to ask how acceptable it was to 
other members of the Achaean league. When Cleomenes 
captured Leuctra shortly afterwards, Aratus refused to engage 
him in open battle. His hipparch, Lydiades of Megalopolis, led 
the cavalry against Cleomenes' army and was killed 88 Aratus 
was censured for his failure to give battle and after Lydiades' 
death, the Achaean army proceeded to Aegium where they 
voted not to finance any further campaigns, a move that made 
Aratus resign his office as strategos. According to Plutarch, the 
delegates resolved that: 
85 Plut. Cleom. 4.4-5. Walbank (1984) p. 457 suggests that his motive was to retain the 
subsidy from Egypt that the Achaean league received. 
'6 See Gruen (1972) p. 609-25, Cartledge (1989) p. 41 and Green (1990) p. 292. Walbank 
(1933) p. 71 commenting on the earlier difficulties surrounding the entry of Argos into 
the Achaean league, suggests that the delay was caused by Aratus' desire not to allow 
Lydiades to negotiate the conditions of entry, in case it would increase the anti- 
Macedonian bloc that existed within the Achaean league. 
87 P1ut. Arat. 36.1-2; Plut. Cleom. 5.1. 
"8 Plut. Arat. 36.1. Cleom 6.4. 
96 
If Aratus wanted to wage war, he must provide the means 
himself. " 
It appears that an expanded Achaean league undertook 
aggressive actions against Sparta at the behest of Megalopolis. 
Should Cleomenes' reforms, which took place around this time, 
be seen as evidence of social problems in Sparta? Plutarch states 
that Cleomenes wished to regenerate Spartan society, in 
particular its citizen body, so that: 
The strongest of them might be made Spartan citizens and 
help to preserve the state by their arms. " In this way" he 
said, "we shall cease to behold Sparta the booty of Aetolians 
and Illyrians through lack of men to defend her". " 
It appears that Cleomenes was reacting against an 
aggressive policy that the Achaean league had instituted, after 
its expansion into Arcadia had added a new dimension to an 
ongoing struggle for control over the Peloponnese. Gruen has 
drawn attention to the role that Megalopolitans, especially 
Lydiades, played in the conduct of this conflict; Urban has 
pointed out how Megalopolis' desire to re-acquire Triphylia 
from Elis may have been a possible factor in provoking the 
conflict 91 Was this policy acceptable to the elite in poleis like 
Dyme, Sicyon and Corinth, who would have had a different 
Walbank (1984) p. 458 argues that Lydiades' supporters were to blame for Aratus' 
resignation. Plut. Arat. 38.1. 
90 Plut. Cleom. 10.6. 
91 Urban (1972) p. 115-6. 
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regional interest from their Arcadian counterparts within the 
Achaean league? Although both Plutarch and Polybius present 
Aratus as the dominant figure in the Achaean league, it would 
appear that Megalopolitan interests dominated the policy 
followed by the Achaean league after 235BC. So were later 
events credited to Aratus by Polybius his sole responsibility, or 
rather the result of Megalopolitan pressure? 
Polybius, the embassy of Nicophanes and Cercidas and the 
Achaean league's appeal to Antigonus. 
The most obvious point at which Arcadian influence on the 
policies of the Achaean league can be seen is the embassy sent 
to Macedonia to sound out Antigonus Doson about intervening 
in support of the Achaean league against Sparta. Polybius 
claims that Aratus secretly sent a mission led by Nicophanes 
and Cercidas of Megalopolis to Macedonia, because he could 
see how Megalopolis was suffering in the face of Spartan 
attacks 92 Polybius continues to claim that Aratus did not make 
his decision to send this mission public knowledge and that: 
Consequently Aratus was compelled in public both to do 
and say many things contrary to his real intention. " 
And as a result: 
92 Polyb. 2.48.1-7. That Aratus was solely responsible for the dispatch of this mission is 
generally accepted. See for example Walbank (1984) pp. 461-462. 
93 Polyb. 2.47.10. 
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For this reason there are some similar matters that Aratus 
does not even refer to in his Memoirs. 94 
However, while unlike Plutarch, we do not have Aratus' 
Memoirs to consult, he tells us that when the decision was later 
taken to ask for assistance from Macedonia: 
Aratus says everything that he can in explaining the 
necessity that was upon him. Polybius however says that for 
a long time, and before the need arose, Aratus mistrusted 
the daring nature of Cleomenes and made secret approaches 
to Antigonus, besides putting the Megalopolitans forward 
to beg the Achaeans to call in Antigonus. 95 
One might question whether Aratus, who had devoted 
much of his life to ridding the Peloponnese of the Macedonian 
presence would have initiated secret talks with Antigonus. Orsi 
has suggested that the embassy was sent with the intention of 
securing an epimachia, or a defensive alliance; and unofficially to 
sound out Antigonus on the possibility of an eventual Achaean 
alliance with Macedonia 96 She suggests that Aratus later 
disowned it in his Memoirs because his earlier decision to seek 
an epimachia might have been a hindrance to a full alliance at a 
later stage 97 
94 Polyb. 2.47.11. Walbank (1957) p. 247 suggests that Polybius got this story from his own 
circles in Megalopolis. 
95 P1ut. Arat. 38.7. 
% Orsi (1991) pp. 78-79. 
97 Orsi (1991) p. 90-93. 
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Should we accept Polybius' assertion that Aratus, who had 
made his reputation as an anti-Macedonian leader, was secretly 
responsible for sending two Megalopolitans on a mission to 
Macedonia, because, according to Polybius, he could see how 
Megalopolis was suffering from Cleomenes' assaults? Before 
Megalopolis joined the Achaean league in 235BC it had been one 
of Macedonia's closest allies in the Peloponnese 98 Lydiades' 
decision to bring it within the Achaean league had severed the 
ties between the two. Walbank suggested that his death would 
make an approach by Megalopolitans to Antigonus easier since 
he could be blamed for any sense of betrayal that might exist' 
Polybius' account of the Cleomenic War comes after his account 
of the development of the Achaean league, with its stress on 
unity and it may be that Polybius was trying to defend 
Megalopolitans against accusations that they had betrayed the 
Achaean league to suit their own interests. In stating that Aratus 
was secretly responsible for this mission, but that for reasons 
that are not specified, was unable to acknowledge his role in his 
Memoirs, Polybius' intention may have been to explain this 
embassy to his contemporaries; at times he even appears to be 
defensive. 
98 Walbank (1957) p. 247 points to Demosthenes' attack on Cercidas' ancestral namesake 
for being pro-Macedonian. 
" Walbank (1984) p. 461. 
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Regarding the ambassadors, Polybius claims that both were 
family friends of Aratus, hence his choice of them to approach 
Macedonia. According to Polybius, although the ambassadors 
were Megalopolitan and Aratus had sent the embassy because of 
Cleomenes' attacks on Megalopolis: 
They said no more than they needed about their own polis, 
dealing with this matter briefly and hastily, but dwelt at 
length on the general situation, in the manner that Aratus 
had told them to. 1°° 
The threat that both ambassadors were supposed to have 
related to Antigonus was that if Sparta and the Aetolian league 
were to co-operate, or if Sparta came to dominate the 
Peloponnese, Macedonia would find itself endangered. 
Although Walbank assumes that Polybius is repeating Aratus' 
account of the embassy, he admits that a Spartan dominated 
Peloponnese was no threat to Macedonia. Nor does Walbank 
accept that the possibility of an alliance between Sparta and the 
Aetolian league was anything more than a slight danger to 
Antigonus' interests 10' The alliance that the ambassadors 
predicted did in fact emerge during the Social War and Polybius 
might have been trying to persuade his readers that the embassy 
was an attempt by Aratus to gain assistance before this 
happened. 
10° Polyb. 2.50.1. 
'°' Walbank (1957) p. 248. For the threat see Polyb. 2.49.1. 
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Thus we are left with the problem of whether Polybius' 
account of this embassy reflects his desire to portray the unity of 
the Achaean league so that anacyclosis' influence on its system of 
government could be contrasted with Rome. 102 In the period in 
which he was writing Megalopolis had been a member of the 
Achaean league for over a century: at the time that the embassy 
was sent this membership had existed for only a few years. So it 
should be asked whether responsibility for this move was solely 
Aratus', or rather, as in the case of the aggressive policy 
undertaken by the Achaean league towards Sparta and Elis, the 
result of Megalopolitan influence over the Achaean league's 
policy. 
Polybius' defensiveness about this mission can be seen in his 
account of the Achaean assembly that discussed it. He states that 
the ambassadors returned with a letter that stated that the 
Macedonians would assist them, but only if and when they 
received permission from the rest of the Achaeans. When this 
was debated at the Achaean assembly, we are informed by 
Polybius that: 
The Megalopolitans appeared before the council of the league 
and showed them the king's letter, assured them of his 
friendly sentiments, and at the same time begged the 
102 Eckstein (1995) p. 198-201 points to the similarities and defensive tone both in this 
speech and Polybius' account of this mission with his account of events in 198BC, when 
the Achaean league under the leadership of Aristaenus of Megalopolis allied with Rome. 
However, Aristaenus' speech in 198BC is actually in Livy, not Polybius 
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Achaeans to ask for his intervention at once. When Aratus 
saw that this was the inclination of the Achaeans he rose, 
and after expressing his gratification at the king's readiness 
to assist them.... he addressed them, begging them if 
possible to attempt to save their poleis and ethnos by their 
own efforts, that being the most honourable and 
advantageous action. But should adverse fortune prevent 
this, then, but only when they had no hope in their own 
efforts, he advised them to appeal to their f riends for aid. l°3 
Polybius' account implies that for Aratus Macedonian 
intervention was the last resort 104 If Aratus was responsible for 
opening discussions with Macedonia, it was a remarkable 
change from his long-established policy. He had been in receipt 
of a subsidy from Ptolemy since he had taken control over 
Sicyon because of his anti-Macedonian actions 105 By allowing the 
return of Antigonus Doson to the Peloponnese, the Achaean 
league became a Macedonian client until 198BC, a vassal of the 
state that Aratus had spent most of his adult life trying to 
remove from the Peloponnese. 
If Megalopolitans had initiated contact with Macedonia, as 
is likely enough in view of the earlier relationship between the 
two, without Aratus' knowledge, it would naturally be 
103 Polyb. 2.50.10-11. 
104 A point made by Eckstein (1995) p. 199. 
105 Plut. Arat. 11.2. There is some ambiguity as to who is the king referred to since it could 
be either Antigonus or Ptolemy, but Porter (1937) p. XLI suggests Ptolemy. 
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something that Polybius would not emphasise since it would be 
contrary to his stress on the unity of the Achaean league. By 
claiming that Aratus had knowledge of this move and that it had 
been carried out at his behest, Polybius was able to present what 
may have solely been a Megalopolitan move as one that had 
enjoyed the support of the entire Achaean league. 
Why would Megalopolis' inhabitants have acted in such an 
independent manner? Attention has been drawn to fear by 
members of the Achaean league's elite to Cleomenes possibly 
extending his reforms to the rest of the Peloponnese, and one of 
the ambassadors was known for his poetry that made reference 
to the masses. However, it is also evident that Cleomenes was at 
the point of defeating the Achaean league, and if he gained 
hegemony over the Achaean league, would dominate 
Megalopolis, a fate her elite would wish to avoid. 
Around the same time, Ptolemy removed his subsidy from 
the Achaean league and transferred it to Sparta. His stated 
reason for doing this was that it would better serve his purposes 
by: 
Setting Cleomenes on to attack Antigonus, as he hoped to be 
able to control more effectively the Macedonian kings with 
the support of the Spartans then with the Achaeans. '°6 
It appears that Ptolemy decided to remove his subsidy 
because Aratus had lost control over the policy of the Achaean 
106 Po1yb. 2.51.2-3. Walbank (1957) pp. 247-8 dates this to the winter of 226/25BC. 
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league and switched his support to Cleomenes because he 
regarded Spartan domination of the Peloponnese as the best 
means for securing this region against Antigonid control. 
Cleomenes again took the offensive, according to Plutarch, 
attacking Megalopolis, before turning towards the poleis that 
originally formed the Achaean league, defeating the Achaean 
army at Dyme. 107 A truce was arranged and Cleomenes was 
invited to discuss the question of hegemony over the Achaean 
league. The first conference was postponed because Cleomenes 
was ill and another was convened at Argos. "' When Aratus 
insisted that Cleomenes should not bring his army to the 
conference, but only a bodyguard of three, the truce broke 
down 109 Around the same time, according to Polybius, Aratus 
sent his son to the Macedonian court to negotiate. ll° 
However, Polybius completely ignores the events 
surrounding the decision to call on Macedonia, and after giving 
his account of the embassy of Nicophanes and Cercidas, he 
merely states that the circumstances brought about by 
Cleomenes' onslaught resulted in a situation whereby the 
Achaeans were: 
107 P1ut. Cleom. 14.1-2. Walbank (1984) p. 463. 
108 P1ut. Cleom. 14.2. Walbank (1984) p. 463. 
109 Plut. Cleom. 15.2., Walbank (1984) p. 464 suggests that the age difference was an 
important consideration; Aratus was unwilling to hand control of the Achaean league 
over to somebody so much younger than himself, so he sabotaged the meeting. 
70 Polyb. 2.51.4-5. 
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Compelled by their position to appeal with one voice to 
Antigonus, ill 
As Orsi notes, Polybius is deliberately vague about who 
exactly was responsible for this action, though she suggests that 
it was not the Achaean assembly, but rather a small group 
centred on Aratus. 112 Polybius' ambiguous account of these 
events, according to Orsi, was due to the legal position regarding 
the decision, since Aratus was exceeding his powers as 
strategos 13 
If one examines Plutarch's account of the events leading up 
to the decision, he states that when the decision was taken to 
invite Macedonian forces into the Peloponnese at a special 
assembly at Sicyon such was the situation brought about by 
Cleomenes' actions, that: 
Only a few of the Achaeans came to meet with Aratus. 
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Aratus was elected as Achaean strategos with full powers 
but when Aratus' appeal to the Aetolian league and Athens for 
assistance, was rejected, Cleomenes offered Aratus an annuity of 
twelve talents per year, provided that he was elected as 
hegemon 115 Having no other alternative, according to Plutarch, . 
Aratus went to the Achaean assembly at Aegium where the 
"' Polyb. 2.51.4 
"Z Orsi. (1991) p. 93. 
13 Orsi (1991) p. 97. 
114 Plut. Arat. 41.1. 
"s P1ut. Arat. 41.2 for the appeal to the Aetolians and Athens. 
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decision was taken to invite Antigonus to the Peloponnese 116 In 
light of Polybius' account of subsequent events and his 
allegations about their culpability in outbreak of the Cleomenic 
War, it is surprising that, according to Plutarch, Aratus first 
appealed to the Aetolian league for assistance and only agreed to 
call on Macedonia when it refused. This indicates that he 
regarded the Aetolian league as his first choice and only agreed 
to accept Macedonian assistance when they refused. 
Reaction in the Achaean league to Macedonian intervention. 
When Aratus did eventually accede to the pressures exerted 
on him to call on Antigonus Doson to intervene in the 
Peloponnese against Cleomenes, how acceptable was this to the 
various members of the Achaean league? The appeal to 
Macedonia was something Aratus only resorted to after the 
Aetolian league and Athens refused to support him. As Plutarch 
states about the subsequent reaction to excesses carried out by 
Macedonian troops in the Peloponnese: 
For these actions men blamed Aratus, not knowing that, 
since he had entrusted the reins to the king, and was 
dragged alongside him, he was no longer master of anything 
16 P1ut. Arat. 45.1-3 
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except his tongue, which it was dangerous for him to use 
withfreedom. ll' 
Plutarch's intention was to portray the tragic nature of this 
decision, how a man who had spent most of his life fighting 
against the Macedonians was forced in the end to seek salvation 
from his former enemies. As with Plutarch's emphasis on the 
Stoic influence on Cleomenes' reforms, we are left with the 
problem that he did not regard his lives as histories; his intention 
was to explore the character of those involved. The decision to 
call in Macedonian troops is usually seen in the context of 
possible socio-economic problems in the Peloponnese. The 
opposition found in Sicyon and Corinth indicates that these 
revolts were actually in opposition to the Macedonian presence 
in the Peloponnese and both revolts came after the entry of 
Macedonian troops to the Peloponnese, not before. Although 
Walbank states that these revolts saved Aratus the 
embarrassment of explaining such a volte-face, this assumes; 
firstly that Aratus had sole responsibility for this decision; 
secondly, that the motivation in both poleis was socio- 
economic. "' Though Plutarch suggests that these actions were 
undertaken because the common people wanted the re- 
distribution of land and the abolition of debts, he also states that: 
"' P1ut. Arat. 45.2-3. 
1' Walbank (1993) p. 198. 
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The leading men in many cases were unhappy with Aratus 
and some of them were also angry with him for bringing the 
Macedonians into the Peloponnese. "' 
At Corinth, the revolt came after the decision to invite the 
Macedonians had already been taken, suggesting that it was a 
response to the decision, not a cause of it. Plutarch states that the 
leading citizens allowed the Spartans to enter, indicating that 
although there is the possibility that the lower classes may have 
favoured Cleomenes, so did those with the most to lose had he 
favoured exporting reforms to the rest of the Peloponnese. 
As Urban noted, both Corinth and Sicyon had traditional 
links with Sparta, and the decision by members of their elite to 
allow Spartan troops entry might reflect the long-standing 
association between these poleis. 12° It is evident from Polybius' 
account of the decision to invite Macedonian troops into the 
Peloponnese that he does not wish to indicate who exactly was 
responsible for taking the decision. But if a small group took it, 
there is the possibility, given its long-standing links with 
Macedonia, that the representatives of Megalopolis and other 
Arcadian communities in the Achaean league may have been 
responsible for forcing the decision to call on Antigonus at the 
extraordinary assembly of the Achaean league, and that 
P1ut. Cleom. 17.3. 
120 Urban (1972) p. 207. 
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Polybius' evasiveness was because of the role that they had 
played in the decision. 
Antigonus' actions on entering the Peloponnese appear to 
have been aimed at securing the interests of the Argives and 
Arcadians within the Achaean league. He advanced on Argos, 
capturing it and restored the statues of former pro-Macedonian 
tyrants that Aratus had removed. Cleomenes was forced to 
retreat into the Peloponnese and was pursued by Antigonus, 
who bypassed the major Arcadian communities in order to expel 
the Spartan garrisons that surrounded Megalopolis 121 Cleomenes 
was defeated at Sellasia and fled to Egypt where he died in a 
coup attempt. lm In the resulting settlement the expanded 
Achaean league remained intact. The Macedonians regained 
control over the Acrocorinth, and Antigonus placed garrisons, 
which appear to have had a coercive role, in strategically 
important locations in the Peloponnese 123Taurion was left in the 
Peloponnese to oversee Macedonian interests, and the Achaean 
league became a Macedonian client. 124 More importantly, it also 
became a member of a Hellenic league, along with the 
Thessalians, Epirots, Acarnanians, Boeotians, Phocians and other 
The pro-Arcadian element in Antigonus' actions was noted by Larsen (1968) p. 321. 
For Sellasia see Polyb. 2.65-69. The death of Cleomenes see Plut. Cleom. 37.7. 
Larsen (1968) pp. 321-322. 
'Z' Polyb. 4.6.4-6. 
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Macedonian clients. Aratus continued as an advisor to the future 
Philip V, but died believing that Philip poisoned him 1" 
Polybius portrays the decision to call on Macedonia as one 
forced upon a unified Achaean league at a time when it had no 
other option. In reality it resulted in the Achaean league 
exchanging possible dominance by Sparta for actual dominance 
by Macedonia; domination by a kingdom that Aratus had spent 
most of his life resisting, presumably with the assistance of many 
communities within the Achaean league. The unrest within the 
Achaean league that is taken as a sign that Cleomenes was 
regarded by the oppressed masses as a liberator came after the 
decision to call on the Macedonians had been taken, not before it. 
At Corinth, which was garrisoned by Macedonian troops until 
Aratus captured it and brought it into the Achaean league, the 
revolt appears to have been motivated by hostility to Macedonia, 
not because Cleomenes' rule would lead to a more equitable 
social order. 
However, for Polybius it was indeed liberation from 
tyranny, though not the tyranny of rule by the masses. Rather it 
was a liberation from the possibility that Megalopolis would be 
forced to live under Spartan control. But was this necessarily in 
accordance with the wishes of all the other members of the 
Achaean league? The reaction to the decision at Sicyon and 
Corinth was revolts against the entry of Macedonian troops into 
" Plut. Arat. 52.1-2. 
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the Peloponnese. The fact that Aratus was a native of one, and 
owned property in another, indicates the extent of internal 
dissension within the Achaean league over the decision. 
Conclusion 
Even though the Cleomenic War falls outside the time-frame 
that Polybius states will be covered in his histories, he gives a 
long account of it, stating that clarification of the situation in the 
Peloponnese was essential for his readers' understanding of 
Rome's advent into the Greek world. Polybius wished to instruct 
his readership as to how Rome had come to conquer the 
Mediterranean world by showing them the influence that 
anacyclosis had on systems of government. Does this result in an 
account of events by Polybius that stresses the unity of the 
Achaean league and fails to take into account the legitimate 
interests that the Aetolian league had in the Peloponnese? 
As a brief examination of some of the evidence 
demonstrates, Polybius' narrative fails to mention important 
aspects of the relationship that the Aetolian league had with the 
Peloponnese. Given the close geographic proximity of Aetolia to 
the Peloponnese it is surprising that Polybius should present 
their actions as those of intruders. The existence of proxenia 
relations between the Aetolian league and many communities in 
the Peloponnese indicate that commercial and political 
connections existed across the Gulf of Corinth. More 
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importantly, the claimed mythical kinship link between the 
Aetolian league and Elis is another factor that Polybius states 
that his histories will not deal with, but which appears have been 
an important factor during the Hellenistic period. The Aetolians 
had crossed the Gulf of Corinth to assist the Eleans in 402BC 
when they faced virtual destruction at Spartan hands and it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that since the fifth century, the 
Aetolians had been willing to assist the Eleans during times of 
extreme crisis. 
Turning towards Sparta and Cleomenes' reforms there, it is 
difficult to accuse Polybius of exaggerating the role that socio- 
economic problems played in the decision to invite Antigonus 
into the Peloponnese, since he does not mention any. Although 
Polybius does later mention in passing that at some part of his 
reign Cleomenes proposed the re-distribution of land to gain 
popular support, he makes no mention of the impetus behind 
this offer. Plutarch, who emphasises the role that Stoic 
philosophy played in influencing Cleomenes' actions, makes no 
mention of him exporting his reforms elsewhere in the 
Peloponnese. Even if Cleomenes did carry out reforms to benefit 
the common man influenced by Stoic philosophy, they were 
limited to residents of Laconia. Polybius does draw attention to 
social and factional strife at Cynaetha, leading to: 
113 
Constant mutual massacres between both sides, 
banishments, the robbery of people's goods and even the re- 
distribution of lands. 126 
This was in a polis that was forced to join the Achaean 
league against its will and had a long association with Elis. So 
should its surrender to Aetolian forces be seen as a sign of socio- 
economic problems in the Peloponnese? Or does it indicate that 
possibly the Achaean league was essentially a political 
organisation and far from the unified body, the single ethnos, that 
Polybius' histories suggests? 
'26 Polyb. 4.17.4. 
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Chapter Three. 
The evolution of Hellenistic leagues. 
Introduction 
In 187BC the inhabitants of Delphi erected an inscription 
recording the expulsion of citizens of the Aetolian league from 
properties they owned around the shrine. However, describing 
those listed as Aetolian is in some respects misleading. Of the 
fifty-nine individuals mentioned, only nine were from 
communities that would have been considered Aetolian during 
the archaic and classical periods; the remainder were from other 
areas in north-western Greece, notably West Locris. l 
This aspect of the Aetolian league; its ability to absorb 
communities from other ethnic areas, has long been considered a 
paradox. Although Polybius describes the Aetolians in the worst 
possible manner, many communities voluntarily joined the 
Aetolian league during the Hellenistic period. Walbank accepts 
that this expansion was one of the few positive things about the 
Aetolians, since "it demonstrated the continuing ability of the 
Greeks to respond to a new political challenge with new 
solutions" .2 Scholten agrees, commenting that the development 
of federal leagues during the Hellenistic period was, "a step 
towards overcoming the narrow local and regional parochialism 
of the classical polls, which had acted as a barrier to the creation 
1 Sherk RDGE no. 37. 
2 Walbank (1993) p. 157. 
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of geographically more extensive forms of participatory 
government" 3 
However, the Aetolians were not alone in absorbing 
communities from other ethnic groups into their league during 
the Hellenistic period. Scholten has pointed out how the 
successful expansion of the Aetolian league may have suggested 
to the Achaeans the potential of a similar approach in the 
Peloponnese 4 Throughout his work, Polybius, though a native of 
Megalopolis in Arcadia, describes himself and other inhabitants 
of his native polls as Achaeans. In his account of the early history 
of the Achaean league, Polybius states that its success was due to 
the fact that: 
One could not find a political system and principle so 
favourable to equality and freedom of speech, in a word so 
sincerely democratic .5 
According to Polybius, the Achaean league developed into a 
state in which the entire Peloponnese: 
Only fell short of being a single polls in the fact of its 
inhabitants not being enclosed by one wall, all other things 
being, both as regards the whole and as regards each 
separate polis very nearly identical .6 
3 Scholten (2000) p. 3. 
4 Scholten (2000) p. 3. 
5 Polyb. 2.38.6. 
6 Polyb. 2.37.11. 
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In his histories Polybius refers to the actions of the Achaean 
ethnos, or people, implying that all members of the Achaean 
league came to form a common identity? We should question to 
what extent Polybius' depiction of the Achaean league was 
influenced by his attitude to the Roman conquest of Greece. In 
particular, how far does Polybius over-emphasise the unity of 
the Achaean league so that he can emphasise its later decline 
through the workings of anacyclosis? Walbank argued that the 
Achaean league was a federation in which an Arcadian like 
Polybius could identify with an institution which expanded 
under the leadership of a Dorian like Aratus to encompass the 
entire Peloponnese .8 However, 
Walbank accepted that the bigger 
poleis in the Achaean league were never fully politically absorbed 
and in times of crisis often acted independently. As he admitted: 
It is prima facie absurd to suppose that cities like Argos, 
Corinth, Sicyon and Megara surrendered their political 
identity and felt themselves to be diminished because they 
had joined the Achaean federation .9 
Thus, it would appear that Polybius' claim that the various 
ethne of the Peloponnese united to form one ethnos, resulting in a 
distinct Achaean identity, and common political interests being 
held by all the inhabitants of the Peloponnese, is questionable. 
7 Earlier historians like Herodotus used the word ethnos in a very restricted way, and in 
practically every case is translated "people" or "nation". See Jones (1996) p. 316. 
8 Walbank (1985) p. 15. 
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Walbank accepts that the larger poleis in the Achaean league 
were never fully absorbed; we need not accept that the 
Megalopolitan Polybius' depiction of the Achaean league 
actually represented a federal state where Dorians, Arcadians 
and later Spartans shared a common identity and interests. In 
reality members of Polybius' family like his father Lycortas, and 
other Megalopolitans, such as Philopoemen and Aristaenus, 
dominated the Achaean league for long periods. 
It is also assumed that the Aetolian and Achaean leagues 
were similar to each other, but there were important differences. 
Both the Aetolian and Achaean leagues expanded during the 
Hellenistic period far beyond the base that they had had during 
the archaic and classical periods. The Aetolians during the 
Hellenistic period absorbed many communities into their league 
that were not ethnically Aetolian. Despite this enlargement, the 
majority of Aetolian strategoi during the Hellenistic period came 
from communities that had been part of the Aetolian ethnos 
during the archaic and classical periods, suggesting that the 
Aetolians retained control over the political institutions they 
created during the Hellenistic period, or at the very least acted in 
unison to protect their interests. 10 In the Peloponnese, the 
9 Walbank (1985) p. 36 
10 O'Neil (1984-86) pp. 45-53 points out that the majority of the strategoi of the Aetolian 
league during the Hellenistic period, for whom we have a virtually complete list, come 
from areas that had always been Aetolian. The vast majority came from the area around 
Trichonion, followed in numbers by those who originated in Calydon and Pleuron. The 
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Achaean league came under the control of Aratus, a Dorian from 
Sicyon, and later of Arcadians from Megalopolis like 
Philopoemen and Aristaenus. Thus, although the Aetolian 
league's policy during the Hellenistic period was carried out by 
politicians who were largely from the Aetolian ethnos; in the 
Peloponnese the policy that Polybius represents as that of the 
Achaean ethnos was actually carried out by a mixture of Dorians 
and Arcadians. 
The intention in this chapter will be to examine the 
evolution of the Achaean and Aetolian leagues from the archaic 
period onwards. My contention will be that although both the 
Aetolian and Achaean leagues changed radically during the 
Hellenistic 'period, their evolution from the archaic period 
onwards was very different. The Aetolians were a distinct ethnos, 
a people with a common identity, expressed through a common 
belief in a mythical past and shared religious beliefs, from at 
least the seventh century. This belief appears to have led to the 
Aetolians acting as a cohesive body within the political 
structures of their expanded league during the Hellenis 
period. 
On the other side of the Gulf of Corinth, the Achaean league 
appears to have been a political union from its inception, whose 
situation in the Achaean league is very different: though we lack the epigraphic 
evidence available from Aetolia, the vast majority of strategoi mentioned by Polybius 
came from Megalopolis, including Philopoemen, strategos on eight occasions, and 
Lycortas, Polybius' father, strategos on at least three occasions. 
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founding members seem not to have held the belief that they 
formed a distinct ethnos as the Aetolians did. Thus, when both 
leagues reacted to changed political circumstances by expanding 
during the Hellenistic period, the Aetolians, because they were a 
distinct people, or ethnos, may have been able to retain political 
control over their league, while the original members of the 
Achaean league lost control over theirs. 
The evolution of the Aetolian League. 
In early times. . . piracy became a common profession 
amongst the Greeks and the barbarians who lived on the 
coast and in the islands ... The same system of armed robbery 
prevailed by land; and even up to the present day much of 
Greece still follows the old way of life- among the Ozolian 
Locrians, for instance, and the Aetolians and the 
Acarnanians and others who live on the mainland in that 
area. Amongst these peoples the custom of carrying arms 
still persists from the old days of robbery. 11 
In this passage Thucydides shows how Aetolian society was 
regarded as primitive and backward during the classical period. 
Despite this, shared religious beliefs appear to have played as 
important a role in the evolution of Aetolian society as they did 
li Thuc. 1.5.1-6.1. 
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elsewhere in the Greek world. 12 Although aspects of Aetolian 
society were different from elsewhere in Greece, it appears that 
the Aetolians considered themselves, and were considered by 
others as an ethnos from at least the mid-seventh century. 
The role that religious practice played in determining the 
character of the Aetolian ethnos is an important factor in 
explaining the policies followed by the Aetolian league during 
the Hellenistic period. Both the Achaean and Aetolian leagues 
absorbed new members during the Hellenistic period. The 
establishment of a religious centre at Thermon, dating from the 
seventh century, seems to have given the Aetolians during the 
Hellenistic period a sense of being a single ethnos, which did not 
exist amongst the members of the Achaean league. This might 
explain why, though the Aetolian league expanded rapidly to 
deal with the threat posed by Macedonia from 280BC, Aetolians 
from the ethnos retained control over the policy that their league 
followed during the Hellenistic period. 
Examining firstly the coastal plain, its two principal 
settlements, Calydon and Pleuron dominate this area and 
communication links between Greece and Southern Italy. 13 
Although little actually remains of Calydon, it is clear that in 
antiquity it was a large settlement, with an extensive shrine 
12 For the importance of religious activity in the formation of Greek political 
communities see Snodgrass (1980) pp. 49-65. 
13 See Aristophanes, Knights L. 75 for the strategic importance this area had for the 
Athenians in the fifth century. 
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adjacent to it that the other communities in the coastal plain 
appear to have used. The other major settlement situated in the 
coastal plain of Aetolia was Old and New Pleuron, which 
controlled access to the pass at Kleisure, connecting the coastal 
plain with the rest of Aetolia. 14 
Thermon, the principal Aetolian religious centre from the 
archaic period onwards and the political centre of the Aetolian 
league during the Hellenistic period, was located along the 
transhumance routes between the fertile area surrounding the 
lakes of the Aetolian interior and the mountainous area to the 
northeast 15 The large size of the agora suggests that the site 
developed as a convenient meeting point for trade, and was in 
use from the Bronze Age until the late Hellenistic period. 16 The 
first building at the site, Megaron B, is of typical mesohelladic 
construction, and is a local adaptation of a type found elsewhere 
in the Balkans. 17 Its primary use is disputed, some arguing that it 
housed a local chieftain; others suggest that it was utilised for 
ritual purposes 18 Though most of the archaeological evidence is 
problematic, extensive finds of Mycenean pottery and utensils 
14 Woodhouse (1897) p. 34. 
15 Antonetti (1990) p. 23. For a more in-depth discussion of the role that transhumance 
played in Aetolian society see Bommelje and Doom (1991) pp. 81-97. 
16 See Antonetti (1990) p. 153. 
17 Antonetti (1990) p-156- 
18 Antonetti (1990) p. 156. The discovery of charred bones at the site would seem to 
indicate the latter. 
122 
have been made at the site, and Antonetti suggests that during 
the Bronze Age Aetolia developed a hybrid culture, mixing 
elements of both Mycenean and northern Greek culture. 19 At the 
end of the Bronze Age and the onset of the Dark ages, Mycenean 
culture in Thermon declined rapidly, and in its place the 
Aetolians began to renew their links with northern Greece, 
especially with Macedonia, Epirus and the Spercheios valley. 20 
During the archaic period the site at Thermon expanded and 
became the central religious centre for the Aetolian ethnos, and 
three temples were developed. 21 This development seems to be 
related solely to religious practice, since no bouleterion or stoa, 
indicating a corresponding political unity, was built before the 
Hellenistic period 22 From the size and the extent of the 
buildings, it is self-evident that some form of centralised control 
must have existed to co-ordinate their construction. The expense 
needed to erect the temples and employ outside workmen in 
their design and construction suggests that some form of 
centralised control had developed in Aetolia concerning 
religious practice, and that the Aetolians developed this site to 
reflect their sense of national consciousness. The site indicates 
19 Antonetti (1990) p. 160. Aetolian pottery was widely exported through northern 
Greece, as well as the Peloponnese and the Ionian Islands. 
20 Antonetti (1990) p. 158. 
21 For a description of the archaic site, see Antonetti (1990) p. 167-196. 
22 Scholten (2000) p. 9 describes the one of the Temples at Thermon dating from the 
seventh century as, "architecturally and artistically avant-garde" 
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that the Aetolians had contact with the Peloponnese during the 
archaic period. The principal temple, dedicated possibly to 
Apollo or Artemis, was once thought to have been the work of 
Corinthian craftsman, though it appears that local craftsmen, 
possibly under Corinthian supervision, were responsible for its 
construction. 23 The metopes themselves cover a wide range of 
mythological topics and again show Corinthian influence in their 
design24 The most prominent figure represented on the metopes 
is Hercules, who is depicted on two series, one showing his entry 
into Olympia, and the other a hunting scene related to the 
Calydonian boar25 Although some scenes have a local origin, 
there is a distinct influence from the art of the eastern 
Peloponnese in their origins, especially from Argos26 Given the 
effort and co-ordination needed to develop this site, it appears 
that from the archaic period onwards the Aetolians considered 
themselves a distinct ethnos. 
23 Bookidis (1976) p. 911. 
24 Payne (1925) pp. 124-32 argues that the metopes are from a transitional period 
between Proto-Corinthian to Corinthian. 
25 See Antonetti (1990) p. 174-178. It is argued by some that the long hair of the hero in 
the hunting scene would preclude it being Hercules. With Hercules playing such an 
important role in Aetolian mythology, the balance of probability as Antonetti argues, is 
with identification with Hercules. Other metopes found at Thermon depict Perseus with 
the head of Medusa, three goddesses who are unidentified, but are possibly the charites, 
Iris with a Centaur, the birth of Athena, and a Gorgon. See Antonetti (1990) p. 167-9. 
26 Antonetti (1990) p. 172. 
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This does not necessarily imply that the Aetolians had 
developed a political union; later additions to the site during the 
Hellenistic period suggest that it was only then that Thermon 
developed into a centre for political administration. 
There was also a parallel development of a religious centre 
at Calydon 27 Although the site at Calydon was destroyed in the 
first century BC, it is possible to reconstruct an adequate picture 
of the ceremonies carried out there from the description that 
Pausanias gives us of the ceremonies carried out in Patrae in the 
second century BC28 As at Thermon, it appears that the site at 
Calydon was dedicated to Artemis, suggesting that both the 
inhabitants of the Aetolian coastal plain and those in the interior 
shared a common religious heritage. The very fact that the 
inhabitants of the coastal plain developed their own religious 
centre at the same time as one was under construction at 
Thermon seems to indicate that this area had a distinct identity 
from the rest of the ethnos. Morgan suggests that the 
development of the site at Calydon may have been an attempt by 
the coastal communities to counterbalance the dominance of the 
inland parts of the Aetolian ethnos29 Although there were shared 
elements in religious practice at both sites, such as devotion to 
27 Antonetti (1990) pp. 243. 
28 Paus. 7.18.8-13. Patrae was also, according to Pausanias, the only Greek State to aid the 
Aetolians in 279BC. See Paus. 7.18.5. 
29 Morgan (1990) p. 8. 
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Artemis and Hercules, the communities of the coastal plain 
appear to have remained distinct from the rest of Aetolia. 30 
If a shared religious experience suggests that the Aetolians 
formed an ethnos from the seventh century onwards, is there any 
evidence for corresponding political structures? The evidence for 
the classical period is very limited 31 From the archaic period 
onwards the Aetolians were willing to go to the effort and 
expense of developing a religious centre at Thermon to serve 
their ethnos. Despite this, it appears that the Aetolian ethnos 
remained politically disorganised until the Hellenistic period. 
Turning to Thucydides' account ' of the Athenian 
expedition to Aetolia in 426BC, it appears that although the 
Aetolians were capable of co-operating with each other in 
matters of self-defence and religious matters, they remained 
politically disorganised. Although some elements of Thucydides' 
account, such as the Messenian accusation that an Aetolian tribe 
called the Eurytanians spoke an almost unintelligible language 
and ate raw meat may not necessarily be accurate and are 
reported as hearsay, it appears on balance to reflect accurately 
Aetolia's fragmented political organisation. According to 
Thucydides, the Messenians informed Demosthenes, the 
Athenian commander, that he should attack three different 
30 Calydon also appears to have shared elements of religious practice with the 
Peloponnese. Antonetti (1990) p. 253. 
31 See Larsen (1968) p. 79 and pp. 195-205. 
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Aetolian communities in succession; firstly the Apodotians, 
followed by the Ophionians, and finally the Eurytanians 32 As 
Thucydides' account of the campaign demonstrates, despite 
being split into different tribes, the Aetolians were capable of 
unifying in mutual self-defence during times of crisis, uniting to 
defeat the Athenian intruders, and the three tribes were capable 
of sending a joint embassy to seek assistance from Sparta and 
Corinth 33 
One of the more intriguing and elusive comments 
regarding the political situation in Aetolia comes at the end of 
the campaign, when a Spartan force, according to Thucydides, 
retreated into an otherwise unknown area he called Aeolis 34 
Scholten and others suggest that this reference indicate that poleis 
on the Aetolian coastal plain like Calydon and Pleuron were at 
this point members of the Achaean league 35 It has been 
suggested that Calydon and Pleuron's membership of the 
Achaean league may have prompted the transformation of the 
32 The evidence provided by Thucydides of the subdivision into tribes is taken by some 
as evidence of a primitive society in Aetolia during this period. However, as Nielsen and 
Roy (1998) pp. 5-44 point out, this was a feature of ethne, the Arcadians also being 
divided into tribes, such as the Azanians in northern Arcadia. 
33 See Thuc. 3.100.1. This embassy was composed of Tolophus an Ophionian, Boriades an 
Eurytanian and Tisander an Apodotian. 
34 See Thuc. 3.102.5. The text is disputed, but the punctuation follows Hornblower (1996) 
p. 516. 
35 Scholten (2000) p. 13. 
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annual gathering at Thermon into an electoral assembly. 36 
Scholten argues that although the Aetolians formed an ethnos, 
they remained politically disorganised until the Hellenistic 
period, and were unable to take advantage of their considerable 
manpower to regain control over Calydon and Pleuron, instead 
having to rely on the Thebans, and later the Macedonians. 
There is little to be said for this view except these poleis' 
later membership of the Achaean league 37 Thucydides does not 
state that the Aetolian coastal plain was under. the control of the 
Achaean league in 426BC; the passage merely implies that he 
considered this region distinct from the rest of Aetolia. Nor is it 
evident that the Aeolis reference implies an Achaean origin. 
Thucydides later describes the ancient Corinthians as Aeolians; 
he may have been referring to earlier contact between the 
Aetolian coastal plain and Corinth 38 
The discovery of an inscription in Athens recording the 
dispatch of an embassy to the Aetolian koinon from Athens in 
367BC would seem to suggest there was some form of central 
36 See Bommelje (1988) pp. 57-61. Scholten (2000) p. 9 n. 33 promises to discuss the 
development of the Aetolian league during the archaic and classical period in a further 
volume. 
37 Scholten (2000) p. 13. For the Thebans see Diod. 15.75.2 and Macedonia under Philip II, 
Demosth 9.34. 
38 Thuc. 4.42.2. 
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authority in Aetolia by the mid-fourth century 39 It recorded an 
embassy sent to appeal to the Aetolian koinon for its assistance in 
gaining the release of a number of Athenian ambassadors that 
had been detained in Trichonion. The Athenians had dispatched 
these ambassadors on the understanding that they would not be 
detained, since they had earlier approached the Aetolian koinon 
and received its assurance that they would respect the Sacred 
Truce. On publication the reference to an Aetolian koinon in the 
inscription was seen as evidence that the Aetolians had evolved 
centralised political institutions; the date for the formation of the 
Aetolian league was duly revised upwards from 314BC. 
Although accepting that the Aetolians did by this stage 
have a league, Walbank comments that: 
It is perhaps appropriate that our earliest reference to the 
Aetolian confederation should concern a breach of generally 
accepted convention, for throughout their history the 
Aetolians were renowned for their lawlessness and piracy. 
Scholten, admitting that there was a koinon in Aetolia that 
was answerable to the rest of the Greek world, argued that some 
residents of Trichonion, if not the entire community, felt no 
39 This inscription was first published by Schweigert (1939) pp. 5-12. It has recently been 
re-published by Woodhead (1997) no. 48. The text used in this discussion will be that of 
the 1997 edition. 
40 Walbank (1993) p. 153. 
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compunction about seizing religious representatives whose 
inviolability was acknowledged by their league 41 
However, the inscription is incomplete; we are given no 
indication of why the inhabitants of Trichonion detained these 
ambassadors. Of more interest is what it tells us about the 
relationship between Trichonion and the Aetolian koinon. 
Although the Aetolian koinion had agreed to the Sacred Truce, 
the inhabitants of Trichonion felt that they could over-rule, or 
ignore this decision. In view of Trichonion's proximity to 
Thermon, it would seem to suggest that those responsible, as 
Scholten argues, did not seem to be operating, "under any 
reciprocal assumption of responsibility to obey that 
government's decisions" 42 
However, would the Athenians have sent an embassy to 
the Aetolian koinon seeking its assistance in gaining the return of 
their ambassadors if that body was powerless to intervene? 43 The 
inhabitants of Trichonion may have violated a Sacred Truce; that 
does not mean that the Aetolians had different values from the 
rest of the Greek world 44 The very fact that the Athenians asked 
the Aetolian koinon to observe the Eleusinian truce in the first 
41 Scholten (2000) p. 15. 
42 Scholten (2000) p. 15. 
43 The word koinon means little more than community. See Thuc. 1.83.4. where 
Thucydides uses koinon to describe Athens. 
44 Scholten (2000) p. 15. 
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place suggests that the behaviour of the inhabitants of 
Trichonion was exceptional. 
Trichonion's action in seizing these ambassadors would 
seem to indicate that communities within Aetolia retained a 
great deal of local independence and that although the koinon 
seems to have had some power, it was probably limited to 
religious matters. This would seem to be supported by a 
reference in Arrian to Aetolian embassies sent to Alexander the 
Great; each of the three Aetolian tribes sending a representative 
at the beginning of his reign 45 Since Arrian was relying on 
primary sources for his information, the reference appears to be 
accurate. 46 Bosworth argued that an Aetolian league with 
political authority must have existed in 367BC when the 
Aetolians gained control of Naupactus 47 He suggests that the 
reference to a multiplicity of embassies was a deliberate ploy, 
suggesting that Philip II had earlier dissolved the Aetolian 
league 48 Since this action would have been sanctioned by the 
Common Peace, Bosworth suggests that the Aetolians 
deliberately sent a multiplicity of embassies to give the 
impression that they were not united 49 
45 Arrian. Anab. I. 10.2. 
46 Bosworth (1976) pp. 164. 
47 Bosworth (1976) p. 164. 
48 Larsen (1968) p. 196 suggests that it was part of normal Aetolian diplomatic practice. 
49 Bosworth (1976) pp. 166-8. 
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There are problems with Bosworth's argument. The only 
evidence that the Aetolians were promised, or gained control 
over Naupactus, comes in a reference in Demosthenes and 
another reference in Strabo that is directly lifted from 
Demosthenes 50 Bosworth bases his argument around his 
reconstruction of a text that claims that Philip captured 
Naupactus and massacred the inhabitants on the resolution of 
the Achaeans, the opposite of the usual reading of the text 
involved 51 Bosworth also assumes that Philip II and the Achaean 
league undertook a campaign against the Aetolians, even though 
we have no evidence for one. He also takes it for granted that 
there was a transformation between the fifth and the fourth 
centuries in Aetolian political structures under Theban influence, 
again an event for which there is no evidence. If one accepts 
Arrian's accuracy, it would appear that at the beginning of 
Alexander the Great's reign the Aetolians had not yet developed 
political structures beyond those needed for the administration 
of religious matters at Thermon. 
Thus, although the evidence seems to suggest that the 
Aetolians considered themselves a distinct ethnos from the 
archaic period onwards, that does not necessarily imply that 
political unity existed before the Hellenistic period. Is this 
evidence that in some way Aetolian society was different from 
50 Bosworth (1976) p. 169. Demosthenes 9.34. Strabo (427). 
51 For Bosworth's reconstruction of this text, see (1976) p. 170. 
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elsewhere in Greece, hence Polybius' depiction of their actions in 
the Peloponnese during the Hellenistic period as irrational? 
Nielsen, in his study of the Arcadian ethnos during the classical 
period, the society Polybius later came from, argues that 
although a state can be considered an ethnos if its inhabitants 
share certain common characteristics, such as a shared history 
and culture, this does not automatically translate into political 
unity 52 As he points out, Arcadia was clearly an ethnos, since all 
of its communities seem to have shared a belief that they were a 
distinct people. Arcadians during the classical period regarded 
themselves and were regarded by other Greeks as a distinct 
people. Despite this, the Arcadians never developed a political 
union during the classical period, remaining politically divided, 
with some Arcadian poleis enjoying -close and friendly relations 
with Sparta. Arcadian society during the classical period also 
shared many elements in common with that in Aetolia, such as a 
division of the ethnos into tribes 53 
Thus elements of Aetolian society during the classical 
period was not all that dissimilar from the Arcadian one that 
52 See Nielsen (1996) pp. 124-148, which discusses Arcadia in the classical period up until 
the synoecism of Megalopolis. Nielsen contends that at least four tribal states can be 
identified in Arcadia during the classical period, the Eutresians, Kynourians, Mainalians 
and Parrhasians. Nielsen contends, (p. 128) that these tribes, or ethnic units, functioned as 
distinct states and had defined territories. I would like to thank the author for sending 
me the relevant sections of his Ph. D. dissertation. 
53 Nielsen and Roy (1998) p. 6. 
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Polybius came from. Does this have any implications for our 
understanding of the later expansion of the Aetolian league 
during the Hellenistic period? External threat plays a significant 
role in the formation of Greek political communities; the 
epigraphic evidence at Thermon begins to accumulate around 
280BC, suggesting that previously Aetolian record keeping had 
been minimal. At the same time the first Aetolian coinage 
appears, indicating that radical changes took place in Aetolia, 
suggesting a transformation in the political situation related to 
the rise of Macedonia .% The changed political circumstances 
brought about by the growth of Macedonian power after the 
ascension of Alexander the Great to the throne of Macedonia 
seem to have provided the Aetolians with the impetus they 
needed to co-operate with each other to combat this threat. The 
result was that the Aetolians, who had always considered 
themselves a distinct ethnos, formed political institutions to 
protect their interests. 
The development of the Achaean League. 
Is it correct to assume that a similar situation existed in 
Achaea? Larsen, following Polybius' account of the early history 
of the Achaean league, assumed that the Achaeans formed an 
ethnos from the archaic period onwards. In reality there is very 
54 Scholten (2000) p. 25. 
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little evidence for this, and most of what there is comes from 
Polybius. 55 
According to Polybius' account, the Achaean league was re- 
founded in 280BC after the Macedonians had earlier dissolved 
it. 56 This dissolution was, Polybius stated, a temporary measure, 
since the Achaeans had formed an ethnos from the earliest times. 
However, Polybius only mentions two episodes regarding early 
Achaean history, an embassy to Southern Italy to mediate after 
riots against Pythagorean influence in government, and another 
sent to mediate between the Spartans and Thebans in the 
aftermath of the battle of Leuctra 57 Little else is known about the 
Achaean league before the Hellenistic period, though it appears 
to have been allied with Sparta during the Peloponnesian War, 
and as late as 330BC fought for Agis III 58 Polybius is remarkably 
silent about the early history of the Achaean league, though 
Walbank suggests that possibly he did not want to admit that 
there was no external evidence of either achievement or high 
principle in the Achaean league 59 
Should Polybius' rather vague account of the early history 
and development of the Achaean league be taken at face value? 
55 Larsen (1968) pp. 80-89. 
56Polyb. 2.41.10-11. Errington (1969) p. 1 suggests that Alexander the Great was 
responsible. 
57 See Polyb. 2.39.11-10. 
58 Thuc. 5.82.1. Xen. Hell. 6.4.17. Walbank (1957) p. 227. 
59 Walbank (1957) p. 227. 
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Polybius like many historians appears to have interpreted the 
past though his understanding of the present, and in this case, it 
was during a period of whose history Polybius probably knew 
very little, if anything. As Catherine Morgan points out, 
Polybius' account of the early history of the Achaean league does 
not fit the archaeological and topographical evidence from the 
archaic period, suggesting that Polybius' account of its 
development was an attempt to create a history for the Achaean 
league of his own day. 60 She argues that an examination of the 
communities that formed the Achaean league during the archaic 
and classical period shows that the original Achaean league was 
composed of four geographically diverse areas 61 According to 
Morgan, there was nothing pertaining to the geographic 
structure of this area that suggests that the communities 
involved came together naturally. Rather, she contends that they 
created a political union to strengthen their position during the 
classical period. While other Greek political communities 
developed around a religious centre, the Achaean league's 
shrine at Aegium was specifically developed to provide a focus 
for the newly developed Achaean league in the sixth century. As 
she points out, there is little or no evidence for the existence of 
an Achaean state until the fifth century, when Herodotus 
60See Morgan (1996) p. 195. She states, "It is important to recognise that Polybius' 
intention is to establish historical credentials, which might prove his contention that the 
Achaean league of his own day enshrined age-old principles of equality and fairness". 
61 See Morgan (1991) p. 131-163. 
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describes the Achaeans as an ethnos; the epigraphic evidence 
only comes at a later stage 62 Though Aegium was developed to 
provide a focus for the Achaean league, at a later stage even this 
site appears to have fallen out of use, since the Achaean league 
decided in 188BC to stop holding its meetings there. Instead it 
changed to a rotating system, meetings alternating between the 
various members of the league, although Thermon remained the 
political centre for the Aetolian league throughout the Hellenistic 
period 63 
Returning to Walbank's contention that the Achaean league 
during the Hellenistic period was a federal state with which all 
the states in the Peloponnese could identify, it would appear that 
as during the classical period, the Hellenistic Achaean league 
was essentially an artificial political creation, not a true ethnos. 
Thus, assuming that Polybius adopted an Achaean identity may 
be misleading, and like other poleis within the Achaean league, 
Megalopolis' elite may have retained much of their identity and 
local interests as a member of the Achaean league. 
Conclusion. 
As Larsen pointed out, although tyche in Polybius' first two 
books is a, fl important factor, Polybius states that it would be 
phaulon, a cowardly or stupid act, to describe the expansion of 
62Hdt. 8.73.1. See Morgan (1996) p. 194 for the epigraphy. 
63 See Badian and Errington (1965) pp. 13-17 for a discussion of the decision. 
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the Achaean league as such. Larsen argues that for Polybius, 
along with the expansion of Rome, the expansion of the Achaean 
league ranks as a major achievement, calling for careful study of 
causation " According to Polybius the expansion of the Achaean 
league led to a situation where the various ethne of the 
Peloponnese merged to form one ethnos 65 Larsen suggested that 
we should share the same wonder that Polybius did at the fact 
that Spartans, Arcadians and others who had been absorbed into 
the Achaean league became content with this situation 66 
This is exactly the situation that Polybius describes in his 
histories. However, despite Polybius' assertions about its unity 
during the Hellenistic period, it would appear that the members 
of the Achaean league were never an ethnos, or a distinct people. 
The subsequent history of the Achaean league shows that Sparta 
was far from happy with its membership, provoking the crisis 
that led to the destruction of Corinth in 146BC. 67 Yet at the same 
time, Polybius is generally recognised as an Achaean patriot. As 
Golan argues, Polybius was a "New Achaean", having been born 
in an Arcadian Megalopolis already incorporated and integrated 
into the Achaean league. He suggests that by Polybius' 
formative years it had become perfectly clear that no polls would 
64 Larsen (1968) p. 218. 
65 Larsen (1968) p. 219. n. 1. 
66 Larsen (1968) p. 219. 
67 See Paus. 7.12.1-4. 
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be able to preserve its old freedom and optimal independence 
within this league 68 
Polybius' intention was to explain to his readers how 
through the workings of tyche and anacyclosis Rome had 
conquered them. Therefore he may have wished them to 
visualise in his Res Graecae the Achaean league as a unitary body 
which encompassed the entire Peloponnese, resembling a single 
polis, so that he could contrast its fortunes with those of the city 
of Rome. If we accept Polybius' depiction of the Achaean league 
go unchallenged are we in danger of letting an emphasis on 
Achaean unity, related to Polybius' stress on the role of 
anacyclosis, influence our understanding of Rome's advent into 
the Greek world? 
It cannot be doubted that elements of Aetolian society were 
different from elsewhere in Greece. Despite these differences, the 
Aetolians did have a homogeneous and coherent structure 
regarding religious practice from the archaic period onwards, 
along with a belief in a shared mythical past. Aetolians were 
viewed by others and appear to have regarded themselves as a 
distinct people or ethnos during the classical period. That the 
Aetolians did not develop centralised political structures until 
the Hellenistic period to complement this is relatively 
unimportant. What is important is that the Aetolians from the 
archaic period onwards had a sense of cohesion and unity, 
68 Golan (1995) p. 13. 
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regarding themselves as an ethnos, that appears to have led them 
to act in a unified manner within their expanded league during 
the Hellenistic period. 
On the other side of the Gulf of Corinth, in the Peloponnese, 
it is by no means evident that the Dorian and Arcadian 
communities who joined the Achaean league during the 
Hellenistic period actually formed a single ethnos as Polybius 
implies. Rather, it would appear that communities joined the 
Achaean league because of their need for protection, and that at 
all times of extreme crisis its members acted in accordance with 
their own interests. Although Polybius stresses the unity of the 
Achaean league, he is talking about a political organisation that 
was dominated for long periods by Megalopolitans like 
Philopoemen, Diophanes, Aristaenus and Lycortas. It is this 
factor, the essentially artificial nature of the Achaean identity 
which Polybius espouses throughout his histories, that appears 
to have been an important factor in determining the reactions of 
the various powers with interests in the Peloponnese in the lead 
up to Rome's intervention in Greece. 
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Chapter Four 
The Aetolian/Achaean alliance and the outbreak of the Social 
War. 
Introduction 
Polybius depicts the actions of the Aetolian league in the 
Peloponnese in the worst of all possible terms. However, the vast 
majority of Aetolian crimes and character defects that he 
mentions come in the context of the Social War between 220- 
217BC, fought after the Achaean league had decided to invite the 
Macedonians to assist them against Cleomenes. Given Polybius' 
desire to stress the unity of the Achaean league and his stated 
purpose to clarify the situation in Greece prior to Rome's 
involvement in Hellenic affairs, it must be asked whether his 
account of events should be taken as a neutral and objective 
account of events. Is Polybius' depiction of events in the 
Peloponnese favourable not only to the Achaean league, but in 
particular to Arcadian communities within it like Megalopolis? 
Aetolian interests in the Peloponnese, through their kinship links 
with Elis and the Peloponnesian outlook of communities like 
Calydon and Pleuron were extensive. It is likely that any radical 
change in the strategic situation in the Peloponnese would 
provoke some response. So should we regard Aetolian actions in 
the Peloponnese as violent aggression and piracy, or rather as an 
attempt to undermine an Achaean league that had recently allied 
with Macedonia? 
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The rise of Macedonia, in particular, the Aetolian policy of 
trying to turn Alexander's successors against each other, has 
been categorised by one historian as a struggle by the Aetolians 
to survive in a new hostile environment. ' What gave the 
Aetolians the impetus they needed to increase co-operation with 
each other and form a political union was the threat they faced 
from Macedonia during the Hellenistic period. 
Although this chapter will concentrate on events in the 
Peloponnese, it should not be forgotten that from the time of 
Alexander the Great, who allegedly threatened to punish the 
Aetolians on his return to Greece, the Aetolian league was in a 
state of almost perpetual conflict with Macedonia? Aetolian 
actions in the Peloponnese during the Social War, as depicted by 
Polybius, should be seen in this context. 
If the Aetolians were engaged in a struggle for control over 
the Peloponnese with the Macedonians, what was the rationale 
behind actions, which Polybius essentially describes as 
irrational? Prior to the decision taken by the Achaean league to 
invite the Macedonians into the Peloponnese to assist them 
against Cleomenes, Aratus appealed to the Aetolian league for 
assistance, although this was denied .3 This appeal is not as 
1 Mendell (1984) p. 129. 
2 See Curt. 6.1.17. for Alexander's remarks. For the seizure of Acarnania see Scholten 
(2000) pp. 134-36. For detailed accounts of the Aetolian league and its conflict with 
Macedonia see Mendels (1984) pp. 129-80 and Scholten (2000) pp. 29-95. 
3 P1ut. Arat. 41.2. 
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strange as it might appear. The Aetolian and Achaean leagues 
allied in 238BC, and such was the level of co-operation between 
them in the following years that Larsen suggested that both were 
considered a unified body .4 As Larsen pointed out, their co- 
operation was as surprising, in light of later events, as the co- 
operation between Athens and Aegina at Salamis, especially as 
the relationship broke down irrevocably afterwards .5 For 
example, in 237BC, in response to a request from Corcyra, a fleet 
of ten ships belonging to the Achaean league was dispatched in 
assistance, with Aetolians helping in manning them .6 Larsen 
claimed that the alliance between the two was one of the most 
hopeful of Hellenistic times and that its breakdown was a blow 
to Greek attempts to resist the growth of Roman power 7 The 
alliance lasted for nearly twenty years, and it seems, from a 
reference in Polybius, to have been in existence as late as 220BC, 
just prior to the outbreak of the Social War .8 
It is evident that the Achaean decision to invite the 
Macedonians into the Peloponnese was the determining factor in 
the breakdown of this alliance. As Scholten noted, the reasons 
behind the Aetolian decision not to send assistance to Aratus' 
4 Larsen (1975) p. 165. 
5 Larsen (1975) p. 160. 
6 See Polyb. 2.9-10. Walbank (1957) p. 160 and Larsen (1975) p. 165-66. 
7 See Larsen (1975) p. 171. 
8 It seems to have been technically in force in 220BC according to Polyb. 4.7.4. See 
Walbank (1957) p. 238. 
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appeal might be explicable by the assaults by the Achaean 
league, under Megalopolitan influence, on Elis. 9 
Again we should question to what extent Polybius' 
representation of the Achaean league and a common Achaean 
identity is based on his need to explain why the Romans ruled 
Greece through the workings of anacyclosis and his need to 
present the Achaean league as a single polis for this purpose. 
Larsen was correct in asserting that the Achaean/Aetolian 
alliance was remarkable in the light of Polybius' later account of 
the relationship between the two. Both leagues did co-operate 
closely during Aratus' expansion into Arcadia. However, this 
alliance was originally concluded between communities that had 
close links with each other across the Gulf of Corinth. By the 
time that the Macedonians, Aetolia's traditional foe, entered the 
Peloponnese, the expansion of the Achaean league and its 
absorption of Arcadian communities like Megalopolis changed 
the situation in the Peloponnese. 
This section will look at the expansion of the Achaean 
league in relation to Aetolian interests in the Peloponnese. My 
contention will be that the Aetolian/Achaean alliance concluded 
in 238BC was based on an Aetolian desire to develop an anti- 
Macedonian bloc in the Peloponnese in conjunction with 
9 See Scholten (2000) p. 187. As Urban earlier pointed out, this assault was probably 
based on the need by the Megalopolitans to reacquire Triphylia, which had been given 
to the Eleans by Lydiades, their former tyrant. Urban (1979) p. 115-16. 
144 
communities on the northern coast of the Peloponnese with 
which it had ties. The policy that Plutarch presents of Aratus' 
attempt to rid the Peloponnese of pro-Macedonian tyrants was 
carried out in a situation where both the Achaean and Aetolian 
leagues were acting in close co-operation, especially during their 
expansion into Arcadia. 
However, the Achaean league expanded rapidly and unlike 
the Aetolians, the original poleis that formed the Achaean league 
appear to have been unable to retain control when poleis like 
Megalopolis were absorbed into it as members. As the larger 
Arcadian communities were absorbed into the Achaean league 
they came to dominate its policy. So the Aetolians, who 
previously had allied with an Achaean league dominated by 
Aratus, were faced suddenly with a transformation of the 
situation in the Peloponnese, when the Macedonians were 
invited into this region under Megalopolitan pressure. 
It was this decision which explains subsequent Aetolian 
actions in the Peloponnese. Polybius, as an Arcadian, depicted, 
and probably believed that Aetolian actions in the Peloponnese 
intended to assist the Eleans prior to the Social War were 
irrational actions motivated by a frenzied desire to loot. 
However, Aetolian actions in the Peloponnese during the Social 
War have to be seen in the context of Aetolia's wider conflict 
against Macedonia and the position that Aetolia's allies in the 
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Peloponnese found themselves in after the Achaean league's 
alliance with Macedonia. 
Aetolian interest in the Peloponnese and the expansion of the 
Achaean league under Aratus. 
As Larsen noted in his discussion of the Aetolian/Achaean 
alliance, before the expansion of the Achaean league under 
Aratus, the Aetolian league was one of the dominant powers in 
the Peloponnese despite the Gulf of Corinth. 10 The Achaean 
league at this point was confined to a relatively small area, not 
much larger than it had been during the classical period; the 
Aetolians and their allies in Elis appear to have controlled much 
of the western side of the Peloponnese. For example, in 240BC, 
the Aetolian league mounted a campaign against Sparta, and at 
the same time appears to have mediated a treaty of isopoliteia 
between Phigaleia and Messene. li 
Aetolian interest in the Peloponnese during the third 
century, despite its separation from this region by the Gulf of 
Corinth, is not as surprising as it might at first appear. Given the 
claims of mythical kinship between the Aetolians and Eleans, it 
would appear that the Aetolians were simply supporting Elean 
interests in the Peloponnese. Pausanias mentions the presence of 
an Aetolian assisting the Eleans at Samikon on Elis' 
10 Larsen (1975) pp. 159-61. 
11 Polyb. 4.39.9; 9.34.9. SIG' 472. 
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southwestern border with Arcadia in the 240s BC. 12 The long list 
of Aetolian actions in the Peloponnese mentioned by Polybius as 
having occurred in the 240s all appear to be connected with 
Elean expansion in north-western Arcadia. 13 The Aetolian league 
also seems to have tried to assist the Eleans in their attempt to 
gain control over Cynaetha in the 240s BC, when Polybius 
mentions internal troubles in this polis. Given that Cynaetha 
controlled the routes connecting Elis, Arcadia and central 
Achaea, it would appear that the Aetolians were attempting to 
assist the Eleans in their attempts to gain control over a disputed 
polis. 14 
Around the same time the situation in the Achaean league 
changed. It would appear, from the evidence provided by 
Polybius, that the Achaean league was re-founded in 280BC by 
the poleis of Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea and Pharae. 15 The Achaean 
league remained relatively small until 251BC, when Sicyon 
joined after Aratus deposed its pro-Macedonian tyrant in a 
bloodless coup. It was under his leadership that the Achaean 
12 Paus. 5.6.1. 
13 See Scholten (2000) p. 117 for a list of Aetolian actions and the attempt by Elis to gain 
control over Triphylia and parts of northwestern Arcadia. 
14 See Scholten (2000) p. 119. 
15 See Polyb. 2.41.12, for the foundation of the Achaean League. By 253BC, it appears that 
Aegium, Bura, Carynea, Leontium, Aegira, Pellene and Olenus had joined. 
Polyb. 2.41.13-15. Walbank (1957) p. 233 
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league began its expansion. 16 This appears to have caused 
difficulties with the Aetolians, since Aratus, like the Eleans, 
desired to control the area around Cynaetha. Following his 
assumption of power at Sicyon, one of Aratus' first actions was 
to launch an attack against Locris and Calydon; he also seems to 
have tried to persuade the Boeotian to attack the Aetolians. 17 
However, Aratus was a close ally of the Ptolemaic kingdom 
in Egypt. Shortly after assuming power Aratus gained a subsidy 
of twenty-five talents from Ptolemy since, according to Plutarch, 
Sicyon was under threat from Antigonus. 18 Given the close 
proximity of Sicyon to the Macedonian garrison at the 
Acrocorinth, Aratus' decision to join the Achaean league seems 
to have been motivated by his desire to gain protection from the 
Antigonids. Why the Achaeans, if they were an ethnos as 
Polybius claims, allowed a polls that claimed a Dorian identity 
into their league is left unsaid, though it would appear to 
support Morgan's contention that the Achaean league had 
always admitted for membership poleis in need of protection. 
Aratus according to Plutarch, rapidly came to dominate the 
Achaean league, and in 243BC, in what Plutarch describes as the 
last and greatest achievement of the Greeks, he seized control 
over the Acrocorinth, removing the Macedonian garrison. 
16 See Plut. Arat. 5.1. and 9.3. for the background to Aratus' accession to power in Sicyon. 
17 For the Boeotian attack on the Aetolians see Plut. Arat. 16.1. Walbank (1984) p. 249. 
18 For the alliance with Ptolemy, see Plut. Arat. 9.1-3. Walbank (1984) p. 247. 
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Shortly afterwards the Achaean and Aetolian leagues allied with 
each other. 19 
Scholten depicts this as an alliance between "Greater 
Aetolia" and "Greater Achaea". 20 This view presupposes a 
knowledge of later events that was not evident to those who 
concluded the alliance. The Achaean league that allied with the 
Aetolian league in 238BC was still a relatively small body whose 
membership was very different from the Achaean league that 
Polybius would later identify with. It would appear that the 
alliance was framed between communities that had a long 
history of contact with each other. Scholten points out the role 
that earlier connections between the Achaean league and the 
Aetolian coastal plain played in the conclusion of this alliance, 
since the Aetolian strategos responsible was Pantaelon of 
Pleuron, indicating that links between the communities on either 
side of the Gulf of Corinth may have assisted. 21 
Soon afterwards, the Achaean league under Aratus struck 
into the Peloponnese, with the aim, as stated by Plutarch, of 
ridding this region of its pro-Macedonian tyrants 22 According to 
19 For the seizure of the Acrocorinth see Plut. Arat. 18.1-26.2. 
20 See Scholten (2000) p. 136. 
21 Scholten (2000) p. 136-7. He also suggests that Aratus' Dorian heritage may have made 
him more open to contacts with the Aetolians, since while as he states, Aratus' motives 
are hard to gauge, he may not have had the same negative attitude towards the 
Aetolians as the Achaeans did. 
22 Walbank (1984) p. 247. 
149 
a plan that appears to have been co-ordinated, both leagues 
launched a joint assault into Arcadia, the Aetolians concentrating 
on gaining control over Mantineia, Tegea and Orchomenus; the 
Achaeans attacking Cleitor, Telphusa and Heraea in an attempt 
to put pressure on Megalopolis 23 The intention appears to have 
been to neutralise the pro-Macedonian states in Arcadia, notably 
Megalopolis. This policy led in 235BC to the pro-Macedonian 
tyrant of Megalopolis, Lydiades, resigning his tyranny and 
bringing his polis within the Achaean league24 Unlike poleis such 
as Argos and Corinth, it would appear that Lydiades negotiated 
the entry of Megalopolis into the Achaean league from a position 
of strength, since the following year he was elected Achaean 
strategos. 
The entry of Megalopolis and other Arcadian communities 
into the Achaean league changed the situation in the 
Peloponnese. The original Achaean poleis were too small to 
counterbalance the rapid influx of new members from Arcadia 
into their league, and the different outlook that Arcadian poleis 
had from the league's original members placed Elis under 
threat 25 As Scholten points out, the addition of Megalopolis and 
Argos to the Achaean league had changed the nature of the 
2' For Aetolian control over Mantineia, Tegea and Orchomenos, see Polyb. 2.57.1. and 
2.46.1-2 Scholten (2000) p. 157-8. 
24 P1ut. Arat. 30.2. 
25 For the attempts by the Eleans to gain control over northern Arcadia from the 250s 
onwards, see Scholten (2000) pp. 118-123. 
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Achaean league, leading to an anti-Spartan policy which brought 
the newly expanded Achaean league into conflict with 
Cleomenes. Furthermore, this resulted in a softening of the anti- 
Macedonian policy of the Achaean league, despite Aratus' 
attempts to the contrary. 26 
It is in this context that the Aetolian league's refusal to grant 
assistance when Aratus appealed to it should be seen. Scholten 
argues that such was the pressure on Aratus from the rest of the 
league that he was unable to arrest the shift towards Macedonia, 
and became the champion of it in order to maintain his own 
position?? As Scholten points out, the Achaean league's decision 
to allow Macedonian troops to re-enter the Peloponnese placed 
the Aetolian league in their most dangerous position since the 
Celtic invasions. The Macedonians already controlled Opountian 
Locris, had allies in Boeotia and Phocis, and would control the 
Acrocorinth after they defeated Cleomenes, and Scholten argues 
that the Aetolian refusal to help the Achaean league was epochal 
and a missed opportunity. 28 
Speaking of an Aetolian refusal to assist the Achaean league 
as such is misleading. Rather, it would appear more accurate to 
say that the Aetolians were refusing to grant assistance to an 
26 Scholten (2000) p. 188. "Sparta's resurrection under Kleomenes only reinforced the 
Lakonophobic legacy these newcomers brought with them from generations of conflict, 
raising Lakedaimon to the koinon's enemies' list". 
27 Scholten (2000) p. 189. 
28 Scholten (2000) p. 189. 
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Achaean league that had followed an aggressive policy under 
Megalopolitan pressure against its ally in Elis. Scholten argues 
that the Aetolian refusal to assist the Achaean league was "a sign 
of their inability to see beyond their old parochial antagonisms 
for the sake of the common gain"29 This is an unfair assessment. 
The Aetolians must have been aware that the newly expanded 
Achaean league had encompassed communities like Megalopolis 
which had links with Macedonia and by failing to grant 
assistance, poleis like Megalopolis would turn towards 
Macedonia. We are told in fact that the Aetolians tried to block 
the pass at Thermopylae to prevent Macedonian troops reaching 
the Peloponnese 30 
However, as Larsen earlier pointed out, after the death in 
battle of Margos of Cerynea, who Polybius describes as the elder 
statesman of the Achaean league, the alliance was never as close 
as it once was 31 Larsen suggested that this was the result of 
Rome's advent into Greek affairs, in particular the Illyrian Wars; 
this ignores the changes brought about by the expansion of the 
Achaean league into the Peloponnese. This expansion had been 
begun by an alliance between the Aetolian and Achaean leagues. 
The transformation of the situation in the Achaean league after 
29 See Scholten (2000) p. 188. 
30 Polyb. 2.52.8. Polybius states that this was just one of the many actions that the 
Aetolians undertook to prevent the return of the Macedonians to the Peloponnese. 
31 For a brief mention of the circumstances surrounding the death of Margos, leading a 
joint Aetolian/Achaean force, see Polyb. 2.9-10. 
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the entry of Megalopolis and other Arcadian communities, and 
the change in the Achaean league's policy that resulted, radically 
altered the balance of power in the Peloponnese to the detriment 
of Aetolian interests. This change, and the' way it transformed 
the situation in the Peloponnese, may explain subsequent 
Aetolian actions. 
The Social War; Aetolia and the Peloponnese. 
After he had defeated Cleomenes Antigonus Doson 
founded a Hellenic league, which the Achaean league joined 
along with other states such as the Thessalians, Epirots, Phocians 
and Macedonians 32 Early in 221BC, Doson died, and the young 
Philip V ascended to the Macedonian throne. This seems to have 
provided the Aetolian league with the impetus it needed to 
restart conflict with Macedonia in an attempt to recover the 
territory it had lost to Antigonus Doson in 228BC. 
It is in this context, their wider conflict with Macedonia, that 
Aetolian actions in the Peloponnese before the outbreak of the 
Social War should be seen. Although Polybius is completely 
hostile towards the Aetolians, ' portraying their actions in the 
Peloponnese before the outbreak of the war as irrational, it 
appears that the Aetolians were attempting to disrupt the 
Macedonian presence in this region. As Scholten acknowledges, 
'Polybius' natural prejudices and preoccupations as a 
32 Walbank (1984) p. 468. 
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Megalopolitan and an Achaean patriot distort his analysis and 
influence what he chooses to narrate" 33 
Despite this, Scholten argues that looting was the important 
factor in defining Aetolian policy towards the Peloponnese, 
suggesting that, "adherence to archaic socio-economic traditions 
appears to have out weighed sober strategic thinking in the 
Aetolian koinon's decision to back that policy" 34 Did the Aetolian 
league's leadership undertake an aggressive policy in the 
Peloponnese merely because they believed that the Achaean 
league's expansion into Arcadia had opened up new 
opportunities for looting? It is what ' Polybius' narrative 
suggests, but merely reflects his opinion. Or did the Aetolians 
view the Achaean league at this juncture simply as an extension 
of Antigonid power, and was their intention in trying to 
dismember it to undermine the Macedonian position in the 
Peloponnese? Aratus had requested the Aetolian league's 
assistance shortly before the appeal to Macedonia , and there 
was opposition within poleis like Corinth and Sicyon over the 
decision to call on Antigonus. It appears that many communities 
within the Achaean league were opposed to the alliance with 
Macedonia, and the situation in the Peloponnese unsettled, a 
situation the Aetolians may have sought to exploit. 
33 Scholten (2000) p. 201. 
34 Scholten (2000) p. 201. 
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Therefore, my contention will be that Aetolian actions in the 
Peloponnese before the outbreak of the Social War were not 
irrational acts of piracy as Polybius presents them. I will suggest 
that Polybius' portrayal of Aetolian actions in this region was 
based on his perception of them as an Arcadian and that his 
stress on Achaean unity, related to his wider intention, fails to 
take into account the competing regional and ethnic interests in 
the Peloponnese. 
According to Polybius, the instigator of the conflict was 
Dorimachus, who was dispatched to Phigaleia to resolve a 
dispute between the inhabitants of that polls and the 
Messenians 35 During his time there Dorimachus seems to have 
learnt that the Messenians were under pressure to join the 
Achaean league 36 On his return to Aetolia an Aetolian raid was 
launched on the Peloponnese, which appears to have been aimed 
at dissuading the Messenians from allying with the Hellenic 
league and joining the pro-Macedonian bloc in the 
Peloponnese 37 
Polybius presents this raid as an Aetolian crime that was 
hatched as part of a private conspiracy between Dorimachus and 
Scopas; an action he considered the greatest of all Aetolian 
outrages in the aftermath of Antigonus's death. Polybius states 
35 Polyb. 4.3.5-6. 
36 Polyb. 4.3.8-4.9. 
37 See Scholten (2000) p. 204. 
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that on Dorimachus' return from Messene, he and Scopas 
conspired together, ignoring both the strategos and the board of 
the apokletoi who formed the Aetolian government, to launch an 
assault on the Peloponnese 38 According to the plan they devised, 
diversionary raids would be launched on the coast of Epirus to 
distract Philip V; at the same time a force led by Scopas and 
Dorimachus would cross into the Peloponnese and march on 
Messene 39 The plan was rapidly enacted and, according to 
Polybius, during their march across the territories of Patrae, 
Pharae and Tritaea, the Aetolians claimed that it was not their 
intention to inflict harm on, anybody, though he alleges that 
looting did take place 40 The raiding party reached Messene, 
avoiding confrontation with the assembled forces of the Achaean 
league at Megalopolis, and also with Taurion the Macedonian 
commander in the Peloponnese 41 The force then split in two, 
most of the force returning to Aetolia via Elis; a smaller party 
proceeded back to Aetolia, launching raids against Pellene and 
Sicyon on the way 42 The Aetolian raid on the Peloponnese was 
38 However, Polyb. 4.5.1. admits that the Aetolian strategos Ariston was in bad health, and 
had largely ceded his powers to the two. 
39 Polyb. 4.5.2-10. Walbank (1940) p. 28 compares this raid to the actions of English 
pirates during the reign of Elizabeth the First. Scholten (2000) p. 204 argues that there is 
some indication that the raid received official approval. See also Eckstein (1995) p. 142 for 
Polybius' depiction of the irrational behavior of the Aetolians at this point. 
40 Polyb. 4.6.9. 
41 Polyb. 4.6.7-12; 9.1-10. 
42 Polyb. 4.9.10-13.5. 
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unsuccessful, and, according to Polybius, soon afterwards 
Messene joined the Hellenic alliance 43 
Scholten argues that an Aetolian desire to loot explain this 
expedition, although he accepts that it seems to have been also 
aimed at trying to prevent Messene, an Aetolian ally, going over 
to the Macedonian camp. A subsequent meeting of the Aetolian 
assembly voted to maintain peace with all parties, provided that 
the Achaean league dropped its planned alliance with Messene. 44 
It is also probable that the plan was intended to take advantage 
of the relative youth and inexperience of Philip V. The raid may 
therefore have been intended to divert Macedonian attention 
towards the Peloponnese and away from Acarnania. 45 
A more problematic event occurred in 220BC, when 
Dorimachos, Scopas and Agelaus led another group of Aetolians 
into the Peloponnese, this time with the intention of seizing the 
polis of Cynaetha located on the borders between Elis, Arcadia 
and Achaea 46 According to Polybius, a faction within Cynaetha 
betrayed it to the raiding party. The raiding force proceeded on 
to Cleitor, which they were unable to capture because of the 
resistance they faced from its inhabitants, and they returned to 
Cynaetha, according to Polybius, committing a multitude of 
43 See Polyb. 4.16.1. 
44 See Polyb. 4.15.8-11. 
45 For Aetolian interests outside the Peloponnese during the Social War, see Scholten 
(2000) pp. 214-218. 
46 Polyb. 4.17.1. 
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crimes on the way there and back. 7 On their return, the raiders 
offered Cynaetha to the Eleans, but the latter refused, and after 
an abortive attempt to install a garrison there, the Aetolian force 
retreated when the Macedonians advanced, according to 
Polybius, destroying Cynaetha in their wake. 
We need to assess whether Polybius' depiction of Aetolian 
actions at this point should be taken as an accurate reflection of 
Aetolian intentions, or merely reflect his own perspective on this 
event, and his need to stress the Achaean league's resemblance 
to a single polis. Scholten argues that the attack on Cynaetha was 
a private venture, intended solely to gain loot, suggesting that, 
"unlike the expedition to Messene a few months earlier their (the 
Aetolians) present escapade at Kynaitha did not have the 
collective sanction of the koinon", and was indeed, "an 
opportunistic third-party action" 48 
Should Aetolian actions be seen in these terms? Or rather is 
Polybius' partisan attitude towards the Aetolians resulting in an 
account of events at Cynaetha that, though reflecting an 
Arcadian's perspective on Aetolian actions, fails to take into 
account strategic interests that the Aetolian league had in the 
Peloponnese? If one considers Cynaetha's location, on the border 
of Arcadia, Elis and Achaea, it controlled the routes connecting 
the three regions. Despite his dismissal of events at Cynaetha at 
47 See Polyb. 4.17.3-19.7. 
48 Scholten (2000) p. 205. 
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this point as a looting expedition, as Scholten pointed out about 
earlier Aetolian actions in the Peloponnese in the 240sBC: 
Certainly strategic considerations make collective Aitolian 
involvement in the northern Peloponnese in the 240s 
understandable. Kynaitha and Psophis, the main site 
under Eleian control in 221, are key points in the routes 
connecting Elis, Arkadia and central Achaia. As events 
during the Social War were to demonstrate, whoever 
controlled these cities controlled access amongst the three 
regions. 49 
Elean forces were to play a vital role during the Social War; 
in the absence of a significant contribution by the Aetolian 
league in the Peloponnese during the Social War, Elean and 
Spartan forces carried out the bulk of the fighting on the 
Aetolian side in this region. The raid appears to have been 
intended to gain control over Cynaetha as a base for operations 
prior to the outbreak of war. According to Polybius, the Aetolian 
raiding force attempted to install a garrison at Cynaetha 
commanded by Euripidas before their withdrawal. The same 
individual was later appointed Elean strategos, commanding 
Elean forces in 219BC during the Social War; he was re- 
appointed to this position in 217BC 50 Although Polybius depicts 
49 Scholten (2000) p. 119. 
50 For Euripidas' appointment at Cynaetha see Polyb. 4.19.5. As strategos of Elis in 219BC 
Polyb. 4.59.1. and later in 217BC, Polyb. 5.94.2. See also Scholten (2000) p. 218. n. 54. 
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the Aetolian raid in a different light, it appears that the Aetolian 
raiders initially attempted to hand Cynaetha over to the Eleans. 
When the Eleans refused, they attempted to install as 
commander of a garrison there the very man who was later to 
co-ordinate Elean military actions against the Achaean league 
during the Social War. These two actions would seem to suggest 
that this raid was motivated by a desire to gain control over a 
strategically important location prior to the outbreak of war. As 
for the destruction of Cynaetha, this took place after the Aetolian 
attempt to capture Cleitor had failed and after the raiders had 
heard about arrival in the Peloponnese of a large Macedonian 
force led by Philip V. It was probably not an act of irrational 
destructiveness as Polybius depicts it, but one intended to 
prevent Cynaetha from being re-occupied and used as a military 
centre against Elis 51 
There is the related question of why some inhabitants of 
Cynaetha betrayed their polis to the Aetolian raiders. This action 
is usually seen in the context of the socio-economic problems 
that may have existed in Cynaetha. It is suggested that the 
restored exiles may have betrayed Cynaetha to the Aetolians 
because they desired land re-distribution 52 
51 Scholten (2000) p. 293. n. 132. "The destruction of the town (Cynaetha) was a deliberate 
move to keep it from being reoccupied by forces hostile to the Aitolians and their friends 
in the region". 
52 Erskine (1990) p. 127. 
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However, it appears from earlier events that a section of 
Cynaetha's inhabitants favoured allying with Elis rather than the 
Achaean league. Nor were the exiles necessarily from the lower 
classes. The Aetolian force gained entry to Cynaetha because one 
of the restored exiles held the office of polemarch, one of a 
number of officials who seem to have been responsible for 
Cynaetha's internal administration: Amongst his duties was 
ensuring that the gates of the polls were secured at night, and 
after overwhelming his colleagues, he opened the gates to the 
Aetolian raiders. 3 As recently restored exiles, it would be only 
natural that they would wish re-gain any, property, including 
land, that had been confiscated at the time of their exile. As for 
the raid being undertaken by an Aetolian force, the Eleans had 
been trying to resist an expansionary Achaean league for much 
of the preceding decade. If the Achaean league was continuing 
to maintain pressure on Elis, the Eleans may not have had 
sufficient manpower to launch an assault on Cynaetha as well as 
guard against Achaean encroachment. Therefore the Eleans may 
have appealed for assistance to their claimed mythical kinsmen 
in Aetolia, who were also attempting to combat Macedonian 
encroachment in their affairs, as their forefathers appear to have 
done in similar desperate circumstances in 402BC m It seems 
53 Polyb. 4.18.1-2. This office is best attested to in Athens. Originally a military figure, by 
the fourth century his duties were primarily concerned with internal administrative 
tasks within the polis of Athens. 
54 Diod. 14.17.9. 
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natural that the Aetolian leadership would attempt to secure a 
base for operations in the Peloponnese prior to the outbreak of a 
wider war with Macedonia by exploiting dissatisfaction within 
this polls' citizenry over Cynaetha's membership of the Achaean 
league 55 
Thus, it would appear that the raid on Cynaetha was not an 
unofficial venture by three Aetolians motivated by financial 
gain, but was intended to gain control over a strategically 
important location prior to a challenge by the Aetolian league 
and its allies to the Macedonian presence in the Peloponnese. 
The second element in the Peloponnesian strategy decided 
upon by the Aetolian league's leadership prior to the outbreak of 
the Social War was to secure Sparta as an ally. This alliance is not 
as surprising as Scholten suggests it is 56 Despite their earlier 
differences, it was in Sparta's interests to co-operate with the 
Aetolian league to secure its independence against further 
encroachment by the Achaean league. The Spartans under 
Cleomenes had recently attempted to gain control over the 
Peloponnese and had only failed because of Macedonian 
55 See Walbank (1936) pp. 64-71 for Aratus' failed attempts to capture Cynaetha. 
Polybius' condemnation of the inhabitants of Cynaetha that let the Aetolian force in is 
not that they betrayed the Achaean people or league, but rather the Arcadians. 
Polyb. 4.20.1-21.12. 
56 Scholten (2000) p. 210 draws attention to the Aetolian raid on Sparta in 240BC. 
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intervention 57 It is not known when exactly the initial Aetolian 
approach to Sparta was made 58 A possible indication of when 
this alliance was concluded comes when the Achaean league 
requested a further Spartan contribution of troops in the 
aftermath of the Aetolian raid on Cynaetha; the request was 
refused: Polybius stated that by this stage Sparta had already 
allied with the Aetolian league 59 
As Walbank points out, the initial dispatch of Dorimachus 
to Phigaleia was probably to organise an alliance between Elis, 
Messene and Sparta. By gaining the Spartans as an ally, it would 
appear that the Aetolians were attempting to challenge the 
Macedonian position in the Peloponnese. As has been recently 
pointed out, for much of the war, "the Achaean league's military 
and political incompetence threatened its stability and internal 
57 Polyb. 4.9.6-7. Sparta was a member of the Hellenic league and had assisted the 
Achaean league on its mobilisation during the Aetolian raid on Messene Their 
contingent was posted on the border with Megalopolis in a reserve capacity, suggesting 
that they were not trusted. 
58Scholten (2000) p. 211 suggests that Messene's decision to join the Hellenic league may 
have been prompted by their knowledge of an Aetolian approach to Sparta. As he points 
out, during the Cleomenic War, the Messenians had offered sanctuary to the entire 
population of Megalopolis, and this may have prompted them to seek closer ties with 
Megalopolis, and through it the Achaean league. As for Messene, Scholten points out 
that the disappointing Achaean performance during the Aetolian raids on the 
Peloponnese may have undermined the position of those who wished to ally with the 
Achaeanleague. 
59 Polyb. 4.16.5. Walbank (1957) p. 463 states that at this stage Polybius was probably 
exaggerating the extent of Aetolian involvement with Sparta. 
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viability" 60 Far from being irrational as Polybius' portrays it, 
Aetolian policy before the war was an attempt to challenge the 
Macedonian position in the Peloponnese, by taking advantage of 
the relative weakness of the Achaean league and possible 
dissatisfaction amongst its various members over the alliance 
with Macedonia. 
During the war itself, the Aetolians concentrated their 
efforts elsewhere, and apart from two exceptions in its opening 
stages, left the fighting in the Peloponnese to the Spartans and 
the Eleans. 61 If one analyses events in the Peloponnese at the 
outbreak of the Social War in 219BC, the Achaean league was 
forced to defend itself against a three pronged assault without 
any assistance from the Macedonians, who were campaigning 
against the Aetolians in Thessaly. The Spartans launched an 
assault on Megalopolis, capturing Athenaeum 62 The Aetolians 
launched a surprise night attack against the city of Aegira, which 
failed because of resistance from its inhabitants, and Elean 
forces, operating under their Aetolian commander Euripidas, 
attacked the territories of Dyme, Pharae and Tritaea. 63 The 
intention appears to have been to dismember the Achaean 
league. The response by the Achaean league to the Elean assault 
60 Scholten (2000) p. 220. 
61 See Scholten (2000) p. 214-218 for an account of Aetolian campaigns elsewhere. 
62 Polyb. 4.58.2. 
63 Walbank (1957) pp. 513-14 suggests that this was a coordinated assault on the 
Achaean league. See also Larsen (1968) p. 221. Polyb. 4.58.2. 
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shows the degree to which communities within the Achaean 
league retained much of their independence and identity, since 
the three poleis attacked appealed to the Achaean league for 
assistance. The younger Aratus, who was strategos at the time, 
was unable to send any mercenaries through lack of money. As a 
result, the poleis involved decided to withhold their contribution 
to the league and instead used it to defend themselves by hiring 
mercenaries. 
What is surprising is the existence of an official called a 
hypostrategos in command of this area, who played a vital role in 
defeating the Aetolian attack. The existence 'of an official who 
appears to have been in command of this area suggests that the 
region around Dyme retained a form of local government 
distinct from the central administration of the Achaean league. 
Nor was this an isolated occurrence. In 146BC, during the 
Achaean War, Polybius states that during the mobilisation of 
Achaean forces, the contingents from Elis and Messene were not 
called to arms, and that the men from the synteleia of Dyme 
failed to appear TM It would appear that the region around Dyme, 
which contained the founding members of the Achaean league, 
had a system of local government that was distinct from the rest 
of the league, something at variance with Polybius' emphasis on 
Achaean unity. 
64 See Larsen (1968) p. 221 for events in 219BC and Polyb. 38.16.3-4 for the existence of 
this body in 146BC. 
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Although this is the only known case in the Achaean league 
of a form of local government, possibly there were other 
examples. There are parallels in Aetolia, where areas that were 
absorbed into the Aetolian league during the Hellenistic period 
such as Acarnania and West Locris enjoyed a separate status, 
being described as tele in official documents 65 As Larsen points 
out, both Acarnania and West Locris had been distinct ethnic 
areas before they became members of the Aetolian league, and 
they appear to have retained some form of local government 
based on their ethnic identity after joining the Aetolian league 66 
The synteleia of Dyme was in existence from 219BC until 146BC; 
the possibility exists that other areaswithin the Achaean league 
may have had a form of local government based around on 
ethnic identity. The following year, the Achaean league was re- 
organised into three distinct zones. The first centred on Sicyon 
and the Argolid, the second on Arcadia, and the final one was 
presumably centred on the synteleia of Dyme. It was only after 
this, and at a comparatively late stage in the war, that the 
Achaean league was able to mount a successful defence against 
the Aetolians and their allies in the Peloponnese 67 
Again, we need to question Polybius' stress on the unity of 
the Achaean league and to what extent its various members 
65 See IG IX(2). 1.3B. for the inscription. Larsen (1968) p. 197. 
66 See Larsen (1968) p. 197. 
67 Scholten (2000) p. 220. 
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acted in unison, as Polybius suggests, or in accordance with their 
own interests,: As Scholten points out, "for most of the conflict, 
Greater Achaia's military impotence and incompetence left its 
territory such easy prey to pro-Aitolian forces that the internal 
stability and continued viability of the Achaean league became a 
real question" 68 Most of the actual fighting against the Eleans 
and the Spartans in the Peloponnese was actually carried out by 
the Macedonians. Given that during most of the conflict, it only 
had to fight against Sparta and Elis, facing no real threat from 
Aetolian forces, the Achaean league proved itself to be powerless 
to defend its position in the Peloponnese without Macedonian 
assistance. 
The war ended, according to Polybius, when news arrived 
of Hannibal's victory over the Romans at the battle of Trasimene, 
and on the advice of Demetrius of Pharos, Philip V entered into 
negotiations with the Aetolian league 69 At this point, Polybius' 
attention turns towards the approach of Rome. It was at the 
peace conference in Naupactus that ended the war that Polybius 
has the Aetolian strategos Agelaus speak about the dangers 
posed by the war in the west coming to a close and the 
possibility of the victor turning his attention towards Greece? 
68 See Scholten (2000) p. 220. 
69 Polyb. 5.101.6-10. 
70 See Polyb. 5.104.1-11. 
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By this stage the Macedonians had gained the upper hand in 
the fighting, and as Philip V's raid on Thermon demonstrates, 
the Aetolians were vulnerable to attack? i Philip V also gained 
control over Phthiotic Thebes, separating the Aetolians from 
Thessaly, while the capture of Zakynthos left Elis vulnerable to 
attack from the sea 72 It would appear that the Macedonians had 
gained the advantage and that the Aetolians were ready to sue 
for peace. 
However, according to Polybius, the Aetolian attitude 
towards the peace settlement changed, since: 
The Aetolians were at first quite happy with the terms of 
their peace with the Achaeans, as the fortune of the war 
had been adverse to them. They had in fact elected Agelaus 
of Naupactus as their strategos because they thought that 
he had contributed more than anyone else to the peace. But 
in less than no time they began to be dissatisfied and to 
blame Agelaus for having cut off all their sources of loot 
and destroyed their future prospects by making peace with 
all the Greeks and not with certain states only. 73 
This reference to the Aetolian peace with the Achaean 
league is interesting as it gives us some indication of the 
situation in the Peloponnese. The Aetolian tactic of trying to split 
71 Polyb. 5.8.1-9. Polybius 5.8.6. describes Thermon as the acropolis of the Aetolians. 
72 See Scholten (2000) p. 227. 
73 Polyb. 5.107.5-7. 
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the Achaean league through the efforts of its allies in Elis and 
Sparta had only been thwarted by Macedonian intervention. 
This would seem to suggest that the Peloponnese would again 
be a centre for Aetolian attention once they had an ally powerful 
enough to assist them. 
Conclusion. 
Polybius devoted a significant part of his work to clarifying 
the situation in the Peloponnese before Rome's advent into the 
Greek world. It should be questioned whether or not his desire 
to explain Roman rule to his Greek readership leads to a stress 
on Achaean unity that might not actually be an account of events 
that is representative to all view-points. 
Polybius' account of events prior to the advent of Rome, 
especially the Aetolian league's actions in the Peloponnese 
before the Social War is probably what he sincerely believed to 
be a true and accurate account of events. It is by no means 
evident that it was anything more than Polybius' perspective. 
Polybius portrays Aetolian actions in the Peloponnese prior to 
the outbreak of the Social War, like the raids on Messene and 
Cynaetha, as irrational acts -intended to loot and create havoc. 
This is how they may have appeared to an Arcadian like 
Polybius; it is by no means evident that the Eleans or Spartans 
regarded their Aetolian ally's actions in the same fashion. The 
entry of Macedonian troops into the Peloponnese placed the 
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Aetolian league in a dangerous situation; it is doubtful that they 
would have allowed such an event to occur without challenging 
it. Polybius is undoubtedly correct in stating that the retreating 
Aetolian force did destroy Cynaetha. His portrayal of this action 
as irrational and destructive though, reflects his own, Arcadian, 
judgement. It is evident that the Aetolian raiding force attempted 
to transfer control of this strategically important location to Elis, 
and subsequently to install a garrison commanded by the 
individual who would later co-ordinate Elis' assault on the 
Achaean league during the Social War. The raiders destroyed 
Cynaetha; it was because Philip V's unexpected arrival in the 
Peloponnese took them by surprise. Thus, this raid was not an 
irrational act of piracy, though Polybius undoubtedly believed it 
to be one. Rather it was part of a plan to gain an advantageous 
position in the Peloponnese at a strategically important location 
prior to the outbreak of war. 
Polybius was clarifying events in the Peloponnese as part of 
his wider intention of explaining how the process of anacyclosis 
had influenced the systems of government in both Rome and the 
Achaean league. Polybius presented the Achaean league as a 
single polis in his histories for this purpose. Despite this, it would 
appear, from the co-ordinated assault by the Eleans, Spartan and 
Aetolian forces at the beginning of the Social War, that there was 
a struggle for control over the Peloponnese between the Aetolian 
league and Macedonia and her Arcadian allies prior to Rome's 
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involvement in Hellenic affairs. Despite Polybius' representation 
of their actions as piracy, the Aetolians had legitimate reasons 
for intervening in the Peloponnese and were able to co- 
ordinating a sophisticated military strategy with their allies in 
Elis and Sparta. Although Polybius describes the Aetolian 
league's actions in the Peloponnese as irrational, it would be 
contrary to his intention of writing pragmatike historia to give any 
indication of the motives that the Aetolians had for intervening 
in the Peloponnese. For Polybius this was the mistaken approach 
to historia that Timaeus took74 
Polybius wrote with the intention of explaining Roman 
imperialism to his audience; it is impossible to separate his 
account of earlier events relating to the Peloponnese prior to 
Rome's involvement in Hellenic affairs from his intentions at the 
time that he wrote them. Polybius lived in a Greece that was 
under Roman control and started his histories when he was in 
detention in Italy. Given that he believed that the Roman system 
of government would eventually decline when anacyclosis 
resumed, the Greeks, who had reached the end of their own 
cycle of anacyclosis with the destruction of Corinth, would from 
that point onwards be on the ascendant. Thus, should his 
emphasis on the earlier unity of the Achaean league be taken at 
face value? Although Polybius' intention to clarify the situation 
in the Peloponnese prior to Rome's involvement in Hellenic 
74 Po1yb. 12. I. -6. 
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affairs was genuine, he appears to have done so in a manner that 
was favourable to Megalopolitan interests. The question should 
be asked whether or not the same applies to his account of 
Rome's later dealings with Greek states. 
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Chapter Five 
Polybius, the Peloponnese and the advent of Rome 
Introduction 
Rome has long been considered an aggressive state that 
sought, as Polybius stated, to bring the entire Mediterranean 
world under its control. ' Despite Rome's known desire to 
expand its influence, the extent to which it manipulated internal 
differences between states in Greece is a question that has 
attracted surprisingly little attention? Is this because Polybius' 
emphasis on the unity of the Achaean league masks differences 
between Greek states over the Peloponnese that Rome exploited? 
According to Polybius, in 207BC, an ambassador from 
Rhodes argued that the Aetolian league's alliance with the 
Romans during the First Macedonian War was harming Hellenic 
interests and that its consequences would be devastating for all 
of Greece. In a speech begging the Aetolian league to come to 
terms with Macedonia before it was too late, Polybius had the 
Rhodian delegate argue that the Romans were manipulating the 
situation to further their imperial ambitions. As he stated: 
'See Polyb. 1.1.5. Harris (1979) is the fullest detailed exposition of this case. North (1981) 
pp. 1-9 accepts Harris with some minor reservations. Even the word Rome, with its 
similarity to the Greek word for strength, had aggressive connotations for Greeks. See 
Erskine (1995) pp. 368-82. 
2 See Walbank (1963) pp. 1-13 for a discussion of Greek attitudes towards Rome during 
the First Macedonian War. All future references are from his selected papers. 
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It is only too evident that the Romans, if they get the war in 
Italy off their hands.... will next throw themselves with their 
whole strength on Greek lands on the pretext that they are 
helping the Aetolians against Philip, but in reality with the 
intention of conquering the whole country. ' 
What should we make of this passage? 4 In particular is 
Polybius giving us an accurate indication of Hellenic attitudes 
towards Rome at the time or one influenced by later events? 
Contacts with Greek communities in Southern Italy undoubtedly 
meant that many states, including the Aetolian league, which 
had proxenia links with this region, were aware of the Roman 
conquest of that region. Thus, Polybius' portrayal of Greek 
attitudes at this point may reflect what he believed to be 
contemporary concerns. The Romans had already shown their 
willingness to intervene in Illyrian affairs and the fears that 
Polybius has the Rhodian ambassador express about long-term 
Roman intentions seems plausible. ' 
In Polybius' account of the First Macedonian War he has a 
series of speeches, which present Greeks regarding Rome as an 
3 Polyb. 11.6.1. 
'See Walbank (1985) pp. 150-1 for five examples of Polybius presenting the Romans as 
aggressive barbarians during the First and Second Macedonian Wars. Although 
Walbank argued that these were an accurate reflection of what was said at the time, he 
compared them to modem day anti-Americanism and general Greek prejudices about 
outsiders. See pp. 153-4. 
'For Rome's position in Illyria at this time, see Hammond (1968) pp. 1-21. 
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imperialistic barbarian aggressor from an early stage. How then 
should we view the initial alliance between Rome and the 
Aetolian league? The Romans appear to have made the initial 
approach to the Aetolian league to fight a war jointly against 
Philip V, so it is a problem to explain why the Aetolian league 
accepted. ' The first Greek statesman that Polybius presents 
warning of the future danger posed to Greece by Rome is the 
Aetolian strategos Agelaus,, several years before the alliance 
between the two. ' Moreover, the reasoning behind the Aetolian 
decision to ally with Rome is rarely explored, beyond stating a 
desire for loot 
Again one must remember that Polybius is not only our 
only source for explaining how Rome came to control the Greek 
world, but that he is virtually our only source regarding internal 
Greek politics at that time. Many studies of Roman imperialism 
have been written; they mostly focus on Rome's intentions and 
actions, ignoring those of the Greek states that Rome came into 
contact with, especially how they used the advent of Rome to 
further their own interests. 
Roman intervention in Hellenic affairs did not suddenly 
change the attitudes of the Greek states towards each other. 
Although its decision to ally with Rome is usually dismissed as 
'See Harris (1979) p. 207. 
' See Polyb. 5.104.1-11. For a recent discussion of this speech see Champion (1997) pp. 
111-128. 
8 This is the implication of Green (1990) p. 299. 
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mere piracy, the Aetolian league had its own pre-occupations in 
212/211BC, in particular its long-standing conflict with 
Macedonia and the alliance between the Achaean league and 
Philip V, which damaged the interests of Aetolia's allies in the 
Peloponnese. If one considers the situation in the Peloponnese 
prior to its alliance with Rome, during the Social War the 
Aetolian league had attempted to undermine the position of the 
pro-Macedonian communities within the Achaean league as part 
of a wider conflict it was fighting against Macedonia. The 
Romans explicitly promised the Aetolian league control over 
territories in Acarnania in Livy's account of the treaty between 
the two, an area over which the Aetolian league had lost control 
to Antigonus Doson in 228BC. An attempt by the Aetolian 
league to use Roman support to recover this region may provide 
their motive for allying with Rome. " However, were the 
Aetolians the only Greek league that attempted to turn Rome's 
move eastward to their own advantage? 
Again there is the problem of assessing the extent to which 
Polybius' perspective on events influences our understanding of 
Roman imperialism. The danger posed to Arcadian poleis within 
the Achaean league like Megalopolis by Nabis' Sparta was an 
important factor in the speech made by Aristaenus urging the 
Achaean league to ally with Rome. Polybius presents the 
Achaean league acting as Rome's equal during much of this 
Livy 26.24.11. Scholten (2000) p. 230. 
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period; a presentation of events which he continues down to 
Callicrates' embassy in 180BC, which he marks as the decisive 
turning point in the relationship between the two. However, in 
line with his intention of writing instructive history, Polybius 
may have over-emphasised the unity of the Achaean league 
during its initial dealings with Rome, so that he could account 
for its decline once its system of government was corrupted by 
the onset of the final stage of anacyclosis. Flamininus removed 
Nabis from Argos in 195BC, restoring it to the Achaean league. 
Despite Polybius' presentation of the Achaean league as Rome's 
equal at this stage, it appears that the Achaean league's 
leadership was dependent, on Roman support. Should the 
alliance formed between the two be seen as a need by Rome for 
respectable allies? 10 Or rather did Arcadian communities like 
Megalopolis seek to use Rome power to secure a dominant 
position over the Peloponnese? 
It is this aspect of the advent of Rome into the Greek world 
that this chapter will consider; how Rome manipulated the 
internal differences and rivalries within the Greek world to 
extend its control. Although the Greeks may have feared the 
consequences, allying with Rome offered them the opportunity 
to further their own local ambitions. Polybius does provide a 
narrative regarding Rome's advent into the Greek world; it is 
one that is heavily influenced by his own regional perspective 
'° Badian (1970) p. 40. 
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and emphasis on the role of anacyclosis in history. My contention 
will be that the Roman/Aetolian treaty of 212/211BC was an 
attempt by the Aetolian league to harness Roman power to 
regain the position it had lost in the Peloponnese during the 
Social War. 
Once Rome had entered the Greek world, other states, 
notably the Achaean league, appear to have followed the 
Aetolian lead and sought to ally with Rome to gain an advantage 
over their rivals. Therefore, Arcadian communities within the 
Achaean league like Megalopolis sought an alliance with Rome 
to further their regional ambitions under the leadership of 
Megalopolitans like Aristaenus and Philopoemen. 
The treaty between Rome and the Aetolian league. 
The treaty between Rome and the Aetolian league records 
the earliest known alliance between Rome and any state in 
Greece. Already known to some extent from Livy, the treaty 
itself was discovered in the 1950s in Acarnania in the form of an 
inscription partially recording its terms. 11 The details of the 
treaty, dealing with the division of the spoils from the actions 
that the allies were to undertake, appears at first sight to 
reinforce Polybius' presentation of the Aetolian league, and the 
alliance is seen merely as a joint looting expedition. " What is 
" See Stsv 111.536.4-15 for the text of the treaty. 
12 Harris (1979) p. 207. 
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overlooked is that the Aetolian league was under the terms of 
this treaty gaining control over poleis within a specified 
geographic area. Livy records a clause stipulating that the 
Romans would return Acarnania to the control of the Aetolian 
league and it appears that the epigraphic text specifically 
outlined the area over which the terms of the treaty were to 
apply, though that section of the inscription is missing. 13 If one 
examines the epigraphic text, poleis that were captured by the 
Romans within the specified area were to be awarded to the 
Aetolian league, with the Romans gaining possession of the 
moveable objects 14 If both were to capture a polis jointly, the 
Romans undertook to hand it over to the Aetolian league 15 The 
treaty further specifies that if any polis wished to re-enter the 
Aetolian league voluntarily, the Romans would allow this, 
presumably a reference to Poleis that had previously been 
members of the Aetolian league16 
Should this treaty be seen in terms of the desire for both for 
loot? Green, pointing out the Roman decision to set limits at 
Corycra, suggests that the Romans were aware that they were 
allying with a state of notorious corsairs. " Gruen has drawn 
attention to the fact that the Romans adopted Hellenic practices 
" Sherk (1984) No. 2 n 1. 
14 See Line 9. 
15 See Lines 10-15. 
16 Scholten (2000) p. 230. 
" Green (1990) p. 299. 
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in treaties with Greek states, pointing out that the practice of 
framing an alliance for limited and specified goals was familiar 
to the Aetolian league. As he argues, the terms of the treaty 
reflect earlier alliances made by the Aetolian league with 
Alexander II of Epirus and Antigonus Gonatas to partition 
Acarnania and the Achaean league respectively 18 However, 
Gruen accepts that the Aetolian league's intention in allying with 
Rome was to plunder, suggesting that the geographic boundary 
set at Corycra was to prevent the Aetolians from extending their 
influence into the Straits of Otranto. 19 
This treaty is also seen as a Roman response to the alliance 
that Philip V of Macedonia concluded with Hannibal in the 
aftermath of the battles of Lake Trasimene and Cannae. 
According to Polybius, Philip V agreed in 215BC to ally with 
Hannibal and not to make a separate peace with Rome until the 
Carthaginians had emerged victorious from the war in Italy. In 
the event of a Carthaginian victory, the Romans would be forced 
to withdraw from areas in,. 
_ 
Illyria where they had established 
interests. According to Polybius, these areas would be returned 
to the control of Macedonian allies, notably Demetrius of Pharos, 
who, according to Polybius, urged Philip V to make peace with 
1e Gruen (1984) p. 19-20, n. 30-31. 
" Gruen (1984) p. 378. Rich (1983) p. 187 suggests that the junior status that Rome had 
during this conflict was a source of resentment later on. 
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the Aetolian league on hearing of Carthaginian victories in 
Italy. ° 
All the above explanations assume that Rome was in a 
desperate situation and allied with the only possible Greek state 
it could find, the Aetolian league, which Polybius describes in 
the worst possible terms. Why the Aetolian league's leadership 
allied with the Romans is a question that receives little attention, 
except for accepting the Polybian depiction of Aetolians 
behaving as mindless pirates. Traditionally this conflict is called 
the First Macedonian War; it is viewed from a Roman 
perspective. It was not the First Macedonian War for the 
Aetolian league, which had been fighting against the 
Macedonians since the time of Alexander the Great. It appears 
that the Aetolian league allied with Rome to gain its assistance in 
regaining control over territory that it had previously lost to the 
Macedonians. After the Social War ended, Polybius presents 
Greek states approaching both Rome and Carthage, since, as he 
states, they feared the danger posed by the Macedonian victory, 
and presumably, the consequences of Philip V' alliance with 
Hannibal if Carthage was victorious Zl By the time of the Roman 
20 For the text of the treaty see Polyb. 7.9.1-17. Gruen (1984) p. 60 has drawn attention to 
the Semitic phraseology in the text, suggesting that Polybius had access to an original 
copy of the alliance between the two. 
21 Polyb. 5.105.7-8. Polybius states a number of Greek states sent embassies to both the 
Romans and the Carthaginians in the aftermath of the Social War because they were 
afraid of Philip's daring. 
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alliance with the Aetolian league the threat of Macedonian 
involvement in the war in Italy was limited, since the Romans 
defeated Philip V and destroyed his fleet in 214BC ' Possibly of 
more concern to the Romans, given their presence in the Balkans, 
were Philip V's conquest of Dimallum and the Parthini and 
Atintani, all of which were within the Roman area of interest in 
Illyria'3 It was after this string of successes by the Macedonians 
that the Roman/Aetolian treaty was concluded. The Macedonian 
capture of Lissus on the coast may also have been a determining 
factor in Rome's decision to seek an ally 24 
If the Romans were defending their interests in Illyria 
against Macedonian encroachment, why would the Aetolian 
league assist them? Returning to the terms of the treaty, although 
they are usually seen as relating to the division of spoils, it is the 
Romans who gain the portable loot when they capture a polis. 
The Aetolian league gained control over all the territory seized 
within the area specified by the treaty, even if the Romans 
captured it without any assistance from Aetolian forces. 
As Gruen points out, the Romans did generally use Hellenic 
models in concluding treaties with Greek states, so the terms of 
the treaty, especially those referring to the Aetolian league 
' Plut. Arat. 51.2. Both Harris (1979) p. 206 and Gruen (1984) p. 377 argue that after the 
Roman destruction of his fleet Philip V was never again in a position to send forces to 
assist Hannibal. 
' Harris (1979) p. 206. 
"Gruen (1984) p. 378. 
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gaining territory need not necessarily be seen as a sign of Roman 
disinterest or weakness. On the contrary, what appear to be the 
decisive factors in the conclusion of this alliance were Rome's 
need to prevent Philip V from expanding on his position in 
Illyria, and the Aetolian league's desire to recover territory it had 
lost to the Macedonians. Livy states that the treaty covered the 
area between the borders of Aetolia and Corycra. Though it is 
supposed that this might refer to a Roman desire to keep the 
Aetolians confined, this assumes that their principal objective 
was gaining loot. Livy's specific reference to the Romans 
handing over Acarnania to the Aetolian league is perhaps more 
significant. ' The Aetolian league had suffered severe defeats at 
the hands of Philip V in this region in 219 and 218 BC on top of 
those inflicted earlier by Antigonus Doson 26 The clause of the 
treaty relating to re-admission of poleis into the Aetolian league 
may indicate that the Aetolian league sought to recover the 
position that it had lost to the Macedonians in Acarnania and the 
Peloponnese? ' Instead of being a piratical adventure, it appears 
that the Aetolian league was using its alliance with Rome to 
regain the position that it had lost to the Macedonians, both 
during the Social War and earlier in 228BC. 
25 Livy. 26.24.11. 
26Scholten (2000) p. 230. 
ý' See Scholten (2000) p. 230. 
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Though specified by Livy, Acarnania was not the only 
region where the Aetolian league had recently lost influence to 
the Macedonians. The alliance between the Achaean league and 
Macedonia had damaged Aetolian interests in the Peloponnese, 
and during the First Macedonian War much of the joint military 
effort between the Aetolian league and Rome took place in this 
region. 
Roman conduct during this conflict has long been 
characterised as their fighting to the last Aetolian 28 In reality it 
would appear that the Roma i sIrimary role during the war was 
to assist the Aetolian league in its attempt to re-form the alliance 
with Elis and Sparta that had existed during the Social War. 
Turning to events during the war, initially the Roman fleet 
centred its operations towards securing the Aetolian, league from 
the sea. In 211BC, Laevinus, the Roman commander captured 
Zacynthos and the Acarnanian port of Oeniadae 29 The following 
year, the Roman fleet, along with an Aetolian force led by 
Scopas, attacked Anticyra in Phocis, apparently with the 
intention of severing Macedonian communications with the 
Peloponnese 30 This was followed by an Aetolian appeal to the 
Spartans recorded in Polybius, and a counter appeal to the 
' Most recently this allegation has been made by Scholten (2000) p. 230. 
'Livy. 26.24.15-16. 
30Livy. 26.26.1-3. Livy states that Anticyra was in Locris. However the Acarnanian 
Lyciscus shortly afterwards mentions it as Anticyra in Phocis. See Polyb. 9.39.2-3. 
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Spartans to remain neutral by an Acarnania embassy 31 Polybius 
has a speech at this point, in which an Acarnanian ambassador 
states, during the debate in Sparta over whether to ally with the 
Aetolian league, that the Greeks were at this point threatened by 
a war with men of a different race who threatened to enslave 
them. The ambassador continues to state that by allying with the 
Romans, the Aetolian league had chosen to ally with barbarians, 
and that their actions would bring disaster on all the Greeks 32 
Polybius presents this alliance as a betrayal of Greek 
interests. In reality the Aetolian league appears to have allied 
with Rome to gain its assistance in trying to undermine the 
Macedonian position in the Peloponnese. Along with their 
appeal to Sparta, Polybius mentions both Elis and Messene as 
Aetolian allies at this time. Once the Spartans had agreed to ally 
with the Aetolian league there was a change in Roman 
involvement in the conflict. According to Livy, Laevinus, the 
commander of the Roman fleet that was assisting the Aetolian 
league, reported to the senate that the war was going well and 
the legion in Greece could be recalled since the Roman fleet 
would be sufficient to keep the Macedonians away from Italy. 
This advice was acted upon and Laevinaus' successor, Sulpicius 
"See Polyb. 9.28.1-39.7 for the speeches by both delegations. 
'Polyb. 9.37.7. 
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Galba, was ordered to send home all his troops, apart from the 
socii navales ? 
Livy illustrates the lessening of the risk of Macedonian 
intervention in the war in Italy by emphasising the decision to 
withdraw the Legion. Was this the real reason? The Romans had 
concentrated their efforts during the initial phase of the war in 
assisting the Aetolian league in recreating the anti-Macedonian 
alliance that had existed at the time of the Social War in the 
Peloponnese. Although the Romans may have been constrained 
by a lack of resources, it could also be postulated that the 
Romans were exploiting the hostility between the Aetolian 
league and Macedonia to further their imperial ambitions. 
Polybius presents the Romans as acting aggressively during this 
conflict. We might infer from this that the senate was already 
looking towards the post-Punic War situation when Rome 
would be free to intervene in Greece, and the alliance with the 
Aetolian league came at a time when the Romans were 
counterattacking after Hannibal's initial successes in Italy. 3' The 
decision by the Aetolian league to ally with Rome at an early 
stage suggests that they regarded the Romans as the most likely 
victors in the Punic War, just as Philip V had sought to capitalise 
on Hannibal's successes in Italy by allying with Carthage. 
"Livy 26 28.1-9. 
' The possibility of the Romans attempting to weaken Philip V is suggested by Harris 
(1979) p. 207. 
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Nor was Rome the only power that the Aetolian league 
sought support from. It appears that the alliance between the 
two was part of a policy undertaken by the Aetolian league to 
gain the support of other powers in its campaigns against the 
Macedonians. In 211BC, when the Roman fleet captured the 
island of Aegina, they handed it over to the Aetolian league, 
which subsequently sold it to Attalus of Pergamum for the sum 
of thirty talents 35 The following year, Attalus was elected as the 
Aetolian supreme commander, receiving the title of strategos 
autokrator, an honorific title. Despite this, the Aetolian alliance 
with Rome still remained. When in the following year Philip V 
opened talks with the Aetolian league, so that, according to Livy, 
neither the Romans nor Attalus would have any reason for 
invading Greece, the arrival of the Roman fleet and Attalus 
ended any hopes of a negotiated settlement 36 
During the war, the Aetolian league's policy towards the 
Peloponnese remained focused on undermining the Macedonian 
position there. During 208BC, with Roman assistance, the 
Aetolians tried to cut communications between Macedonia and 
central Greece, fortifying the pass at Thermopylae, and the 
Roman fleet attempted to gain control over the coast 37 Philip V 
proceeded to Phocis, where there was an 
' Polyb. 9.42.5-8. 
' Livy. 27.33.4. 
37 Livy. 28.7.3. 
attempt by 
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ambassadors from Ptolemy and Rhodes to negotiate between the 
Romans and Macedonians. ' The conference was disrupted by an 
attack by the Spartan regent Machanidas on the Achaean league, 
and postponed. 
However, in 205BC a radical change took place in the 
Achaean league that appears to have had far reaching 
implications for the Aetolian league's anti-Macedonian policy in 
the Peloponnese, when Philopoemen of Megalopolis was elected 
strategos of the Achaean league. Philopoemen had earlier served 
as Achaean hipparch, and during his time in office had reformed 
the Achaean cavalry force 39 As strategos, we are told that he 
reformed the Achaean infantry, re-equipping the lightly armed 
troops, previously deployed, with Macedonian equipment such 
as the sarissa pike and the aspis shield. In 205BC the newly 
reformed Achaean army was paraded at the Nemean games 40 
Although both Polybius and Plutarch discuss the military 
implications of Philopoemen's actions, both are silent as to the 
political ramifications. Errington suggests that these reforms 
mark the beginning of a renewal within the Achaean league, 
with Philopoemen wishing to lessen the Achaean league's 
dependence on Macedonian support and break the ties that had 
Livy. 28.7.13-14. 
39 See Polyb. 10.22-24 and Plut. Philop. 7. 
40 Plut. Philop. 7. Paus. 8.49.7. Livy 27.31.11. For a detailed discussion of the military 
reforms undertaken by Philopoemen, see Anderson (1967) p. 104-5. 
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existed between the two since the end of the Cleomenic War 41 
Errington points to the attempted plot by Philip V to murder 
Philopoemen in 205BC as evidence that he was a threat to the 
Macedonian position in the Peloponnese 42 
Instead it appears that Philopoemen's reforms were a sign of 
the close relationship that existed between the Macedonians and 
Arcadian poleis within the Achaean league like Megalopolis. 
Philopoemen had served Macedonian interests in Crete in the 
period immediately before his election as hipparch of the Achaean 
league, and would do so again at a later stage. It is unlikely that 
Philopoemen would have introduced these reforms without 
Macedonian approval43 It would appear that Philopoemen's 
reforms indicate increased Megalopolitan co-operation with 
41 See Errington (1969) p. 70. Errington himself admits that Philip V had a possibly 
undeserved reputation for assassinations. The number of failed attempts that he is 
credited with would seem to suggest, according to Errington, that these accusations 
were the fabrications of hostile contemporaries. Polybius portrays Philip as a tyrant who 
frequently murdered his political opponents; at one point Polybius presents Flamininus 
making a joke about it, with Philip replying with a sardonic smile, Polyb. 18.7.6. 
4' See Plut. Philop. 12.2. 
43 Plutarch suggests that Philopoemen refused Antigonus' offer that he should serve 
under him because he disliked taking orders, and instead went to Crete because he felt 
that he did not wish to be idle and because of the experience he would gain there. 
(Plut. Philop. 7. ). As Errington (1968) p. 28 points out, Philopoemen's activities in Crete 
coincided with Macedonian interests, and cannot have been independent of them. 
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Macedonia. " From Philopoemen's assumption of the office of 
Achaean strategos until his death in 183BC, all the known 
strategoi of the Achaean league were Megalopolitans, with 
Philopoemen himself holding the office on at least eight 
occasions 45 In light of Philopoemen's close association with 
Macedonian interests on Crete, his reforms may have extended 
beyond the military sphere and encompassed political reforms 
that strengthened the position of Megalopolis and other 
Arcadian poleis within the Achaean league. Polybius, with his 
close -association with Philopoemen and concern with showing 
the unity of the Achaean league, makes no reference to any 
political implications these reforms may have had. Given that the 
Aetolian league appears to have attempted to exploit divisions in 
the Peloponnese during the Social War, it appears probable that 
Arcadian communities like Megalopolis would try to consolidate 
44 Errington (1969) pp. 70ff is the only modem scholar to pay any attention to the 
political side that Philopoemen's reforms might have had, since Anderson strictly 
discusses the military implications. 
' For lists of the strategoi of the Achaean league between 211-179-8BC, see Errington 
(1968) p. 300 (table II), who also lists reconstruction by earlier scholars. Apart from 
Philopoemen, other Megalopolitans who held the office of strategos in this period were: 
Aristaenus, 199-9,196-5,188-7 and 186-5 BC. 
Diophanes in 192BC. 
Archon in 190-89 and 187-6BCBC. 
Lycortas in 185-4,183-2 and 182-1BC. 
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the dominance they had achieved within the Achaean league at 
the end of the Cleomenic War. 
The victory of the newly equipped Achaean army over the 
Spartans at Mantinea and the death of the Spartan king 
Machanidas ended the Aetolian alliance with Sparta, and the 
Aetolian league concluded peace with the Macedonians shortly 
afterwardsDid the Aetolians conclude a separate peace with 
Macedonia because they felt that the Romans had not adequately 
supported them during the conflict? Or because the defeat of the 
Spartans destroyed the anti-Macedonian alliance that the 
Romans had helped the Aetolian league create in the 
Peloponnese? Rich suggests that the separate peace between 
Aetolia and Macedonia may have been the result of the Aetolian 
league feeling that the Romans had abandoned them. He 
suggests that the Aetolian decision was a humiliation for Rome, 
because it came at a stage when they were able to release 
adequate resources to prosecute the war successfully. "" This 
would seem to have some merit, since shortly after the 
conclusion of peace between the Aetolians and Macedonians, a 
Philopoemen himself held the office in 208-7,206-5,204-3,203-2,201-0,193-2,191-0,189- 
8 and 183-2BC. All the known strategoi between 201 and 181BC, when Hyperbatus of 
Dyme was elected strategos, were from Megalopolis. 
/ Gruen (1984) p 380 argues that after the Battle of Metaurus the Romans were in a better 
position to send troops to the Aetolians. 
' Rich (1983) p. 139. 
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Roman force under P. Sempronius Tuditanus arrived in Greece, 
but was unable to induce the Aetolian league to restart the war 48 
However, 'it was not likely that the Aetolian league would 
wish to resume war against Macedonia after the defeat of Sparta, 
one of its principal allies in the Peloponnese. Furthermore, the 
assumption is that it was a Roman War, the First Macedonian 
War; it was for the Aetolian league the Fifth Macedonian War 49 
It was an attempt by the Aetolian league to gain the support of 
other states, of which Rome was one, to counter the losses that 
they had suffered to the Antigonids in the preceding decades. So 
should the dispatch of this Roman force be seen as an attempt by 
the Romans to coerce the Aetolian league back into the war? Or 
rather was it a separate campaign, mounted in Illyria to 
consolidate Roman interests? Tuditanus, after failing to persuade 
the Aetolian league to declare war on Macedonia, consolidated 
the Roman presence in Illyria by regaining control over the 
Parthini, and certain towns near Dyrrhachium, suggesting that 
the Romans were intent on securing their own interests. 
The Aetolian league was not mentioned in the Peace of 
Phoenice that ended the war between Rome and Macedonia. 
Despite this omission, many of its allies were listed by Livy as 
Roman adscripti to the treaty; Ilium, Attalus, Pleuratus (an 
48Livy. 29.12.1-4. 
" Scholten (2000) p. 230. 
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Illyrian), Nabis, Elis, Messenia and Athens 5° Although questions 
have been raised as to the authenticity of this list, virtually all of 
the states mentioned had been allies of the Aetolian league since 
the time of the Social War 51 The decision by the Romans to list so 
many Aetolian allies as adscripti, would seem to suggest, as 
Harris argues, a forward looking policy by the Romans, with 
their presence creating the conditions for an almost inevitable 
appeal for military assistance 52 Though they were not included 
in the actual peace agreement, the Aetolian league had been 
forced by the changed situation in the Peloponnese to come to 
separate terms with the Macedonians. Given that the Romans 
had listed so many of their allies as adscripti, the Aetolians may 
have felt that in any future conflict the Romans would regard 
them as potential allies. 
Again, one must question whether Polybius' depiction of 
Aetolian intentions during the First Macedonian War are those 
50 Livy. 29.12.14. The description of Nabis as tyrant of Sparta suggests a Polybian origin. 
s' Derow (1979) p. 6-7 argues that the list is derived from Polybius. Harris (1979) p. 207-8 
argues that the Romans intended to list these states as friends of Rome, and create a 
condition whereby they could lay the foundations for a future appeal by these states to 
Rome. Gruen (1984) p. 382 states that it was normal Hellenic practice. More recently, 
Habicht (1995) p. 198 is more sceptical as to the authenticity of the list. However, there 
had been a mythical kinship relationship between the Aetolian league and Elis since at 
least the fifth century, the Illyrian was called after Pleuron in Aetolia, and Sparta and 
Messene had been Aetolian allies since the end of the Cleomenic War. The inclusion of 
Ilium as an adscriptus reflects Roman beliefs about the Aeneas legend 
52 Harris (1979) p. 207-208. 
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of an Arcadian who was unable to accept that the Aetolian 
league had legitimate interests in the Peloponnese. The Achaean 
league's alliance with Macedonia had placed the Aetolian league 
in a difficult position. The Aetolians had been unable to defeat 
the Macedonians by themselves when they had tried to reverse 
Antigonid gains in the Peloponnese and defend their allies Elis 
during the Social War. It would seem natural that they would 
seek support from other powers to continue this policy. 
Roman intentions are less easy to assess. It appears unlikely 
that the Romans allied with the Aetolian league to prevent Philip 
V intervening on behalf of the Carthaginians in Italy, though this 
possibility cannot be ruled out entirely. Roman support for the 
Aetolian league appears to have been partly defensive, 
preventing Philip V from using the opportunity posed by the 
Punic War to detach Roman allies in the Balkans. It was also in 
some respects aggressive. By approaching the Aetolians and 
supporting their efforts to regain control over territory they had 
lost to the Macedonians, the Romans were able to lay down the 
groundwork for their future intervention in the Greek world. As 
Polybius has the Rhodian ambassador and others claim, the 
Romans seem to have exploited the problems that the Aetolian 
league faced to extend their influence over the Greek world. 
In understanding Rome's entry into the Greek world, it is 
essential to appreciate both the conflict between the Aetolian and 
Achaean leagues in the Peloponnese and its exploitation by the 
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Roman intruders. Roman involvement with the Aetolian league 
during the First Macedonian War undoubtedly led to them 
gaining an appreciation of the position in the Peloponnese. After 
they had intervened in the Greek world, their decision to seek, 
and later cultivate an alliance with the Achaean league after 
198BC, may reflect an attempt by the Romans, and Flamininus in 
particular, to manipulate the situation in the Peloponnese to 
their own advantage. 
Nabis, Sparta, the Peloponnese and the Aetolian appeal to 
Rome. 
The Aetolian/Roman alliance of 212BC appears to have 
been motivated by the Aetolian league's desire to use Roman 
power to regain its position in the Peloponnese and defend its 
allies there. The issues raised by the Achaean league's alliance 
with Rome in 198BC show how Polybius' emphasis on the unity 
of the Achaean league distorts our understanding of Roman 
imperialism and Flamininus' behaviour in the Peloponnese. 
Before considering this alliance we should first examine how the 
situation in the Peloponnese was altered by the assumption of 
power at Sparta in 205BC by Nabis. Few Spartan kings have 
provoked more controversy than Nabis; Polybius characterises 
him as the worst of all possible characters. However, Nabis, as 
Shimron pointed out, suffers in that only Polybius' extremely 
biased account of his reign survives, and in light of the excesses 
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he is accused of committing, it is best to remember that we have 
no other evidence about Nabis' character 53 For example, 
Polybius alleges that Nabis committed robbery, torture and 
piracy on a regular basis and that his supporters were rapists, 
highwaymen and burglars 54 In one incident Nabis is accused by 
Polybius of using a device reminiscent of a medieval iron 
maiden made in the image of his wife to extract taxation from his 
fellow Spartans 55 
Modern scholars also see Nabis' actions as a continuation of 
the socio-economic reforms carried out in Sparta during the late 
Hellenistic era. 6 Most recently Cartledge has argued that Nabis' 
claim to be restoring the mythical Lycurgan constitution, like 
those of his predecessors, was merely propaganda. It appears 
that Nabis's behaviour was more akin to a Hellenistic tyrant than 
a Spartan king 57 
As in the case of Cleomenes' reign, Polybius makes no 
mention of Nabis cancelling debts in Sparta, though he does later 
53 Shimron (1972) p. 79-80. 
54Polyb. 13.6.4. 
0 Polyb. 13.7.1-11. Shimron (1972) p. 87 suggests that there may have been some truth to 
these accusations, stating that many Spartans, especially those in positions of authority 
or wealth may have favoured co-operation with Macedonia instead of reviving the 
traditional Spartan regime. 
'Shimron (1972) p. 83 Piper (1986) p. 95 and Cartledge (1989) p. 67 point out that Nabis, 
despite his name, was actually a member of one of the Spartan royal families. 
57 Cartledge (1989) p. 67-69. 
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accuse him of carrying out this measure in Argos 58 Most of the 
socio-economic reforms that Nabis is credited with come from 
his rule in Argos, not Sparta, though Polybius' text is extremely 
fragmentary at this stage. Although Nabis carried out changes in 
Spartan society, there is no actual evidence regarding his 
motives, and his reforms in Argos may have been an attempt to 
gain popularity. 
It also appears that Nabis was responding to the changes 
that were taking place in Spartan society, not initiating them. 
During this period Sparta was undergoing a transformation, 
constructing defensive walls for the first time in its history, a 
sign of increased urbanisation in a city previously known for its 
rural characteristics. Nabis' reign also saw a change in the 
structure of Spartan society, with an increase in grave goods 
indicating increased wealth, along with changes in Spartan 
sculpture, showing that Sparta was becoming more open to 
outside influences 59 However, many of these changes had begun 
before Nabis' assumption of power and were by no means 
completed by the time of his death 60 Nabis was in many ways a 
product rather than the cause of changes that were ongoing in 
Spartan society. Although Nabis was willing to use Sparta's once 
glorious past as propaganda, he was faced with a changing 
" Eckstein (1987) p. 228. 
s' Cartledge (1989) p. 71-72 
60 Cartledge (1989) p. 72. 
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situation; his reforms seeming to have been undertaken to 
strengthen SpartaI militarily. 
The defensive nature of Nabis' reforms can be seen if one 
turns towards his decision to enfranchise a large number of 
slaves. Again there are problems. Polybius describes those who 
benefited from Nabis' reforms as douloi and Livy describing 
them as servi, balanced by the evidence from Strabo that the 
institution of helotry survived in Sparta 61 The use of helots in the 
Spartan military had a long tradition; Cleomenes shortly before 
his defeat had freed six thousand helots to serve in his army 62 
Taken in connection with the other changes in Spartan society 
that happened during Nabis' reign, such as the development of a 
navy and a treasury to regulate financial affairs, his actions were 
probably designed to increase Sparta's military power. Another 
point to consider is the role that Philopoemen's reforms in the 
Achaean league had in prompting these changes. With the 
Achaean army reformed and apparently under firm 
Megalopolitan control, it is interesting to consider Nabis' 
reforms in the context that this threat posed to Sparta. Sparta 
had, ever since the Cleomenic War, been engaged in conflict with 
an expansionary Achaean league in which Arcadian 
communities like Megalopolis had an extremely influential 
61 Cartledge (1989) p. 69. For the survival of this institution in Sparta see Strabo. 8.365. 
Shimron (1972) p. 90. Nabis appears to have had extensive support from the Perioeci 
towns. See Shimron (1972) p. 88. 
62 For the earlier use of slaves in the Spartan military see Hunt (1998) pp. 171-5. 
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position. Philopoemen and a reformed Achaean army posed a 
threat to Sparta; it would seem natural that Nabis would 
undertake any measure necessary to ensure Sparta's continued 
independence. 
Nabis' assumption of power also presented the Aetolian 
league with an opportunity to again challenge the Macedonian 
position in the Peloponnese, when in 204BC war broke out 
between the Achaean league and Sparta. According to Polybius, 
war erupted when Nabis refused to return a number of horses 
stolen from Megalopolis 63 Whether this story is true, or was the 
sole cause of the war is unknown, but for the next three years a 
border conflict was waged between Sparta and Megalopolis. In 
201BC, Nabis attempted to seize Messene, a move that Polybius 
condemns, since it was in alliance with Sparta at the time `4 
However, Messene had co-operated with the Aetolian league 
during the Social and First Macedonian Wars, so possibly Nabis, 
with Aetolian encouragement, was trying to reform the anti- 
Macedonian alliance in the Peloponnese that had existed since 
the time of the Social War. 
The following year, when Philopoemen was Achaean 
strategos, he mobilised the Achaean army secretly, and defeated 
Nabis' army at Sellasia 65 Shortly afterwards Philopoemen 
6' Polyb. 18.8.3-7. 
64 Polyb. 16.13.1-3. 
6'Polyb. 16.37.1-38. 
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departed for Crete where he served Philip V's interests " This 
move appears surprising, especially as Nabis continued his 
attacks to the extent that the inhabitants of Megalopolis were 
forced to grow their crops within its walls 67 Such was the 
resentment felt by the Megalopolitans at Philopoemen's 
departure for Crete, according to Plutarch, that moves were 
made to exile him. They were only prevented from doing so by 
the intervention of the Achaean league's strategos, Aristaenus of 
Megalopolis, even though Plutarch states that he was a political 
opponent of Philopoemen `' 
This episode raises two questions. Firstly, why did 
Philopoemen leave the Peloponnese for Crete at a time when 
Megalopolis was under attack from Nabis? Secondly, why did 
Aristaenus support one of his political opponents? The answer 
lies in the situation in Crete at this time. Nabis, through the 
development of a navy, had made Crete an important area of 
operations, especially for mercenaries, and there is evidence of 
an extensive Spartan presence there during the Hellenistic 
period 69 There were also extensive Macedonian interests on the 
island, and it is not inconceivable that Philopoemen was sent 
66P1ut. Philop. 13.1. 
67 P1ut. Philop. 13.1. 
68 P1ut. Philop. 13.4 
69 Errington (1969) p. 34 draws attention to the large army of mercenaries recruited in 
Crete by Nabis. 
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there as Philip's representative. " Errington has suggested that at 
this time Philopoemen and Aristaenus were close political allies 
and the breakdown in the relationship between the two came 
later; this would seem to be contradicted by Plutarch's assertion 
that they were not. " It appears that Aristaenus intervened to 
save Philopoemen from being exiled because his presence in 
Crete was as part of the close co-operation between the 
Macedonians and Arcadian poleis like Megalopolis within the 
Achaean league. The war between the Achaean league and 
Sparta continued after the Roman invasion and given its 
seriousness was of primary importance to theAchaean league . 
72 
Should the outbreak of war between Sparta and the 
Achaean league be seen in a wider context? Given their interest 
in Greece and the end of the Second Punic War, the Romans may 
have been aware of it, along with the possibilities it raised, since 
Nabis was a Roman adscriptus at Phoenice. For the Aetolian 
league, the resurgence of Sparta and the attempt by Nabis to 
gain control of Messene in 202BC created an opportunity for 
them to intervene in the Peloponnese and undermine the 
70 See Errington (1969) pp. 34-48, for an account of rival Spartan and Macedonian interests 
in Crete at this time. Nabis appears, according to Errington, to have had a close 
relationship with Cnossos, while the Achaean league and Macedonia had a close 
relationship with Gortyn. 
" Errington (1969) p 74, suggests that Aristaenus' election as strategos in 199BC was a 
victory for Philopoemen's party and policy. 
' Larsen (1968) p. 381. 
201 
Macedonian position there. It is in this context that the Aetolian 
embassy asking for Roman intervention in Greek affairs should 
be seen. The problem lies with the dating, since Livy does not 
give an exact date and Appian dates it to after the appeal by 
Rhodes and Pergamum to Rome. 73 
Livy informs us that the Aetolian league approached the 
senate and requested a renewal of the alliance between the two, 
along with Roman aid to combat the growth of Philip V's power. 
But the Romans refused, stating that they would not assist 
because of the Aetolian league's earlier separate peace with 
Macedonia ". Regardless of the dating of the supposed appeal, 
one is left with the problem of why the Aetolians would have 
appealed to Rome, and why the senate chose not to exploit this 
pretext for intervention in Greece. ' 
The Romans may have refused the Aetolian request for 
assistance because they felt betrayed by the decision to seek- a 
separate peace with Macedonia. However, at the time it had 
concluded peace with Macedonia, the Aetolian league had in fact 
" For Livy's account of the embassy see Livy. 31.29.1ff, and the appeal 31.29.4. For 
Appian's reference and dating see App. Mac. 4. Derow (1979) p. 7, suggests that the most 
likely date for the appeal was the one suggested by Appian, that is late 201BC, after the 
Rhodian appeal to Rome. Earlier Holleaux (1921) pp. 293-7, rejected the appeal 
mentioned by Appian, arguing that probably after the battle of Zama, the Aetolians 
appealed to Rome for help against Philip but were rebuffed; evidence in Holleaux's eyes 
that the Romans did not wish to intervene in Greece. Harris (1979) p. 213 is sceptical 
about the veracity of Appian's reference. 
'Briscoe (1973) p. 130. 
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little alternative, since Sparta had been defeated, leaving its 
Peloponnesian strategy in ruins, and there was no sight at the 
time of the Romans offering significant assistance. So if the 
Aetolian league did in fact make an appeal to Rome, we are left 
with the problem why it was rejected. There is the possibility of 
hurt Roman pride or indifference, but if Philip V was planning a 
campaign in Illyria, it was in Rome's own interest to assist the 
Aetolians, regardless of what had happened at the end of the 
First Macedonian War. 75 If the Aetolian league's appeal to Rome 
ties in with the war between the Achaean league and Sparta, and 
Nabis' attempt to seize Messene, it may be the case that the 
Aetolians were again trying to involve Rome in their efforts to 
undermine Macedonian interests in the Peloponnese. In light of 
Aetolian interests in this region, especially the need to secure 
Elis' position, the resurgence of Sparta under Nabis' leadership 
created the conditions for an Aetolian intervention in the 
Peloponnese, hence the appeal to Rome. 
This might be the precise reason why the senate rejected the 
appeal. With the war with Hannibal virtually over, Rome was 
looking towards expanding eastwards, and probably did not 
wish to become openly involved with Aetolian league. 76 Rome 
Badian (1958) p. 61-6 and Errington (1972) p. 131-2 suggest that Illyria was the 
Roman's principal concern at this time. 
76 Derow (1979) p. 8 argues that the Romans did not wish to return to Greece as the allies 
of the Aetolians, because of the earlier predictions that they would return on the pretext 
of assisting the Aetolians. 
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was an aggressive state and the Aetolian league was probably 
aware of the threat it posed. But there were also advantages to be 
gained by Greek states who co-operated with Rome. The 
Aetolian league had, during the First Macedonian War, 
attempted to regain territory it had lost to the Macedonians by 
allying with Rome, and undoubtedly wished to renew their 
alliance to achieve the same goal. The Roman refusal should not 
be seen as a slight to the Aetolian league, but rather in terms of 
the Romans trying to gain maximum flexibility in their future 
operations. If they had agreed to renew the alliance with the 
Aetolian league at this point, the Romans would have done so on 
formal terms, with a treaty similar to the one in 212BC concluded 
between the two. In 212BC the Romans needed the Aetolian 
league. At the end of the Second Punic War they were free to 
exploit the situation in Greece to their own advantage. " By 
refusing to enter into an alliance with Aetolia before the 
outbreak of the Second Macedonian War, the Romans were 
leaving their options open, making it clear that the alliance they 
had concluded with the Aetolian league in 212BC was at an end. 
" Derow (1979) p. 8 points to the calculated and consistent nature of Roman dealings 
with the Aetolian league. 
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The Aetolian and Achaean league's reaction to Roman 
intervention 
Having rejected the Aetolian league's approach, Rome 
entered the Second Macedonian War in response to embassies 
from Athens and Rhodes requesting its assistance against Philip 
V. By the end of the war, both the Achaean and the Aetolian 
leagues were Roman allies, with the Aetolians playing a 
significant part in the Roman campaign. Rome was in alliance 
with two powers that had spent much of the previous twenty 
years in almost continual conflict with each other over their rival 
interests in the Peloponnese. With Polybius, indirectly through 
Livy at times, serving as our principal source, we naturally find 
an account of these events that is favourable to the cause of the 
Achaean league, and to Megalopolitans in particular. 
My contention in this section will be that the Romans sought 
the support of a compliant elite who needed their support in 
order to secure their interests in the Peloponnese. Thus, 
Flamininus exploited the need by Megalopolitans to remove the 
threat from Nabis and retain their dominant position within the 
Achaean league. Polybius presents the relationship of the 
Achaean league and Rome as one between equals in the period 
immediately after the alliance between the two. I shall contend 
that the Megalopolitan leadership of the Achaean league sought 
to use Rome's intervention to secure its own interests in the 
Peloponnese. 
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If one examines Roman actions during the war, the Romans 
firstly approached the spring assembly of the Aetolian league in 
199BC, along with an embassy from Athens, to persuade the 
delegates to ally with Rome. '$ We are informed that the majority 
of the assembly favoured allying with Rome, but that the 
Aetolian strategos Damocritus had the decision postponed to an 
extraordinary meeting, where the vote was in favour. Why did 
Damocritus decide to delay the meeting until later in the year? 
Gruen suggests that the delegates were waiting to see which side 
would win and that the Aetolians could equally have allied with 
the Macedonians since their only concern was to regain the 
territories they had recently lost. 79 This is taking a naive view of 
Aetolian elite's attitude towards Macedonia. In the light of the 
fact that both states had been in a state of almost perpetual 
conflict from the time of Alexander the Great, Aetolian co- 
operation with Macedonia was unlikely. From the speech 
recorded in Livy it would appear that the Aetolian league was 
presented with the choice of either allying with Rome or facing 
destruction. As Derow points out, when the Romans approached 
the assembly, they made it clear that the Aetolian league should 
regard itself as lucky to have this opportunity. The Roman 
attitude, as he points out, was that despite their previous 
'h Livy. 31.29-32. 
" Gruen (1984) p. 444. 
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alliance, by this stage the Aetolians were regarded simply just as 
one other Greek state. 0 
However, this speech, like any other, should not necessarily 
be taken as a completely accurate reflection of what was said. 
Although not specified, it is evident that the Aetolian league 
entered into an alliance with the Romans under the impression 
that it would stand to gain in the post-war settlement. Judging 
from their reaction these promises were not fulfilled. As Derow 
acknowledges: 
The impression one gets (at the outbreak of the Aetolian/Syrian 
War) is that they (the Aetolians) thought they knew (the terms of 
the alliance) and were astonished and angry when Flamininus 
informed them that in fact they did not. How this situation could 
have come about cannot, be firmly established, but it is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that the Aetolians, when they joined the 
Romans in 199BC, were either told or allowed to believe 
something that wasn't true. Or again, they might have been told 
something that was true in 199BC, but that ceased to be true on 
the morrow of Cynoscephalae. 81 
All we know for certain is that at the outbreak of the 
Aetolian/Syrian War the Aetolian league felt that Flamininus' 
settlement had betrayed its interests. If one looks at the Aetolian 
80 Derow (1979) p. 8. As he points out, the Romans make it clear who exactly is the master 
in the situation. 
61 Derow (1979) p. 12. 
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league's participation during the war, a force of six thousand 
men was sent to join Flamininus in 198BC, and Roman and 
Aetolian forces co-operated closely. The evidence suggests as 
Larsen pointed out, that Roman and Aetolian officers trusted 
each other, with the Aetolian contingent saving the Romans on 
at least one occasion 82 The Aetolian league played an important 
role in assisting the Romans during their the campaigns against 
Philip V. Although they were traditional rivals of Macedonia, the 
conclusion could be drawn that the Aetolians did so in the 
expectation that they would be rewarded for their efforts. Again, 
one must return to the situation in the Peloponnese, in 
particular, the Macedonian alliance with the Achaean league. It 
is not inconceivable that the Aetolian leadership might have 
been led to believe that Roman victory over Macedonia would 
secure the position of its Peloponnesian allies like Elis. 
The Achaean league entered the Second Macedonian War 
allied with Macedonia and still involved in a war with Nabis ' 
As the war with Rome began to go badly for Philip V, he made 
an overture to the Achaean league aimed at trying to retain its 
support. Initially Philip offered that if the Achaean league 
provided troops to replace Macedonian forces in garrisons at 
Corinth, Chalcis and Oreus, he would fight their war against 
Nabis. This request was refused but Philip returned Hera, 
82 Polyb. 18.21.5 and Livy 33.7.7. Larsen (1968) pp. 384- 385. 
'3 Larsen (1968) p. 381. 
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Alipheria, Triphylia and Orchemenos to Achaean jurisdiction. 
The Achaean league in return remained neutral and continued to 
pursue its war against Nabis 85 Errington suggests that the 
Achaean strategos Cycliades was exiled because he was a pro- 
Macedonian and that the Achaean league was moving away 
from its alliance with Macedonia under Philopoemen's 
leadership, though the possibility that his exile was related to the 
war with Sparta going badly appears just as probable 86 The 
relationship between the Achaean league and Macedonia formed 
at the end of the Cleomenic War was based on the need of 
Arcadian poleis like Megalopolis for an ally powerful enough to 
ensure their position against their rivals in the Peloponnese such 
as Sparta, the Aetolian league and Elis. After Rome entered the 
Greek world, they may have begun to fear the post-war 
repercussions of remaining allied with Macedonia, especially as 
Nabis was a Roman adscriptus; a fear that Flamininus exploited 
on Rome's behalf. 
Flamininus and the Achaean alliance with Rome. 
198BC saw T. Quinctius Flamininus appointed as 
commander of the Roman forces in Greece. He was to play a 
decisive role in defining Roman policy in Greece both during 
'' See Briscoe (1973) pp. 174-5 who accepts that these areas were returned to the Achaean 
league at this time. 
Eckstein (1976) p. 139. 
Polyb. 18.1.2. Errington (1969) p. 87. 
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and in the immediate aftermath of the Second Macedonian War. 
Little is known about him before he became Consul. He appears 
to have been born around 229/228BC and only held relatively 
minor appointments before he was elected Consul 87 Flamininus 
may have spent a long period of time in Tarentum, gaining 
experience of dealing with Greeks and their customs. " Given 
Flamininus' role in the foundation of Roman control in Greece, 
his actions and their intentions have caused intense debate. 
Briscoe described Flamininus as a man who used underhand 
methods, who fundamentally could not be trusted 89 However, 
instead of seeing Flamininus' actions as his alone, it might be 
more accurate to see them as a reflection of a policy decided on 
by the senate, which Flamininus had to implement. The Romans 
entered the Second Macedonian War with the intention, as 
Polybius states, of expanding their power over Greece. Any 
commander sent by Rome must have been aware that this was 
his mission and would have used any opportunity presented to 
achieve it. 
According to Livy, when in 198BC Flamininus' forces were 
besieging Elata, a delegation arrived informing him that 
a' Badian (1971) p. 107. 
' Badian (1971) p. 108, Livy. 29.13.6. For the debate on whether Rome had experts or not, 
the most important contribution in recent years is Gruen who argues that there were no 
experts on eastern affairs within the Roman elite, though in his discussion of 
Flamininus, Gruen admits that he was an exception. See Gruen (1984) pp. 214-17. 
B9 Briscoe (1972) p. 22. 
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Aristaenus, the strategos of the Achaean league, was willing to 
ally with Rome 9° Flamininus responded by sending a mission 
composed of his brother L. Quinctius along with representatives 
from Attalus and Rhodes to the Achaean assembly at Sicyon. 
The role of Aristaenus and his exact identity is a matter of 
some debate, since there were two Achaean politicians with this 
name. One, from Dyme, served as hipparch of the Achaean league 
in 207BC. The other earlier saved Philopoemen from being 
exiled, and is identified by Plutarch as a Megalopolitan 91 Which 
Aristaenus Livy refers to is unclear, but the evidence and 
circumstances would seem to point towards an identification of 
the Aristaenus in 198BC with Aristaenus of Megalopolis 92 
Arcadian communities, within the Achaean league, in 
particular Megalopolis, had played an important role in creating 
the alliance between the Achaean league and Macedonia at the 
end of the Cleomenic War. Aristaenus' willingness to abandon 
Macedonia in favour of an alliance with Rome was a 
controversial decision, and the speech recording the arguments 
he made in favour of allying with Rome appears to reflect 
' Livy. 32.18.3-5. 
91 Eckstein in recent years has identified the politician in 198BC not as a Megalopolitan 
but as a citizen of Dyme. See Eckstein (1995) p. 200. However, he gives no evidence for 
this claim, and appears ignorant about Deininger's article associating the Aristaenus in 
question with Megalopolis. 
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contemporary concerns about the situation in the Peloponnese 
held by Megalopolitans which Flamininus subsequently 
exploited 93 As the debate of the Achaean assembly shows, many 
of the delegates felt that their interests would not be served by 
allying with Rome, and many delegations, including 
Megalopolitans, wished to retain the Achaean league's alliance 
with Macedonia. Aristaenus' speech, in particular its emphasis 
on the threat from Sparta and the need to secure the Achaean 
position against Nabis, gives us some indication of why he 
favoured abandoning the alliance with Macedonia in favour of 
one with Rome 94 
Aristaenus, according to Livy, argued for an abandonment 
of the alliance with Macedonia, not out of fear of Rome or 
necessity, but because Macedonia had failed to assist the 
Achaean league in its war against Nabis. The delegates, 
according to Aristaenus, would be correct in abandoning 
Macedonia, since it had abandoned the Achaean league to 
Sparta 95 As he states at one point in the speech: 
92 See Deininger (1966) pp. 376-380 for a detailed discussion of the evidence. He argues 
that the Aristaenus mentioned in 198BC was from Megalopolis. Supported by 0' Neil 
(1984-86) p. 36. 
93Eckstein (1995) p. 200. 
94 Briscoe (1973) p. 203 argues that this speech contains considerable embellishments over 
the Polybian original. 
" For the speech see Livy 32.21ff. 
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Then Philip tried to draw our fighting men away into 
Euboea, by promising that he would carry on the war 
against Nabis. But when he saw that we neither voted him 
that support, nor were willing to be entangled in his war 
with Rome, he forgot that alliance which he now makes so 
much of, and left us to be pillaged and plundered by Nabis 
and the Spartans. 96 
This, the threat posed to the Achaean league by Nabis, and 
the Macedonian inability to assist, permeates Aristaenus' speech. 
For example at one point Aristaenus asks: 
Why then does Philip not defend its, his old allies, from Nabis 
and the Romans? 97 
This theme of Macedonian betrayal of ' Achaean interests, 
may have been an attempt by Polybius to defend Aristaenus 
against accusations that he had betrayed Greek interests. Philip 
V's dubious character, his alleged murder of both Arati, his 
adultery with Aratus the younger's wife and his sexual abuse of 
virgins is also mentioned by Aristaenus as a justification for 
abandoning Macedonia in favour of Rome 98 These were the sort 
of crimes committed by tyrants before the working of anacyclosis 
transformed this type of government into aristocracy. " 
Aristaenus' speech also reflects the fear that if the Achaean 
% Livy. 32.21.10-11. 
97Livy. 32.21.13. 
98 Livy. 32.21.24. 
Polyb. 6.7.7. 
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league did not change sides it would be left isolated and 
vulnerable, especially in view of the Roman alliances with the 
Aetolian league and Nabis. In the new circumstances brought 
about by the advent of Rome, Aristaenus asks the delegates to 
face the reality of the situation the Achaean league found itself 
in, since as he states: 
Previously the Romans supported the Aetolians simply with 
their fleet. At that time the coastal cities of Philip' allies 
were in a state of terror; but the inland regions were so safe 
from Roman forces, that Philip plundered the Aetolians 
although they begged in vain for Roman aid. But now the 
Punic War which lasted for sixteen years in Italy is over for 
the Romans, and they have not merely sent assistance to the 
Aetolians who were fighting the war; they themselves, as 
leaders in the war, have attacked Macedonia by land and sea 
at once. 1°° 
As Aristaenus states, by remaining allied with Macedonia, 
the Achaean league would be placed in an impossible position, 
especially since its war with Sparta was still in progress: 
The Peloponnese is a peninsula, attached to the mainland by 
the narrow strip of the Isthmus, open and vulnerable above 
everything else to attack from the sea. What if a hundred 
decked ships, fifty lemboi and thirty Issaean. cutters begin to 
plunder the coast and attack our towns which lie close to 
10° Livy. 32.21.18-20. 
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coast. Yes, we could retreat to the inland cities- but they are 
alight with internal war, a war that rages in our heartland! 
When Nabis and his Spartans press on us by land and the 
Romans by sea, from where am I to request from Philip 
Macedonian reinforcements? Or shall we by ourselves with 
our own forces defend against the Romans the towns they 
will attack? "' 
According to Livy the reaction of the delegates to this 
speech was one of uproar, and they were divided according to 
"peoples", not individually 102 Although the assembly voted 
narrowly to accept the measure, the delegates from Dyme, Argos 
and Megalopolis walked out to express their disapproval at the 
abandonment of the alliance with Macedonia. Again one can see 
the role that kinship links played in Greek politics, the Argives 
claiming that the Macedonian royal family was descended from 
them. "' Gruen has remarked on the bitterness that the decision 
of the Achaean league caused; even twenty-five years afterwards 
'o' Livy. 32.21.26-28. 
'o. Livy. 32.22.1-2. 
703 See Briscoe (1973) p. 211 for the kinship link. There were personal ties between 
Megalopolis and Macedonia, since Antigonus Doson had helped the Megalopolitan 
rebuild their city after its destruction in 223BC by the Spartans. The reasons for the 
citizens of Dyme walking out of the Achaean assembly appeared to be linked with the 
sacking of that polis during the First Macedonian War by the Roman fleet. Its inhabitants 
were saved from slavery by the intervention of Philip V. See Paus. 7.17.5. 
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Polybius admits there was some unease about abandoning 
Macedonia 104 
However, the elite in Arcadian communities within the 
Achaean league such as Megalopolis had their own political 
objectives in the Peloponnese. By deciding to abandon Philip V 
and turn to Rome, Megalopolitans like Aristaenus appear to 
have placed their own interests first and allied with Rome while 
they had the opportunity to do so. Without any real effort, 
Flamininus had secured the Peloponnese and neutralised Philip 
V's potential allies in this region. As Eckstein noted, the 
campaign of 198BC was a turning point in the relations between 
Greece and Rome since it established the Roman presence in 
northern and central Greece, and the Achaean league's decision 
to ally with Rome played an important role in cementing this. l°5 
At the end of 198BC both the Achaean and Aetolian leagues 
were supporting Rome. The two had different interests in the 
Peloponnese, which created problems regarding the post-war 
settlement. One could ask why Flamininus would have allowed 
himself to be placed in this position. The Roman approach to the 
Aetolian league was understandable; the two had previously 
fought together against Macedonia. It is less clear why 
'°° Polyb. 18.6.7. Gruen (1984) p. 175. Eckstein (1995) pp. 200-1 dwells on the moral 
reasons behind the decision. 
"Eckstein (1976) p. 119. Eckstein (1995) p. 200 notes the parallels between this decision 
and the earlier one by the Achaean league to ally with Macedonia and notes Polybius' 
unwillingness to delve deeply into the reasons behind both these decisions. 
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Flamininus decided to ally with the Achaean league, especially 
since their sole contribution to Rome's war effort was to assist in 
the siege of the Acrocorinth. 106 Nor does it appear that the 
Achaean league, especially Arcadian communities within it like 
Megalopolis, pre-occupied as they were with the war with 
Nabis, presented a threat to Rome's interests, and that 
Flamininus was therefore forced to come to an accommodation. 
The Achaean league had made no effort to assist Macedonia and 
given its war with Nabis was unlikely to do so. 107 It also seems 
unlikely that Aristaenus would have approached Flamininus 
without some prior indication that his offer of alliance would be 
accepted. 
Why then did Flamininus approach Aristaenus? There is the 
possibility that he was concerned that leaving the Achaean 
league allied with Macedonia would present a threat to the 
security of his army as Eckstein suggests. 108 However, Flamininus 
may have been attempting to exploit the disputes between the 
Achaean and Aetolian leagues in the Peloponnese for Rome's 
benefit. If Rome's intention was, as Polybius states, to bring the 
entire world under its control, the suggestion that Rome would 
allow states like the Aetolian and Achaean leagues to continue 
106 Aymard (1938) p. 53. If the Achaean league was given control of the fortress at this 
point is not made clear 
107 Badian (1970) p. 47 argues that there was no reason for Flamininus to conduct a 
campaign in the Peloponnese at this time. 
10S Eckstein (1990) p. 61. 
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with an independent foreign policy is unrealistic. Despite this, 
there was still much that a state could gain by allying with 
Rome. The approach to the Aetolian league in 212BC indicates 
Roman awareness of the hostility between the Aetolian league 
and Macedonia, and the Aetolian desire to recover the position 
that they had lost to the Macedonians in the Pelop9nnese and 
Acarnania. It is not inconceivable that the Romans were also 
aware of the rivalries between various states in the Peloponnese. 
Possibly the Roman approach to, and its subsequent attitude 
towards the Achaean league was made in the knowledge that the 
Achaean league was essentially 'a political union in which 
Arcadians, in particular Megalopolitans, played an important 
role. In this case, it appears possible that the Roman decision to 
ally with the Achaean league was based on their long-term 
objectives, and that Flamininus 'was exploiting the internal 
differences within the Greek world in a calculated manner. Once 
Rome had entered the Greek world and Philip V had been 
defeated, the Roman alliance with the Aetolian league had 
served its usefulness. Thus, it was in Rome's interest to exploit 
Greek differences over the Peloponnese for its own benefit. 
Nabis and the Roman/Achaean treaty. 
If the Romans were exploiting internal divisions within the 
Greek world, who exactly was responsible for their policy, and 
how should actions undertaken by Flamininus in the 
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Peloponnese in the aftermath of the Second Macedonian War be 
viewed? This section will consider whether or not Flamininus' 
settlement was devised to take advantage of the differing 
interests between the Achaean and Aetolian league in the 
Peloponnese. The Aetolian league's subsequent decision to invite 
Antiochus to Greece can only be understood in the context of 
how Flamininus' settlement affected its interests in the 
Peloponnese. 
I will contend that Flamininus concluded a treaty of alliance 
with, and then restored Argos to the Achaean league, as part of 
his settlement of Peloponnesian affairs, to demonstrate that in 
the future Rome would recognise the Achaean league's primacy 
in the Peloponnese. The Romans were aware from a very early 
stage that the Peloponnese was an important pre-occupation for 
the Aetolian league, having assisted the Aetolians in creating an 
alliance with Elis and Sparta at the beginning of the First 
Macedonian War. This explains the actions undertaken by 
Flamininus. Instead of allowing the Aetolian league to regain the 
position that it had in the Peloponnese prior to the Cleomenic 
War, Flamininus appears to have supported the Achaean 
league's claims to be the dominant political force in the 
Peloponnese, possibly calculating that this was best for Roman 
interests. Flamininus' campaign against Nabis was not an ad hoc 
decision because of his need to retain forces in Greece in order to 
prepare for the forthcoming struggle with Antiochus. Rather it 
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was a calculated ploy designed to provoke the Aetolian league 
into war. With the Roman settlement and an expansionary 
Achaean league threatening their allies in the Peloponnese like 
Elis, Messene and Sparta, the Aetolian league, already 
disappointed at the Roman failure to remove Philip V from the 
Macedonian throne, was left politically isolated, and thus 
appealed to Antiochus. 
After Flamininus' Isthmian declaration, the most pressing 
problem was the position of Argos. " Argos had objected to the 
Achaean league's decision to ally with Rome in 198BC, allying 
with Philip V, who in turn gave the city to Nabis to administer. "' 
This strengthened Nabis' position in the Peloponnese and, at the 
end of the war, the Achaean league, under Aristaenus' 
leadership started to lobby Flamininus to restore Argos to the 
Achaean league. Although Flamininus had, at a conference in 
Mycene in 197BC, confirmed Nabis' control over Argos, at this 
point he decided to restore Argos to the Achaean league. "' 
It appears unlikely that Flamininus decided to undertake 
this action without realising that Arcadian communities within 
Polyb. 18.46.5-15. 
10 For an account of the war see Harris (1979) pp. 218- 219. 
"' Livy. 32.40.1-5. Harris (1979) p. 219, argues that in view of the fact that Argos had 
wanted Macedonian not Spartan control, Flamininus had to restore Argos to the control 
of the Achaean league if he wished to have his declaration taken seriously. Errington 
(1969) p. 89 suggested that Flamininus might have wished to keep his forces in Greece so 
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the Achaean league like Megalopolis genuinely feared Sparta. 
One of the major themes in Aristaenus' speech urging the 
abandonment of the alliance with Philip V had been the fear that 
the Achaean league would be placed in a dangerous position by 
Nabis' alliance with Rome. It appears that the war with Nabis 
formed part of a strategy formulated by Flamininus to gain the 
support of an Achaean league that would be a compliant Roman 
subject state. By supporting the Achaean league's claims for 
control over Argos, Flamininus was publicly showing that Rome. 
would support Achaean, not Aetolian interests in the 
Peloponnese, even though Nabis was a Roman adscriptus at 
Phoenice. Flamininus' decision to restore Argos to the control of 
the Achaean league was a complete reversal of previous Roman 
policy. Despite Polybius' representation of this campaign as a 
liberation of Argos from Sparta tyranny, it is evident that even 
he was willing to acknowledge that Flamininus' decision was a 
complete reversal of previous Roman policy. 
The campaign itself was an easy victory for the Romans. 
Flamininus quickly had Nabis besieged in Sparta, and the two 
leaders met to discuss the dispute. The debate that took place is 
surprisingly seen as a victory for Nabis, in that he was seen to 
overcome the arguments of Flamininus concerning the 
that he could demonstrate Roman strength to Antiochus, possibly fearing that Nabis 
would ally with Antiochus. 
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legitimacy of the Roman campaign. "' Flamininus argued that the 
revolt that resulted in Argos leaving the Achaean league was the 
work of a few men and that Nabis had no popular support for 
his continued occupation. Nabis on the other hand pointed out 
that he had taken control of Argos after it had left the Achaean 
league and was allied to Philip V of Macedonia. Nabis also 
argued that Flamininus had earlier recognised his control 
over Argos and the Roman decision to back the Achaean league 
in its claims was a complete reversal in policy. After defending 
his actions in Argos, Nabis stated in response to Flamininus' 
accusation he was a tyrant that: 
As for the title (of tyrant), I can only reply that, whatever 
kind of a man I am, I was no different when you yourself, 
Titus Quinctius, made the alliance with me. At that time, as 
I remember, you addressed me as king; now I observe that I 
am called a tyrant. If I had myself altered the title of my 
own authority, it would be up to me to explain my 
inconsistency; but since it is you who are changing it, you 
must explain your own. 113 
There is the question of whether or not Argos actually 
needed to be liberated. Eckstein doubts that Nabis genuinely 
enjoyed popular support in Argos, arguing that actions he 
"Z Oliva (1971) p. 291, Gruen (1984) p. 454. The speech is probably Polybian in origin, 
though Livy probably did make some adjustments, Briscoe (1981) p. 98. 
13 Livy. 32.38.5-9. 
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undertook there such as plundering the property of its leading 
classes, cancelling debts and redistributing lands would have 
caused resentment at his rule amongst the Argives. 114 Given that 
the evidence in question comes from Polybius, one could 
question whether Nabis was actually so unpopular. We are 
informed that two thousand Argives fought for Nabis, and 
although they might have been hostages, the fact that they 
received a triumphant welcome on their return suggests that 
many Argives preferred Nabis' rule to membership of an 
Achaean league in which they had little power 15 
The war with Nabis was an integral part of Rome's 
settlement in the Peloponnese in the aftermath of the Second 
Macedonian War and it is unlikely that Flamininus undertook 
this action without being aware of its consequences. By returning 
Argos to the Achaean league, Flamininus was able to deepen the 
Achaean league's dependence on Rome, weakening the position 
of the Aetolian league and its allies in the Peloponnese like 
Sparta and Elis in the process. Flamininus' eventual settlement in 
the Peloponnese appears to have been aimed at securing the 
loyalty of the Arcadian communities within the Achaean league 
for the alliance with Rome. Nabis was forced to destroy the fleet 
he had built, relations between Crete and Sparta were ended and 
some Laconian coastal communities were placed under the 
14 Eckstein (1987) p. 221. 
"s Contra Eckstein (1987) p. 225. 
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control of the Achaean league. "' However, Nabis was left in 
power in Sparta and his reforms were left untouched. "' In reality 
Flamininus' settlement reduced Nabis' usefulness as an ally to 
the Aetolian league, although his continuation in power ensured 
that the Achaean league, especially its Megalopolitan leadership, 
remained dependent on Roman support. If the Aetolian league 
had allied with Rome on the understanding, or hope, that their 
interest in the Peloponnese and elsewhere would be served by 
the Roman settlement, Flamininus' actions proved them wrong. 
The Roman/Achaean treaty. 
If Flamininus was supporting the Achaean league's interests 
in the Peloponnese by restoring Argos to its control, what was 
the basis of the relationship between the two at this point; in 
particular, was there a formal treaty? It has long been supposed 
that the Achaean league had a treaty of alliance with Rome, or as 
Badian argued a so-called foedus aequum. 118 The problem lies in 
what the treaty said and when it was concluded, since as Gruen 
points out, a common problem with treaties in the ancient world 
is that they rarely come to light except as vague generalities or 
isolated stipulations 119 The first reference to a desire by the 
Achaean league for a formal alliance with Rome comes in 197BC, 
16 Livy. 34.35.3. 
117 Livy. 34.35.5 
1e Badian (1952) pp. 76-80. 
"9 Gruen (1984) p. 14 
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when an embassy led by Damoxenus of Aegae requested one 
from the senate. This was opposed by other Greek states because 
of the Achaean league's outstanding territorial disputes with 
Elis, Messene and the Aetolian league, and the matter was 
referred to Flamininus and the ten commissioners. "' The next 
definite reference to a treaty between the two comes in 183BC, 
when an embassy was sent to Rome to renew the alliance 
between Rome and the Achaean league. " ' It appears that a 
formal alliance was concluded between the Achaean league and 
Rome at some point between 197 and 183BC, but when exactly is 
unknown. 
Nor is it known what the treaty stipulated. Lycortas makes 
reference in 184BC to the relationship between the Achaean 
league and Rome as one between equals; we should not 
necessarily assume that the Romans actually made the Achaean 
league their theoretical equals in a foedus aequum. 122 Lycortas' 
claim may be related to Polybius' theory on the role that 
anacyclosis played in influencing events and his desire to show 
the Achaean league and Rome acting as equals. As Gruen 
pointed out, the only treaty with a Greek state that could be 
described as a foedus iniquum is the Roman treaty with the 
120 Polyb. 18.42.6-8. 
... Polyb. 23.4.12-13. For the reference to a treaty by Lycortas, Livy. 39.37.9. 
'2 This Badian's conclusion (1952) pp. 76-80. 
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Aetolian league in 188BC, and that in their, relations with Greeks 
the Romans generally used Hellenic models 1 
The importance of the Achaean league's treaty with Rome 
lies not only in the date that it was concluded, but also the 
motives that the Romans had for allying with the Achaean 
league. The first definite reference regarding the existence of a 
treaty between the Achaean league and Rome comes during 
Messene's attempt to cede from the Achaean league in 183BC, 
when the Achaean league asked for Roman assistance under the 
terms of the treaty between the two. The senate initially refused 
to assist, and was only after the revolt had been suppressed by 
Lycortas that the senate told the Achaean envoys that it had 
observed the terms of the treaty between the two. 124 Ironically, 
although it is assumed that the treaty between the Achaean 
league and Rome is the key to understanding the development 
of the relationship between the two, the only definite evidence 
for its existence comes when the senate appears to have regarded 
the alliance as expendable. 
Is there any evidence for the earlier existence of a treaty? 
There is a reference in Appian, which states that after 
Flamininus' Isthmian proclamation, the Greeks, including the 
Achaean league, sent ambassadors to enrol themselves as Roman 
"m Gruen (1984) p. 25. 
124 See Polyb. 23.17.3-4. 
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allies. As Badian pointed out, this reference is meaningless. '15 
Badian argued that since there is no reference to a treaty between 
the Achaean league and Rome either in the preliminaries of the 
war with Nabis, or its declaration of war on Antiochus, the treaty 
must have been concluded shortly after the Achaean declaration 
of war in 192BC. He contends that Rome rewarded the Achaean 
league with a treaty that made the two theoretical equals 126 
However, in 188BC, Philopoemen entered Sparta, which by 
this stage was a member of the Achaean league, to restore a 
number of exiles. 127 To resolve a number of objections from the 
Spartans, an embassy from the Achaean league was sent to the 
senate led by Diophanes and Lycortas of Megalopolis, and 
according to Livy: 
Lycortas, on the instructions of Philopoemen, claimed that 
the Achaeans should be allowed to carry out what they had 
decreed (in Sparta) under the terms of the treaty and in 
accordance with their own laws, and that the Romans 
should grant them, unimpaired, the liberty which they 
themselves had guaranteed. l28 
The question arises whether the treaty that Lycortas was 
referring to was the one between the Achaean league and Rome, 
or whether it was a treaty that governed the conditions by which 
125 App. Maced. 9.4. See Badian (1952) p. 76. 
126 Badian (1952) p. 77. 
"' Badian (1952) p. 79. 
' Livy. 38.32.8. 
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Sparta agreed to become a member of the Achaean league? 
Badian dismisses this reference as inconclusive, suggesting that 
the treaty that Lycortas is referring to was the treaty that was 
concluded between Sparta and the Achaean league in 192BC. 
129 
Badian argued that the subsequent incorporation of Elis and 
Messene into the Achaean league demonstrates a change in 
Achaean attitudes towards Rome, with the Achaean league 
following a more independent foreign policy because it had been 
awarded a treaty giving it theoretical equality with Rome. 13o Did 
the Achaean league incorporate Sparta and Messene, Aetolian 
allies from the time of the Social War, and Elis, which claimed 
kinship with the Aetolians, gaining control over the Peloponnese 
in the process, simply because it believed itself to be Rome's 
theoretical equal?... 
Accepting that the Romans would use a Hellenic model in 
their treaty with the Achaean league, obvious analogies are to be 
drawn with similar treaties the Romans concluded with the 
Maronites and Jewish kingdoms during the Hellenistic period 132 
In the case of the Maronite treaty, there is a clause that bears a 
'2' See Badian (1952) p 78, where he dismisses this reference as inconclusive. He admits 
to the possibility that the text may refer to a treaty with Rome, as indeed Holleaux (1921) 
pp. 400-22 had earlier argued. 
"0 Badian (1952) p. 79-80. 
13' Badian (1952) p. 79 suggests that the Achaean league was previously promised control 
over Messene. 
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striking similarity to a possible clause in the Achaean treaty. 
During the war with Messene in 183BC the Achaean league 
requested that the senate should, in accordance with the terms of 
the treaty between the two, ensure that no Italian State would 
provide arms or food to Messene 133 A similar clause is found in 
the Maronite treaty, stating that both sides, if at war, should 
ensure that they should not provide corn, arms or ships to each 
other's enemies, and a similar clause is found in the Jewish 
treaty 1' This suggests that the Achaean league's treaty with 
Rome was similar to the one enjoyed by the Maronites and the 
Jews, for both of which we have the text. If this is the case, there 
are a number of other clauses that might be found in common 
with the Achaean treaty. For example, in the Maronite and 
Jewish treaties, neither side is to allow its territory or that of its 
allies to be used for an attack on the other. Clauses could only be 
removed or included with the agreement of both sides, and both 
should fight for each other if they go to war 1 
Although according to the text, these treaties were to be 
observed for all time, there appears to have been an opt-out 
'32 For the Maronite treaty see Arch. Delt. 28 (1973) {1977} Chron. plate 418. For the Jewish 
treaty with Rome see 1. Macc. 8.26. 
133 Polyb. 23.9.12. 
13' 1. Macc. 8.26. 
"" Gruen (1984) p. 37 suggests that the Achaean treaty contained a clause stipulating that 
the Achaean assembly could not be called by a Roman without the authority of the 
senate. 
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clause, and the senate's rebuff to the Achaean league's request 
for aid in 183BC echoes a clause in the Maronite treaty. ' Thus, in 
assessing what the Achaean league's treaty with Rome probably 
contained, the following clauses seem likely to have been 
included in it. The treaty was not binding, if one side did not 
wish to aid the other there was no obligation to do so. More 
importantly, the reference to the renewal of the treaty during the 
Achaean embassy to Rome in 183BC would seem to suggest that 
aid was not automatic, but had to be requested, and could be 
refused. Again this is a fairly standard clause in Hellenic treaties. 
Circa 129BC Pergamum erected an inscription celebrating the 
fact that "goodwill, friendship and alliance" had just been 
concluded with Rome. It appears that in the same year they 
requested that the senate adjudicate on their boundaries, and in 
the record we have of this, there is a reference to the fact that, 
"goodwill, friendship and alliance are to be renewed" 13' 
Although there is some doubt as to the date of the second 
inscription, if a date around 129BC is accepted, it seems unlikely 
a treaty that had just recently been concluded would have to be 
renewed. So it appears likely that the reference by Polybius of 
the proposed renewal of the treaty between the Achaean league 
and Rome in 183BC means that one side is telling the other that 
"6 Polyb. 23.9.12. Lines 33-36 of the Maronite treaty. 
"7 See SIG3 694 line 10 and IGRR IV 262(copy A) line 5. 
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they wanted to do something in accordance with the terms of the 
existing treaty. 
If the Achaean league's treaty with Rome was similar to the 
one concluded between the Romans and the Maronites and 
Jewish kingdoms, did the Achaean league's Megalopolitan 
leadership assume that just because they had this treaty, they 
could conduct their affairs in the Peloponnese without any 
reference to Rome? During the Aetolian/Syrian War 
Philopoemen and Diophanes of Megalopolis took control over 
Elis, Messene and Sparta, three states that had a long history of 
co-operation with the Aetolian league, with apparent Roman 
approval. Although the senate found some elements of the 
actions undertaken by Philopoemen at Sparta in 188BC 
objectionable, Lycortas' argument that the Achaean league had 
acted within the bounds of the treaty was accepted. ' It is hard to 
avoid the conclusion that these three states were seized under 
the terms of a treaty of alliance that the Achaean league had 
concluded with Rome. 
The question is when this treaty was concluded. If one 
returns to the first reference to the Achaean league's desire for a 
treaty with Rome in 197BC, the senate, because of a number of 
outstanding territorial disputes between Achaean league and 
other Greek states, postponed the decision. According to 
"8 Badian (1952) p. 78. "The treaty may be one with Rome; it is perhaps more likely that 
it is that with Sparta and therefore irrelevant to our inquiry". 
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Polybius, the Eleans claimed control over Triphylia, the 
Messenians claimed Asine and Pylus, and the Aetolian league 
claimed control over Heraea. The decision regarding how these 
disputes should be resolved was handed over by the senate to 
Flamininus and the ten commissioners. 139 However, the 
absorption of Elis and Messene by the Achaean league during 
the Aetolian/Syrian War, along with events at Sparta in 192BC, 
resolved any outstanding territorial disputes that may have 
existed in the Peloponnese in favour of the Achaean league. If 
one returns to the reason why the senate did not conclude a 
treaty of alliance with the Achaean league in 197BC, the situation 
in the Peloponnese was unsettled; all the states with interests in 
this region were seeking to gain an advantage over each other by 
appealing to Rome. By returning Argos to its control in 195BC, 
Flamininus gave the Achaean league visible Roman support for 
its territorial claims in the Peloponnese. Flamininus' restoration 
of Argos to Achaean control indicates that he had already 
decided whose interests in the Peloponnese Rome should 
support. 
It is in this context that the date of the Achaean league's 
treaty with Rome should be assessed. The senate referred the 
question of deciding the nature of the relationship between the 
Achaean league and Rome to Flamininus; it would appear 
probable that the treaty of alliance between the two was part of 
'ý' Po1yb. 18.42.6-8. 
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his settlement of Peloponnesian affairs in the aftermath of the 
Second Macedonian War. There is the question of who was 
responsible for defining Roman policy, Eckstein suggesting that 
the Romans muddled through like the British in the 19" century, 
and that many of their decisions were taken on an ad hoc basis. 14° 
Crawford, on the other hand, argues that the senate dictated 
Roman foreign policy, and that officials like Flamininus were 
instruments of senatorial policy. Although they naturally had 
some freedom of action, they could not deviate far from the 
guidelines set before they were sent to their command, since the 
wealth of experience accumulated by the members of the senate 
was an important factor in determining Roman policy. "' 
However, although the senate may have played the key role 
in defining Roman policy, a commander in the field like 
Flamininus would have to take decisions based on his own 
judgement and initiative. This does not imply that there was a 
confused or muddled approach in Roman policy. Flamininus 
was probably appointed to his command on the basis of his 
earlier experience of dealing with Greek states in Southern Italy; 
possibly he was expected to take advantage of internal 
differences that he felt might benefit the spread of Roman 
domination over the Greek world. By returning Argos to the 
control of the Achaean league, Flamininus was able to 
10 See Eckstein (1987) pp. 268-319 for Flamininus in Greece. See p. xxii for the analogy. 
141 See Crawford (1978) pp. 67-73. 
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demonstrate to Arcadian communities like Megalopolis, some of 
whose inhabitants were unhappy about the abandonment of 
Philip V in 198BC, that the alliance with Rome would protect 
their interests in the Peloponnese. 
In this case, it is probable that the treaty of alliance between 
the Achaean league and Rome was concluded shortly after the 
senate handed over the matter to Flamininus, before he restored 
Argos to Achaean control, sometime in 197/196BC. Although 
there is no reference to the existence of a treaty in the debate 
before the outbreak of war with Nabis in 195BC, Polybius, from 
whom presumably Livy drew his account, wished to present this 
war as a liberation of Argos from Spartan control. Furthermore, 
at this point in his narrative Polybius wished to emphasise the 
Achaean league's independence and the soundness of its 
government, to the extent that it could deal with Rome as an 
equal, so he could emphasise its later decline through the 
process of anacyclosis. Flamininus' support for the Achaean 
league, despite the fact that he earlier appears to have agreed to 
Nabis' continued occupation of Argos, indicates that by 195BC 
Flamininus had probably concluded a treaty with the Achaean 
league. Does it have any implications for our understanding of 
subsequent events, especially the relationship between the 
Achaean league and Rome? It is indisputable that three 
Megalopolitan politicians absorbed Elis, Messene and Sparta into 
the Achaean league during the Aetolian/Syrian War, with 
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Messene joining under Flamininus' direction. It appears that the 
treaty between the two was an attempt by Flamininus to exploit 
the desire by Megalopolitans like Aristaenus and Philopoemen 
to gain dominance over the Peloponnese. 
Conclusion. 
Polybius has a Rhodian ambassador claim in 207BC that the 
Romans were aggressive imperialists who manipulated their 
allies and who would, once the Second Punic War was over, turn 
their attention to Greece and exploit the problems of the Aetolian 
league. Although possibly this was Polybian rhetoric, influenced 
by his knowledge of later events, the ambassador's accusations 
were an accurate reflection of events. Once the Second Punic 
War was over, Rome almost immediately turned towards 
Greece, using the problems of its adscripti from the First 
Macedonian War to gain a pretext for intervention. 
Rome's advent in their affairs presented Greek states with 
the opportunity to make gains at the expense of those who were 
not fortunate enough to be offered the opportunity to ally with 
Rome. If one looks at the alliance between Rome and the 
Aetolian league in 212/211BC, it is usually viewed in the context 
of Rome needing an ally in Greece to fight against Philip V and 
an Aetolian desire to loot. The alliance is seen in terms of Roman 
desperation, the Aetolians, whom Polybius describes in the 
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worst of all possible fashions, are seen as the only allies that 
Rome could find. 
That ignores the position that the Aetolian league found 
itself in at the end of the Social War. Having been earlier 
defeated by Antigonus Doson in Acarnania in 228BC, the 
Aetolian league had been placed in a difficult position by the 
Achaean league's alliance with Macedonia. Arcadian 
communities in the Achaean league like Megalopolis were 
threatening their allies in the Peloponnese; that league was itself 
allied to Macedonia; the Aetolians urgently needed to take 
action. 
It is in this context that the Aetolian ' alliance with Rome 
should be seen. Contacts with Greek communities in southern 
Italy suggests the Aetolian league was probably aware of events 
there during the Second Punic War, along with the consequences 
for them when the war was over. Philip V of Macedonia appears 
to have allied with Hannibal in the belief that the Carthaginians 
would be victorious, and thus secure Macedonian interests in 
Illyria. The Aetolian league's alliance with Rome appears to have 
been concluded for similar reasons. Although the treaty between 
the two is usually seen as an agreement pertaining to the 
division of spoils from looting, it is evident from its provisions 
that the Aetolian league may have been primarily concerned 
with regaining territory that it had previously lost to Macedonia. 
Livy's reference to the restoration of Acarnania to Aetolian 
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control by Rome, along with the joint actions undertaken by 
both, indicates that the Aetolian league allied with Rome in the 
belief that it could use Roman support to regain the position it 
had lost to Macedonia in the preceding decades. 
Once Rome had entered in the Greek world the situation 
changed. Despite the efforts of the Aetolian league to restore the 
alliance before the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War, the 
Romans entered the war without a formal alliance with it. Was 
this refusal to ally with the Aetolian league a response by the 
Romans to the separate peace that they had made with 
Macedonia in 206BC? Or does it indicate the path that Roman 
policy would follow once the Second Punic war was over? The 
Romans arrived in Greece with the intention of imposing their 
control. Thus the senate's refusal to renew their alliance with the 
Aetolian league prior to the Second Macedonian War may have 
been based on a realisation that this alliance had served its 
usefulness. The Romans had assisted the Aetolian league during 
the First Macedonian War to use its links with Elis and alliance 
with Sparta against the Macedonian presence in the 
Peloponnese. So when they intervened in Greek affairs during 
the Second Macedonian War, they were undoubtedly aware of 
the rival states that were contending for control over the 
Peloponnese. Flamininus' actions, both in seeking an alliance 
with the Achaean league, and later in restoring Argos to its 
control, appears to have been an attempt to exploit the situation 
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for Rome's benefit. Polybius presents the relationship between 
the Achaean league and Rome at this stage as one between 
equals. The fact that the Achaean league expanded to encompass 
the entire Peloponnese during the Aetolian/Syrian War would 
seem to indicate that Polybius' fellow Megalopolitans benefited 




The fruits of co-operation 
Introduction 
Just before the evacuation of Roman forces from Greece, 
Flamininus called a conference at Corinth. ' In his speech he 
addressed the concerns of the Aetolian and Achaean leagues 
about the situation in the Peloponnese after the war with Nabis, 
and then turned towards the evacuation of Roman forces from 
Greece. He announced that Roman garrisons would be removed 
from the three fetters of Greece, and that all Roman troops would 
withdraw to Italy. According to Livy, Flamininus' reasoning was 
simple. As he stated: 
He did this so that all men might know whether lying was a 
Roman habit, or a speciality of the Aetolians, who had 
spread the fear that the cause of liberty had been wrongly 
entrusted to the Roman people and that the Greeks had 
merely exchanged Macedonian masters for Roman lords? 
Polybius presents Roman actions at this stage of their 
involvement in Greek affairs, especially Flamininus' behaviour, in 
almost ideal terms. Having liberated Greece from a tyrant like 
Philip V, Rome refused to take advantage of its victory, deciding 
instead to withdraw, leaving the Greeks free. It cannot be 
'Livy. 34.48-49. See also Larsen (1968) p. 404 and Gruen (1984) p. 455. 
2 Livy. 34.49.5-6; Polyb. 18.45.6. for a similar charge from the Aetolians about Roman 
duplicity. 
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doubted that the Romans did withdraw their legions to Italy 
shortly after this conference, and that a claim to have brought 
freedom to the Greeks from Macedonian tyranny was a major 
theme in Roman propaganda in the aftermath of the Second 
Macedonian War. ' It is also evident that as the Romans were 
withdrawing, the Aetolian league was openly stating that Rome 
was a threat to Greek freedom and had betrayed its promises. Nor 
was this a recent accusation. Before the war against Nabis, 
Polybius has an Aetolian called Alexander make a number of 
accusations about broken Roman promises regarding their 
declaration of freedom, stating that: 
His final charge was that they were making Argos and Nabis 
an excuse for staying in Greece and keeping their army in the 
country. Let them, he said, transport their legions to Italy; 
and he stated that the Aetolians promised that either Nabis 
would withdraw his garrison from Argos voluntarily, on 
terms, or they would compel him by force of arms to submit 
to the power of a united Greece. 4 
In reply, Aristaenus, the strategos of the Achaean league, 
argued that Flamininus should pay no attention to Alexander's 
offer. Rather he should instead: 
'For the assertion that Polybius suspended his otherwise negative depiction of Aetolian 
behaviour during this period, see Sacks (1975) pp. 92-107, a position disputed by 
Mendels (1984-86) pp. 63-73. 
4Livy. 34.23.9-11. 
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Forbid that city (Argos) to be a prize to be contended for 
by a Spartan tyrant and Aetolian pirates, in such a plight 
that its recovery by you would bring greater misery than 
its capture by him (Nabis). The sea between us does not 
protect us from those brigands, Titus Quinctius; and what 
will our future be if they establish their citadel in the heart 
of the Peloponnese? 5 
Livy, presumably drawing on Polybius, seems to be drawing 
attention to the differing interests between the Aetolian and 
Achaean leagues over the Peloponnese. Alexander's offer to have 
Nabis withdraw from Argos implies that the Aetolian league was 
concerned about the influence on their Peloponnesian interests 
were Rome to restore Argos to the Achaean league. Aristaenus' 
reply shows that he was concerned with the possibility of the 
Aetolian league retaining its position in the Peloponnese, and 
sought Roman support to see that it was removed. 
Polybius' presentation of, Roman behaviour and its dealings 
with the Achaean league in the aftermath of the Second 
Macedonian War is conditioned by his belief in the role that 
anacyclosis played in allowing the Romans to achieve their 
conquest. Polybius' intention in writing pragmatike historia was to 
instruct his Greek readership in a two-fold fashion. Firstly, as to 
how the suspension of anacyclosis over a prolonged period led to 
the circumstances arising in the Roman republic's system of 
s Livy. 34.24.1-3. 
241 
government that resulted an almost an ideal state emerging, 
producing highly principled leaders like Flamininus. 
Polybius' second purpose was to demonstrate to his Greek 
leadership the changes that had taken place in their own society 
that had allowed them to be conquered; the internal corruption 
that had taken place in the Achaean league through the workings 
of anacyclosis in its system of government. To do this Polybius had 
to present the Achaean league as a single democratic polls, which 
could initially deal with Rome as an equal. In this situation, the 
Aetolian league's interests in the Peloponnese, no matter how 
legitimate, were contrary to those of the Achaean ethnos. 
It is in this context that Flamininus' decision to restore Argos 
to the control of the Achaean league prior to his evacuation of 
Greece should be seen; it posed a significant challenge to the 
Aetolian league's interests in the Peloponnese. Derow has drawn 
attention to the unspecified promises that appear to have been 
made to the Aetolian league prior to their alliance with Rome 
during the Second Macedonian War, and how they appear not to 
have been fulfilled in Flamininus' settlement of Greek affairs. " As 
Polybius has Dicaearchus, the Aetolian envoy sent to Antiochus 
to gain his participation in the Aetolian/Syrian War, state: 
He began by saying that the booty taken from Philip had 
gone to the Romans; but the victory belonged to the 
Aetolians; it was the Aetolians and no one else who had 
6 Derow (1979) p. 8. 
242 
given the Romans a foothold in Greece, and they had 
provided them with the resources for victory. ' 
Polybius, from whom these speeches probably derived, 
acknowledges that the leadership of the Aetolian league seems to 
have genuinely felt that their interests in the Peloponnese had 
been betrayed by Flamininus' decision to support the Achaean 
league over Argos. 
Was Flamininus supporting the Achaean league, or simply 
the interests of one region within it? Apart from its expansion into 
Arcadia in the 230s BC, the next large-scale expansion of the 
Achaean league came during the Aetolian/Syrian War, when Elis, 
Messene and Sparta, all of who were long-standing allies of the 
Aetolian league and traditional rivals of Arcadia, were 
incorporated into the Achaean league. This expansion was carried 
out under the leadership of three Megalopolitans: Aristaenus, 
who initially argued that the Achaean league should ally with 
Rome, Diophanes and Philopoemen. At least one of these 
annexations was carried out under Flamininus' direction. 
Again, it must be remembered that as a source of evidence, 
Polybius' narrative represents just one opinion from the many 
states that came into contact with the Romans. We should, as so 
often before, question Polybius' assertions regarding their role in 
these events. More importantly, we should also challenge his 
depiction of the actions of political leaders from elsewhere in the 
'Livy. 35.12.15 
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Peloponnese. Callicrates, because of his actions in 180BC during 
an embassy to Rome to try and resolve the question of the Spartan 
exiles, has been seen as a pro-Roman politician. Should his actions 
be viewed solely in this context? Poleis like Leontium, who 
founded the original Achaean league, appear to have lost much of 
their power to Arcadian states like Megalopolis after the decision 
to ally with Macedonia during the Cleomenic War. As for 
Polybius' presentation of Callicrates' actions, this embassy is 
marked as the decisive turning point in the relationship between 
Rome and Greece, though it is apparant that little change actually 
occurred. Polybius depicts Callicrates' embassy in the manner 
that he does to demonstrate to his readers the point where the 
Achaean league began its degeneration though the natural 
process of anacyclosis from a democracy that initially dealt with 
Rome on equal terms into eventual mob-rule and anarchy. It is in 
this context that Polybius' presentation of the events surrounding 
the Aetolian/Syrian War has to be seen. 
This chapter will examine the situation in the Peloponnese 
from the beginning of the Aetolian/Syrian War until the embassy 
of Callicrates and the resolution of the Spartan exile question in 
180BC. I will contend that Aristaenus and Philopoemen co- 
operated with the Romans to foil Aetolian plans at Sparta prior to 
the outbreak of the Aetolian/Syrian War, because it was in their 
interest to remove the threat that they faced from the Aetolian 
league and its allies in the Peloponnese. Though Megalopolitans 
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like Philopoemen and Aristaenus might not have wished to see 
Rome emerge as the dominant power in the Greek world, they 
placed their own interests first. 
Once the Aetolian league had been defeated by the Romans, 
and the Achaean league was under the control of politicians from 
Megalopolis, under the guidance of Philopoemen, the Achaean 
league started to follow a more independent foreign policy, 
renewing its diplomatic links with the Hellenistic monarchies. I 
will argue that the Romans viewed this action as a threat to their 
position in the Greek world, and exploited the question of the 
Spartan exiles to undermine the position of the Megalopolitans 
within the Achaean league. This resulted in the emergence of 
Callicrates, who used this opportunity to break the dominant 
position that Megalopolis exercised over the Achaean league. 
The Aetolian/Syrian War and Philopoemen's entry into Sparta. 
Turning to the outbreak of the war itself, the first action 
undertaken by the Aetolians was an appeal to Philip V, Antiochus 
and Nabis sometime in 193BC 8 Although these missions found a 
mixed response, the embassy dispatched to Sparta was 
e See Livy. 35.12.4-5 for the assembly that decided on the dispatch of these embassies. 
Deininger (1971) p. 73 argues that the Aetolian league was trying to use the differences 
within these states between pro and anti-Roman factions. It appears that ambassadors 
from Antiochus to Rome may have conferred with Aetolians on their return journey, 
since one of them, Hegesianax, was made an Aetolian proxenos in 193BC. See SIG' 585. 
Line 43 and Walbank (1940) p. 192 for the chronology. 
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immediately successful. According to Livy, the Aetolian envoy 
pointed out in a long speech how Sparta's position in the 
Peloponnese had been weakened by Flamininus' settlement. The 
result was that Nabis: 
Confined within his own walls, (Nabis) now saw the 
Achaeans lording it over the Peloponnese; he would never 
have another chance of receiving what was his if he let slip 
this opportunity... all this was said to arouse the tyrant's 
spirit, so that when Antiochus invaded Greece, the 
consciousness that the treaty of friendship with Rome had 
been violated by wrongs done to their allies might unite 
Nabis with Antiochus. 9 
Local interests appear to have been the decisive 
consideration in determining Hellenic actions, and indicate that 
Flamininus had placed the Achaean league in a dominant position 
in the Peloponnese after the Second Macedonian War. On 
receiving information that the Aetolian league was willing to act 
against Rome, according to Livy, Nabis immediately attempted to 
reverse Flamininus' settlement by attacking the coastal 
communities awarded to the Achaean league. " Again one can see 
9 Livy. 35.12.7-9. 
10 Livy. 35.13.1-2. "Nevertheless the kings either made no move, or moved too slowly. 
Nabis at once sent agents round all the coastal settlements to stir up civil disorders in 
them, he brought some of the leading citizens to his side by gifts, while murdering 
others who were obstinate in their attachment to the Roman alliance. Titus Quinctius 
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the situation in the Peloponnese being exploited by the Aetolian 
league. By encouraging Nabis to attack, the Aetolians appear to 
have been trying to re-establish the alliance that had existed 
between it and forces in the Peloponnese from the time of the 
Social War onwards. 
The Achaean league under Philopoemen reacted by 
establishing a garrison at Gythium, and an embassy was sent to 
Rome to seek assistance. " In reply, on their way to Antiochus, an 
embassy under Flamininus stopped to assist the Achaean league, 
and the Romans dispatched a fleet of ships to aid them. However, 
although Nabis was attacking the Achaean garrison in Gythium, 
Philopoemen made no response until the return of the Achaean 
embassy from Rome. 12 When it returned, a further embassy was 
sent to Flamininus to seek his advice, which was to wait until the 
had charged the Achaeans with the responsibility for safeguarding all the Laconian 
coastal districts. " 
" Livy. 35.13.3. Philopoemen had returned from Crete in 194BC, and given his earlier 
association with Macedonia, there appears to have been some difficulties connected with 
his re-entry into Achaean politics, which were resolved when Philopoemen supported a 
number of small Arcadian communities who wished to leave Megalopolis. See Plut. 
Philop. 13.5. Errington (1969) p. 90 suggests that this event should be dated to 
Philopoemen's return to Crete and that Aristaenus opposed his return over his supposed 
desertion in 200BC. 
12 Livy. 35.25.3-4. 
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arrival of the Roman fleet 13 Before this reply was relayed, the 
Achaean league declared war against Nabis. 14 
On his arrival Flamininus imposed a truce between the 
combatants 15 Philopoemen's role in resisting Nabis and appealing 
to Rome suggests that he was willing to co-operate with the 
Romans as long as it was in his political interests. The possibility 
of the Aetolian league regaining its political influence in the 
Peloponnese, to the detriment of Megalopolitan interests, 
provides a possible explanation for the subsequent actions 
undertaken by Philopoemen at Sparta. 
Nabis' Assassination. 
This section will focus on the reaction of the Achaean league, 
and Megalopolitans in particular, to events at the outbreak of war 
between Rome and Antiochus in 192BC. It will examine the 
actions of Philopoemen and other Megalopolitans in bringing 
initially Sparta, and subsequently, Elis and Messene, into the 
Achaean league. It will consider whether Philopoemen's actions 
" Flamininus' advice for the Achaean league to wait for the Roman fleet was sound, 
since the Achaean flagship fell to pieces when it attacked Gythium. Plut. Philop. 14.3 
14 Livy. 35.25.12. 
's For Flamininus' intervention, which is not mentioned by Livy, see Plut. Philop. 15, and 
Paus. 8.50.6-10, which does not mention Flamininus by name. These events appear to 
have occurred before the panaitolika, the regular Spring meeting of the Aetolian league, 
before the opening of the campaigning season of the year, so in other words before the 
Aetolians declared war against Rome. Larsen (1968) p. 411. 
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along with those of other Megalopolitan should be seen as 
evidence that that they were acting in collaboration with Rome, 
and whether Polybius' regional perspective and stress on 
Achaean unity in his histories mask the situation in the 
Peloponnese. 
Turning to the outbreak of the war, the decisive stage of the 
conflict happened before the arrival of the Roman army in 
Greece. 16 Philopoemen's actions at Sparta played an important 
role in hindering the Aetolian league's plan to secure a number of 
important strategic locations in Greece prior to Antiochus' arrival 
from Syria. The Aetolian failure to secure Sparta gave the Romans 
the ability to react before Antiochus had moved only a small part 
of his force to Greece. Therefore, Polybius' account of these 
events, transmitted through Livy, needs to be carefully 
considered. 
According to Livyy account, after the Aetolian assembly 
voted to invite Antiochus to Greece to arbitrate between it and 
Rome in 192BC, the apokletoi took over, and it was they who 
decided on the course of action, suggesting that the move towards 
war was carefully planned. Missions were sent to Demetrias, 
Chalcis and Sparta. 17 The Aetolians managed to secure Demetrias, 
though their efforts at Chalcis were unsuccessful " It was the 
16 A point made by Larsen (1968) p. 414. 
" Livy. 35.34-38. 
1e See Livy. 35.34.5-12. for Demetrias. Livy 35.38.1-14. for Chalcis. 
JL 
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attempt to capture Sparta that was decisive, and the actions 
undertaken there by Philopoemen may be the key to 
understanding Polybius' depiction of this conflict. 
According to Livy, Alexamenus, a former Aetolian strategos, 
was sent to Sparta with a force of a thousand infantrymen and 
thirty picked cavalrymen, along with secret instructions to kill 
Nabis and bring Sparta into an alliance with the Aetolian league 19 
According to Livy, the reasons for carrying out this plan were 
that: 
Nabis had been deprived of the coastal towns by the 
Romans, and then actually confined by the Achaeans 
within the walls of Sparta, and anyone who took the 
initiative in killing him would, it was supposed, win from 
the Spartans the gratitude for the whole operation. The 
Aetolians had a reason for sending men to him in the fact 
that he had been asking them desperately to send him 
reinforcements since they had instigated him to rebel. " 
On his arrival, Alexamenus informed Nabis that Antiochus 
had already arrived in Greece, and that their united forces would 
be enough to defeat the Romans. In order to demonstrate the 
potential power of the Aetolian league, Alexamenus proposed to 
Nabis that he should personally review the Aetolian force. When 
Nabis accepted this offer, accompanied only by a few 
19 Livy. 35.35.6f. 
20 See Livy. 35.35.1-3. 
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bodyguards, Alexamenus ordered the Aetolian cavalry to kill 
him. 21 
According to Livy, after Nabis had been killed, Alexamenus 
galloped off to seize his palace, and an assembly was called at 
which he delivered a speech regarding the situation. However, as 
Livy states: 
But, as was fitting in a plan embarked upon with 
treachery, everything conspired to hasten the downfall of 
the perpetrators of the crime. The leader shut himself up in 
the palace and spent a day and a night examining the 
tyrant's treasury; the Aetolians, who wished to appear as 
the liberators of the city, acted as if they had captured it, 
and turned to plundering it. 22 
According to Livy, as Alexamenus was gloating over Nabis' 
treasure, the Spartans, after their initial shock, turned on the 
Aetolians, killing most of them. According to Livy, after the 
Aetolian force had been killed or fled, the forces of the Achaean 
league intervened, since: 
Philopoemen had set out for Sparta on hearing of the 
tyrant's murder. Finding there a scene of terror and 
confusion, he summoned the chief citizens and, after 
delivering the sort of speech that Alexamenus should have 
made, he attached the Spartans to the Achaean alliance. He 
Z' Livy. 35.35.8-19. 
" Livy. 35.36.5-6. 
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did this easily because Aulus Atilius happened at this time 
to have reached Gythium with twenty-four ships. Z3 
Plutarch gives a rather similar account, stating that: 
Philopoemen, seizing his opportunity, fell upon the city 
with an armed force, and partly by compulsion, partly by 
persuasion, brought it over to his purposes and made it a 
member of the Achaean league. 24 
The literary evidence tells us little about what actually 
happened. In particular, why did the Aetolians assassinate Nabis, 
one of their long-standing allies in the Peloponnese, and the only 
monarch of the three approached in 194BC who supported the 
Aetolian plot to act against Rome? Sparta had been an ally of the 
Aetolian league since the beginning of the Social War, and Nabis 
was mentioned in the Peace of Phoenice as a Roman adscriptus, 
along with other allies of the Aetolian league. The Aetolian league 
had also attempted to prevent Flamininus' removal of Nabis from 
Argos in 195BC. When one considers the result, Sparta's 
absorption into an Achaean league that supported Rome during 
the war, Alexamenus' decision not to consolidate the Aetolian 
position in Sparta, instead gloating over Nabis' treasury like a 
greedy child, appears as an act of crass stupidity. 
2'Livy. 35.37.1-3. 
24 P1ut. Philop. 15.2-3. Plutarch makes no mention of the role that the Roman fleet played 
in persuading the Spartans to join the Achaean league. 
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Cartledge suggests that the Aetolians decided to murder 
Nabis because he had become an unreliable ally, describing them 
as "faithless", a comment that echoes Larsen's earlier comment 
that the Alexamenus' murder of Nabis was "treacherous"'' There 
is naturally the possibility that Alexamenus murdered Nabis for 
financial reasons, and that the failure to capture Sparta was due to 
his greed. Yet, Alexamenus had been dispatched to Sparta with 
instructions from the Aetolian apokletoi. His mission was part of a 
deliberate plan decided in advance by the governing body of the 
Aetolian league. Is it conceivable that Alexamenus decided, for 
some inexplicable reason, to murder an important ally of the 
Aetolian league, purely to gloat over his treasury? 
Before the arrival of the Aetolian force, it appears that the 
Achaean army under Philopoemen was active in the area 
surrounding Sparta, and that a border war was in progress, 
probably connected to Nabis' attacks on the Laconian coastal 
communities placed under the Achaean league's control by 
Flamininus. Philopoemen's swiftness suggests that he was close 
by with a substantial force. Possibly Philopoemen's reaction to the 
events in Sparta was not, as the sources would have it, a reaction 
to the unscrupulous actions of the Aetolian league, but may have 
been an attempt by Megalopolitans within the Achaean league to 
take advantage of the situation by seizing control over Sparta. If 
one considers the settlement imposed there in 192BC, it would 
25 Cartledge (1989) p. 77 and Larsen (1968) p. 413. 
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appear that Philopoemen was concerned with gaining the support 
of certain members of the Spartan elite. According to Plutarch, 
Philopoemen was successful because: 
He carried with him the best men amongst the Spartans, who 
hoped to have in him a guardian of their liberties. " 
The identity of Philopoemen's supporters in Sparta has 
divided modem scholars. 7 In assessing Philopoemen's settlement 
at Sparta a number of points must be borne in mind. Firstly, there 
was no restoration of exiles in 192BC, nor were the new citizens 
created by Nabis expelled. This suggests that the liberties that the 
Spartans wished to preserve were those granted to them by 
Nabis 28 Shimron suggests that the embassy sent to Rome in 
191BC asking for the restoration of the coastal communities and 
the hostages taken in 195BC was in fact from the Spartan 
government Z9 
2' Plut. Philop. 15.3-4. Shimron (1972) p. 102 suggests that Nabis' supporters were left in 
control of Sparta, since he argues that Plutarch is referring to the "principal" men in 
Sparta, Shimron translating aristoi as principal. However this is in order to reinforce his 
own argument. Cartledge (1989) p. 78 opts for best. 
'' P1ut. Philop. 15.4-6 Errington (1969) pp. 110-112 argues that they were members of the 
Spartan elite who had remained under Nabis' regime, but who did not support his 
policies. He argues that Philopoemen was engaged in a client-patron relationship with 
his old guest friend Timolaus, who accepted membership of the Achaean league. 
2'Plut. Philop. 16.4-5. 
"See Polyb. 21.1. This view is opposed by Errington, who argues that there was a change 
in government in Sparta, a view supported by Walbank (1979) p. 88. 
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What happened in Sparta in 192BC is puzzling. If one accepts 
Livy's account, before the Aetolian league invited Antiochus to 
Greece they first murdered one of their most important allies in 
the Peloponnese for unspecified and irrational reasons. Then, 
Philopoemen brought Sparta within the Achaean league, but 
failed to make any change to the Spartan system of government, 
apparently leaving Nabis' reforms intact 30 
It is unquestionable that Alexamenus was responsible for 
Nabis' assassination. This does not mean that Livy's account, 
following Polybius' depiction of these events, is sympathetic to 
the motives that prompted this action. Nabis was involved with a 
war with the Achaean league, and his primary concern was to 
recover the coastal communities Flamininus had given to the 
Achaean league to administer. Nabis may have believed that the 
Aetolian plot was a gamble doomed to failure, and calculated that 
Spartan interests were best served by refusing to co-operate 31 
Though Livy, following Polybius, asserted that- Nabis attacked 
30 Grainger (1999) p. 440-41 suggests that Alexamenus' failure to take control of Sparta 
was because of a pre-arranged plan between the Aetolian league and Philopoemen. He 
argues that the Aetolians were undoubtedly aware of the ambitions of the leadership of 
the Achaean league to unite the entire Peloponnese. Grainger suggests that the 
Aetolians murdered Nabis with the intention of creating the conditions that would allow 
Philopoemen to intervene and install a pro-Achaean government in Sparta before the 
Romans could intervene. Grainger does not specify why the Aetolian league would have 
wanted Philopoemen to take control over Sparta. 
31 See Polyb. 21.3.4. for the earlier decision by the Romans to release Spartan hostages, but 
to retain Armenas, Nabis' son, who died shortly afterwards. Walbank (1979) p. 91. 
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these communities on the instigation of the Aetolian league in 
194BC, this assault may in reality have had more to do with local 
rivalries than any grandiose plot against Rome. 
The depiction of how Nabis was killed and of Alexamenus' 
subsequent actions follows in the Polybian tradition of 
representing the Aetolians as acting in an irrational manner in the 
Peloponnese. If Alexamenus was acting in accordance with a pre- 
arranged Aetolian plan to seize control of strategically important 
locations at the advent of a war that was itself a highly risky 
venture, he may have had no other choice if Nabis refused to co- 
operate. However, the Aetolian failure to consolidate control over 
Sparta was probably related more to Philopoemen's sudden 
intervention than Alexamenus' greed. 
The problem with most discussions of these events is that 
they focus solely on Sparta, without considering the role that 
Sparta and the Peloponnese played in the Aetolian league's 
strategic thinking, along with the consequences of Nabis' 
assassination 32 The Aetolian failure to secure control over Sparta 
did hinder Antiochus' movements on his arrival in Greece. Soon 
afterwards Antiochus arrived with an army of approximately ten 
thousand men and occupied Demetrias, which the Aetolians had 
32 There has been a move away from accepting the Polybian narrative in recent years, 
most notably by Cartledge (1989) pp. 67-70. Accepting that there were revolutionary 
aspects of Nabis' regime, Cartledge places them in a wider context, arguing that Nabis 
had more in common with a Hellenistic tyrant than a traditional Spartan king did. 
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successfully secured. ' This force was inadequate, since Antiochus 
needed to use it to provide garrisons around Greece, whilst at the 
same time retain a force adequate for battle' Acting under the 
belief that Sparta and the other two locations would be secured by 
the Aetolian league, Antiochus had hastened to Greece with a 
force inadequate for both tasks. The failure to secure Sparta 
forced Antiochus to divert a thousand troops to Elis to defend 
Aetolia's Peloponnesian allies, weakening the force that he hoped 
to confront Rome with 35 
If the Achaean league was supporting Rome in its conflict 
with Antiochus, what did Megalopolitans such as Philopoemen 
gain in return? Although Philopoemen's seizure of Sparta was a 
reaction to events there, it is evident that not only did 
Philopoemen gain control over Sparta in 192BC, but that other 
Aetolian allies in the Peloponnese, such as Messene and Elis, were 
later absorbed into the Achaean league under Flamininus' 
direction. 
Again the problem is to assess how far the Romans knew 
about and exploited regional differences within the Greek world. 
After Flamininus' settlement in the Peloponnese had been so 
detrimental to the interests of the Aetolian league, the Aetolian 
decision to approach Antiochus was an attempt to try and reverse 
" Livy. 35.43.4-5. 
34 Larsen (1968) p. 415-416. 
`5 See Livy. 35.43.6. and 36.5.2-3. Larsen (1968) p. 416. They were probably also meant to 
protect Messene. 
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this settlement. As such, it was in the interest of Megalopolitans 
like Philopoemen to co-operate with Rome in order to secure their 
own position in the Peloponnese. 
Philopoemen's intervention at Sparta favoured Roman 
interests; despite this, his stated policy towards Sparta during the 
war was that: 
Since king Antiochus and the Romans were hovering about 
in Greece with armies so great, it behoved the strategos of 
the league to pay attention to them, and not to stir up 
domestic troubles 36 
Sometime in 191BC, Plutarch informs us that there were 
problems in Sparta, and in response the Achaean strategos, 
Diophanes of Megalopolis, marched on Sparta with Flamininus to 
restore order. Before they could intervene, Philopoemen went to 
Sparta in a private capacity, and: 
Put an end to the disorders in the polis, and brought the 
Lacedaemonians back into the league as they were from the 
outset 37 
Once the Aetolian/Syrian War was over, in 188BC, 
Philopoemen's reaction was very different. The cause of trouble 
was the congregation of a number of Spartan exiles at Las, one of 
the coastal communities over which the Achaean league had been 
given protective status in 195BC. The Spartan government 
36 P1ut. Philop. 16.1. 
37 P1ut. Philop. 16.2. Aymard (1938) p. 337. 
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attacked the exiles, who in response appealed to the Achaean 
league for assistance. ' 
According to the sources, Philopoemen insisted that those 
responsible be handed over for trial. The Spartans refused, 
instead killing thirty pro-Achaean politicians, and appealed to the 
Roman consul at Cephallonia, who suggested that all involved 
send embassies to Rome 39 Diophanes and Lycortas, both 
Megalopolitans, were sent to represent the Achaean league. 
Diophanes suggested that the matter should be left to the senate 
to settle. Lycortas argued that the matter be left to the Achaean 
league, which would deal with this problem under the terms of 
the treaty 4° According to Livy the senate's reply was: 
So obscurely worded that while the Achaeans took it as a 
concession of their claims in relation to Sparta, the Spartans 
interpreted it as not giving the Achaeans all that they had 
demanded 41 
Why did the Romans give such an ambiguous answer that 
made both sides believe that they were in the right? 42 Encouraged 
by the Roman response, Philopoemen led the Achaean army to 
'8 See Livy. 38.31.6-7. 
39 Livy. 38.31.5-6. Between their appeal and the sending of the embassy it appears that the 
Achaean league declared war on Sparta, though because of the onset of winter there was 
little fighting. 
40 Exrington (1969) p. 137. 
" Livy. 38.32.10. 
`' Errington (1969) pp. 143-4 suggests that the senate wished not to get involved. 
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Sparta, accompanied by the exiles, and a conference was arranged 
at a place called Compasion 43 An affray broke out and seventeen 
Spartans were killed. A further sixty-three were executed the 
following day after a brief trial that resembled a lynching. 
Philopoemen entered Sparta and imposed a settlement designed 
to humiliate. The walls that Nabis built were pulled down. All the 
slaves and foreign mercenaries that had been enfranchised were 
expelled, and the constitution and system of education of the 
mythical Lycurgus, (or those parts of it that Nabis had found it 
expedient to restore), were replaced by the Achaean model. Those 
who refused to accept these measures were rounded up and sold 
into slavery, the money raised being used to repair the portico in 
Megalopolis that had been damaged by Cleomenes' forces. Sparta 
was also forced to give Belbinatis to Megalopolis. " 
As Cartledge points out, the events of 192BC must have come 
as a shock and a humiliation to the Spartans with their long 
history, and in reality marked the end of Sparta's independence 45 
Philopoemen's brutality four years after he had brought Sparta 
within the Achaean league shows signs of his Megalopolitan 
background 46 Sparta's subjection was not solely to the Achaean 
league, but specifically to Megalopolis 47 
Livy. 38.33.6-11. 
" For Philopoemen's settlement see Livy. 38.34.1-9. 
Cartledge (1989) p. 77-8. 
46 Errington (1969) p. 147. As Errington argues, many, if not all of the actions 
Philopoemen undertook show signs of him wishing to demonstrate Sparta's subjection 
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The key point in assessing these events is the ambiguous 
reply from the senate regarding what should be done about the 
Spartan attack on the exiles at Las. If Livy is to be believed, the 
problem was that both sides seem to have regarded it as giving 
them what they wanted, but unfortunately that is all we are told. 
Again one must remember that all the Achaean officials involved 
in this affair, such as Philopoemen and Diophanes, were 
Megalopolitans intent on humiliating Sparta. As Polybius, in a 
fragment of his otherwise lost account states: 
It was a good act to restore to their country the Spartan 
exiles. . . and it was an advantageous one to 
humble Sparta 48 
It is evident that Megalopolitan like Philopoemen 
considered that the senate's reply gave them total authority to do 
what they liked in Sparta. It is arguable whether this was what the 
senate intended. When in the following year the Spartans 
complained to the senate about the actions undertaken by 
Philopoemen, we are told that: 
to Megalopolis. Plutarch mentions that a Spartan source records a death toll of three 
hundred and fifty. Plut. Philop 16.4. 
41 It might be simply coincidence, but in 188BC, the Achaean league changed its 
assembly's location from Aegium to a system where the assembly met in different poleis 
within the Achaean league in rotation (Livy. 38.30.1-6). See Badian and Errington (1965) 
p. 13-17. 
' Polyb. 21.32C. 
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They finally procured a letter from Marcus Lepidus.... 
consul at that time, in which he wrote to the Achaeans 
saying that they had not acted rightly in Sparta 49 
Philopoemen sent an embassy in response, and when it 
returned in 185BC, it reported that: 
They (the senate) were displeased at the destruction of the 
wall at Sparta and at the... of those executed at Compasion, 
but that they did not revoke their previous decision. ' 
Although the Romans were displeased with the actions 
undertaken by Philopoemen in 188BC, they did not object to 
Sparta' s membership of the Achaean league. Their sole concern 
was the brutal manner in which Megalopolitans like Philopoemen 
acted at Sparta. 
Nor was Sparta the only state in the Peloponnese that came 
under the control of the Achaean league during the 
Aetolian/Syrian War. At the same time that he tried to invade 
Sparta in 191BC, according to Livy, Diophanes also attempted to 
invade Messene and Elis. Flamininus, after an appeal from 
Deinocrates, which stated that the Messenians were willing to 
49 Polyb. 22.3.1-2. 
50 Polyb. 22.7.5-7. Diodorus has a different account where Roman envoys report the 
displeasure of the senate and states that it was displeased at the construction of the 
walls. Diod. 29.17. Walbank argues that Diodorus made a mistake and that the senate's 
displeasure at the completion of the walls should refer to their destruction. He suggests 
that the lacuna in the Polybian text referred to the senate's displeasure at the abolition of 
the Spartan constitution. Walbank (1979) p. 188. 
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surrender to Rome but not to the Achaean league, prevented the 
invasion. According to Livy, Flamininus set himself up as a 
neutral arbitrator, and made Messene recall its exiles and join the 
Achaean league 51 Elis also appears to have become a member at 
this point, resulting in the Achaean league dominating the 
Peloponnese 52 
All three states had co-operated with the Aetolian league 
during the Social and First Macedonian Wars, with both Elis and 
Messene subsequently fighting against Rome with the Aetolians, 
and had long resisted absorption into the Achaean league. Does 
Flamininus' decision to make them part of the Achaean league 
show his ignorance of the situation in the Peloponnese? Or rather 
was he rewarding the close co-operation received from 
Megalopolitans like Philopoemen? If one returns to the situation 
before the war, Aristaenus' reaction to the Aetolian league's offer 
to persuade Nabis to evacuate Sparta was to express the fear that 
such a move would result in the Aetolian league retaining its 
position in the Peloponnese. Nabis' death and Philopo ; emen's 
seizure of Sparta was a major blow to the plot that the Aetolian 
league had hatched. Although Philopoemen's actions in 192BC 
5' Livy. 36.31.6-9. See Aymard (1938) pp. 343-345, Gruen (1984) p. 468-70 for these events. 
According to Errington (1969) pp. 125-6. Deinocrates was a client of Flamininus. 
52 The Achaeans also tried to gain control over the island of Zacynthos, but were 
prevented from doing so by Flamininus, see Paus. 8.30.5. Elis was certainly a member of 
the Achaean league by 189BC according to Livy. 38.32.3. 
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were probably not preconceived, they undoubtedly did assist 
Rome. 
The key-figure surrounding these events is Flamininus, who 
had been instrumental in the conduct of the relationship between 
the Achaean league and Rome since 198BC. His actions in the 
Peloponnese in the aftermath of the Second Macedonian War, 
especially his decision to remove Nabis from Argos, seem to 
suggest that he favoured Achaean, in particular, Megalopolitan, 
primacy in the Peloponnese. When Nabis had attacked the coastal 
communities placed under the control of the Achaean league, 
Flamininus had intervened to support Philopoemen, and later 
presented Messene and possibly Elis to the Achaean league. These 
actions would seem to suggest that he was rewarding 
Megalopolitan assistance with control over the Aetolian league's 
allies in the Peloponnese. 
This co-operation does not mean that politicians in the 
Achaean league like Aristaenus and Philopoemen were pro- 
Roman. Again, one must remember how the Romans, to further 
their imperial ambitions during the First Macedonian War, 
exploited the position that the Aetolian league found itself in. 
Flamininus' role in developing the relationship between the 
Achaean league and Rome, indicates that his decision to support 
the primacy of the Megalopolitans within the Achaean league was 
based on his awareness of the situation in the Peloponnese, 
exploiting tensions between Greek states to further Rome's 
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control. Although the advent of Rome in the Greek world was 
undoubtedly viewed with apprehension by many Greek states, it 
also gave them the opportunity, if they co-operated with Rome, to 
further their local ambitions. As Philopoemen's actions show, by 
assisting Rome he was able to humiliate the Spartans and avenge 
all the perceived wrongs suffered by Megalopolis at Spartan 
hands since 370BC. 
Rome, the Achaean league and the question of the Spartan 
exiles. 
If Megalopolitan politicians benefited through their co- 
operation with Rome during the Aetolian/Syrian War, this raises 
questions about how closely the Romans exercised their control 
over the Greek world. Firstly how much latitude and freedom 
Rome gave the states that co-operated with them. Secondly how 
accurate was Polybius' depiction of the evolution of the 
relationship between the Achaean league and Rome. Was it the 
case that initially the Achaean league was able to maintain its 
independence, but later became subject to Rome? Or rather that 
Polybius was explaining the situation between the two in terms 
of the influence of anacyclosis, presenting the two acting as 
equals, so that he could instruct his readers about the decline 
that had taken place in the Achaean league? In 188BC, when the 
Aetolian league was defeated by Rome and forced to conclude a 
humiliating treaty, the Achaean league had expanded to 
encompass the entire Peloponnese. Eight years later came the 
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embassy of Callicrates, who according to Polybius, first gave the 
Romans the idea that they should treat the Greeks as subjects. 
In this section I will contend that when Philopoemen tried 
to pursue a more independent foreign policy, this, coupled with 
his treatment of Sparta in 188BC, caused concern to the Romans 
about the dangers it would pose. Fearful about the 
consequences, the senate exploited the problem of the Spartan 
exiles, and later the Messenian revolt, to undermine the 
dominant position that Megalopolis and other Arcadian 
communities held within the Achaean league, Callicrates using 
Roman support to gain power for the region in the Peloponnese 
he represented. Indeed, although Polybius states that Callicrates 
was the initiator of great calamities for the Greeks, he also 
admits that Callicrates was quite unaware of the role that he was 
to play 53 
For Polybius the great calamity that Callicrates was 
responsible for in 18OBC was initiating the final stage of 
anacyclosis in the Achaean system of government, even though in 
reality Callicrates was probably trying advance the interests of his 
own region. Polybius speaks at great length about the unified 
nature of the Peloponnese under the Achaean league; its other 
members probably resented the dominance exercised by 
Megalopolitans within it. I shall suggest that the Romans 
exploited the situation in Sparta and Messene to weaken the 
53 Polyb. 24.10.8. 
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Megalopolitan position within the Achaean league. This 
encouraged the emergence of politicians like Callicrates who were 
from states that had been excluded from the centre of power in 
the Achaean league. Polybius' assertions that Callicrates 
manipulated the mob and only gained election to the office of 
Achaean strategos though his use of bribery, were to show to his 
readers the onset of the last phase of anacyclosis in the Achaean 
system of government. Prior to this mission Polybius presents 
Achaeans like Philopoemen and Aristaenus dealing with Rome as 
equals, portraying Callicrates' decision to tell the senate that they 
should in future treat the Achaean league as a subject state as the 
end of this situation. We should question the extent to which 
Polybius' representation of the earlier interaction between 
Achaean leaders such as Philopoemen with Rome was based on 
his need to show an Achaean league whose democracy declined 
under the influence of anacyclosis. 
The first sign that the Achaean league, and Philopoemen in 
particular, was not willing to assume a subservient position 
towards Rome came in 188BC, when Flamininus attempted to 
have a Boeotian exile restored, and requested that the Achaean 
and Aetolian leagues send embassies to accomplish it. The 
Achaean league first demanded that Boeotia and Megara settle a 
number of outstanding lawsuits. The Boeotians refused, so 
Philopoemen allowed the Megarians to seize property in 
compensation. Because of the tension caused by these raids, 
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Flamininus was unable to carry out his plan, since as Polybius 
states: 
Had the senate at this juncture followed up its order, war 
would have erupted: but now the senate kept quiet? 
Philopoemen also seems to have tried to interfere with the 
settlement Flamininus imposed in Messene in 191BC. From a 
remark made by Diophanes in 185BC, it appears that 
Philopoemen tried to adjust the settlement around this time. " 
Philopoemen's actions at Sparta had assisted the Romans at the 
outbreak of the Aetolian/Syrian War, and had been rewarded by 
Flamininus. Philopoemen had undertaken these actions only 
because they were in Megalopolis' interests. Once the Aetolian 
threat to the Peloponnese had been neutralised, Philopoemen may 
have started to look towards strengthening the Achaean league's 
alliances with other Greek states to defend against further Roman 
encroachment. 
If this is the case, the diplomatic contacts that the Achaean 
league renewed with the Hellenistic monarchies shortly 
afterwards take on a new meaning. Sometime in 188BC, 
Demetrius of Athens came to renew the alliance that Ptolemy had 
54 Polyb. 22.4.16. For an account of the episode see Polyb. 22.4.1-17. Megara had been a 
member of the Achaean league since 205BC. See Errington (1969) p. 153. 
Polyb. 22.10.6-7. Errington (1969) p. 157 and Walbank (1979) p. 193. Errington suggests 
that this restoration would have caused conflict in Boeotia similar to that caused by 
Flamininus' restoration of Deinocrates in Messene in 191BC, and his attempted actions 
in Sparta in the same year. 
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with the Achaean league, and Philopoemen agreed, dispatching 
an embassy to Egypt. ' The only problem is that it is not certain 
which alliance was being renewed 57 The Achaean league and 
Egypt had earlier been allied. Aratus concluded an alliance with 
Ptolemy before he brought Sicyon into the Achaean league. 
During the Cleomenic War the Ptolemaic monarchy had 
withdrawn its subsidy to Aratus in favour of Cleomenes. When 
or whether this relationship had been restored is unknown. 
When the embassy from Egypt returned to the Achaean 
assembly at Megalopolis in 185BC, two further ones accompanied 
it. 58 After hearing a report regarding the senate's decision not to 
take any further action over Philopoemen's actions at Sparta in 
188BC, the representatives of Eumenes of Pergamum requested 
that the alliance between the two should be renewed and offered 
one hundred and twenty talents to pay the Achaean 
assemblymen 59 The alliance was renewed, but the money was 
refused because of fears that this would give Pergamum control 
over Achaean affairs, along with a dispute over who should 
control Aegina 60 
' Polyb. 22.3.5-6. 
'See Walbank (1979) p. 178. 
Polyb. 22.7.1. ff 
Polyb. 22.7.8. 
60 Po1yb. 22.8.13. 
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Next, the Achaean ambassadors to Egypt reported that they 
had renewed the alliance with Ptolemy and exchanged gifts 
61 
Aristaenus voiced an objection, asking which particular alliance 
was being renewed. Because of the ambassador's failure to be 
specific as to which alliance they had renewed, he refused to 
allow ratification of their actions 62 The final mission was from 
Seleucus, who offered a fleet of ships and requested the renewal 
of the alliance between the two. The alliance was renewed, but the 
gift refused ' 
The importance of this conference at Megalopolis on later 
events cannot be over-emphasised. The Achaean league, under 
Philopoemen's leadership, sought to broaden its diplomatic 
contacts, renewing an alliance with Egypt that appears to have 
been dormant for fifty years. The question is should these moves 
be seen as part of normal Hellenistic diplomacy? Or in view of 
Philopoemen's earlier moves against Flamininus' settlement in 
Boeotia and Messene, as an attempt to form a system of alliances 
to protect the Achaean league from further Roman encroachment? 
Since 198BC Megalopolitans within the Achaean league had 
supported Roman interests. This had been in a period when the 
Aetolian league and Sparta had threatened the Achaean league, 
and specifically, Megalopolitan interests in the Peloponnese. Once 
61 Polyb. 22.9.1. 
62 Polyb. 22.9.12. Errington (1969) p. 164 suggests that Aristaenus wished to publicly 
humiliate Philopoemen and Lycortas. 
' Polyb. 22.9.13. Walbank (1979) p. 192. possibly because they had refused Eumenes' gift 
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the Aetolian and Spartan threat had gone, it would appear that 
Philopoemen was trying to gain as many allies as possible to 
prevent further Roman encroachment on Achaean affairs. 
Aristaenus' role and his objections might give us some 
indication of how this move was viewed. He did 
object 
to the 
renewal of the alliance 'with Ptolemy, but merely to the terms on 
which it would be doing so. Aristaenus did publicly humiliate 
Philopoemen, making him and the ambassadors appear 
incompetent, so possibly he was engaged in political games with 
his rival. However, this does not imply that Aristaenus 
represented a pro-Roman party; he had no objection to the 
Achaean league renewing the two other alliances. The Egyptians 
had abandoned the Achaean league during the Cleomenic War. 
Possibly Aristaenus felt that the Achaean league should not 
renew its relationship with a state that had earlier abandoned it to 
the mercies of Sparta. 
Taken in the context of the psychological impact that 
Antiochus' and Philip V's defeats had on the Greeks if appears 
that the Achaean league was from a relatively early stage acting 
against the possibility of further Roman encroachment, seeking 
allies in the Hellenistic World. Unless they were invited, it 
appears unlikely that the representatives of the three most 
important Hellenistic monarchs would try and renew their 
alliances with the Achaean league at the same time. 
271 
The Roman response was swift. Shortly after the conference 
at Megalopolis, when the Nemean festival was in progress, 
Quintus Caecilius Metellus, a Roman envoy on his way back from 
Macedonia, arrived " Why he chose to make this detour is not 
made clear, since he was not originally told to deal with 
Peloponnesian affairs. As Polybius makes apparent, Caecilius was 
dissatisfied with events in Sparta. The senate's earlier reaction, 
had stated that Sparta was essentially an internal matter for the 
Achaean league. Although the senate had sent a letter expressing 
its displeasure at the way that Philopoemen had acted in 188BC, it 
did not revoke its previous decision. On Caecilius' arrival, he 
requested that Aristaenus summon the magistrates of the 
Achaean league, and according to Polybius, proceeded to: 
Find fault with them for having treated the Spartans with 
unwarranted cruelty and severity; and exhorted them to 
correct past errors. 
65 
Caecilius' intervention, especially as the senate had decided 
that it was an internal matter for the Achaean league, seems 
surprising. Errington suggests that Aristaenus invited him, and 
this is what Polybius implies, stating that during Ceecilius' 
speech Aristaenus remained silent, thus indicating his agreement 
with his remarks. Caecilius requested that the Achaean assembly 
Polyb. 22.10.1. 
Polyb. 22.10.2. Erskine (2000) p. 175 points to Quintus Caecilius' anger, a typical 
barbarian characteristic, in Polybius' depiction of his behaviour at Megalopolis. 
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be called to hear his complaints about the league's treatment of 
Sparta. The four officials responsible, Aristaenus, Diophanes, 
Philopoemen and Lycortas, all of whom were Megalopolitans, 
refused, and they informed Caecilius that the assembly could not 
be called unless there was written permission from the senate, 
forcing him to back down. ' 
Caecilius' intervention raises interesting questions about the 
relationship between the senate and Roman commanders in the 
field. Caecilius' actions contradicted the senate's previous 
decision to leave the question of the Spartan exiles to the Achaean 
league. Polybius states that the Achaeans blamed Aristaenus and 
Diophanes for his intervention, but along with Philopoemen and 
Lycortas they agreed not to call the meeting requested 67 
So if the senate did not plan Caecilius' intervention, why did 
he choose to contradict its policy, especially as Polybius presents 
his behaviour as an angry and irrational act? One must consider 
whether Philopoemen's attempts to expand the relations that the 
Achaean league had with the Hellenistic monarchies was viewed 
as a threat by the Romans; also the independence Roman 
commanders had to take action when they saw fit. It would 
appear that any attempt by the Achaean league to maintain an 
independent foreign policy was contrary to Roman interests. 
Polyb. 22.10.11-12. 
67 Gruen suggests that after the Roman/Achaean treaty, a special law was passed that 
allowed individual Romans to call assemblies only if they had such permission. See 
Gruen (1984) p. 37. 
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Although Polybius presents these actions as part of the Achaean 
league maintaining its independence, in reality the decision to 
renew alliances with the Hellenistic kingdoms in the aftermath of 
the Aetolian/Syrian War would have been seen as suspicious. As 
the senior Roman official present in the region, Caecilius might 
have felt it necessary to react to the challenge posed to Rome by 
the conference at Megalopolis. 
The result of this intervention was the dispatch of two 
embassies to Rome, one from Sparta and another from the 
Achaean league. The Achaean embassy, led by Apollonidas of 
Sicyon, was sent to apologise for their behaviour towards 
Caecilius 68 Areus and Alcibiades, whom Polybius describes as 
old exiles who had recently been restored to Sparta by 
Philopoemen, led the Spartan embassy 69 The identity of Areus 
and Alcibiades is confused, as is their official status. Errington 
sees them as an extremist faction within Sparta who did not 
represent the government, but Shimron and Walbank suggest that 
there was a change in Sparta's government shortly beforehand, 
and that they were official representatives. 70 Polybius merely 
states that they: 
8 Walbank (1979) p. 195. The identity of Apollonidas and his association with 
Philopoemen is unknown. Walbank's assertion that there was little opposition within 
the Achaean league over the question of Sparta should be treated with caution. We only 
have the evidence provided by the Megalopolitan Polybius. 
Polyb. 22.11.6-7. 
70 Errington (1969) p. 175; Shimron (1972) pp. 108,140-146; Walbank (1979) p. 196. 
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Went on a mission against the Achaeans to the ruling 
power, and accused those who had so unexpectedly saved 
them and restored them to their homes. " 
It would appear that Polybius considered this embassy a 
betrayal, but his words indicate something about Sparta's 
willingness to remain a member of the Achaean league. 
Philopoemen had humiliated Sparta in 188BC; it is reasonable to 
suppose that he left in control those who were most favourably 
disposed at the time to Spartan membership of the Achaean 
league. Unless there was a change of government in Sparta, which 
appears unlikely, it would appear that even those who co- 
operated with Philopoemen in 188BC viewed Spartan 
membership of the Achaean league unfavourably. It is also 
possible that the Spartans may have received an assurance from 
Caecilius that Sparta's membership of the Achaean league would 
be reviewed. 
The senate had changed its opinion about the Spartan exile 
question by the time that the embassies arrived in Rome. After 
hearing the Spartan complaints, they dispatched a mission led by 
Appius Claudius Pulcher to investigate the matter, and on his 
arrival he found that the Achaean league had sentenced Areus 
and Alcibiades to death in their absence. In the following debate, 
Lycortas defended Philopoemen's actions in Sparta in a long 
" Polyb. 22.11.8. 
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speech. ' Appius' extremely blunt and brief reaction was to state 
that: 
He strongly advised the Achaeans to achieve a reconciliation 
while it was still open to them to do so of their own free will, 
for fear that they should be forced to it later against their will 
and under compulsion. 73 
Should this reversal in policy be seen as a sign of Roman 
concern about the fate of a few Spartan exiles? Caecilius' 
intervention seems to have persuaded the senate to become more 
closely involved in events in the Peloponnese. It would appear 
that Roman interest in the Spartan question was actually based on 
their concern about Philopoemen's attempt to renew diplomatic 
contacts with other Greek states, whilst maintaining the fiction 
that Rome had in reality brought freedom to the Greeks from 
Macedonian tyranny. 
The result was the dispatch of more embassies to the senate 
from the Peloponnese, since according to Pausanias, Pulcher 
encouraged the Spartans to send representatives to Rome. 74 At this 
point, events become confused, since there were several missions 
from Sparta. The first was led by Lysis, who wanted a complete 
restoration of all the property he and his supporters had 
possessed before they were exiled. The second, led by Areus and 
n Livy. 39.36-37. 
" Livy. 39.37.19. 
74 Polyb. 23.4.1. Paus. 7.9.4. 
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Alcibiades, wanted the restoration of all their property up to the 
value of one talent, with the rest to be distributed amongst the 
rest of the citizens. Serippus, who supported the Achaean league, 
led a third mission, the final one being led by Chaeron who 
represented those killed at Compasion. 75 
The senate's decision was to give the matter over to a 
commission to three, composed of Flamininus, Caecilius and 
Appius Claudius, who were to reach a solution to this question. 76 
Badian points to the expertise and close involvement in Greek 
affairs that the three commissioners had. " Flamininus had been 
involved with attempts to settle Spartan affairs in 191BC, and was 
the key figure in developing the relationship between the 
Achaean league and Rome. Caecilius had raised the issue of the 
Spartan exiles at the Nemean Games in 185BC, after the senate 
had written saying that they considered the matter closed. Appius 
Claudius had been sent by the senate to investigate the affairs of 
the Achaean league after Caecilius' intervention, and on assessing 
the situation, supported the view that the matter warranted 
Roman intervention. 
' Who exactly represented the Spartan government is a matter of guesswork. For 
example Errington (1969) p. 288 argues that apart from Chaeron's group, all the others 
were in exile. Shimron (1972) p. 149 that all the Spartan representatives apart from 
Serippus' group were in exile. 
76 Polyb. 23.4.7. 
Badian (1958) p. 90. 
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The commission proposed that all the exiles should be 
restored along with the bodies of those killed at Compasion, and 
that Sparta should remain a member of the Achaean league. '$ 
However, property was not mentioned in the settlement; since 
this was the issue that divided the Spartans the question was 
essentially left unresolved. To analyse what the decision of the 
Roman commission would mean, by restoring the exiles without 
making any provision for the restoration of property, they might 
have been trying to weaken the Megalopolitan position within the 
Achaean league by creating the potential for further discord. 
According to Polybius, the Achaean envoy Xenarchus was 
unwilling to agree to these measures, and only did so because he 
feared the consequences of not doing so'' This appears to suggest 
that not only were the Romans aware of situation in the 
Peloponnese with various ethnic groups contending for position 
over each other, but that they were exploiting the situation to 
further their control over the Greek world. 
The Messenian War 183BC 
The process of subverting the position that Megalopolitans 
held within the Achaean league by the senate continued during 
the war with Messene. The reasons for this conflict are quite clear. 
Messene had become a member of the Achaean league during the 
Aetolian/Syrian War under Flamininus' direction. In view of its 
78 Polyb. 23.4.8-9. 
79 Polyb. 23.4.15. 
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earlier alliance with the Aetolian league, and hostility to the 
Achaean league, its membership was not voluntary. 
Philopoemen, who interfered with Flamininus' settlement in some 
unspecified manner, made this situation worse 8° What is of 
interest is the way the Romans exploited the issue to further their 
control over the Greek world. Flamininus was responsible for 
Messene's membership of the Achaean league. His attempt to 
assist Messene to secede, along with the senate's refusal to assist 
the Achaean league to regain control over Messene suggests that 
the relationship between Rome and Arcadian communities in the 
Peloponnese that Flamininus had created in the aftermath of the 
Second Macedonian War had broken down. I shall argue that the 
senate was exploiting regional differences in the Peloponnese to 
remove the hold that Megalopolitans had over the Achaean 
league in order to promote the interests of those who might be 
more favourably disposed to supporting Rome. 
According to Polybius, Deinocrates approached Flamininus, 
sometime in 183BC to discuss Messene's continued membership 
of the Achaean league 81 After listening to Deinocrates' 
complaints, Flamininus requested that the Achaean popular 
assembly be called to discuss the matter, but Philopoemen 
refused because permission was not available from the senate, 
B0 How exactly Philopoemen interfered with the settlement is unknown. According to 
Walbank (1979) p. 193, it must have been in a manner that weakened Deinocrates' 
position. 
81 Polyb. 22.5.1f. 
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and Flamininus appears to have abandoned his attempts to 
restore Deinocrates, at least publicly. ' Soon afterwards war broke 
out between the Achaean league and Messene when the latter 
tried to secede. Around the same time, there appears to have been 
a change in the Spartan government, undoubtedly brought about 
in the aftermath of the Roman commission. As with so much else 
in this period of Spartan history, it is not clear who exactly was in 
control ' What is important is the embassy sent by the Achaean 
league-to gain Roman support in restoring both Messene and 
Sparta to the Achaean league. Before the senate received the 
ambassadors, they requested that Q. Marcius Philippus, who had 
just returned from Macedonia, give his opinion on the matter. He 
stated that: 
If the senate paid no attention to the request for the 
present... Sparta would be reconciled with Messene, upon 
which the Achaeans would be only too glad to appeal to the 
Romans. 84 
This appears to indicate an informed knowledge of the 
situation within the Achaean league, with the senate drawing on 
82 Polyb. 23.5.16-17. 
83 Errington (1969) p. 289 argues that the group of Chaeron allied with that of Serippus to 
take power. Shimron (1972) pp. 146-8 argues that Lysis' group took power since they 
were exiled in 185BC by Areus and Alcibiades, who were exiled after their embassy to 
Rome. He bases this on the murder of two Spartan ambassadors on their way to Rome. 
One of them, Agesipolis, was a former Spartan king associated with Cleomenes. See 
Polyb. 23.6.1-3. 
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the knowledge and advice of those who had recent experience of 
Greek affairs. Thus, when the embassy from the Achaean league 
requested that supplies from Italy be prevented from reaching 
Messene, and that Roman troops be dispatched in accordance 
with the treaty of alliance, the senate replied that: 
Not even if the people of Sparta, Corinth or Argos deserted 
the league should the Achaeans be surprised if the senate did 
not think that it concerned them. Giving full publicity to 
this reply, which was a sort of proclamation that the 
Romans would not interfere with those who wished to desert 
the Achaean league, they continued to detain the envoys, 
waiting to see how the Achaeans would get on at Messene 85 
Errington suggests that it was the senate's intention to force 
the Achaean league to negotiate a solution, and that the 
ambassadors were retained to make sure the answer did not 
become public. " Walbank rightly points out that there was no 
point in retaining the ambassadors if they were to keep secret 
something that the Romans wished to publicise 87 He suggests 
that the Romans wished to maintain pressure on the Achaean 
league to find a settlement to the Messenian question. 
By refusing to send assistance to the Achaean league, and 
encouraging other poleis to leave it, Polybius presents the senate 
Polyb. 23.9.9-10. 
Polyb. 23.9.12-14. 
Errington (1969) pp. 186-7. 
87 Walbank (1979) p. 229. 
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laying down a challenge. However, did the senate view the 
Achaean league's inability to restore the Spartan exiles as a direct 
threat? The Achaean league's request that supplies from Italy 
should not be sent to Messene, and that Roman troops be 
dispatched, was merely a formal way of gaining Roman support. 
The senate's refusal was a means of expressing its disapproval at 
Philopoemen's renewal of the Achaean league's links with the 
Hellenistic monarchies. Alone, the Achaean league was a 
relatively small body, many of whose members had been forcibly 
incorporated. If Philopoemen's intention was to liberate Greece 
from Roman occupation, he could only hope to achieve this goal 
in conjunction with others. 
It would appear that the senate viewed the renewal of the 
Achaean league's alliances with the Hellenistic monarchies 
during the Megalopolis conference of 185BC as a threat to their 
position and authority, hence the refusal to supply assistance. The 
senate appears to have wished to avoid conflict, instead opting for 
an indirect approach. With the Aetolian league reduced in power 
and no longer able to intervene in Peloponnesian affairs, and 
Sparta a member of the Achaean league, the initial reasons that 
Megalopolitan like Philopoemen had for supporting Rome 
disappeared. The senate was left with a political elite within the 
Achaean league, which by taking an independent line in foreign 
policy, seemed not to be accepting their de facto status as Roman 
subjects, despite their "liberation" from Macedonia. They might 
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have felt that it was better for Roman interests to reduce the 
dominance that Megalopolitan had over the Achaean league, and 
promote the interests of other regions in the Peloponnese, whose 
political representatives would be dependent on Roman support. 
The senate's answer that they would not prevent the shipment of 
arms or supplies from Italy should not be seen as a direct threat, 
since it is unlikely that the Messenians relied on supplies from 
Italy. It was more of a public reprimand, informing 
Megalopolitans that the policy they were following was not 
satisfactory, since they were not acting as befitted Roman subjects. 
Indeed, when Lycortas quelled the revolt, and the senate was 
informed of the victory, its reaction was quite different. 
According to Polybius, they recalled the Achaean ambassador 
Xenarchus, and: 
Entirely ignoring their former answer, they gave another 
reply to the same envoys, informing them that they had 
provided that no one should import from Italy arms or corn 
to Messene. 88 
A further consequence of the Messenian revolt was the death 
of Philopoemen. He was captured and executed by the 
Messenians during the fighting, leaving a vacuum in the 
leadership of the Achaean league 89 
so Polyb. 23.17.3-4. 
89 P1ut. Philop. 20.1-3. 
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The resolution of the Spartan question and the embassy of 
Callicrates. 
This section will deal with the resolution of the Spartan exile 
question, in particular Callicrates' actions and Polybius' depiction 
of them. My contention will be that Callicrates' actions should not 
be seen as those of a traitor to the Greek world, or a pro-Roman. 
Although Golan has argued that Callicrates and Polybius came 
from similar political backgrounds, this is based on the 
assumption that the Achaean league functioned as Polybius 
claimed it did 9° The principal difference between Callicrates and 
Polybius is that Achaean poleis such as Leontium lost control of 
the league they had founded to Dorian like Aratus and 
Arcadians like Polybius. Callicrates' actions should be seen in the 
context of an internal struggle for control over the Peloponnese; 
his concern in 180BC was to challenge the domination that 
Arcadians had over the Achaean league, and re-assert the position 
of his own region. 
More importantly, Polybius wrote his histories in order to 
explain to his readers how, through the workings of anacyclosis 
and tyche, the Romans had come to control the Greek world. 
Polybius states that it was Callicrates who gave the senate the 
idea that the Greeks should be treated like subjects for the first 
time. Polybius also depicts Callicrates' mission resulting in an 
'0 Golan(1995) p. 75. He earlier suggested that after Megalopolis had been integrated into 
the Achaean league it was unable to preserve its independence. Golan (1995) p. 13. 
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increased role for the mob in dictating the decisions of the 
Achaean assembly and bringing corrupt politicians into the 
highest offices of the Achaean league. In effect Polybius was 
presenting to his readers the internal decline that had taken place 
in the Achaean league at a time when Rome was extending its 
control over the Greek world. Callicrates' entry into Achaean 
politics was therefore part of the natural process of anacyclosis that 
influenced the system of government in a democracy like the 
Achaean league. 
After Messene was brought under control it was decided to 
re-admit Sparta to the Achaean league 91 When and why Sparta 
had left is unknown 92 Although the Achaean league was willing 
to accept Sparta, according to Polybius, it was unwilling to restore 
to Sparta: 
Those of the old exiles who had behaved with such 
ingratitude and irreverence to them. 93 
They appear to have been the remnants of the group 
represented by Areus and Alcibiades who were unable to accept 
the Achaean league's authority 94 The result was the dispatch of 
two embassies to the senate, one led by Bippus of Argos 
91 Polyb. 23.17.5. - 18.5. 
92For opinions on what exactly was happening in Sparta, see Errington (1969) p. 290 and 
Shimron (1972) p. 114. Both agree that there was an alliance between Serippus and 
Chaeron at this time, but not on much else. 
93 Polyb. 23.17.10. 
94 Shimron (1972) p. 110 and Walbank (1979) p. 252. 
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representing the Achaean league, the Spartans sending Chaeron 
and the exiles Cleitis and Diactorius 95 When the exiles appeared 
at Rome, the senate, according to Polybius: 
Promised the exiles that they would write to the Achaeans 
begging for their return to their country 96 
When Bippus arrived to represent the Achaean league a few 
days later, the senate gave a different reply. According to 
Polybius: 
The senate gave them a courteous reception, expressing no 
displeasure with anyone for the conduct of the matter. 97 
Why would the senate give two contradictory messages to 
these embassies? Polybius states the Spartans had gained their 
letter through importunity, though there is no evidence of it 98 The 
Achaean leadership genuinely seem to have believed that Bippus 
was informed by the senate that they had taken no action, and 
Walbank suggests that they might have informed Bippus that the 
Spartans begged for this letter and that it was only given with the 
greatest reluctance' 
An indication of why the senate might have taken this 
approach may be found in the embassy composed of Lycortas, 




Errington (1969) pp. 199-200. 
Walbank (1979) p. 255. 
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receipt of some warships he had donated to the Achaean league 100 
That the Romans viewed this action as a challenge to their wider 
interests might explain the senate's contradictory answers. 
Although the Achaean league was not acting in a threatening 
manner, the senate might have feared the potential threat posed 
by Lycortas' continuation of Philopoemen's policy in broadening 
the number of alliances that the Achaean league had with other 
Hellenistic states. The very fact that Lycortas continued this policy 
might have indicated to the senate that Flamininus' decision to 
support Megalopolitan interests and primacy in the Peloponnese 
was mistaken. Both Flamininus and Caecilius had previously 
used the question of the Spartan exiles to curb the power of the 
Megalopolitans within the Achaean League. Again, if one looks at 
the leadership of the Achaean league, the prominence of 
Megalopolitans is apparent throughout this episode. As Eckstein 
points out, Polybius, in the fragment following Callicrates' 
embassy, presents Aristaenus as a patriot whose actions were at 
all times honourable lol Regarding Polybius' depiction of 
Aristaenus' policy towards Rome, Eckstein points out that 
Polybius is actually defending it. 102 Although there appears to 
10° Polyb. 24.6.1-7. Aratus was probably the grandson of the earlier Achaean leader and 
sent because of his family's earlier relationship with Egypt. The mission was cancelled. 
101 See Eckstein (1995) p. 200-3. 
Eckstein (1995) p. 203. n. 39 suggests that even though Polybius reported a suspicion 
that Aristaenus was responsible for the intervention of Quintus Caecilius at Megalopolis 
in 185BC, this does not undermine his general assessment of Aristaenus as a patriot. 
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have been a disagreement between Philopoemen and Aristaenus 
about the policy that the Achaean league should follow regarding 
its relationship with Rome, Polybius does not accuse Aristaenus 
of treachery. 
However, Philopoemen's death during the Messenian War 
created a vacuum within the Achaean league's leadership that an 
aspiring and ambitious politician from the north-west of the 
Peloponnese, who felt that the interests of his region had been 
neglected by the Achaean league, might have sought to fill. Much 
of the trouble that had arisen between the Achaean league and 
Rome was due to the inability of Megalopolitans to settle the 
question of the Spartan exiles. Sparta was naturally an important 
consideration for an Arcadian like Polybius; to a politician from 
one of the original members of the Achaean league like Callicrates 
it was a relatively unimportant matter that should be quickly 
settled without provoking Rome. 
Thus, when there was a fresh communication from the senate 
regarding the Spartan exiles in 180BC, the Achaean strategos 
Hyperbatus of Dyme raised the question at the assembly. "' 
According to Polybius, the Achaean league split into two groups. 
One was led by Lycortas, who advised that the Achaeans should 
take no action, arguing that to do so would: 
103 Walbank (1979) p. 261 for Hyperbatus of Dyme. His father had earlier been strategos 
during the Cleomenic War. Hyperbatus was the first non-Megalopolitan to hold the 
office of Achaean strategos since 205BC 
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Violate our oaths, our laws and the inscribed conventions 
that hold our league together. 104 
Callicrates objected to this position stating, according to 
Polybius, that the will of Rome was above all else 105 Despite this, 
as Derow points out, it is important to remember that in no extant 
passage of his work does Polybius describe Callicrates as pro- 
Roman. " Although the same is true of his depiction of 
Aristaenus, the difference in the characterisation of the two in 
Polybius' work is evident 107 If one considers the different regional 
perspective that Callicrates had towards Sparta from that of 
Megalopolitans like Aristaenus and Lycortas, his intervention and 
suggested solution to the problem might reflect the perspective of 
one of the founder members of the Achaean league. Compared to 
104 Polyb. 24.8.4. Walbank (1979) p. 261 argues that the Achaean league had introduced 
new laws to prevent any further discussion of the Spartan question. 
105 Polyb. 24.8.6 
106 Eckstein (1995) p. 205 makes reference to Derow's argument, but draws attention to 
Polybius' account of others who describe Callicrates as pro-Roman. The only passage 
quoted by Eckstein in support of this position, (Polyb. 30.27. ) does not describe Polybius 
as pro-Roman. It actually states that after an attempt to restore Polybius and the other 
Achaean exiles failed, in the public bath, bathers refused to share the same water as 
Callicrates since they considered his presence morally polluting. Polybius also states that 
when Callicrates was declared the victor at public festivals some of the audience made 
noises to show their displeasure. How Polybius in Italy knew about this is left unsaid, 
and Plutarch makes similar references to expressions of distaste against Socrates' 
accusers. See Plut. Mor. 538A. cf Walbank (1979) pp. 455. 
107 See Walbank (1979) pp. 264-267 for a comparison between Polybius' treatment of 
Aristaenus and Callicrates. 
289 
Megalopolis, poleis such as Leontium, one of the original members 
of the Achaean league, had no history of animosity towards 
Sparta. There is also the possibility of personal ambition playing a 
role; possibly Callicrates saw supporting Rome as the best way for 
advancing his own ambitions. However, suggesting that 
Callicrates' ambition was purely personal fails to take into 
consideration the way that poleis like Leontium had been 
sidelined after the expansion of the Achaean league into Arcadia 
during the 230s BC. Callicrates may have seen this moment as an 
opportunity to re-assert the position of the original Achaean poleis 
within the league they had created. 
Returning to the embassy itself, according to Polybius, when 
the Achaean assembly met to decide what action to take, they 
appointed an embassy consisting of Callicrates of Leontium, 
Lydiades of Megalopolis and Aratus of Sicyon to point out to the 
senate what Polybius states was Lycortas' opinion "' That they 
should have sent Callicrates to express Lycortas' views seems 
extraordinary, especially since Polybius makes no reference to the 
other ambassadors' comments to the senate, despite their 
illustrious ancestry. 109 
1.. Polyb. 24.8.8. 
109Callicrates' two companions share the same names as Lydiades who brought 
Megalopolis within the Achaean league and Aratus, who had been so important in 
expanding the Achaean league. It is usually accepted that Callicrates' fellow 
ambassadors were their descendants. 
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When he arrived in Rome, Polybius states that Callicrates 
departed from the position held by Lycortas and: 
He not only attempted to bring audacious accusations 
against his political opponents, but to lecture the senate'lo 
According to Polybius' account of this mission, Callicrates is 
reputed to have told the senate that: 
It was the fault of the Romans themselves that the Greeks, 
instead of complying with their wishes, disobeyed their 
messages and orders. "' 
Callicrates proceeded to claim, according to Polybius, that 
there were two parties in all the Greek states, one of which 
maintained that all the written complaints of the Romans be 
carried out, no matter what their own laws might state. In the case 
of the Achaean league, those who suggested that their own laws 
took precedent were in the ascendancy, and as he pointed out to 
the assembled senators: 
The consequence being that the supporters of Rome were 
constantly exposed to the contempt and slander of the mob, 
while it was the reverse with their opponents. "' 
Callicrates, according to Polybius, proceeded to argue that 
the Romans should indicate which of the two parties he indicated 
"0 Polyb. 24.8.9. 
"' See Polyb. 24.9. lff for the speech. 
112 Polyb. 24.9.4-5. 
291 
existed within the Achaean league they favoured. Were they to do 
so, Callicrates argued that: 
If the senate now gave some token of their disapproval the 
political leaders would soon go over to the side of Rome, and 
the multitude would follow out of fear. But in the event of 
the senate neglecting to do so, every one would change and 
adopt the other attitude, which in the eyes of the multitude 
was more dignified and honourable. "' 
How accurate is Polybius' account of Callicrates' speech? 
Polybius states that Callicrates used these, or similar words in his 
address to the senate. That he states the obvious to his readers 
suggests a defensive attitude. 114 Returning to his account of the 
senate's reaction to Callicrates' speech, Polybius states that: 
The senate, thinking that what Callicrates had said was in 
their interest, and learning from him that they should exalt 
those who supported their decrees, and humble those who 
opposed them, now first began the policy of weakening those 
members of the several states who worked for the best, and of 
strengthening those, who, no matter whether rightly or 
wrongly, appealed to its authority 115 
Accepting that the Romans remained ignorant of the 
possibilities offered by exploiting internal divisions within the 
"' Po1yb. 24.9.6-7. 
Polyb. 24.10.1. 
15 Polyb. 24.10.3-4. 
292 
Greek elite, as Polybius states, until Callicrates pointed it out to 
them, is unrealistic. From 185BC, the senate had used the question 
of the Spartan exiles to weaken the Megalopolitan position within 
the Achaean league. Flamininus had earlier secured the support 
of Megalopolitans like Philopoemen and Aristaenus by granting 
them control over former Aetolian allies in the Peloponnese like 
Elis, Sparta and Messene during the Aetolian/Syrian War. 
Therefore, we should be asking whether Polybius portrays the 
events surrounding Callicrates' embassy in a manner intended to 
show to his readers the onset of anacyclosis in the Achaean 
league's system of government? ' 
Up to the 20th century, discussions of Callicrates' actions 
describe him as a traitor to the Greek world. The first effort to see 
him in a different light came with Badian, who argued that 
Callicrates was an ordinary man making the most of an 
extraordinary situation. 116 Derow supports this view, suggesting 
that Polybius' depiction of this mission is totally utilitarian in 
character; Callicrates' advice to the senate produced no real 
benefits either to the Greeks or even to the Romans themselves. 117 
Eckstein on the other hand argues that Polybius depicts 
Callicrates' actions as those of a profoundly immoral man who 
16 Badian (1958) p. 90-1. 
Derow (1970) p. 13. In the CAH, Vol 8, (2"d ed), p. 300 n. 15 Derow, making reference to 
his 1970 article states that "the connection between Callicrates' demarche at Rome and 
Perseus' accession to the Macedonian throne needs very much to be borne in mind". 
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betrayed "Achaea", "the best" and "justice". 118 Eckstein argues 
that to understand Polybius' condemnation of Callicrates it is 
important to remember that for Polybius the best policy was to 
deal with Rome on almost equal terms 119 By telling the Romans 
that they should treat the Greeks as subjects, Eckstein argues that 
Callicrates changed the relationship, and this is why Polybius 
holds him in such contempt. However, as Derow earlier noted: 
Roman intervention in the affairs of the league had been 
brought about by the returned Spartans in 188, and their 
example was followed often in the succeeding years. From 
that point on (if not even earlier) Achaean sovereignty over 
the internal affairs of the league was far from complete. This 
was recognised by Polybius. 120 
As Derow points out, Callicrates' embassy is not recorded in 
Livy, suggesting that the Romans did not regard it as a major 
turning point. 12' Though there is no evidence for the Achaean 
league for the following five years, even if it was a period of 
unrest within the Achaean league, it produced no embassies to or 
from Rome. " Derow argues that Callicrates merely "succeeded in 
18 Eckstein (1995) p. 205. 
19 Po1yb. 24.10.9. Eckstein (1995) p. 205. 
120 Derow (1970) p. 20. 
'Z' There is the possibility that Livy failed to include this embassy since he may have 
thought it better not to mention Polybius' assertion that Roman policy was made by 
Greek subjects. 
'u Derow (1970) p. 21. 
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introducing Roman support and fear of Roman power into the 
local politics of the Greek states, and he was instrumental in the 
adoption of intervention in local affairs as a standard of Roman 
diplomacy". " According to Derow, Callicrates' actions paved the 
way for the emergence of a new generation of Greek leaders who 
used Rome and the fear of Roman power to extend their own 
authority. 124 This is implied by Polybius who states that the senate: 
Wrote not only to the Achaeans on the subject of the return 
of the exiles, begging them to contribute to strengthening 
the position of these men, but to the Aetolians, Epirots, 
Athenians, Boeotians, and Acarnanians, calling them all as 
it were to witnesses if for the express purpose of crushing 
the Achaeans. Speaking of Callicrates alone with no 
mention of the other envoys, they wrote in their official 
answer that there ought to be more men in the several states 
like Callicrates. 125 
Polybius states that the senate took Callicrates at his word, 
and not only supported him, but wrote in support of politicians in 
other states who like Callicrates were willing to support Roman 
interests without question. His implication is that before this 
point Rome had no imperialistic designs in Greece. "' If the senate 
" Derow (1970) p. 21 
'2' Derow (1970) pp. 21-22. 
Polyb. 24.10.6-7. 
Walbank (1979) p. 263 suggests that they were writing to the states in which the exiles 
lived. 
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actually wrote to other Greek states to indicate that they regarded 
Callicrates' embassy as marking a change in their attitude 
towards Greece, why does Livy fail to record the embassy? 
Despite Polybius' claims, although Callicrates was elected as 
Achaean strategos, probably in 180-79BC, according to Polybius 
through bribery and corruption, as Gruen points out, the four 
known Achaean strategoi between 179-168BC were opponents of 
Callicrates, indicating that there was no real change within the 
Achaean league-" If one accepts that Rome supported Callicrates 
in a public manner, as Polybius argues that it did, it is surprising 
that the result of this support was not more evident. 12' 
Although Polybius presents it as such, was Callicrates' 
embassy the defining point in the evolution of the relationship 
between the Achaean league and Rome? The Spartan exile 
question was essentially a Hellenic one. Callicrates' handling of 
its settlement and Polybius' depiction of it should not be seen 
solely in terms of the relationship between the Achaean league 
and Rome. If one looks at the eventual settlement, found on an 
inscription erected at Olympia by the Spartans, no mention is 
" Polyb. 24.10.15. for the charge of bribery. Gruen (1984) p. 500; Xenarchus in 175-4BC, 
Archon 172-1BC and 170-69BC, Xenon 168-7BC. All are from Megalopolis. 
" Walbank (1979) p. 263 accepts that no real change is evident in the relationship 
between the Achaean league and Rome, suggesting that Polybius exaggerated the 
importance of Callicrates' mission. 
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made of Rome in the text, and Callicrates alone is thanked for 
having restored the Spartans. "' 
One must remember that Callicrates represented regional 
interests that were at variance with Polybius' attitude towards 
Sparta. Poleis like Leontium had become politically isolated 
after the expansion of the Achaean league into Arcadia during 
the third century. Callicrates may have seen complying with 
Rome over the Spartan exile question as the best chance to 
restore some of the position poleis like Leontium had lost within 
the Achaean league. Possibly Callicrates' criticism of the actions 
of Lycortas and other Megalopolitans came from their 
domineering behaviour towards other states in the 
Peloponnese; Polybius attacks Callicrates for raising the 
Messenian question, even though the Romans had not 
complained about it. 13' It was not the relationship between the 
Achaean league and Rome that changed. Rather, Callicrates' 
emergence undermined the hold that Megalopolitans like 
Polybius held over the Achaean league. 
Does Polybius regard Callicrates' embassy to Rome as a 
major turning point for other reasons? During the period from the 
initial alliance between the Achaean league and Flamininus in 
198BC, until the point where Callicrates departed from the 
position Polybius claims he had agreed with Lycortas before his 
'29 SIG3 634. 
130 See Polyb. 24.10.13. 
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departure, Polybius' histories present Rome and the Achaean 
league acting almost as equals. Polybius had to show his readers 
the point where the Achaean league's democratic system of 
government began to decline through the workings of anacyclosis. 
Polybius presents Callicrates' emergence leading to an increase in 
the role of the mob in the proceedings of the Achaean league's 
assembly; Callicrates informing the senate about the fickleness of 
the mob and how it could be manipulated to Rome's advantage in 
increasing its control over Greece. Polybius' emphases on 
Callicrates' mission as a turning point in the relationship between 
the Achaean league and Rome may be related to his belief in the 
role that anacyclosis played in allowing the Romans to achieve 
control over the Achaean league. Polybius emphasises to his 
readers that before Callicrates' embassy the Achaean league's 
relations with Rome were on more or less equal terms. After 
Callicrates had addressed the senate this situation changed. As 
Polybius states: 
For it was still possible for the Achaeans even at this 
stage to deal with Rome on more or less equal terms, as they 
had remained faithful to her ever since they had taken part 
in the most important times, I mean the wars with Philip 
and Antiochus, but now after the Achaean league had 
become stronger and more prosperous than at any time 
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recorded in history, this effrontery of Callicrates was the 
beginning of a change for the worse. 
l31 
Finally there is the question of how Rome regarded 
Callicrates' intervention: That it played an important role in the 
formulation of Roman policy seems unlikely. The emergence of a 
political challenge to the status quo in the Achaean league 
undoubtedly worked in the senate's favour. By agreeing to settle 
the Spartan question in a manner that was acceptable to most 
sides, Callicrates' actions suited Roman interests. The Spartan 
problem had emerged as a result of Caecilius' intervention in 
185BC, and had been prolonged by the decision of the senatorial 
commission appointed to resolve the matter. Roman actions 
towards the Achaean league during this period should not be 
seen as a reaction against the threat posed by an anti-Roman 
faction, but as an attempt by Rome to manipulate the situation in 
the Peloponnese. It would appear that having brought Greece 
under its control, the actions of both Philopoemen and Lycortas in 
renewing links with the Hellenistic monarchies were viewed with 
suspicion by the Romans. By supporting Callicrates' restoration of 
the Spartan exiles, the Romans allowed the emergence of a 
politician who was opposed to the Megalopolitans who had 
dominated the political institutions of the Achaean league for so 
long, and who, more importantly needed Rome in order to retain 
his position. 
13' Polyb. 24.10.9-10. 
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Conclusion. 
Aristaenus' comments about the Aetolian league's proposal 
that they should be allowed to persuade Nabis to evacuate Argos 
voluntarily is indicative of the internal divisions in the Greek 
world, and how the Romans exploited them to further their 
control. By removing Nabis from Argos and restoring it to the 
Achaean league, Flamininus sent a clear signal that the 
Peloponnese would in future come under the control of the 
Achaean league. During the Aetolian/Syrian War this control 
became apparent. Polybius emphasises the independence of the 
Achaean league during this conflict, along with the admirable 
behaviour of Romans like Flamininus. However, Polybius was 
attempting to show how anacyclosis had influenced both the 
Achaean and Roman systems of polity during the period covered 
in his histories where the fates of the Achaean league and Rome 
had become intertwined. Initially both had acted as equals; but 
only because the suspension of anacyclosis in the Roman system of 
government had made it almost an ideal state, and the Achaean 
league was a democracy whose system of government had yet to 
be corrupted. In reality, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
Megalopolitan strategoi of the Achaean league undertook actions 
at Sparta in 192BC that were beneficial to Roman interests, and 
300 
were rewarded by Flamininus with control over three former 
allies of the Aetolian league. 
Though Megalopolitans did benefit as a result of their co- 
operation with Rome, in particular with Flamininus, this does not 
necessarily imply that they were pro-Roman. As the humiliating 
treatment of Sparta by Philopoemen in 188BC suggests, they co- 
operated with Rome because they wished to see their own 
interests in the Peloponnese secured. Megalopolitans like 
Aristaenus and Philopoemen supported Rome during the 
Aetolian/Syrian War because an Aetolian led "liberation" of 
Greece would have been detrimental to their interests. When the 
war was over, Philopoemen's decision to open diplomatic 
contacts with other Greek states seems to indicate that he wished 
the Achaean league to gain allies to defend itself against further 
encroachment, once he had gained all that he could from co- 
operating with Rome. 
This provoked a response from the senate, who seem to 
have monitored the activities and actions of their subjects in its 
newly acquired area of influence in the East closely. Roman policy 
towards the Peloponnese indicates an awareness of the competing 
interests of both leagues in that region, which they exploited. 
Initially, Rome used the desire of the Aetolian league to remove 
the Macedonian presence from the Peloponnese to gain a pretext 
for intervention in the Greek world. When the Aetolians had 
served their purpose, Flamininus exploited the desire of the 
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Megalopolitans to secure control over the Peloponnese by 
removing the threat that they faced from Nabis and the Aetolian 
league. 
It is in this context that Callicrates' actions should be seen. 
The Romans could not have maintained the fiction that they were 
liberators had they intervened directly. Instead they exploited 
existing tensions within the Peloponnese to ensure that the area 
remained under the control of a compliant elite that needed their 
support. Callicrates' behaviour before the senate was not a 
betrayal of Hellenic interests and surrender to Rome. Rather, 
Callicrates, like Greek politicians from the time of the Aetolian 
league's alliance with Rome in 212/211BC appears to have co- 




Po1ybius, the Peloponnese and resistance to Rome 
Introduction 
Rome's defeat of Antiochus in 188BC consolidated its 
control over the Greek world. In the resulting peace treaty the 
Aetolian league was made subordinate to Rome! Seventeen 
years intervened before Rome again campaigned in the -east, a 
period seen as one of comparative neglect of Greek affairs by the 
Romans? 
According to Polybius, the Third Macedonian War was 
caused by the preparations made by the Antigonids to lead a 
war of liberation against Rome. Polybius states that before his 
death in 179BC, Philip V was preparing for war against Rome, 
and that Perseus was continuing his father's policy! With the 
exception of Pedech, most scholars discount Polybius' assertion 
of Macedonian responsibility for this conflict, arguing that it was 
Rome's decision to initiate the conflict. " Harris suggests Polybius 
blamed the Macedonian kings for the outbreak of war because: 
He deeply regretted the war and the end of the precarious 
political equilibrium in which the Greeks had lived since 
189BC. He found himself with the impossible choice of 
'Harris (1979) p. 223. 
'Harris (1979) p. 227. 
3 Polyb. 22.18.10-11. 
4 Pedech (1964) p. 139. 
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blaming Perseus or the senate. Perseus had not behaved 
at all belligerently towards Rome, as Polybius knew; yet 
the historian could not write, by the late 140s could 
probably not even allow himself to think, that the senate 
had purposefully destroyed the equilibrium. ' 
Polybius' claims of Macedonian responsibility for the 
outbreak of Third Macedonian War were, as Harris earlier 
stated, understandable, because: 
How could the pro-Roman political agent in the tragic 
Greece of the late 140s admit that it was the Romans who 
had upset the tolerable equilibrium of the years before the 
Third Macedonian War? 6 
Polybius does state that initially Philip V, and later Perseus, 
was preparing for war against Rome; he was actively involved in 
Greek politics during this period: his assertion should not be 
discounted. As Harris admitted, the state of the evidence is such 
that we have only a partial glimpse of it, and Polybius may have 
expounded his theory about Macedonian responsibility in book 
twenty-seven. 7 
We do know certain things. Firstly, whatever Polybius' 
motivation in writing his histories, we have them because he had 
been detained in Italy in the aftermath of the Third Macedonian 
'Harris (1979) pp. 227-8. 
'Harris (1979) p. 115. 
'Harris (1979) p. 115 
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War. That is undisputed, though why the Romans felt it 
necessary to detain Polybius is left unsaid. Polybius' account of 
why he was detained is preserved in fragmentary form, leaving 
us with Pausanias, who appears to have confused Polybius' 
account of his detention with Roman practice in his own day. 
Did the Romans detain Polybius, along with a thousand other 
hostages from the Achaean league, and retain them in Italy for 
sixteen years, merely at Callicrates' prompting, as Polybius and 
Pausanias suggest? Although it is tempting to suppose that the 
events of 146BC led to Polybius becoming pro-Roman, even 
some of those who suggest this acknowledge that he felt a 
profound anxiety about the course of events in the years leading 
to the destruction of Corinth! 
As Kallet-Marx has recently demonstrated, the Achaean 
War of 146BC was not the decisive break that it had been 
previously thought since there is little evidence of any change in 
Greece in its aftermath! The contention that Polybius became 
pro-Roman is partly based on the belief that socio-economic 
8 See especially Walbank (1972) pp. 166-83, who traces the development of Polybius' 
attitude towards Rome, from a cautious anti-Roman position before his detention into a 
cynical and detached one during his period in detention, until the events of 146BC led to 
him embracing the Roman cause. Other scholars, notably Green (1990) pp. 279-81 accept 
Walbank's view. Walbank's view has not gone unchallenged, see Ferrary (1988) p. 327- 
34 and Eckstein (1995) p. 232. For a recent re-appraisal of events after 146BC see Kallet- 
Marx (1995) pp. 129-53. 
Kallet-Marx (1996) p. 2. As he points out on p. 61, "No evidence collaborates Pausanias' 




issues played an important role in the events surrounding 
Corinth's destruction, and that Polybius co-operated with and 
accepted Roman rule because he feared the consequences of a 
breakdown in social order 10 t cannot be doubted that Polybius 
claimed to have assisted the Romans in t eir-set ement of Greek -tl 
affairs in the aftermath of Corinth's destruction. However, co- 
operation with an imperial regime does not necessarily imply 
acceptance of it. " As Polybius stated about his own behaviour 
after Corinth's destruction: 
In times of danger it is true those who are Greek should help 
the Greeks in every way, by active support, by cloaking 
faults and by trying to appease the anger of the ruling 
power, as I myself actually did at the time of the 
occurrences; but the literary record of the events meant for 
posterity should be kept free from any taint of falsehood, so 
that instead of the ears of readers being titillated for the 
present, their minds may be reformed in order to avoid their 
falling more than once into the same error. 'Z 
70 For the existence of inscriptions from Megalopolis and Acacesium in Arcadia thanking 
Polybius for his help against Roman vengeance, see Paus. 8.37.2 and 8.30.8. 
" As Eckstein points out, Polybius' condemnation of the actions of the leaders of the 
Achaean revolt show not that he disapproved of their actions. Rather that he was critical 
of their inability, once they had provoked the war, to prosecute it efficiently, a criticism 
he also applies to his account of the actions of Antiochus and Perseus. See Eckstein 
(1995) p. 220 for the Achaean leadership, pp. 213-14 for Antiochus and pp. 215-16 for 
Perseus. 
12 Polyb. 38.4.7-8. 
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In book six of his histories Polybius stresses the role that the 
suspension of anacyclosis in the Roman system of government 
played in allowing it to achieve control over the Mediterranean 
world. However anacyclosis had not been suspended in other 
systems of government; Polybius had to present to his readers 
the decline that had taken place elsewhere, especially in the 
Achaean league, which had allowed the Romans to achieve their 
mastery over the Mediterranean world. Polybius believed that 
tyche was changeable and, although it had benefited Rome 
during its rise to dominance, eventually this situation would be 
reversed. The final image that Polybius presented to his Greek 
readership, that of Roman soldiers using works of art for board 
games, came at the end of his depiction of a steady decline in 
Roman behaviour post-Pydna. Perhaps he was implying to his 
readers that anacyclosis had resumed and that the Romans were 
reverting to their true barbarian selves. 13 Although the 
destruction of Corinth was undoubtedly intended as a 
psychological measure by the Romans to intimidate their 
subjects, it does not appear to have ended Greek hopes for future 
freedom from Roman domination, or to have changed the 
situation in Greece. On the contrary, the experience in other 
societies subject to imperial rule indicates that although colonies 
can remain peaceful for long periods of time, this does not imply 
13 Polyb. 39.2.1-3. See Erskine (2000) pp. 181-2 for the barbarian characteristics in Polybius 
depiction of Roman behaviour during the sacking of cities. 
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that their inhabitants accept the status quo. 14 Rather that 
resentment over the initial conquest lingers, manifesting itself at 
an opportune moment. As Golan has argued, Polybius' emphasis 
on the unity of the Achaean league might well have been to 
educate a future generation that would live in a Greece that was 
free from Roman domination, since: 
Polybius wished to give the youth of Greece the experience 
of action and inaction which he had observed and studied: 
for those young men would sooner or later carry on a more 
fortunate life then his own, and have the opportunity to 
develop an uninterrupted political career in a free Achaea 
(and Greece). " 
"Because of Rhodesian UDI, Zimbabwe was one of only four European colonies in sub- 
Saharan Africa to have a war of independence, and the only one whose society 
anthropologists could examine to gauge African attitudes towards the conflict in relative 
safety; they found that many of their preconceptions were mistaken. Firstly, the issue 
that had played the vital role in mobilising African support for the war was not white 
rule as such, but rather the land seizures carried out by Europeans at the end of the 19' 
century. Another factor found was the extent to which the independence movement 
stressed the continuation between their own campaign and the earlier revolt against 
white rule in 1896. The liberation war of the 1970s is called the Second Chimurenga, the 
First being the revolt of 1896; the term Third Chimurenga being used to describe 
Zimbabwe's present difficulties by the government. Though between 1896 and 1972 
Rhodesia was peaceful, African resentment at actions carried out in the late 19" century 
lingered, resulting in open revolt against white rule when conditions were right. See 
Ranger (1985) pp. 113-78. 
`Golan (1995) p. 7. 
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Again, one must return to the notion of anacyclosis; Polybius 
believed that constitutional development occurred in cycles, and 
he implies in his account of the Roman system of government 
that internal forces within the Roman republic, combined with 
external pressure, would cause its eventual decline. "' Polybius 
emphasises the madness and irrationality of both the mob at the 
Achaean assembly and the leadership of the Achaean league in 
his account of Corinth's destruction in 146BC; an emphasis that 
has been taken as evidence of a socio-economic basis for this 
revolt. However, this was the sort of behaviour that Polybius, in 
book six, claimed existed at the end of the cycle of anacyclosis that 
democracies like the Achaean league were subject to. After 
Corinth's destruction the cycle of anacyclosis would re-start in the 
Achaean league and its society would be renewed by the 
emergence of a single strong individual who, Polybius stated, 
would bring men salvation from the desperate situation they 
found themselves in. At Rome, along with the internal forces 
that would lead to its decline, external pressures would impinge 
on the Roman system of government detrimentally once 
anacyclosis resumed, as indeed the Achaean league had been 
weakened by increased Roman interference in its affairs after 
Callicrates' embassy. Polybius wrote his histories to instruct his 
readership, so that they could learn from past mistakes. In doing 
so the renewed society that would eventually arise in Greece 
16 Polyb. 6.57.1-10. 
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from Corinth's destruction would learn from the mistakes of the 
past, and be able to assert external pressure on a Roman 
Republic that was suffering from internal decline. 
This chapter will examine resistance to Roman rule in 
Polybius' histories along with his attitude towards it, especially 
the role that regional differences in the Peloponnese played in 
formulating these revolts. Polybius' assertion that Philip V and 
Perseus were planning a revolt against Rome was probably an 
accurate reflection of events, especially given Polybius' fellow 
Megalopolitans' support for renewing the Achaean league's 
alliance with Macedonia prior to the war. Discontent amongst 
Megalopolitans like Lycortas and Polybius over Callicrates' 
settlement of Spartan affairs in 180BC appears to have led them 
to approach Perseus in an attempt to renew the ties that 
Megalopolis had with Macedonia. Callicrates appears to have 
opposed this because having managed to re-assert the position 
of the original members of the Achaean league by co-operating 
with Rome, he needed to continue this support to maintain his 
position. 
From there it will look at Roman actions, suggesting that the 
Romans, aware of the potential threat posed by Megalopolis' 
links with Macedonia, exploited the situation in the 
Peloponnese, especially in Elis and Messene, to ensure that the 
Achaean league was not in a position to support Perseus. I shall 
contend that Polybius was detained in Italy not through 
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Callicrates' prompting, but because his actions during the war 
had caused the Romans to be suspicious. Pausanias' account of 
the events surrounding Polybius' detention was influenced by 
Polybius' desire to show anacyclosis at work in the Achaean 
league, by demonstrating how it came under the dominion of 
corrupt politicians like Callicrates. 
As the limited evidence available for the Peloponnese in the 
period after the Third Macedonian War seems to suggest, 
Callicrates was by no means dominant. After his death in 149BC 
and the emergence of a new crisis involving Sparta's 
membership of the Achaean league, politicians from Megalopolis 
tried to re-assert the political power of the Arcadian 
communities within the Achaean league. The Romans, already 
worried about the situation in Macedonia, intervened to crush 
any possibility that Andriscus' revolt would spread to the 
Peloponnese. Polybius marks out the destruction of Corinth for 
special attention. As he states: 
The thirty-eight book contains the completion of the 
misfortune of Greece. For though both Greece and her 
several parts had often met with mischance, yet to none of 
her former defeats can we more fittingly apply the name of 
misfortune with all it signifies than to the events of my 
own time. " 
17 Po1yb. 38.1.1. 
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Polybius wrote with the intention of explaining to his 
readers how they came to find themselves under Roman rule. It 
is an inescapable fact that in the early part of his work, in 
particular his first five books, Romans and the Roman state are 
described in almost ideal terms, appearing to have many 
rational, Greek like qualities. In Polybius' account of the 
Achaean War, the Romans act rationally; it is the behaviour of 
his fellow Achaeans that Polybius portrays as irrational. 
However, Polybius' intention was to explain to his readers how 
they came to be under barbarian rule. By emphasising the ideal 
nature of the Roman republic during its conquest of Greece, 
Polybius intention was to show his Greek readers why the 
Romans had been successful in achieving domination over them. 
Because of the balance the Romans had achieved in their system 
of government they were able to overcome Greek states, like the 
Achaean league, which were coming to the end of their cycle of 
anacyclosis. Therefore, Polybius' emphasis on the mob and 
anarchy in the events surrounding the Achaean War does not 
indicate that it had a socio-economic basis. Rather, that he 
wished to emphasise to his readers that this was the great 
misfortune that marked the end of the cycle of anacyclosis in the 
Achaean league, after which Greek fortunes could only ascend. 
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The Achaean league and the Peloponnese prior to the Third 
Macedonian War. 
From 179 to 175BC there is no mention of the Achaean 
league in the sources, or the immediate impact of Callicrates' 
embassy on the Achaean league. Drawing from the limited 
evidence available, I will suggest that Megalopolitans within the 
Achaean league, dismayed at Callicrates' settlement at Sparta in 
180BC, tried to re-establish links with Macedonia prior to the 
outbreak of the Third Macedonian War. Callicrates opposed this 
move because his position, and that of the region in the 
Peloponnese that he represented, was dependent on Roman 
support. I will suggest that defining the divide within the Greek 
elite as one between pro and anti-Roman fails to take into 
account the differences between the various ethnic groups in the 
Peloponnese, and how the Romans exploited these divisions. 
In 175BC Livy records an approach from Perseus to the 
Achaean league, the first mention we have of the situation in the 
Peloponnese after Callicrates' embassy 18 According to Livy, 
Perseus wrote to the Achaean assembly requesting that the law 
that forbade Macedonians entry to the Achaean league be 
revoked and that philia between the two be renewed. In return, 
Perseus offered to return to their owners all the escaped slaves 
from the Achaean league that had fled to Macedonia 19 There 
1a Livy. 41.23. ff 
19 Livy. 41.23.2-3. 
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were probably few Macedonians who had been excluded from 
the Peloponnese, and few escaped slaves from the Achaean 
league living in Macedonia 2° It appears that Perseus was trying 
to renew the alliance formed between the Achaean league and 
Macedonia in the aftermath of the Cleomenic War. Of particular 
interest are the speeches in favour of accepting Perseus' offer by 
Archon, a Megalopolitan closely associated with Lycortas and 
Polybius, and that against by Callicrates. 
According to Livy, Callicrates argued that revoking the law 
forbidding Macedonian entry into the Achaean league would 
violate the relationship with Rome. He goes on to argue that 
Perseus was set on provoking war with Rome since he had 
recently conquered Dolopia and had marched through Thessaly. 
The latter point is what Callicrates found the most objectionable. 
As he points out, the possibility existed that Perseus was 
preparing the ground for a revolt against Rome and his fear was 
that: 
We may soon find Macedonian armies and even the king 
himself, crossing from Delphi to the Peloponnese and that 
we may be involved with the Macedonians as they take up 
arms against the Romans. 21 
20 When exactly the law forbidding Macedonians to enter the Achaean league was 
passed is unknown. Aymard (1938) p. 112 and Gruen (1984) p. 500 suggest 198BC. 
21 Livy. 41.23.16. 
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Gruen accuses Callicrates of using scare tactics in predicting 
war, though, as he admits, there seems to be little evidence of 
Roman pressure'2 Assuming that Livy left the speech largely 
unaltered it probably reflects Polybius' account. Given the long 
association that Megalopolis had with Macedonia, Callicrates 
may have felt that the possibility existed that Arcadian 
communities within the Achaean league like Megalopolis might 
seek to use Macedonian support to undermine the position that 
he had gained in the Achaean league. His support for Rome may 
have been due to his need to counteract this possibility. 
Archon's speech in favour of accepting Perseus' approach 
probably gives an accurate impression of the beliefs held by 
Polybius and other Megalopolitans at this time. Although 
Archon stated that there was no evidence of war breaking out 
between Macedonia and Rome, and that he is not arguing 
against the Achaean league's alliance with Rome, his attitude 
towards Rome was hostile. Archon, countering the arguments 
that Callicrates had made, pointed out that the Dolopians were 
the weakest of all people and that the Achaean league was not as 
vulnerable as they were. Archon directs his audience's attention 
to the changed circumstances they faced, informing them that 
Rome no longer supported the Achaean league as it once did. As 
he states, if Macedonia did, as Callicrates suggested, attack: 
Gruen (1984) p. 501 
315 
We have no more claim on the Romans, no higher standing 
with them, we who have always been their allies and 
friends, than the Aetolians who were only a short time ago 
their enemies. " 
This hardly represents the feelings of a reliable ally. Archon 
continues by reminding his audience of why the Achaean league 
had abandoned its alliance with Macedonia in 198BC; as he 
points out, the Antigonid kingdom and the Achaean league were 
longstanding allies, and: 
The services rendered to us by former kings of Macedonia 
were so great as to wipe out any wrongs inflicted by Philip. 
If there were such, especially as he is now dead. 24 
He continues by reminding his audience of the reason they 
debated for so long in Sicyon in 198BC about abandoning the 
alliance with the Antigonids, although there was a Roman fleet 
at anchor nearby: 
There was no immediate threat from the Romans to 
persuade us; there was still something certainly, which 
caused such prolonged discussion; and that thing was the 
ancient association with Macedonia, and the great services 
by their kings to us in past times. ' 
' Livy. 41.24.9. 
24 Livy. 41.24.12. 
" Livy. 41.24.15. 
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Archon clearly wished to renew the alliance with 
Macedonia and had the backing, according to Livy, of the 
Achaean strategos Xenarchus. It appears unlikely that Perseus 
would have made this approach unless he felt that there was a 
very good chance if it being accepted, therefore the initial 
approach to renew the alliance may have come from the 
Peloponnese. Does Archon's willingness to renew the alliance 
with Macedonia and the arguments he used indicate that this 
move was anti-Roman, and a sign that he and others within the 
Achaean league wished to ally with Perseus in a war against 
Rome? 
Again, the question is probably more complex then merely 
seeing the relationship with Rome as the sole issue dominating 
the internal affairs of the Achaean league. Megalopolitans like 
Archon might have sought to renew the alliance with Macedonia 
but this does not necessarily imply that they would blindly 
support Perseus in any future conflict with Rome. As Polybius' 
actions during the Third Macedonian War suggest, although he 
and other Megalopolitans may have wished to see Perseus 
emerge victorious from the conflict, they were unwilling to 
commit themselves openly until it began to look as if Macedonia 
stood some chance of success. 
Perhaps one should consider this approach in the same 
context as the earlier ones at Megalopolis in 185BC. In the 
immediate aftermath of the Aetolian/Syrian War the Achaean 
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league, under Philopoemen's guidance, had decided to renew its 
alliances with a number of Hellenistic powers. Given the 
changed circumstances brought about by the advent of Rome in 
Hellenic affairs, it would appear that Greek states sought to try 
and widen their diplomatic contacts. The approach from Perseus 
was not the only one that the Achaean league received in 175BC. 
In the same year, Antiochus promised the Megalopolitan that 
he would construct a defensive wall around their polis when 
requested 26 It would also appear that around the same time, 
circa 174BC, the Achaean league decided to cancel all the 
honours that it had awarded to Eumenes of Pergamum. There is 
no record of when this took place, and the first indication that it 
happened came in 169BC when Attalus sent a deputation asking 
for their restoration 27 Eumenes was a close Roman ally, who 
during his visit to Rome in 172BC warned that the Achaean 
league could be a threat. 28 
Returning to Perseus' approach, should it be taken as a sign 
that the Arcadian communities within the Achaean league 
favoured forming an alliance with Macedonia against Rome? 
According to Livy, the Achaean league refused Perseus' 
approach not because of Callicrates' arguments, but because the 
damiourgi: 
Livy. 41.20.6. 
" Po1yb. 27.18.1-3. 
28 Livy. 42.12.6. The blame for the Achaean decision was placed on two Rhodian judges. 
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Resented the idea that Perseus should obtain by means of a 
letter a few lines long a concession that he had not deemed 
important enough for a delegation. " 
Instead of seeing this affair as evidence of growing 
differences between the Achaean league and Rome, it should 
possibly be seen as part of an internal struggle within the 
Achaean league. Antiochus approached not the Achaean league, 
but Megalopolis, suggesting that he viewed this polls as the key 
to his Peloponnesian policy. Possibly Callicrates feared that 
Megalopolitans like Lycortas and Polybius would seek to use 
Macedonian support to influence events in the Peloponnese to 
the detriment of his own regional interests. 
It would also appear that the Romans were aware of, and 
exploited the regional differences that existed within the 
Achaean league to ensure that the Peloponnese remained stable 
during its confrontation with Perseus. In 172BC, just prior to the 
Third Macedonian War, a mission consisting of the two Lentuli 
visited the Achaean league. They were detached from a far 
larger mission, and were sent to the Peloponnese, where, 
according to Livy: 
They toured the cities, urging all the communities alike to 
assist the Romans with the same intense loyalty as they had 
" Livy. 41.24.19. Gruen (1984) p. 500 suggests that Perseus hurt the Achaean league's 
pride. 
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shown in the first war against Philip and then in the war 
against Antiochus. 30 
The reaction of the Achaean assembly, along with events in 
Boeotia, gives us some indication of what the Roman intention 
was. After their tour, the Lentuli went to the Achaean assembly, 
where Livy tells us that the delegates were: 
Indignant that they, who had supplied every help to the 
Romans from the outbreak of the Macedonian war, and had 
in the war been enemies of Philip, should be on the same 
level as Messene and Elis, who had afterwards borne arms 
on the side of Antiochus against the Roman people. And 
having recently been attached to the Achaean league, were 
complaining that they were handed over to the victorious 
Achaeans as a prize of war. 31 
Gruen dismisses this episode as the Achaean league 
professing its loyalty with a display of petulance 32 Larsen took a 
more realistic view, suggesting that that the Romans were 
encouraging regionalism in the Achaean league ' He draws 
attention to the larger mission, which visited Epirus, Aetolia, 
Acarnania, and Boeotia that the Lentuli were detached from. In 
Boeotia, in response to a situation where some members of the 
Boeotian elite favoured allying with Perseus, the embassy 
'° Livy. 42.37.7. 
31 Lvy. 42.37.8-9. 
' Gruen (1984) p. 505 
-"Larsen (1968) p. 436. 
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exploited the differences within the Boeotian league, especially 
resentment at Theban dominance, declaring that: 
The Romans intended to give the individual cities a chance 
of deciding their own best interests. 34 
The visit of the Lentuli to Elis and Messene gives us some 
indication, both of the situation within the Achaean league, and 
Roman awareness of and exploitation of regional differences 
within the Greek world. Flamininus had awarded both of these 
states to the Achaean league during the Aetolian/Syrian War 
and Elis in particular had been a close Aetolian ally, both 
claiming kinship ties with the other. The visit by the Lentuli to 
these two states suggests that the Romans may have been 
concerned about the possibility that Arcadian poleis like 
Megalopolis might co-operate with Perseus, and sought to 
counteract this possibility by exploiting Messenian and Elean 
dissatisfaction at their membership of the Achaean league 
At the outbreak of war this mission was followed by 
another, which requested that the Achaean league send a 
thousand men to garrison Chalcis, a request that Archon agreed 
to ' It would appear that Lycortas and his supporters' attempt to 
renew links with Macedonia prior to the Third Macedonian War 
was viewed by the Romans with suspicion, hence the dispatch of 
' As Gruen (1984) p. 507 and 513 points out, when hostility arose, the reason for split 
within Boeotia was often hostility to Thebes rather than fidelity to Rome. 
Gruen (1984) p. 506-7 assumes that they only visited Elis and Messene. 
Polyb. 27.2.11-12. These troops were to hold this position until Roman forces arrived. 
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the Lentuli. But were these actions, especially the attempt to 
renew the alliance with Perseus, part of a wider anti-Roman plot, 
or were they instead motivated by the loss of Arcadian influence 
in the Peloponnese? Lycortas and his fellow Megalopolitans had 
dominated the Achaean league from the end of the Cleomenic 
War until Callicrates' embassy to Rome in 180BC and it would 
appear that even after Callicrates' mission that Megalopolitans 
retained an important position within the Achaean league. The 
events surrounding the restoration of the Spartan exiles had 
demonstrated to them that in future they would be subject to 
Rome. In this situation, Polybius and his fellow Megalopolitans 
may have regarded the possibility of a Macedonian revolt 
against Rome favourably, but were anxious to ensure that their 
own position remained intact. 
The Achaean league and the Third Macedonian War. 
This section will deal with the policy followed by the 
Achaean league during the Third Macedonian War, suggesting 
that the actions taken by Polybius during the war were 
sympathetic to Perseus. The Achaean league's neutrality during 
the conflict was due to a reluctance to identify openly with the 
Macedonian cause until it became apparent that Perseus had a 
chance of victory. It will consider the debate on Achaean policy 
that Polybius participated in before he assumed the office of 
Achaean hipparch in 170/169BC, over the policy the Achaean 
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league should follow during his term in office, along with 
Polybius' actions during his mission to Marcius Philippus in 
169BC. I will suggest that Polybius was sent to assess the 
situation with a view to supporting Perseus if the circumstances 
were right. Polybius' sixteen-year detention in Italy was 
therefore not solely the result of Callicrates' intrigues, but of his 
actions during this conflict. 
On the outbreak of war, the Achaean league remained 
neutral though a force of fifteen hundred archers was sent to 
assist the Romans 37 There was no declaration of war by the 
Achaean league against Perseus, unlike the situation in 192BC, 
when the Achaean league had been the first Greek State to 
declare war on Antiochus; its neutrality was undoubtedly a blow 
to Roman propaganda efforts. This might explain the subsequent 
mission of Gaius Popilius and Gnaeus Octavius soon 
afterwards 38 After visiting Thebes, they proceeded to the 
Peloponnese, touring the region in an attempt to gain support 
for Rome. 39 What is of more interest is their declaration, 
according to Polybius, in the various places they visited that: 
They knew who were those who were hanging back more 
than they ought, as well as who were the active and zealous 




men. It was evident that they were just as unpleased with 
the former as with their opponents. 40 
According to Polybius' account, there was a rumour that the 
envoys were intent on accusing Lycortas, Archon and Polybius 
of disloyalty and remaining inactive at the Achaean assembly 
because they were waiting to see who would emerge victorious. 
When they arrived at the Achaean assembly at Aegium the 
Roman envoys failed to make these accusations: Polybius stating 
that they had no reason to do so 41 
Would Lycortas and Polybius have supported the 
Macedonian cause simply because they wished to remove the 
Romans? Or rather was their primary concern to ensure that 
after the war, Megalopolitan interests in the Peloponnese were 
not affected detrimentally? The approach made by Perseus to the 
Achaean league in 175BC seems to have led the Romans to 
suspect that Arcadian communities like Megalopolis might 
declare their support for Perseus at a crucial point in the conflict. 
The envoy "! ý decision to visit" a number of poleis individually 
90 Polyb. 28.3.4. See Walbank (1979) p. 330. 
41 Polyb. 28.3.9-10. Errington (1969) p. 209-10 suggests that the intention was to curb any 
possible threat from the Achaean league, without making any accusation. Larsen (1968) 
p. 469 suggests that this was guesswork by Polybius. Larsen argued that although the 
Romans may have mentioned that there was a disloyal group within the Achaean 
league, they would not have mentioned Polybius by name, since it would be more 
effective to leave the threat hanging in the air. 
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suggests that they were trying to gauge the level of support for 
Rome amongst the various states in the Peloponnese. 
A clearer indication of Megalopolitan attitudes towards 
Rome can be seen in a meeting recorded by Polybius at the 
beginning of his term of office as hipparch, convened to discuss 
what policies should be followed by the Achaean league in the 
following year. Present at the meeting were Lycortas, Polybius, 
Arcesilias and Ariston of Megalopolis, Stratius of Tritaea, Xenon 
of Patrae and Apollonidas of Sicyon 42 According to Polybius, 
Lycortas argued that the Achaean league should remain neutral 
during the war, since were they to help Rome it would be: 
Disadvantageous to all the Greeks as he foresaw how very 
strong the victors in the war would be, while he thought it 
dangerous to act against Rome. 43 
Apollonidas and Stratius argued that neutrality should be 
maintained; though those who wished to assist the Romans 
should be prevented from doing so. Archon in reply suggested 
that the Achaean league should act: 
As circumstances enjoined, and neither give their enemies 
any pretext for accusing them, nor allow themselves to be 
reduced to the same state as Nicander, who, even before 
' Polyb. 28.6.1-9. Presumably the elected officials of the Achaean league. 
43 Polyb. 28.6.5. 
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he experienced the weight of Roman power, found himself 
in the utmost distress. ' 
It was Archon's view that prevailed. However, the decision 
to remain neutral was based on the understanding that the 
Achaean league should act as circumstances dictated, and this 
meeting came shortly after a number of victories by Perseus 45 
Polybius' subsequent embassy to the Roman consul Marcius 
Philippus in Thessaly, during the latter's preparation for the 
invasion of Macedonia, gives some indication of why this policy 
may have been viewed with suspicion by the Romans. Militarily 
the situation was undecided. Perseus' forces had gained a 
number of victories, having reached Stratus in Aetolia, where 
they were forced to retreat due to lack of support 46 Archon, the 
Achaean strategos, mobilised the Achaean league's army and 
instructed Polybius to offer its services to the Romans. 
According to Polybius, Archon had decided on the course of 
action, "to refute the suspicions and accusations of the Romans 
by positive actions" 47 
The Achaean embassy went to the Roman army that was 
encamped at Perrhaebia, between Azorium and Doliche, just as 
the Romans were about to cross Mt. Olympus 48 Here, Polybius 
" Polyb. 28.6.7-8. 
See Livy. 43.18.1-11. 
46Livy. 43.21.6. and 22.11. 
47Polyb. 28.12.1. 
48 Polyb. 28.13.1. The exact location is unknown, Walbank (1979) pp. 345-6. 
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decided that the Achaean league's offer of assistance should be 
delayed because of the critical state of affairs. He and his 
colleagues accompanied the Roman army during the invasion of 
Macedonia but did not approach Philippus to offer Achaean 
assistance until the Roman army had reached Heracleium on the 
river Apila 49 During this delay, a considerable time elapsed, and 
the campaign turned in Rome's favour 50 
Why did Polybius delay in telling Philippus about the 
Achaean offer? Walbank suggests that since the Achaean league 
was committed to co-operating with the Romans, the offer was 
made in the knowledge that it would not be accepted, thus 
creating an impression of loyalty. " He also suggests that it 
would have been fulfilled had it been accepted, but that Achaean 
forces would not have been useful to Rome. 2 Errington draws 
attention to the internal dimensions of the offer, pointing out 
that it stole Callicrates' thunder by demonstrating loyalty to 
Rome 53 Polybius did delay in making his offer for a considerable 
period. From his arrival at the Roman camp until he approached 
Philippus, a considerable time, which Polybius does not fully 
account for, elapsed. 
49 Polyb. 28.13.2. 
50 Walbank (1979) p. 343. 
51 Walbank (1979) p. 344. 
52 Walbank (1979) p. 344-5 
53 Errington (1969) p. 211. 
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Pedech suggests that Polybius had received secret orders 
from Archon, instructing him only to make the offer when the 
Romans were about to win. ' Walbank discounts this, suggesting 
that the offer was made in the knowledge it would be rejected. If 
this was the case, why was it not made when Polybius initially 
arrived at the Roman camp? If the intention was to create an 
impression of loyalty, surely an offer prior to the Roman 
invasion of Macedonia would have been more beneficial to the 
Achaean league in the post-war period. Why did Polybius wait 
until Perseus ordered that his treasury at Pella should be thrown 
into the sea and the dockyards at Thessalonica had been burnt? " 
Offering assistance at that point, especially when it could have 
been offered earlier, hardly seems likely to create an impression 
of loyalty. 
However, the Roman march into Macedonia was a gamble 
that was not assured of success. As Livy's narrative points out, 
the Romans took immense risks in using the route they took, and 
could have faced defeat. Perseus had also achieved a number of 
victories in Illyria prior to this 56 It is possible that Polybius 
delayed in making his offer of the Achaean league's forces until 
he could see that the Roman invasion of Macedonia would be 
successful. Had it failed he and his fellow Megalopolitans would 




have perhaps pushed for an alliance between the Achaean 
league and Macedonia, the foundation for which they had tried 
to build before the war. Previous Roman missions to the 
Peloponnese, especially their approach to Elis and Messene 
before the outbreak of war, seem to show that the Romans were 
aware of discontent at their presence in the Peloponnese, and 
sympathy for Macedonia. These missions appear to have been 
intended to exploit divisions between the various members of 
the Achaean league to counteract the danger posed by 
Megalopolitans like Polybius persuading the Achaean league to 
ally with Perseus at a crucial moment. Polybius' hesitancy in 
offering Achaean troops to assist Philippus' campaign in 
Macedonia may have confirmed the suspicions about the loyalty 
of Polybius and his fellow Megalopolitans that the Romans had 
before the war. 
When Polybius did eventually make his offer to Philippus, 
he was assured that the assistance of the Achaean league would 
not be necessary. The other ambassadors returned to the 
Peloponnese but Polybius remained with the Romans 57 
Eventually he was asked by Philippus to return to the 
Peloponnese when another Roman commander, Appius Centho 
requested that the Achaean league send five thousand troops to 
assist the Romans in Epirus 58 According to Polybius, Philippus 
'' Po1yb. 28.13.5-6. 
-" Polyb. 28.13.7. 
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asked him to oppose this move but at the debate in the Achaean 
assembly to approve this request Polybius made no mention of 
Philippus' request. There is the further problem of how 
Philippus knew about Centho's request for assistance 59 Walbank 
suggests that either Polybius opposed the move because of the 
links between the Achaean league and Epirus and blamed 
Philippus from malice, or that his silence indicates a reluctance 
to get involved in a quarrel between two Romans 60 Briscoe 
pointed out that Philippus may actually have wished to place the 
Achaean league in an awkward position since in 183BC he had 
told the senate that they should not assist the Achaean league in 
preventing Messene's defection 61 Polybius' delay in offering 
support for the Roman cause may have made the man who had 
earlier argued against assisting the Achaean league suspicious of 
Polybius' actions and motivation. It might be that Philippus' 
request was actually made not to keep Centho idle, but rather to 
negate the offer of Achaean troops made by Polybius 62 
Polybius' behaviour and caution should be seen in the 
context of internal Peloponnesian politics. Although 
Megalopolitans like Polybius may have favoured a Macedonia 
victory, their primary concern was to defend their local interests 
Walbank (1979) p. 346 suggests that Centho approached the Achaean assembly at 
Aegium directly. 
60 Walbank (1979) pp. 346-7. 
" Briscoe (1964) p. 70. Polyb. 23.9.4ff. See Gruen (1984) p. 509. 
bZ Polyb. 28.13.8. 
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in the Peloponnese. The Achaean league maintained its links 
with other Hellenistic states during the conflict, sending envoys 
to honour the coming of age of Ptolemy and to renew the 
Achaean league's alliance with Egypt in 169BC 63 
The renewal of this alliance led to an approach from Egypt 
in the winter of 169/168BC, requesting military assistance for the 
war against Antiochus IV and a debate in the Achaean assembly. 
Polybius and Lycortas supported the dispatch of Achaean forces 
to Egypt, while Callicrates opposed it. " The size of the force to be 
sent was not that large, consisting of two hundred cavalry and a 
thousand infantry commanded by Lycortas and Polybius 65 
Callicrates' objection was that Achaean troops should not be sent 
overseas at that point but should be retained in case the Romans 
needed them and also that since the war was none of the 
Achaean league's business it should not intervene. 
In reply, Polybius and Lycortas argued that the Roman had 
already claimed that they had no need for Achaean troops, and it 
was only a small part of the league's total force. The proposal to 
dispatch this force was just about to be accepted by the 
assembly, when a letter arrived from Philippus requesting that 
the Achaean league assist Rome in making peace between Syria 
and Egypt. An embassy was sent to accomplish this. " 
63 Polyb. 28.12.8-9. 
6' Polyb. 29.23.1. 
`3 Polyb. 29.23.5. 
66 Polyb. 29.25.7. 
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Callicrates' objection to this mission is not hard to 
understand. His objection on the grounds that forces be retained 
to assist Rome against Perseus does not mean that his policy was 
total co-operation with Rome; rather that he did not want to see 
his political foes get the credit for a successful campaign in 
Egypt. His argument was probably just an excuse 67 Philippus' 
role is more interesting. Walbank suggests that he was 
upholding senatorial policy, conveying the official Roman view 
as long as the Third Macedonian War was in progress. ' As the 
composition of the embassy shows, it heavily reflected Arcadian 
interests within the Achaean league, and in light of 
Philopoemen's efforts in 185BC to renew the alliance that the 
Achaean league had with Egypt, may have appeared detrimental 
to Roman interests. 
The Third Macedonian War ended in Roman victory and as 
Polybius initially devised his work, this was the point where 
Rome had completed its conquest of the known world. During 
the war, the Achaean league had remained neutral. Polybius 
along with other Megalopolitans appear to have favoured 
allying with Perseus prior to the war, and it would seem that 
their preferred outcome would have been a Macedonian victory. 
As for Callicrates, depicting him as pro-Roman or favourable 
' Gruen (1984) p. 510. Deininger (1971) p. 183 n. 34 suggests that Callicrates did favour 
total co-operation with Rome. 
' Walbank (1979) p. 402 accepted by Gruen (1984) p. 510. 
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towards Rome fails to take into account the situation in the 
Peloponnese. Just as Philopoemen's actions at Sparta had 
assisted the Romans at the outbreak of the Aetolian/Syrian War 
in 192BC, Callicrates seems to have realised that he could best 
advance the political interests of the region of the Peloponnese 
he represented by co-operating with Rome. Roman suspicion 
that Arcadian communities within the Achaean league were 
sympathetic to Perseus was evident, both before and during the 
Third Macedonian War; a suspicion that Callicrates appears to 
have used to gain an advantage over his rivals. 
ius' The aftermath of the Third Macedonian War and Polybius' 
detention. 
This section will deal with the aftermath of the Third 
Macedonian War, in particular the decision to detain Poybius as 
a hostage in Italy. I shall argue that the Romans took the decision 
to detain Polybius because of their belief that he had been 
disloyal during the war. Furthermore, that Polybius' decision to 
place the responsibility for his detention solely on Callicrates, 
was to show his readers the Achaean league's system of polity in 
decline due to anacyclosis' influence on its political institutions, 
resulting in a once virtuous democracy being dominated by 
corrupt and dishonest politicians like Callicrates. 
After the battle of Pydna, the victor, L. Aemilius Paullus, 
went on a trip around the Peloponnese, visiting Corinth, Sicyon, 
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Argos, Epidaurus, Sparta, Megalopolis and Olympia 69 The 
purpose of this trip appears to have been sightseeing, and 
according to Livy: 
He avoided any inquiry about the sentiments of individuals 
or states in regard to the war with Perseus, to avoid 
troubling the minds of allies with the apprehensions of any 
reprisals. " 
When he arrived in Amphipolis, Paullus was approached by 
a number of embassies, including one led by Callicrates. " 
According to Polybius, these groups all worked together for the 
same end, ridding themselves of their political opponents. 
Eventually the ten legates came to use these groups to relay their 
orders. ' However, the events surrounding Polybius' detention 
as a hostage are confused since his own account ends at a vital 
stage and instead we are left with Pausanias' account. 
According to Polybius, Callicrates approached Paullus at 
Amphipolis. However, he claims that because the Romans feared 
that the Achaean league would not believe Callicrates if they 
used him to relay their instructions, they sent two legates, Gaius 
Claudius Pulcher and Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus, to the 
69 Polyb. 30.10.3-6. 
70 Livy. 45.28.6. 
Polyb. 30.13.3-4. Along with Callicrates, embassies from Boeotia, Acarnania, Epirus and 
Aetolia approached Paullus. 
' Polyb. 30.13.6-7. 
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Achaean assembly. ' As Polybius' account suggests, the legates 
appear to have been sent to investigate correspondence between 
Perseus and the Achaean league, though he states that nothing 
had been found in the Macedonian archive that clearly 
implicated any Achaean. 74 Some evidence of correspondence 
between Perseus and the Achaean league was discovered and 
forwarded to the two legates, but at this point Polybius' account 
ends. 75 
Pausanias' account states that in the aftermath of the Third 
Macedonian War Callicrates approached the Roman commission 
sent to settle the affairs of Greece and became friendly with one 
of its members, described as dishonourable. ' This legate went to 
the Achaean assembly and asked that those who had helped 
Perseus be executed, along with all those who had held office 
during the period. Xenon, the Achaean strategos, objected, 
arguing that the Achaean league had been loyal to Rome; he 
offered that those accused be tried either before the Achaean 
assembly or in Rome. " The Roman, according to Pausanias: 
" Polyb. 30.13.8-11. Polybius states that these two legates were the two most senior of the 
ten. As Larsen pointed out, they were actually very junior in status, suggesting that 
Polybius was trying to inflate his own importance. Larsen (1968) p. 479 n. 3 followed by 
Walbank (1979) p. 436. 
'° Polyb. 30.13.8-11. 
75 Polyb. 30.13.11. 
76 Paus. 7.10.7. 
Paus. 7.10.9. 
335 
Took the pretext offered, and sent for trial before Roman 
courts all those whom Callicrates accused of supporting 
Perseus. 78 
How do we reconcile the two accounts? Firstly there is the 
question of Pausanias' accuracy. Pausanias was a travel writer, 
who included historical stories simply to enliven and illustrate 
his description of sites, since he assumed that his readers were 
familiar with what he was talking about 9 There is the question 
of whether he had read Polybius or not, a topic that divides 
scholars. According to Meadows, in Pausanias' account of the 
historiography of Sparta until the end of the reign of Cleomenes 
III, he appears to have had no knowledge of Polybius' writings, 
apparently using Aratus' Memoirs instead. 80 Meadows contends 
that a good deal of the history of the Achaean league recounted 
by Pausanias at the beginning of book seven clearly did not 
derive from Polybius 81 Habicht opposes the view that Pausanias 
was ignorant of Polybius' writings, pointing out that Pausanias' 
interest in Greek history stops in 146BC, the point that Polybius 
chose to end his histories, suggesting that he was familiar with 
Polybius' works. 82 Pausanias' emphasis on Callicrates' corruption 
and dishonest nature seems to be in line with Polybius' depiction 
" Paus. 7.10.10. 
7 'Habicht (1985) pp. 96-7. 
80 Meadows (1995) p. 113. 
81 Meadows (1995) p. 101 n. 47. 
eZ Habicht (1985) p. 102. 
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of political leaders who dominate a democracy at the end of the 
process of anacyclosis. 
In some respects, the question is not whether Pausanias read 
Polybius but whether he understood him 83 The offer made by 
the Roman legate in Pausanias' account, offering a trial in Rome 
or in Achaea, reflects legal practice in the second century AD, the 
time when Pausanias was writing, where, as Roman citizens, the 
accused would have had this option. Although Polybius records 
an embassy sent to Rome asking for the recall of the hostages, it 
appears that the senate believed that the detainees had already 
been tried ' The purpose of this embassy seems to have been to 
get clarification of the legal position, the envoys offering to 
undertake an inquiry into the detainees' actions and to punish 
those found guilty on Rome's behalf. ' 
Again one must remember the situation in the Peloponnese, 
and the competing interests of the various ethnic groups within 
it. Polybius might have been correct in asserting that Callicrates 
assisted the Romans and probably did denounce him. Given his 
earlier actions, it would appear that the Romans took the 
decision to remove Polybius and the other hostages to Italy 
because they had been sympathetic to Perseus' cause. In the 
aftermath of the Third Macedonian War the Romans punished 
83 Habicht (1985) p. 98 points out that Pausanias was probably writing from memory, 




any sort of indiscretion that occurred during the conflict. 
Compared to events in Aetolia where thousands were 
massacred, their actions in the Peloponnese were comparatively 
restrained 86 As for Polybius placing the blame for his detention 
on Callicrates, it was his intention to show Achaean democracy 
gradually descending into chaos and anarchy through the 
workings of anacyclosis. Callicrates' dishonest and corrupt 
behaviour, along with that of the Roman legate who assisted 
him, present in Pausanias' account, would seem to suggest that 
possibly Polybius' account of his own exile was a continuation of 
this theme. 
Callicrates' probable denunciation of Polybius and others 
does not necessarily imply that the Romans were favouring a 
pro-Roman elite within the Achaean league. The fact that four 
embassies were dispatched from the Achaean league asking for 
the release of the detainees would seem to suggest otherwise 87 If 
Callicrates played a role in Polybius' detention, it was probably 
only to confirm suspicions that the Romans already held. 
Internal Achaean politics 167-147BC. 
While the hostages were being kept in Rome, Callicrates 
appears to have been neither slavishly pro-Roman, nor in 
8` See Livy. 45.28.7. for the massacre. Gruen (1984) p. 515 draws attention to the 
endorsement given to this act by Paullus. 
" Walbank (1979) p. 455 states that if Callicrates was left in complete control, then the 
dispatch of these embassies is "strange". See also Larsen (1968) p. 483-4. 
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complete command of the Achaean league; Megalopolitans such 
as Thearidas, Polybius' brother, remained politically important. " 
It would appear that regional tensions remained between the 
various members of the Achaean league, and in 164BC a 
boundary dispute arose between Sparta and Megalopolis. It 
appears that both sides appealed to Rome, seeing as a mission 
sent to the east, led by Gaius Sulpicius Gallus and Manius 
Sergius, was ordered to resolve the dispute. At this point 
Polybius' account ends, and Pausanias continues the narrative. 
This presents a problem, in that Pausanias states that the dispute 
was between Argos and Sparta 89 Pausanias appears to have 
either confused Argos with Megalopolis, or possibly there was 
another boundary dispute 9° Pausanias, presumably following 
Polybius, depicts Gallus' intervention as arrogant; stating that 
after insulting those involved he ordered Callicrates to resolve 
the problem 91 Then, according to Pausanias, Gallus approached 
the Aetolians at Pleuron who were members of the Achaean 
league but wished to leave. He ordered them to send an embassy 
to Rome where permission was granted 92 The senate then 
" Polyb. 32.7.1. SIG' 626 states that he was from Megalopolis and had a father called 
Lycortas and a brother called Polybius. 
89 Paus. 7.11.1-2. 
Walbank (1979) p. 465 opposes the suggestion that there were two disputes. 
" Paus-7.12.1. 
'Z Paus. 7.12.3. 
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proceeded to order Gallus to separate as many states as he could 
from the Achaean league. 93 
How accurate is Pausanias' account? Gruen argues that the 
transfer of the boundary dispute to Callicrates was standard 
Roman practice, and that the reference in Pausanias to Gallus' 
arrogant behaviour was derived from Polybius who hated him 94 
A fragmentary inscription from Olympia suggests, according to 
Gruen, that an Achaean arbitration board gave the ultimate 
decision, and that the Romans merely affirmed an earlier Greek 
decision 95 As for the allegations about Pleuron and the 
dismemberment of the Achaean league, Gruen denies this 
actually happened, suggesting that Gallus would have had no 
desire to prolong his stay in the Peloponnese, since the main 
thrust of his mission was an investigation of the affairs of 
Eumenes and Antiochus 96 Gruen suggests that Pausanias 
muddled his facts and anticipated events twenty years in the 
future 97 
This criticism lacks conviction; though confused, possibly 
because he was writing from memory, it appears that Pausanias 
derived his account of this mission from Polybius. The 
instructions given to Gallus by the senate before he set out on his 
93 Paus-7.12.3. 
94 Gruen (1976) p. 50 
" SIG' 665 lines 42-50. 
Polyb. 31.1.6-8. 
Gruen (1976) p. 51. 
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mission were to inquire diligently into the actions of Antiochus 
and Eumenes in case they were making any preparations to 
attack Rome in concert 98 Gallus' actions in the Peloponnese 
suggest that the Romans were concerned that elements in the 
Achaean league would assist in a new challenge to Rome's 
position, and that he was sent to assess the situation. At the very 
least his actions would seem to suggest that the situation in the 
Peloponnese was unsettled. 
The origin of the Achaean War itself came in 150BC, when 
Sparta attempted to leave the Achaean league. What type of 
society Sparta had at this time is open to question, " The problem 
is that virtually nothing is known about Sparta's membership of 
the Achaean league between 180 and 15OBC. The fact that a 
Spartan, Menalcides, was elected Achaean strategos, seems to 
suggest that some members of the Spartan elite had reconciled 
themselves to Sparta's membership of the Achaean league. 10° 
Despite this, it appears that a desire to regain Spartan 
independence remained. 
According to Pausanias, Menalcidas, during his term as 
Achaean strategos, was bribed by the Oropians to secure his 
assistance in a dispute they were having with the Athenians. 
Menalcidas in turn offered Callicrates half of the bribe to secure 
" Polyb. 31.1.8. 
Shi iron (1972) p. 130 suggests that at this time the socio-economic question in Sparta 
was no different from elsewhere in Greece, and indeed may have been less serious. 
'0° Shimron (1972) p. 131/132. 
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his assistance in securing an outcome that was favourable to the 
Oropians. '°' When the dispute was resolved, Menalcidas refused 
to give Callicrates his share of the money. Callicrates in 
retaliation accused Menalcidas of attempting to detach Sparta 
from the Achaean league when the latter was on an embassy to 
Rome, a capital charge 102 So that he would not be brought to trial 
to face this charge, Menalcidas bribed the new Achaean strategos, 
Diaeus of Megalopolis, to prevent Callicrates taking action 
against him. However, Diaeus was concerned that he would 
appear corrupt for accepting a bribe from Menalcidas. According 
to Pausanias, Diaeus started a boundary dispute with Sparta to 
divert attention away from his own corruption. 
It is unlikely that there was any truth behind these 
allegations. Pausanias undoubtedly drew this information from 
Polybius, who wished to emphasise the corrupt nature of the 
Achaean leadership, so that he could instruct his readers about 
the affect that anacyclosis was having on the Achaean league's 
system of government. Accepting that there was a dispute 
within the Achaean elite that was not caused by corruption, why 
did this crisis spiral out of control? Though it may be tempting to 
see it as a local squabble, the situation in Macedonia had been 
disturbed by the rise of Andriscus, a pretender to the Antigonid 
'01 Paus. 7.12.1-4. 
102 Paus. 7.12.2. 
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throne, and may explain both the subsequent actions of the 
Achaean leadership and the harshness of the Roman reaction "' 
The Roman response to Andriscus' revolt was to send Scipio 
Nasica to investigate 104 Prior to Scipio's arrival, the Thessalians 
had appealed to the Achaean league for assistance when 
Andriscus attacked them. 10' Scipio took command of the Greek 
forces and drove Andriscus out of Thessaly. However, 
Andriscus remained in control of Macedonia, so a Praetor, 
Publius Juventius, was sent along with a legion to bring the 
situation under control, but was defeated. 106 Andriscus then re- 
invaded Thessaly, and the revolt became a serious threat to the 
Rome's position, especially since Andriscus enjoyed widespread 
popular support, Polybius stating that the people fought for him 
with greater enthusiasm then they had fought for the real 
Antigonid kings. 107 As a result, in 148BC, Q. Caecilius Metellus 
was sent to crush the revolt l08 
Events in Macedonia are important for understanding the 
background to the Achaean War. Simultaneous trouble in 
Macedonia and the Peloponnese may have raised Roman fears 
about the possibility that Diaeus would renew the traditional ties 
103 Po1yb. 36.10.1-7. 
'04 Zonaras 9.28. See Larsen (1968) p. 488. 
Po1yb. 36.10.6. 
'06 Florus. I. 30.5. 
'°' Polyb. 36.17.14. 
'08 Zonarus 9.28. 
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that Megalopolis had with Macedonia. Although the Achaean 
league had earlier provided assistance against Andriscus, after 
he had defeated a legion, Greeks like Diaeus may have felt that 
the time had come for a revolt against Roman domination. 
It would appear that it was Andriscus' revolt rather than 
base corruption that caused divisions within the Achaean elite. 
The three politicians involved all had different interests. 
Menalcidas was concerned with detaching Sparta from the 
Achaean league and restoring its independence, and had 
powerful Roman allies. When Menalcidas was imprisoned in 
Alexandria in 168BC, he was freed after the intervention of Gaius 
Popilius. l°9 Diaeus represented the traditional anti-Spartan view 
held by Megalopolitans. As a grandson of Diophanes, a rival of 
Philopoemen, he was bound to get an unfavourable reaction 
from Polybius 110 With the outbreak of Andriscus' revolt, Diaeus 
may have felt that it was possible to humiliate Sparta by 
overturning Callicrates' settlement, gaining the prestige that his 
family had lost to Philopoemen in 191BC. Callicrates probably 
wished to retain the settlement that he had implemented at 
2 
Sparta in 180/179BC. 
Thus, when Callicrates did bring capital charges against 
Menalcidas, they had nothing to do with bribery; rather they 
109 Larsen (1968) p. 490. 
"o Gruen (1976) p. 54. The two are linked by the fact that Diophanes was a son of Diaeus. 
At the very least they came from the same family. 
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were probably brought because Sparta was trying to secede from 
the Achaean league. Shortly afterwards, Diaeus assumed the 
office of Achaean strategos, and the Spartans appealed to the 
senate over the territory disputed between itself and 
Megalopolis. The reply from the senate was that Achaean courts 
should try all but capital cases. "' The interpretation placed on 
this statement by Diaeus was that: 
The senate had committed to them the right to condemn a 
Spartan to death. 
"' 
Diaeus presented the Spartans with a list of twenty-four 
men whom he claimed had disturbed the peace. His intention in 
doing so was to gain a pretext for war, since he simultaneously 
mobilised the Achaean league's army. '13 The Spartans, realising 
that they could not get a fair trial, appealed to Rome, and the 
Achaean league sent Diaeus and Callicrates in response, though 
Callicrates died on the way to Rome. "' The senate was faced 
with a return to the situation that had prevailed in the 190s BC, 
when it had found it necessary to curb Megalopolitan power 
over the Achaean league. Therefore, they needed to carefully 
consider the situation before sending the delegation they 
Paus. 7.12.4. 
112 Paus. 7.12.4. 
113 Paus. 7.12.6-7. 
14 Paus. 7.12.8. "I do not know that he would have been of any assistance to the 
Achaeans; perhaps he would have been the cause of greater trouble". 
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promised both sides115 Diaeus, already aware of Andriscus' 
revolt in Macedonia, probably heard that the Romans had been 
defeated by Andriscus while in Rome, which may have 
prompted him to believe, that the Romans would be occupied 
with events in Macedonia, and would ignore events in the 
Peloponnese. 
As a result, when Diaeus returned to the Peloponnese and 
approached the Achaean assembly, according to Pausanias he: 
Misled the Achaeans into the belief that the Roman senate 
had decreed the complete subjection to them of the 
Lacedaemonians. 16 
On the other hand, Menalcidas told the Spartans that the 
Romans had entirely freed them from the Achaean league. "" 
Which one was telling the, truth? Gruen argues that it was 
yet another case of the Romans giving non-committal answers 
out of indifference. "' Harris on the other hand suggested that the 
confusion was intentional. "' Menalcidas would hardly have said 
what he did, unless the senate had said, or implied, Sparta 
would be allowed to leave the Achaean league. It is clear that by 
this stage the senate had decided that events in the Peloponnese 
needed to be resolved. The reason that it delayed the dispatch of 
75 Paus. 7.12.9. 
116 Paus. 7.12.9. 
117 Paus. 7.12.9. 
1e Gruen (1976) p. 56. 
"9 Harris (1979) p. 243. 
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the mission that they promised, and the contradictory answers 
given to both the Spartan and Achaean representatives may have 
been intended to prevent the Achaean league from sending aid 
to Andriscus. 120 
In the meantime, the Achaean league, encouraged by Diaeus 
and the new strategos, Damocritus of Megalopolis, went to war 
with Sparta 121. Metellus, the Roman commander in Macedonia 
asked a Roman embassy on its way to the east to stop off in the 
Peloponnese and request that the Achaean league refrain from 
attacking Sparta until the promised embassy from the senate 
arrived. " The Achaean league ignored this request; Damocritus 
continued his attacks, quickly defeating the Spartans, though he 
failed to capture the actual city, confining his forces to 
plundering the surrounding countryside. ' Damocritus was 
fined fifty talents for his failure to capture Sparta, and being 
unable to pay, was driven into exile, Diaeus replacing him as 
strategos. 124 
Metellus sent another embassy, requesting that the Achaean 
league refrain from further action against Sparta until the 
120 Morgan (1969) p. 434. 
Paus. 7.13.1. 
Paus. 7.13.2. Gruen (1976) p. 56 suggests that Metellus did not want any further trouble 
in Greece while the situation in Macedonia was unsettled. 
Paus. 7.13.3-4. 
Paus. 7.13.5. If for any reason a strategos was unable to finish his term in office; the 
previous holder regained it. 
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promised embassy from the senate arrived. Diaeus agreed to this 
request, but garrisoned the surrounding towns in the hope of 
provoking a Spartan response. ' Menalcidas fell into this trap by 
attacking the town of Iasus, thus restarting the war. "' The 
Spartans were completely defeated and turned on Menalcidas, 
who was forced to commit suicide. 127 
The background to the Achaean War is important as it gives 
us some indication of why the Romans may have decided that it 
was necessary to undertake a campaign against the Achaean 
league. Although Callicrates' death and the return of the 
hostages from Rome may have caused this dispute, the 
emergence of a new generation within Megalopolis' political 
elite and their traditional hostility towards Sparta was probably 
responsible. Megalopolis and presumably other Arcadian Poleis 
had remained politically important within the structures of the 
Achaean league, and in the context of Andriscus' revolt, a fear 
that events there would spread to the Peloponnese must have 
been a cause of concern to the senate. Despite Roman requests 
for restraint, Megalopolitans like Diaeus and Damocritus had 
provoked conflict with Sparta, and the sight of Greek states 
acting in accordance with their local interests and attempting to 
change the situation in the Peloponnese was provocative. 
'u Paus. 7.13.6. 
" Paus. 7.13.7. This town is otherwise unknown, see Frazer (1898) p. 134. 
'27 Paus. 7.13.8. 
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Realising that they could no longer control the Peloponnese by 
proxy the Romans decided to intervene, at the same time turning 
Macedonia into a province. The result was the embassy of L. 
Aurelius Orestes. 
Orestes' embassy 147BC. 
The senate had originally promised this embassy in 149BC, 
so when it did eventually arrive there had been a delay of two 
years 128 According to Pausanias, when Orestes arrived in 
Corinth, he asked Diaeus and the magistrates of all the poleis 
who were members of the Achaean league to meet him at his 
lodgings. There, he told them the senate had decreed that: 
Neither the Lacedaemonians nor yet Corinth itself should 
belong to the Achaean league, and that Argos, Heracleia by 
Mt. Otea and the Arcadian Orchomenus should be released 
from the Achaean league. 129 
The reason he gave for this decision was that these poleis 
were not originally Achaean. According to Pausanias, this 
statement caused outrage, provoking an attack on all the 
Spartans present, even those who took refuge in Orestes' 
lodgings 130 Polybius tells us that when Orestes returned to Rome 
' Gruen (1976) p. 58-9 blames this on a lack of direction in senatorial policy. Morgan 
argued that the delay was due to the situation in Macedonia, the Romans delaying the 
dispatch of this mission until the situation there was under control. 
Paus. 7.14.1. 
10 Paus. 7.14.2-3. 
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he informed the senate that he and his colleague's lives had been 
in danger. "' Polybius accuses Orestes of exaggerating the 
danger, though the Achaean league did feel it necessary to 
dispatch an embassy to apologise 132 
There are similarities between Orestes' request and Roman 
demands at the beginning of the Third Punic War. Before 
hostilities broke out, the Carthaginians were asked to destroy 
their city and move to another site ten miles inland. ' This 
request was impossible for them to accept, so they chose war 1 
The order given by Orestes seems to have been intended to 
provoke a similar reaction. The removal of the poleis listed would 
in reality have destroyed the Achaean league. Nor is there any 
evidence that any of them, apart from Sparta, wished to leave the 
Achaean league 1 Justin states that the embassy was given secret 
orders before it left Rome to break up the Achaean league, since 
the Romans were looking for an excuse to provoke war. ' 
Although Polybius claims that the reason for the mission was to 
merely to scare the league into submission, Walbank dismisses 
this view as patently unconvincing, arguing that the Romans 
131 Polyb. 38.9.1. 
'32 Paus. 7.14.3 and Polyb. 38.10.1-2. 
"' Dio. 32.6.3. 
Harris (1979) pp. 234-40. 
' Morgan (1969) p. 435-6. 
'ý` Justin 34.1.1-5. 
350 
intended to provoke war. 137 Justin claims that such was the rage 
of the crowd: 
That they would even have killed the ambassadors of Rome 
themselves, had not the latter fled in panic when they heard 
the uproar begin. "' 
The senate had got the reaction that it wanted. Despite this, 
war was not immediately declared. Dio suggests that Orestes' 
embassy was intended to weaken the Achaean league, and it 
probably did cause splits. 139 Diaeus was determined on war; 
other Achaean politicians made moves towards conciliation. An 
embassy led by Thearidas, Polybius' brother, was sent to 
apologise: 4° With the revolt in Macedonia over, some Achaean 
politicians probably realised that the Romans would act harshly, 
and sought to minimise the damage that could be caused. As 
Morgan pointed out, there was no possible reason for sending 
Orestes' mission except to break up the Achaean league, 
although the Romans probably did not expect such a violent 
reaction to their message. 14' Therefore, a second embassy led by 
Sextus Julius Caesar was sent, and according to Polybius, was 
instructed by the senate to: 
"7 Polyb. 38.9.6. Walbank (1979) p. 700. Gruen (1976) p. 60. 
Justin 34.1.9. 
Dio. Fr. 72.1. 
140 Po1yb. 38.10.1-2. Paus. 7.14.3. See Briscoe (1974) p. 70 
191 Morgan (1969) p. 437. 
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Administer a mild censure for what had taken place, and 
then to beg and instruct the Achaeans not to give further 
heed in future to those who urged them to the worst 
courses. 142 
Polybius states that this was manifest proof that the senate 
did not want to dissolve the Achaean league. Since the senate 
made no mention of reversing the terms offered by Orestes, it 
must be assumed that they were still intent on dissolving the 
Achaean league. 143 As Polybius admitted, some Achaeans 
believed that Caesar had been sent because: 
The Romans were playing false, as the fate of Carthage was 
undecided. This however was not the fact... they thought it 
fit to alarm the Achaeans and curb their undue arrogance, 
but by no means wished to go to war with them or proceed 
to an absolute breech. '" 
Caesar's embassy 147BC. 
Caesar met Thearidas on the way to Rome, and persuaded 
him to accompany the Roman mission to the Achaean assembly 
at Aegium where, according to Polybius' account, Caesar barely 
mentioned the earlier mistreatment of Orestes' mission. 145 
According to Polybius' account, the delegates were divided into 
'"' Polyb. 38.9.4. 
Larsen (1968) p. 493 and Walbank (1979) p. 700 - 
'"" Polybius states that this assertion was untrue. Polyb. 38.9.7 
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three groups, all with differing opinions over what to do. One 
grouping appears to have been willing to compromise; their 
stated motivation in accepting the Roman offer was that they 
had before them the fate that awaited those who opposed 
Rome. 146 Along with this group, there were those who Polybius 
describes as the majority. He describes them as having: 
Nothing to say against the just strictness of Sextus, and 
being obliged to keep silent, yet they remained ill 
conditioned and demoralised. "' 
The last group was composed of Diaeus and Critolaus' 
supporters. According to Polybius they were: 
A deliberate selection from each polis of the worst men, the 
most wretched and the greatest corrupters of the league. "' 
Critolaus was the new strategos, having replaced Diaeus 
shortly beforehand. "' It would appear that the discontent 
amongst the delegates was not due to socio-economic problems, 
but rather that that they felt it was the opportune moment to act 
against Rome. Just as Diaeus' earlier actions may have been 
influenced by the revolt in Macedonia, according to Polybius, 
this group felt that: 
145 Polyb. 38.10.3. 
'46Polyb. 38.10.6. 
147 Polyb. 38.10.7. Fuks (1970) p. 85 argues that these men were the lower class supporters 
of Diaeus and Critolaus. 
'48Polyb. 38.10.8. 
'49 Walbank (1979) p. 701. 
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The Romans, owing to their campaigns in Africa and Spain 
were afraid of a war with the Achaeans, and consequently 
tolerated everything and were ready to say anything. 15° 
This grouping requested that a new meeting should be held 
at Tegea, at which the Spartans could be present. 15' The meeting 
was a disaster since the Achaeans under Critolaus failed to turn 
up, with Critolaus announcing in response to the Roman envoys 
that he was: 
Not empowered to arrange anything without taking the 
opinion of the people, but that he would refer the matter to 
the next assembly that was to meet in six months. 152 
His intention seems to have been to insult the Romans, and 
this move made war inevitable153 Gruen suggests that Critolaus 
asked the Achaeans not to attend because he feared renewed 
mob violence. l" This appears doubtful; Megalopolitan politicians 
like Critolaus and Diaeus appear to have been determined to 
force an internal solution to Sparta's membership of the Achaean 
league without reference to Roman interests. The fact that the 
Romans were engaged in the Third Punic War, as well as in 
Spain, may have encouraged them to believe that they would be 
unable to intervene in the Peloponnese. Along with this, the 
150 Polyb. 38.10.10 
15' Polyb. 38.10.12. 
'52 Polyb. 38.11.7. 
153 Larsen (1968) p. 493. 
"4 Gruen (1976) p. 63. 
354 
situation in Macedonia was tense since Andriscus had only 
recently been defeated and another pretender may possibly have 
emerged. "' In the light of the links between Megalopolis and 
Macedonia, along with the popularity that Andriscus' revolt had 
enjoyed, Critolaus may have felt that the time was ripe for a 
revolt against Rome. 
Caesar returned to Rome, reporting Critolaus' behaviour to 
the senate, stating that the latter had: 
Acted in a wrong-headed way and like a madman. 
156 
Critolaus then toured the Peloponnese, informing the 
people of what had happened at Tegea and, according to 
Polybius: 
Accused the Romans and gave the worst sense to all that 
they had said. 
157 
Socio-economic issues and the Achaean War. 
It is this tour that has led some to suggest that the Achaean 
War was actually a social revolt. Fuks identified four areas that 
might be taken as evidence to suggest that the war was a revolt 
by the lower classes against the Romans and their upper-class 
allies. In particular he draws attention to the measures taken by 
Zonaras. 9.28.9. Morgan (1969) pp. 430-33. 
Polyb. 38.11.6. Erskine (1990) p. 200, discussing madness in Polybius, argued that 
Polybius believed at this point that it was madness for the Achaeans to revolt after the 
Romans had brought peace and order to Greece. 
157Polyb. 37.11.7-9. 
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the Achaean league regarding the cancellation of debt, the 
freeing of slaves and the financing of the war effort by the 
league's elite along with Polybius' depiction of the supporters of 
the Achaean leadership 158 
Turning towards the first area identified by Fuks, when 
touring the Peloponnese, Polybius reports that: 
He (Critolaus) advised the magistrates not to exact 
payments from debtors or to admit into prisons those 
arrested for debt, and also to make the enforced 
contributions permanent; until the war was decided. "' 
Polybius seems to be trying to create impression that these 
were private instructions from Critolaus to the local 
magistrates 160 As Fuks pointed out, this was an official decision 
by the league, local officials were not to take into prison private 
debtors, and loans raised by consortiums for individuals were to 
be suspended for the duration of the war. This would seem to 
suggest that this policy was carefully devised not to disturb the 
social order since neither capital nor interest was to be touched. "' 
These measures were only to last for the duration of the war. 162 
" Fuks (1970) pp. 78-89. Shimron (1972) p. 133 suggests that it is ironic that by 146BC the 
Achaeans are the radicals and the Spartans the conservatives. 
Polyb38.11.10. 
160 Fuks (1970) p. 80. 
Fuks (1970) see also Walbank (1979) pp. 702-3 and Briscoe (1974) p. 70. 
'62 Fuks (1970) p. 81. 
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The second area, the freeing of slaves, should be seen in 
terms of military necessity at a time of extreme crisis. After the 
Achaean army had been virtually been wiped out, Diaeus 
ordered that: 
All the poleis should set free twelve thousand of such of their 
home-born and homebred slaves as were in the prime of life 
and after arming them, send them to Corinth. 163 
Again Fuks points out that the intention was defensive. The 
fact that these slaves had to be home-born and bred suggests that 
they were as close as possible to free citizens. '' The financial 
effort of the Achaean elite is also easily explained. According to 
Polybius, Diaeus: 
Saw that the public exchequers were very badly off in 
consequence of the war with Sparta, he compelled them to 
make also special calls and to exact contributions from the 
wealthier inhabitants, not only from the men, but from 
women also. 
165 
Fuks points to an inscription from Troizen, which illustrates 
that these measures were undertaken to aid the league, not as 
part of any social reform. " Such was the enthusiastic response to 
these measures, that according to Polybius: 
' Po1yb. 39.15.3-5. 
16° Fuks (1970) pp. 81-2. 
165 Po1yb. 38.15.6. 
" IG W. 757. Fuks (1970) p. 83. 
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The women, stripping themselves and their children of their 
jewellery, had to contribute to this, almost as of a set 
purpose, to a fund that could only bring destruction on 
them. "' 
Fuks suggests that this was voluntary on the part of the 
women and shows their commitment to the war effort. 16' As for 
the supporters of the Achaean leadership, from Polybius' 
depiction of them it has been assumed that Diaeus and Critolaus' 
supporters were from the lower classes 169 According to Fuks, the 
key passage is Polybius' depiction of the crowd at the Achaean 
assembly, where he says that: 
Never had there been collected such a pack of artisans and 
common men. 170 
Fuks suggests that this passage demonstrated that the 
Achaean leadership were supported by the lower classes, which 
hoped for social and economic advances from the war. " Why 
Diaeus would have desired to see the lower classes take control 
over the Achaean league is left unsaid. As he was presumably a 
man of property himself, there was no reason for him to hope for 
167 Po1yb. 38.15.11. 
" Fuks (1970) p p. 83-84. Walbank (1979) p. 712 agrees that it may be voluntary, but adds 
that since Polybius mention it in the context of official pressure, that it may mean that 
the women had to sell their jewels in order to meet the official assessment. 
" 69 Fuks (1970) p. 84. 
10 Polyb. 38.12.5. 
" Fuks (1970). 85-6. 
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social upheaval. Although the leaders of revolutionary 
movements are often members of the elite, it does not appear 
that Diaeus was concerned with undertaking a socio-economic 
revolution. 
The Achaean War 146BC 
After the Achaeans had rejected the last chance offered to 
them by Caesar's embassy the senate responded by sending the 
consul elected for that year, Mummius, with a fleet and an army 
to the Peloponnese. " 
Despite the preparations for war by both sides, Metellus 
sent four legates to the Achaean assembly at Corinth since, 
according to Pausanias, he hoped to win the war without any 
assistance. " Critolaus had already toured the Peloponnese, 
stirring up the people there. Thus, when Metellus' legates 
arrived in Corinth they received a hostile reception. '74 Which 
group encouraged Metellus' belief that there was a peace party is 
unknown. Stratius, the only detainee known by name apart from 
Polybius admitted to being in contact with these legates, along 
with Euagoras of Aegium 175 According to Polybius, Critolaus 
stated that: 
'n Paus. 7.15.11. 
173 Polyb. 38.12.1. According to Paus. 7.15.2. at the same time he led his army down to the 
Gulf of Lan-da 
14 Po1yb. 38.12.4. 
"3 Polyb. 38.13.4.. 
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We should not so much fear the Spartans or the Romans, as 
those among ourselves who are co-operating with the 
enemy. " 
Critolaus persuaded the Achaean assembly to declare war 
on Sparta, though as Polybius says it was in reality a declaration 
of war against Rome. " Metellus had already led his army 
towards the Peloponnese while the legates were in Corinth, so 
strategic surprise by the Achaeans was impossible. Critolaus 
seemed aware that the Romans had usually advanced into 
Greece by land so he sent the league's army to Heraclea, which 
was trying to cede from the league. "" Metellus surprised it, and 
the Achaean army was forced to retreat 179 Metellus pursued the 
retreating Achaean army to Scarphelia, where he destroyed it. 
Critolaus disappeared after the battle, Pausanias stating that his 
body was never found; though it probably fell into the nearby 
marshes l80 
Diaeus replaced him as strategos. With the league's army 
gone Diaeus was forced to recruit slaves. 18' This gave him 
fourteen thousand men, four thousand of whom he sent to 
Polyb. 38.13.3. 
"' Po1yb. 38.13.6. 
"8 Larsen (1968) p. 495 postulates that its proximity to Thermopylae suggests that the 
Achaean league thought that if it could hold this position against Metellus it might have 
a chance. 
Paus. 7.15.3. 
'ý° Paus. 7.15.4. 
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Megara to defend the Isthmus. The Achaean army was forced 
back to Corinth when the Romans approached. "' 
Metellus then offered the Achaean league a chance to 
surrender before Mummius' arrival, possibly because he wanted 
the credit for this campaign. 183 Andronidas, a supporter of 
Callicrates, was sent to negotiate, and returned with terms 
which, we are informed by Polybius, Stratius a former Roman 
detainee begged Diaeus to accept, being supported by the 
hypostrategos Sosicrates, who was tortured for suggesting 
surrender. Diaeus decided to fight on. ' 
With Mummius' arrival, Metellus retired to Macedonia 1" A 
battle was fought on the Isthmus where the Achaean army was 
completely defeated 186 Diaeus fled to Megalopolis, where he 
killed his wife and committed suicide 187 Corinth was left 
undefended, most of its inhabitants fleeing in terror. After 
waiting three days, Mummius stormed the city, razing it to the 
ground and looting a large number of works of art in the 
process. 188 
1e' Polyb. 38.15.1. Paus. 7.15.7. 
'$Z Paus. 7.15.10. 
'.. Paus. 7.15.11. 
"` Polyb. 38.17.1-18.1. 
"" Paus. 7.16.1. describes Mummius' force, which also contained Greek contingents. 
'88 Paus. 7.16.3. 
187 Paus. 7.16.6. 
Polyb. 39.22, Paus. 7.16.7-9, Justin 34.6, Livy Epit 42. The destruction of Corinth is a 
famous episode, though why the Romans chose Corinth in particular for punishment, 
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Polybius, tarache and anacyclosis. The Achaean league and 
the Peloponnese after 146BC. 
What happened in the Peloponnese after 146BC is virtually 
unknown. Polybius tells us that the Romans sent out ten 
commissioners to settle the region and that he was asked to help 
them on his return from Carthage. "' Pausanias states that a 
tribute was imposed on Greece and that all the federal leagues 
were abolished for a short time, although they were quickly 
restored. However, they were not restored on the model that had 
existed before 146BC. As Pausanias states: 
Down to my day a Roman governor has been sent to the 
country. "' 
Apart from this passage very little is known about the 
Peloponnese until Mithridates' invasion. Polybius, by his own 
admission, helped the Romans in their settlement of the 
especially as the leaders of the revolt were all Megalopolitans, is unknown. Possibly its 
position on the Isthmus, linking the Peloponnese with the rest of Greece, indicates that it 
was intended to serve as a warning to the Greeks as to what fate befell those who 
rebelled against Rome. Purcell (1995) p. 138 draws attention to the connections between 
the sack of Corinth and Carthage, and mentions the claim in the Aeneid that the sack of 
Corinth was Rome's revenge for the sack of Troy. 
Strabo 10.486 states that Delos, an important centre for Roman negotiatores, benefited 
from Corinth's destruction and it has been plausibly suggested that they may have 
exercised some influence in the decision to destroy it. See Harris (1979) pp. 98-99. 
189 Polyb. 39.4-5. 
190 Paus. 7.16.9-10. 
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Peloponnese after the Achaean War. Polybius' co-operation with 
the Roman settlement, his critical attitude towards the leadership 
of the Achaean league, along with his emphasis on the madness 
and irrationality of the mob at the Achaean assembly, has led to 
an assumption that Corinth's destruction changed his attitude 
towards Rome's presence in Greece into acceptance. 
However, one of the most important documents that 
survives from this period, a letter from the proconsul Quintus 
Fabius to the citizens of Dyme, dealing with a case of arson 
there, has recently been re-appraised, challenging prevailing 
attitudes about the situation in Greece in the aftermath of the 
Achaean War. "' Previously it was believed that this document 
dated from 115BC, but a new version of the text suggests that it 
should definitely be dated to the period immediately after the 
Achaean War, around 144BC. 192 How this piece of evidence 
should be interpreted has also caused problems. When it was 
thought that the document dated from 115BC, most 
commentators saw it as evidence that Roman commanders in 
Macedonia exercised close control over Greece from the time of 
the Achaean War. 93 It was also taken as evidence to support the 
contention that the Romans were seeking to suppress democratic 
19' Sherk RDGE no. 42. SIG3 684. 
See Ferrary (1988) pp. 189-99 and Kallet-Marx (1995) pp. 141-43. 
193 Kallet-Marx (1995) p. 129. For an example of the earlier view, see Gruen (1984) p. 524. 
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regimes in Greece in favour of oligarchies because they were 
concerned about socio-economic problems. 194 
The new version of the text suggests that what took place at 
Dyme should be dated much earlier and was in reality a 
continuation of the Achaean War. The very fact that Fabius does 
not describe the events that took place in this polls as a stasis, 
would suggest, according to Kallet-Marx, that those involved in 
the arson mentioned in the inscription were not motivated by 
socio-economic factors 195 As Kallet-Marx points out in his 
reconstruction of the text, there is no reference to the destruction 
of records pertaining to debts in the fire, simply to the 
destruction of laws. 196 Nor were those responsible from the lower 
classes. On the contrary, they both appear to have held the office 
of nomographoi, suggesting that the arsonists were members of 
the local elite 197 As Kallet-Marx contends, the arsonists intention 
was to incite the local population to revolt, and as he points out, 
during the Jewish revolt of 66AD, the archives in Jerusalem were 
burnt to attract the support of the poor, though the revolt always 
remained nationalistic. As he points out about the arson in 
Jerusalem: 
Had we known no more about this event then we do about 
the Dyme incident, we might have concluded swiftly and 
194 Fuks (1972) pp. 21-7. 
'95 Kallet-Marx (1995) pp. 131-2. 
Kallet-Marx (1995) p. 136. 
This appears to have been a local, not a federal office, Kallet-Marx (1995) p. 137. 
364 
with utter confidence that the uprising was in essence a 
debtors uprising against the rich. l98 
Dyme had a long history of animosity towards the Romans. 
During the First Macedonian War its citizens were about to be 
sold into slavery by the Romans until they were saved by Philip 
V, and in 198BC, along with delegates from Megalopolis and 
Argos, they left the Achaean assembly in protest over the 
decision to ally with Rome. 199 
The question is what sort of constitution was being restored 
by Fabius? When the inscription was dated to 115BC it was 
believed that it referred to the federal leagues that Pausanias 
stated the Romans allowed the Greeks to form20° An acceptance 
of Kallet-Marx's proposed new date would seem to suggest that 
the events in Dyme were in reality associated with Greek 
resistance to the settlement imposed by Mummius in the 
immediate aftermath of the Achaean War 201 This would seem to 
indicate, as Ferrary, who previously suggested that the 
inscription should be dated to around 144BC, argued, towards a 
restoration of traditional political structures in Greece in the 
aftermath of the Achaean War. As Ferrary points out, Fabius 
seems to be trying to continue the fiction of Rome as the liberator 
of Greece. He contends that since the perpetrators of the arson 
See Jos. BJ. 2.427 for events in Jerusalem. Kallet-Marx (1995) p. 150. 
Livy. 32.22.10. Paus. 7.17.5. 
20° Paus. 7.16.10. 
201 Polyb. 39.5.3. 
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were associated with the recent leaders of the Achaean league, 
the Romans were claiming to have liberated the citizens of Dyme 
from their tyranny. Ferrary suggests that poleis like Dyme 
returned to the independent status that they had before the 
foundation of the Achaean league, as was stated Roman policy 
before the Achaean War. 202 
What this inscription tells us about the nature of Roman 
control in Greece is more revealing. Fabius was probably given 
the task of settling matters in Greece and ensuring that the 
settlement was accepted 203 This was not an unusual action; 
Flamininus remained in Greece for two years after his defeat of 
Philip V to settle outstanding matters204 Fabius' role was to 
ensure that Rome's position in the Peloponnese was respected. 
The initial approach to deal with the arsonists came from a 
group within Dyme, who were probably members of the local 
elite willing to co-operate with Rome. What Fabius was trying to 
do in Dyme was support those who realised that, at that point, 
Roman domination over Greece was a fact of life, and knew that 
Rome would not intervene in their local affairs if its position in 
the Greek world was not threatened. It would appear that at 
Dyme Fabius was exploiting differences between Greek 
202 Ferrary (1988) p. 189-99. 
203 Kallet-Marx (1995) p. 145 argues that Polybius probably assisted Fabius but may have 
over-emphasised his role in the settlement 
204 Kallet-Marx (1995) p. 145. Flamininus defeated Philip V in 196BC, but did not leave 
Greece until 194BC. 
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politicians as Romans had done since their alliance with the 
Aetolian league in 212BC. 
It would appear from this re-interpretation of the inscription 
that the disturbances at Dyme did not have a socio-economic 
basis, but were rather part of an uprising against Roman control. 
Should it change our understanding of Polybius' depiction of the 
events surrounding the Achaean War? Polybius by his own 
admission co-operated with Fabius in his settlement of the 
Peloponnese and it is hard to escape the contention that the 
events of 146BC may have changed his attitude towards Rome 
into one of compliance. Indeed, Polybius states that he returned 
to the Peloponnese after the Achaean War, having managed to 
capitalise on the results of his previous actions, something that 
was deserved because of his goodwill towards Rome205 
However, Polybius' extension to his histories was not 
merely an afterthought that reflected his experiences in 
detention. Polybiüs' intention in writing prägmatike historia was 
to demonstrate to his Greek readership how the suspension of 
anacyclosis had affected the Roman system of government, 
producing the circumstances that had led to Rome achieving 
domination over the Mediterranean world. However, anacyclosis 
was not unique to the Roman system of government, only its 
suspension was; the systems of government in all poleis were 
subject to this force, including states that resembled poleis like 
'Ag Po1yb. 39.8.1-2. 
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the Achaean league. As Polybius states, his intention in 
extending his histories down to 146BC, explaining the course of 
events in the period between the battle of Pydna and the 
destruction of Corinth, an account that is largely missing, was 
because he believed that it would allow his readers to: 
Be able to see clearly whether the Roman government is 
acceptable or not, and future generations whether it should 
be considered to have been worthy of praise and admiration 
or rather of blame. ZO6 
Does this mean that Polybius accepted that Rome was an 
established presence in the Greek world? The events 
surrounding Corinth's destruction may have caused him to co- 
operate with Rome and intercede on behalf of communities that 
faced Roman retribution. This does not mean that Polybius 
became pro-Roman. As he stated, when in difficulty Greeks 
should always assist Greeks 207 As with so much in his histories, 
Polybius' ideas about the role that anacyclosis played in 
influencing events may account for his depiction of the actions 
of the Achaean leadership in 146BC, and give an indication of 
how Polybius viewed Rome's presence in the Greek world. 
Walbank argued that Polybius' intention in his account of 
the Achaean War, despite his extremely negative and cynical 
portrayal of Roman behaviour between books thirty-one and 
206 Polyb. 3.4.1. 
W' Polyb. 38.4.7-8. 
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thirty-three, was to justify Rome's behaviour. Walbank suggests 
that there is a profound change in Polybius' attitude towards 
Rome from book thirty-five onwards, a period that Polybius 
depicts as a time of taro, che, or internal conflict, throughout the 
Mediterranean! 
," 
In Greece corrupt politicians controlled the 
Achaean league and its assembly was dominated by the mob. 
Hasdrubal, who Polybius depicts as empty-headed and 
pompous, displaying his wealth at a time when his people were 
suffering, ruled Carthage, and in Macedonia the people had 
rallied to the cause of the false Philip, Andriscus. As for 
Polybius' depiction of Roman actions, Walbank contends in 
contrast to his depiction of events elsewhere during this period 
of tare -. -he, that the debate Polybius' records about Hellenic 
attitudes towards Roman actions at the beginning of the Third 
Punic War show that he approved of Rome's actions in 146BC. 
According to Polybius' account, four opinions about Roman 
behaviour towards Carthage existed in Greece at that point. 
Some Greeks argued that the Roman decision to be rid of a 
menace like Carthage was a wise decision. In opposition to this 
view there were those who considered that Roman behaviour 
was undergoing a change for the worse, and that Rome would 
probably come' to the same end as Athens and Sparta, an 
argument reinforced by those who argued that Rome's action 
was impious and treacherous. The final argument provided by 
" Walbank (1985) p. 336. 
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Polybius was that since the Carthaginians had broken their 
treaty with Masinissa, the Romans were able to do what they 
liked' Yet, the decision that Polybius presented the Romans as 
adopting, embarking on a policy that resulted in the total 
destruction of Carthage, was a decline from earlier standards of 
Roman behaviour 210 After Cynoscephalae Polybius presents 
Flamininus stating that the Romans never destroyed their 
enemies after a war, and that although brave men ought to press 
hard on their enemies while fighting, they should also show 
themselves courageous in defeat, and moderate and humane in 
victory "' The Romans, in deliberately deciding on Carthage's 
annihilation in 146BC, were acting in a cruel and barbarian 
fashion. 
Walbank contended that ultimately Polybius' stress on 
tarx the in this period was related to his belief that since Rome 
had by this point become the dominant power in the 
Mediterranean, any rising against it'. rule was futile and 
' See Polyb. 36.9.1-17. Walbank (1985) p. 339 contends that the arrangement of the 
arguments so that those favouring Rome begin and end the debate and the extra space 
allotted to the pro-Roman argument shows that Polybius favoured this policy. 
210See Petzold (1969) pp. 62-63 for the argument that Polybius was allying himself with 
Rome's critics at this point. 
21 See Polyb. 18.37.2. Walbank (1985) p. 339. While suggesting that Polybius approved of 
Roman policy at this point, Walbank acknowledges that Polybius was earlier critical of 
Philip V for destroying Thermon during the Social War and other earlier failures to 
show mercy and compassion. 
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meaningless 212 Should we accept that tarache should be seen in 
this context, especially given Polybius' depiction of the internal 
corruption in Carthage, Achaea and Macedonia? 
Again one should return to Polybius' account of anacyclosis, 
an essential part of the pre-Christian Indo-European belief 
structure, and given Plato's writings, familiar to Polybius' Greek 
readership, and its importance throughout his historin213 As 
Walbank pointed out, it was only after the destruction of 
Corinth, at a comparatively late date in the composition of his 
histories, that Polybius decided to incorporate his account of the 
evolution of the Achaean league into a single polls into his 
second book 214 We are left with the question as to whether 
Polybius' emphasis on the madness and irrationality of the 
inhabitants of the Achaean league in 146BC was a deliberate 
device to instruct his Greek readership in the workings of 
anacyclosis. Polybius took what was in reality a failed revolt 
against Rome, which he depicted as forming part of a wider 
period of tar ache around the Mediterranean, and presented it to 
i 
his readers as marking the end of the cycle of anacyclosis in the 
Achaean league's system of government. 
Z'Z Walbank (1985) p. 337. 
2'3 Polyb. 6.5.1. "Perhaps this theory of the natural transformations into each other of the 
different forms of polity is more elaborately set forth by Plato and certain other 
Philosophers; but as the arguments are subtle and stated at great length, they are beyond 
the reach of all but a few". See Plato Republic 8.544 and Laws 4.712. 
14 Walbank (1985) p. 342. 
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Eckstein suggests that Polybius' criticism of the Achaean 
leadership and the Achaean people was due to the fact that 
Polybius believed their actions to be irrational, shameful and 
disgraceful, suggesting that he was setting up idealistic 
standards of behaviour that would have been familiar to his 
aristocratic audience 215 This is a vast overstatement of the role 
that socio-economic issues played in the Achaean War. The 
leadership of the Achaean league did undertake reforms during 
the war; they were desperate measures to defend the 
Peloponnese against the Roman onslaught, and were not 
intended to permanently end social-iniquities in the 
Peloponnese. The Achaean War was caused by a boundary 
dispute between Sparta and Megalopolis that spiralled out of 
control when Diaeus decided to challenge Roman control over 
Greek affairs; it was not a socio-economic revolt. It is evident, if 
one examines the Achaean War and the limited evidence for the 
period leading up to it, that dissatisfaction with the Roman 
presence in Greece existed. Kallet-Marx's new text of the Dyme 
inscription indicates that the destruction of Corinth does not 
appear to have lessened Greek desires to be rid of the Roman 
control. 
Polybius depicted Rome in the initial part of his histories as 
a state that was at the height of its powers, led during its 
conquest of the Mediterranean world and long struggle with 
215 Eckstein (1995) p . 221. 
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Hannibal in Italy by virtuous men 216 But as Polybius has Scipio 
imply when, according to Polybius, they watched Carthage burn 
together, Rome was not immune from a resumption of 
anacyclosis, and the same fate that befell Carthage, which itself 
had a mixed system of government at one time, could befall 
Rome. "' 
Polybius believed that both internal and external forces 
eventually combined to bring destruction to every polis. Polybius 
stated that although the external forces that played a part in the 
decline of poleis were unknown, eventual internal decline was a 
regular process, and in his account of events at Carthage and the 
Achaean league in 146BC, Polybius does portray internal 
conflict, or tarache, in these poleis Zla Moreover, Polybius does 
describe the onset of internal decline in the Roman Republic in 
the period before tara. ' the took hold elsewhere; the influx of 
wealth from Macedonia after Pydna leading to extravagance, 
luxury and the idle parade of riches amongst the Roman youth, 
with the exception of Scipio. He also describes the senate's 
Z'6 This was the point where Polybius believed Rome reached its zenith. See Powell 
(2001) p. 23. 
217 Polyb. 38.21.1-3. Polyb. 38.22.1-2 states that while he watched Carthage burn, Scipio 
quoted Homer. 11.6.448-9, and when questioned by Polybius stated that, "without any 
attempt at concealment he names his own country for which he feared when he reflected 
on the fate of all things human. Polybius actually heard him and recalls it in his 
histories". 
218 Polyb. 6.57.2-3. 
373 
actions during this period in a deeply cynical fashion 219 The 
decision to destroy Carthage in 146BC was a decline from 
Rome's earlier high-minded behaviour towards those it 
defeated. Possibly Polybius was indicating to his readership that 
Rome's decline had already begun. 
The Romans had been favoured by tyche during the period 
covered by Polybius' histories, when the fortunes of the Achaean 
league along with other states around the Mediterranean had 
become inter-linked with Rome; anacyclosis had been suspended 
in the Roman system of government during their conquest of the 
Mediterranean world. It had not been in the Achaean league. It is 
in this context that Polybius' depiction of the events surrounding 
Corinth's destruction should be seen; his desire to demonstrate 
to his readers the completion of the internal decline in the 
Achaean league's democratic system of government which 
allowed the Romans to achieve mastery of the Mediterranean 
world. At the beginning of his histories, Polybius announced his 
intention to explain how and under what system of polity the 
Romans came to control the entire world 22° Polybius had to 
explain to his Greek readership how they found themselves 
living under Roman rule, and his emphasis on the role of 
anacyclosis and tyche in his histories was an attempt to account 
for this paradox, the rational Greeks finding themselves under 
2'9 Polyb. 31.25.3-5. 
720 Polyb. 1.1.5. 
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the irrational rule of the barbarian Romans. Polybius depicts a 
Roman republic that is strong and virtuous because of the 
benefits brought about by anacyclosis' suspension, precisely at 
the time when Greece suffers from internal decline. During 
Rome's advent into the Greek world Macedonia has a ruler like 
Philip V, who in the lead up to the battle of Cynoscephalae is 
depicted by Polybius as habitually cruel, treacherous and a 
promiscuous drunk. His opponent Flamininus is portrayed by 
Polybius as a highly intelligent young man whom was well- 
versed in public affairs. " Rome was victorious, but only because 
the balance achieved in its system of government by the 
disruption of anacyclosis produced men of Flamininus' character, 
while Philip V, despite the promising start to his career, was 
corrupted into a tyranttm 
The Achaean league had a system of polity that was just as 
liable to the process of anacyclosis as the Roman one, a factor 
Polybius stressed to his readers by inserting an account of its 
development into book two after the events of 146BC tm In his 
account of the support that the leadership of the Achaean league 
received in 146BC, especially at the assembly in Corinth that 
rejected Sextus' offer, Polybius states that when the Roman 
envoys made their appeal: 
Eckstein (1995) pp. 183-4. 
See for example Polyb. 6.7.7. where Philip V shows similar characteristics to a tyrant. 
' Walbank (1985) p. 342. 
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The people on listening to them, showed no disposition to 
comply, but jeered at the delegates, hooted and hustled them 
out of the meeting. For never had there been collected such a 
pack of artisans and common men. All the poleis, indeed, 
were in a drivelling state, but the malady was universal and 
. most fierce in Corinth. "' 
Polybius in book six describes three stages through which 
constitutions progressed under the influence of anacyclosis. The 
final one was democracy, the stage that he depicts the Achaean 
league enjoying, and he claims that democracy eventually ends 
in mob-rule and anarchy ' Then, when after some great disaster 
has left men weakened, a single strong individual, who brings 
men together from the state of wretchedness they find 
themselves in, emerges "6 
Polybius depicts the destruction of Corinth as the single 
, greatest misfortune 
to have ever occurred in Greece, exactly the 
sort of event that he predicted at the end of the cycle of 
anacyclosis' In his account of the events leading up to Corinth's 
destruction, Polybius emphasises the role of the mob, and the 
anarchy that prevailed at the Achaean assembly which had 
fallen under the sway of an irrational leadership. This is exactly 
the situation he stated would occur at the end of the final stage 




2M Polyb. 6.5.5-9. 
u' Polyb38.1.2. 
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of anacyclosis, when democracy transformed into mob-rule and 
anarchy. " Nor was Polybius' emphasis on the mob as a factor in 
Achaean politics a recent occurrence. In his account of 
Callicrates' embassy to Rome in 180BC, the great turning point 
in the relationship between the Achaean league and Rome, 
Polybius claimed that Callicrates pointed out to the senate how 
the mob at the Achaean assembly could be manipulated to 
increase Roman control over the Achaeans. According to 
Polybius, Callicrates was only successful in gaining election to 
the office of Achaean strategos on his return from Rome because 
he resorted to bribery ' This accusation has parallels with 
Polybius' depiction of the situation when democracy transforms 
in the final stage of anacyclosis: 
When a new generation arises and the democracy falls into 
the hands of the grandchildren of its founders, they have 
become so accustomed to freedom and equality that they no 
longer value them ... so when they begin to lust for power 
and cannot obtain it through themselves or their own good 
qualities, they ruin their estates, tempting and corrupting 
the people in every way. 23o 
According to Pausanias' account of the origin of the 
Achaean War, undoubtedly drawn from Polybius, a dispute 
228 Polyb. 6.9.8-9. 
229 Polyb. 24.10.14-15. 
230 Polyb. 6.9.5-6. 
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between the leadership of the Achaean league over the division 
of a bribe began the process that resulted in the eventual 
destruction of Corinth and the dissolution of the Achaean 
league. Similar behaviour occurred when democracy was 
transformed through the natural cycle of anacyclosis, since as 
Polybius earlier stated: 
For the people, having grown accustomed to feed at the 
expense of others and to depend for their life on the property 
of others, as soon as they find a leader who is enterprising 
but is excluded from the highest office by his penury, 
institute the rule of violence; and now uniting their forces 
massacre, banish and plunder, until they degenerate again 
into perfect savages and find once more a master and 
monarch. 23' 
Essentially Polybius emphasised the role of the mob in the 
events surrounding Corinth's destruction not because he wished 
to show that it was a revolt by the lower classes. Rather his 
account was intended to demonstrate to his readers the effect of 
anacyclosis in its final stage. Corinth's destruction was not 
permanent, tyche was changeable, and though it had favoured 
the Romans during their conquest of the Mediterranean world, it 
would turn again in the favour of the Greeks. Rome was 
victorious in 146BC, but the only way that its system of 
government could go, was downwards, eventually degenerating 
" Polyb. 6.9.8-9. 
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into anarchy. As for the Achaean league, at least it could sink no 
lower. Eventually, as Polybius predicted to his readers, a single 
strong individual would emerge as the cycle of anacyclosis 
resumed. He would bring men salvation from the state that they 
found themselves in, subjection to Roman rule. In this process he 
would be assisted by Greeks politicians who would have learnt 
the mistakes that had occurred in the past from Polybius' inquiry 
into it, and build a society that would be able to place external 
pressure on a Roman Republic that was suffering from internal 
decline. When that had occurred, the Achaean league would rise 
phoenix like from the ashes left from Corinth's destruction. 
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Conclusion. 
Polybius, posterity and the limits of literary history 
Analytical history has its origins in a series of lectures 
given by Hegel during his tenure as Professor in the University 
of Berlin in the early 19`' century. Kant had earlier argued that 
the task of historical philosophy was: 
To discover a purpose in nature behind events, and to 
decide whether it is after all possible to formulate in terms of 
a definite plan of nature a history of creatures who act 
without a plan of their own. ' 
In response to Kant's challenge, Hegel argued to his 
audience that history was a rational science, and: 
Whoever looks at the world rationally will find that it 
assumes a rational aspect... The overall content of world 
history is rational and indeed has to be rational; a divine 
will rules supreme and is strong enough to determine the 
overall content. Our aim must be to discern this 
substance, and to do so; we must bring with us a rational 
consciousness! 
' Kant, Idea of a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784), in P. Gardiner 
(Ed) Theories of History, London 1959 p. 29. 
'Hegel " Second draft: The Philosophical History of the World (1830), in Lectures on the 
Philosophy of World History (Cambridge 1975) pp. 26-30. 
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According to Hegel, who essentially secularised the 
Calvinist doctrine of predestination, it was necessary in 
understanding history to realise that the individual was an 
organic part of the wider community. Hegel argued that just as 
we are all born into a single language group, we are also born 
into a common historical background and, amongst the most 
important of all the "objective" powers for understanding 
history that Hegel emphasised were the family, civil society and 
the state. For Hegel the state was greater than the individual 
citizen was; it was moreover more than the sum of all its citizens. 
Yet Hegel's assertions about the nature of history have been 
disputed. Collingwood, the English philosopher of history, 
doubted that history could be seen in simple, positive terms. He 
argued that all historical evidence was merely a reflection of 
"thought"; the most that the historian could do was to 
reconstruct or re-enact past "thoughts" inevitably under the 
influence of his own unique experience. Collingwood concluded 
that a historian's goal could only be "a knowledge of the 
present", and specifically, " how it came to be what it is". Given 
that history, as he argued, is an attempt to understand the 
present by reconstructing its determining conditions, as a science 
it can only be teleological, because historians can write only from 
the vantage point, and with the prejudices, of their own present? 
3 Collingwood, R. G. " Lectures on the Philosophy of History. 1926", in The idea of History: 
with Lectures (1926-1928), ed. J. van der Dussen, Oxford 1993. pp 363,412,420. 
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As such, present day historians who use a literary source 
like Polybius to reconstruct events and society during the 
Hellenistic period are faced with two problems. Firstly they are 
dealing with a text which was intended not merely to inform, 
but also to instruct an audience whose society, attitudes and 
beliefs are far removed from their own. Secondly, it is an 
undeniable fact that how historians perceive the past and 
evidence from it has changed throughout the ages. If one takes 
Polybius as an example, his histories have served a multitude of 
roles since the time of his re-emergence during the Renaissance, 
and scholars have interpreted the information he provides in 
varying ways. During the sixteenth century Polybius was used 
primarily as a technical authority on military matters. Political 
theorists from the time of Machiavelli have drawn on Polybius' 
writings regarding the mixture and balance in the constitution of 
states for ideas on framing the constitutions of the ideal republic. 
As Eckstein points out, during the nineteenth century Polybius 
was frequently mined solely as a source of information about 
Rome. " In some regards this attitude continues to this day, 
Polybius' sixth book in particular is viewed by some historians 
merely as a valuable source of information about Roman 
institutions once his theory of anacyclosis has been discarded. ' 
` Eckstein (1995) p. 17. 
'See for example Luce (1997) pp. 138-9 who in his discussion of book six remarks that, 
"When Polybius gets away from the straight jacket of theory, he comes into his own in a 
quite remarkable way". 
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Finally along with other ancient writers, notably Plutarch, 
Polybius is used by historians to reconstruct a picture of the 
Hellenistic world as a period of immense socio-economic crisis, 
leading to reforms in Sparta and the eventual destruction of 
Corinth. 
Yet, as Collingwood would argue, Polybius' purpose in 
writing his histories was ultimately to understand his own 
present and to instruct his contemporary Greek readership about 
it, not to provide a picture of the past for future generations; 
essentially as Collingwood would contend Polybius' writings are 
testimony rather than evidence. Polybius' stated aim was to 
explain to his contemporary readers how and under what 
system of polity Rome's conquest of the Mediterranean world 
had been achieved, by inquiring into the circumstances that had 
led to Rome's conquest, anacyclosis' influence on systems of 
government all over the Mediterranean. Polybius was 
attempting to rationalise for a Greek audience something that for 
many of them was unthinkable, barbarian rule. He did so in an 
essentially Hegelian fashion, by stressing the importance of the 
state in-historical events, presenting his readership with a picture 
of how tyche had affected the interaction of two states that 
resembled poleis, Rome and the Achaean league. 
However, just as Hegel's model for understanding the 
process of history results in the role of the individual being 
marginalised, in some respects what becomes marginalised in 
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Polybius' histories is the individuality of the various peoples of 
the Peloponnese. Polybius presents a picture of the different 
ethne of the Peloponnese uniting as one ethnos, coming to 
resemble a single polls. Given that Polybius' purpose was to 
explain to his contemporary Greek readership how the reality 
they faced, that of Roman domination, had come about, perhaps 
this picture was exaggerated to fit his purpose of explaining this 
conquest through tyche and anacyclosis. As such, the extent to 
- which these concepts influenced Polybius' presentation of events 
needs to be carefully considered by historians today. 
From the outset of Polybius' work anacyclosis is essential in 
understanding both his universal approach and subsequent 
narrative. Polybius argued that the Romans had achieved their 
success through the agency of tyche, a supernatural force that 
had suspended the process of anacyclosis in Rome's system of 
government at a time when it had been unfavourable to Greek 
states like the Achaean league. Yet tyche was changeable and 
what had once favoured the Romans would lead to their 
eventual destruction. Although in the earlier part of his work 
Pölybius describes Roman policy and actions in an extremely 
favourable light, post-Pydna, his comments on Roman actions 
and behaviour become increasingly cynical and critical. In 
Greece he describes a steady decline in the fortunes of the 
Achaean league, from the period when it could deal with Rome 
on an equal basis under the leadership of Philopoemen and 
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Aristaenus until the corruption of politicians like Callicrates and 
Diaeus. Eventually these two strands come together at Corinth's 
destruction. At this point the Achaean league had reached the 
end of its cycle of anacyclosis, while in Rome anacyclosis was 
about to resume; Scipio speculating that just as his ancestral 
home Troy had been destroyed at the hands of Greeks, so might 
Rome. 
The problem facing the present day historian is whether or 
not the pragmatike historia Polybius wrote should be taken at face 
value, especially regarding events in the Peloponnese. It cannot 
be doubted that Polybius' writings do contain valuable evidence; 
the fact that information he provides can be verified from other 
sources seems to indicate this. Polybius undoubtedly had, like all 
historians in antiquity, to use a certain degree of poetic license in 
recounting speeches made by others; there is no indication that 
these speeches were anything other than what he sincerely 
believed to be an accurate reflection of contemporary concerns. 
That Polybius provides a narrative of historical events, to the 
best of his ability, should not be questioned 
What should be questioned is the way Polybius presented 
the evidence he collected. If one takes the entire concept of 
imperium, Polybius' writings, especially his emphasis on the 
virtuous nature of the Roman republic, has been taken by 
historians such as Mommsen, Holleaux and Badian as evidence 
that, although the Romans were aggressive, they were not 
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consciously so. Admittedly Rome fought many wars, but 
Polybius' narrative of the first two Punic Wars shows that Rome 
was essentially defending itself. Indeed, scholars who follow in 
this school contend that it was only after 148BC, the point where 
Polybius' histories stop, that Rome became a consciously 
imperialist power. Other historians, notably Colin and Harris, 
have used Polybius' writings as a framework for arguing that 
Rome planned its conquests in a systematic fashion and was 
from an early stage an imperialistic power that sought to gain 
mastery over the Mediterranean world. 
Possibly the differences between both schools are due to the 
fact that for Polybius history wäs not a sterile and neutral 
account of past events. Rather it was an active investigation of 
what had gone before which he hoped would provide his 
readers with lessons from which they could draw hope and 
inspiration for the future. Polybius wished to explain to his 
readers how, through the workings of tyche and anacyclosis, they 
had become subject to Roman rule; he presented a picture of 
Greek society and the situation in the Peloponnese that fitted this 
intention. It must be remembered that Polybius' writings were 
part of a genre that could trace its origins from the epic and oral 
traditions; a genre that was also heavily influenced by 
philosophical concepts. ' Polybius appears to have found 
inspiration in his approach to the writing of history from the 
`Polybius cites Homer on no less than fourteen occasions, see Sacks (1981) p. 160. 
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travels of Odysseus; even Romans such as Cato remarked upon 
Polybius' own identification with the latter. ' In this light, the 
present day reader should approach Polybius' text with some 
caution. 
If one turns towards Polybius' presentation of the Achaean 
league it cannot be doubted that states in the Peloponnese 
belonged to some form of political federation during the 
Hellenistic period. This does not necessarily mean that Polybius' 
depiction of the Achaean league as a body where the entire 
Peloponnese united to the extent that it resembled a single polls, 
or his stress on a common Achaean identity, is an accurate 
depiction of the situation. Rather, Polybius' stress on the 
Achaean leaguerutopian unity was perhaps due to his need to 
show his readership how they had found themselves living 
under Roman rule, by contrasting the fortunes of its people and 
their system of polity with those of the people and city of Rome. 
For example, in the period around the Second Macedonian War, 
Polybius portrays the Achaean league as a state that under the 
leadership of Philopoemen and Aristaenus dealt with a Roman 
Republic whose motives for intervening in Greece were 
principled on an equal basis. It is doubtful that this happened in 
Walbank (1972) pp. 51-2. Note Polyb. 35.6.4. where Cato makes a joking analogy 
between the two. However, though it is usually considered as a joking reference to 
Polybius' identification with Odysseus, it is possible that Cato was drawing Polybius' 
attention to the fact that the Senate may have been reluctant to release him, and that he 
should not tempt fate by "pushing his luck". 
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reality. Yet, if Polybius was to show his readers how the 
Achaean league declined through the workings of anacyclosis 
after Callicrates' embassy, it was necessary for him to show in an 
idealised fashion how it had previously interacted with Rome. In 
assessing Polybius' depiction of the actions of Greek states in the 
Peloponnese, historians are faced with the possibility that his 
stress on an essentially artificial Achaean identity might distort 
our understanding of the events surrounding Rome's conquest 
of Greece. It is important to remember that Polybius was an 
inhabitant of a polls whose raison d'etre was to provide a focus 
for Arcadian resistance to Spartan imperialism. If this is the case, 
a present day historian is left with the question as to whether 
Polybius' histories and attitudes towards various states in reality 
reflect the interests, pre-occupations and prejudices of a 
Megalopolitan. 
It cannot be doubted that Polybius portrays the actions of 
the Aetolian league and Spartan kings such as Cleomenes and 
Nabis in the worst of all possible fashions. It is also an 
inescapable fact that the Aetolians had allies in the Peloponnese 
and a mythical kinship link with Elis, and furthermore, that both 
Elis and Sparta were long-standing rivals of Arcadia in 
Peloponnesian politics. For an Arcadian like Polybius, Aetolian 
actions such as the destruction of Cynaetha prior to the outbreak 
of the Social War were acts of mindless violence; they were not 
to an Elean. Thus, a historian is left to ponder the question of 
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whether or not Polybius' natural prejudices account for his 
depiction of events. It would be unfair to accuse Polybius of 
intending to mislead or misinform his readership; it would in 
reality be a gross misrepresentation of his intention in writing 
history. Polybius' histories, intended as they are to instruct, 
might mislead his present day readers, since they are the 
writings of a man who wrote and shaped his narrative to 
provide his contemporaries with the consolation that although 
the Romans had been successful this time, they would not 
always be. Indeed as Polybius had pointed out about an earlier 
incursion by the Celts, history was not merely a means for 
recording past events; it served a more practical purpose, since 
as he argued: 
I think history has a special obligation to record such 
episodes in the drama of tyche and to pass them on to future 
generations so that those who come after us may not be 
wholly ignorant of them and may not be confounded by the 
sudden and unexpected inroads of these barbarians, but 
instead, having some appreciation of how short-lived and 
easily repulsed they are, may stand their ground under 
attack and do everything in their power not to yield to them 
in any way. For I consider that the writers who recorded 
and handed down to its the story of the Persian invasion of 
Greece and the attack of the Gauls on Delphi have made no 
small contribution to the struggle of the Hellenes for their 
389 
common liberty. For there is no one who armies of men or 
abundance of arms or vast resources could frighten into 
abandoning his last hope, this is to fight to the end for his 
homeland, if he kept before his eyes what part the 
unexpected played in events, and bore in mind how many 
different types of men, what determined resolve and 
weapons were reduced by the resolve and power of those 
who faced danger with intelligence and courage. 8 
e Polyb. 2.35.5-8. 
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